Faither

Vernon L. Allen Issue Editor

HOWARD ALDRICH
NATHAN CAPLAN
ROBERT M. FOGELSON
JOHN R. FORWARD
LYNNE B. IGLITZIN
GARY MARX
JOHN B. McCONAHAY
ALBERT J. REISS, JR.
DAVID O. SEARS
ROBERT SHELLOW
J. M. TOMLINSON
JAY R. WILLIAMS

HE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES

O spse

THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES

Published Quarterly

©Copyright 1970 by The SOCIETY FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF SOCIAL ISSUES

A Division of

THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

Annual Subscription		\$9.00
Institutions and Organizations		7.00
Individuals		2.25
Single Copy Price	- OF PURPOSE	

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues is a group of over two thousand psychologists and allied social scientists who share a concern with research on the psychological aspects of important social issues. SPSSI is governed by Kurt Lewin's dictum that "there is nothing so practical as a good theory." In various ways, the Society seeks to bring theory and practice into focus on human problems of the group, the community, and the nation as well as the increasingly important ones that have no national boundaries. This Journal has as its goal the communication of scientific findings and interpretations in a non-technical manner but without the sacrifice of professional

Bertram H. Raven, General Editor, 7SI, Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024.

SPSSI Officers and Council: Robert Chin, President; Robert L. Kahn, President Elect; Martin Deutsch, Past President; Robert Hefner, Secretary-Treasurer; Council Members: George W. Albee, Kenneth B. Clark, Richard Flacks, William A. Gamson, Marcia Guttentag, Edwin P. Hollander, Irwin N. Katz, Richard A. Schmuck, David O. Sears, Philip G. Zimbardo.

Society Address: Caroline Weichlein, SPSSI Executive Secretary, P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Subscriptions to the Journal, applications for membership in the Society, changes in mailing address, and requests for information should be sent to Mrs.

Back Numbers: Orders for one or more copies of a particular issue or supplement should be sent to Journal of Social Issues, P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. (See inside back cover for a listing of recent Journal numbers.)

Editorial Committee: Barry E. Collins, Jonathan Freedman, Harold B. Gerard, Jacqueline D. Goodchilds, Reginald L. Jones, William McGuire, Charles Y. Nakamura, Harold Proshansky, Bertram H. Raven, Nevitt Sanford, David Sears, Paul Secord, and

Selected Articles Editor: Barry E. Collins, Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024.

Managing Editor: Jacqueline D. Goodchilds, Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024.

Se Class Postage paid at Ann Arbor, Michigan

Publishes, quarterly by the Society of the Psychological Study of Social Issues, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Publication Office: Edwards Brothers, Inc., 2500 South State Stree, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104.

The Journal of

SOCIAL ISSUES



WINTER 1970 VOL. 26 No. 1

f Fant. & Peyl, Res

GHETTO RIOTS	.87
Issue Editor: Vernon L. Allen	
Toward Understanding Riots: Some Perspectives Vernon L. Allen	1
Civil Disorder and the Agents of Social Control Gary T. Marx	19
The New Ghetto Man: A Review of Recent Empirical Studies Nathan Caplan	59
Internal-External Control and Black Militancy John R. Forward and Jay R. Williams	75
Ideological Foundations for Negro Action: A Comparative Analysis of Militant and Non-militant Views of the Los Angeles Riot T. M. Tomlinson	93
Racial Socialization, Comparison Levels, and the Watts Riot David O. Sears and John B. McConahay	121
Violence and Grievances: Reflections on the 1960s Riots Robert M. Fogelson	141
Violence and American Democracy Lynne B. Iglitzin	165
The Effect of Civil Disorders on Small Business in the Inner City Howard Aldrich and Albert J. Reiss, Jr.	187

Social Scientists and Social Action from wi Establishment	. Robert Shellow	207
Biographical Sketches		221
Abstracts		225
The Activists' Corner	. Nevitt Sanford	233

Editorial Notes

ABOUT THIS ISSUE

The current issue was initiated and developed through its beginning stages by the previous general editor, J. A. Fishman, and editorial committee: Martin Deutsch, Irwin Katz, Bernard Kutner, Matthew B. Miles, Harold M. Proshansky, Milton Schwebel, J. Diedrick Snoek, and Abraham J. Tannenbaum; they were assisted by the former managing editor Barbara Franks.

Cover by Etta Proshansky.

COMMENTS AND REJOINDERS

Readers wishing to discuss or comment upon any of the articles in this or other issues of JSI may submit their reactions or criticisms to the editor-elect, Bertram H. Raven, Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024. Criticisms or observations of general interest will be published in a Comments and Rejoinders section of JSI.

SELECTED ARTICLES ISSUE

The Selected Articles Issue will receive approximately 25% of the yearly page total of the Journal of Social Issues and will be devoted to individual articles consistent with JSI policy. The major function of the Selected Articles Issue is to publish empirical studies relevant to contemporary social problems, extrapolations from basic research to important social problems, theories about social problems with a firm foundation in social science, and, to a smaller extent, essays concerning the role of the behavioral scientist in non-academic contemporary society. Purely philosophical essays, exhortations for action which do not deal directly with the role of the behavioral scientist, and general social commentary are not appropriate.

Authors with single papers falling within the province of the Journal of Social Issues are encouraged to submit them to the Selected Articles Editor in triplicate. The paper must be completely double-spaced, including quotations and references. JSI follows the New Revision (1967) of the Publication Manual of APA, which means that bibliographical references are indicated by their publication dates within the text and are listed alphabetically at the end of the paper. Footnotes are collected on a single page and placed at the end of the article. All figures and tables are placed on separate pages and included at the end of the article. Every article must be accompanied by a 100–120 word abstract and a brief bio-

graphical sketch for each author.

Because the Selected Articles Issue is on a once-a-year publication schedule, the review process is somewhat more leisurely than is typical. The editor may well need to accumulate two or three month's work on manuscripts in order to get a feel for the kind of

material which is being submitted for the current issue.

The Selected Articles Issue is under the general direction of the Selected Articles Editor, but the final responsibility for any $\mathcal{J}SI$ issue lies with the entire editorial board. As with all $\mathcal{J}SI$ issues, the board reserves the right, after the entire issue has been submitted by the editor, to request further revision of (or to reject completely) any individual article.

The 101st Social Issue

It will no doubt come as something of a surprise for many of SPSSI's founders to realize that twenty-five years have passed—not quietly, but most assuredly—since the society was founded and the Journal of Social Issues first appeared. This is then the one hundred and first issue of JSI. The very first and the second issues of the journal, edited by Gene Weltfish, dealt with problems of prejudice with special attention to relationships between Negroes and whites. One hundred editions later, we find ourselves again

focusing on the same basic issue.

7SI was established to further the goals of SPSSI, "to bring theory and practice into focus on human problems of the group, the community, and the nation as well as the increasingly impor-tant ones that have no national boundaries." It has been its purpose to bring the findings of social psychological research to bear on the solution of problems, to stimulate research which has social relevance, to provide feedback from the application of scientific findings so as to further social theory and research. It would be difficult to gauge how successful the journal and the society have been in this regard. We can point to the fact that the journal has been widely read and cited both by social scientists and practitioners. We can look back through the earlier issues and gain some satisfaction both from the range of topics covered, the quality of the articles, and the increased sophistication and knowledge which are evident in successive issues. The initial volume of 7SI included 250 pages and had a distribution of approximately 950. The twenty-fifth volume, comprising 811 pages, had a paid circulation of about 7000. The growth of JSI has been exponential, with the greatest increases during the terms of the last two editors, Robert Chin and Joshua Fishman.

Most of the formulae which have been developed over the past twenty-five years and which have contributed to the success of the journal will be continued. Recent innovations, such as the Comments and Rejoinders section and The Activists' Corner, will also be maintained. Our most obvious change, of course, is in the journal cover. It will be noted that the cover de-emphasizes the periodical quality of the journal and emphasizes the specific topic considered therein. In effect, what we wish to say is that, though we are still a Journal of Social Issues, the issues are of more importance than the

journal. Each issue will then have its distinctive cover, which will reflect its contents and give due credit to the issue editors and contributors who have made that edition possible. We expect to be introducing additional changes in time.

Again Negro-White Relations?

The fact that our 101st issue, dealing with black-white relations, is reminiscent of the first, the second, and several other issues in between may suggest to some that we are making a full-circle—or even spinning our wheels. More careful review does,

however, indicate some striking differences in focus.

Early issues began by attempting to make a case for the fact that racial and religious prejudice existed. Apparently it was felt that for at least some people this was a questionable fact that still remained to be demonstrated. The authors next went on to examine the dynamics of prejudice with particular emphasis on the personality and social characteristics of the prejudiced white Anglo-Saxon Protestant. Over the years the interest in religious prejudice has waned. There has also been less attention to the characteristics of the white prejudiced person. The spotlight has instead turned to the enormity of the effects of prejudice upon the Negro American. It is stated or implied that, even if racial prejudice were somehow completely eliminated, the festering wounds would still be present for the injured parties and some sort of remedial treatment would be necessary in order to bring the black American to his rightful position in American society. Such changes, it has been suggested, must be initiated by the white majority. The white liberal social scientists, who wrote practically all of the articles, still tended to view the blacks paternalistically, as objects whom whites should somehow mold to what they considered to be an acceptable pattern.

The emphasis in the current issue is clearly distinct from what has gone before. The black is seen here not as a passive object but as an active participant. It is his violent response that we are viewing here and the horrendous conditions that led to that

response.

There have been recent statements in high government sources to the effect that the day of the black ghetto riot is over. Increased racial pride, coupled with the assessment of personal loss in the ghetto and an aura of fear and caution, is said to have led blacks to turn their backs on violence. It remains to be seen whether these prognostications are true. But true or not it would seem of critical importance for us to understand fully how the ghetto riots occurred and why they developed. Gunnar Myrdal, in his classic study, The American Dilemma, seemed optimistic in hoping that once Americans became aware of the extent to which their prejudicial behavior was inconsistent with the American

ideal, then the situation would almost automatically correct itself. He perhaps overlooked the ingenuity by which other psychological processes can operate to deny the existence of undesired facts or to otherwise rationalize them. If we can pretend that the discriminatory behavior does not exist or that economic and social progress will correct it in a matter of time, then it will be very simple for us to do nothing—as we have done so often in the past. Phrases alluding to the values of "benign neglect," however these might have been intended, provide just the rationale which the privileged majority might use in avoiding its responsibilities. It is for such Americans that the message contained in this issue would appear to be especially important.

Communicating our Message to a Wider and More Significant Audience.

The previous paragraphs emphasize especially the responsibilities which lie before us. The problem is not merely that of finding answers to critical social psychological problems, but of communicating our answers to a wide audience and particularly to those gatekeepers who ultimately determine policy. Social scientists have been subjected to harsh criticism for not anticipating many of the problems which we face today. To some extent such criticism is justified. Yet, a perusal of social scientific literature over the past several decades indicates that we did indeed give many warnings which were overlooked by policy-makers. How then can we be more effective in communicating our message and in affecting policy? This is the problem which will face us during the years ahead. It is in this regard that the potential contribu-

tions of journals such as JSI assume mammoth importance.

If the impact of JSI on policy-makers is questionable, I can at least attest to its impact on one person, namely myself. For it was some of the early issues of JSI, along with several articles by Kurt Lewin, which were most influential in determining my choice of social psychology as the area to which I wished to devote my professional life. It would be interesting to find out how many others were similarly affected. This paternal image of the journal, and the fact that I follow a line of very distinguished social psychologists, leads me to approach my term as general editor with particular feelings of humility, awe, and challenge. In facing this challenge, it is encouraging to have the able assistance of Jacqueline D. Goodchilds as managing editor, a very capable editorial board, and the commitments of a number of excellent issue editors. We will all welcome comments and suggestions from our readers as to how we and JSI can more effectively fulfill our functions.

Toward Understanding Riots: Some Perspectives

Vernon L. Allen University of Wisconsin

Riots Past and Present

During the 1960s, riots in black ghettos swept across urban areas of the United States in seemingly epidemic fashion. These dramatic episodes of collective violence left in their wake enormous human suffering and economic loss, vividly reminding us that the American dilemma—the disparity between democratic ideas of equality and the status of black citizens—still exists, as

it has existed for over 200 years.

To the growing body of literature written about recent riots in black ghettos are added the essays comprising the present issue of the Journal of Social Issues. These essays do not pretend to represent a comprehensive coverage of the topic of riots in general. No attempt is made, for example, to come to grips with university-related disturbances; nor do we attempt to deal with the even broader topic of violence and aggression (both personal- and state-instigated) in its many manifestations. Recognizing, however, that broader formulations may be of value in helping to understand the 1960 riots, some articles do discuss general theoretical issues.

Riots and metaphors. Though the arson, looting, and violence of recent ghetto disturbances were alarming and perplexing to most people, riots are certainly not unique events in the social experience of the United States nor, for that matter, in the expe-

rience of other nations. But in view of the destructiveness and extensiveness of recent riots, it is not surprising that the nation reacted with shock and bewilderment.

In historical perspective the recent riots must be seen not as unique phenomena, but as wholly continuous with a long history of racially-based strife and civil disturbance in the United States. Many dramatic instances of racial conflict could be cited, but the interracial riots that erupted in several cities in 1919 seem to hold special significance as heralding a turning point in racial conflict in the United States (Waskow, 1966). During numerous earlier instances of racial conflict, whites attacked blacks in a rather onesided fashion. When attacked by white mobs during the 1919 riots, however, blacks fought back vigorously, which led many observers to claim that from those riots emerged the militant "New Negro." It can with fairness be claimed that by the 1960s a long history—if not tradition—of interracial conflict and riots existed in the United States. (Not to be overlooked is the fact that our history is also replete with instances of nonracial riots including, for example, Irish workers in 1936, riots connected with various religious sects, and a long series of labor-movement riots.)

In spite of our rather riotous history the man in the street was, nonetheless, alarmed and puzzled by the 1960 ghetto riots, and looked for ways to allay his confusion and anxiety. During and subsequent to the riots, several interpretations and definitions of "what happened" were offered by diverse sources ranging from laymen to social scientists. It is interesting and instructive to examine the metaphors that help the public to simplify and give meaning to a series of occurrences that evoke considerable confusion and anxiety (Edelman, 1967). Aside from the function of simplifying aspects of the world for the public, a metaphor holds implications for a causal analysis and for a course of action. Each of the interpretations mentioned below probably provides a partial fit to reality, and each has received support from certain segments of the community at some time. More thorough consideration of the meaning of the riots is found in articles by Bowen and Masotti (1968), Fogelson (1968), and Grimshaw (1968). Turner (1969) has discussed the theoretical grounds for predicting when a public will view collective acts of disruption and violence as social protest or as crime or rebellion.

Some public officials, among others, have declared that the riots were "senseless" outbursts of violence devoid of message and further meaning, politically or psychologically (the "sound and fury signifying nothing" school). A scientific view denies, of course, that social events are acausal; neither has it been true historically that riots were meaningless outbursts. On the con-

trary, riots were frequently used in times past as a means of achieving desired goals when more legitimate means were unavailable or had met with failure (Rudé, 1964). As the examination of the grievances of the black community by several authors in the present issue indicates, there is no basis for believing that the recent riots were an exception.

Another definition of the riots sees them as merely a manifestation of large-scale criminal behavior, probably incited by organized and conspiratorial elements. To contend that the riots sprang from sophisticated organizational efforts is, however, to

take refuge in fantasy instead of fact (Kerner, 1968).

Still another view is that the 1960 riots represented a continuation of the long American tradition of race riots. But the recent riots were not interracial clashes in the same way as earlier riots; for example, roving bands did not engage in large-scale attacks on members of the opposite race. Also, violence in previous riots was directed mainly toward persons; in the 1960 riots

violence was directed mainly toward property.

Another definition of the 1960 riots uses the rhetoric of revolution, interpreting riots in the United States as analogous to (or part of) the world-wide revolutionary movement to overthrow white colonialism. "Colonial rebellion" may on first sound seem to resonate with truth; but closer analysis reveals the limitations of this rhetoric. Many actions of the rioters—their spontaneity and the consumer-oriented nature of much of their destruction—seemed to signify a desire to participate more fully in the benefits of the system rather than an intent to overthrow it.

In some quarters interpretation of the riots as basically reflecting class conflict has found acceptance. This definition holds some validity simply because class and racial membership overlap to a great extent in the United States. But it is quite incomplete. For example, data indicate that middle-class blacks are even more hostile to whites than are the very poor (Murphy & Watson, 1970). Race would seem frequently to over-ride social class in the experiences of blacks in the United States: discrimination impinges upon the middle-class black as surely and as effectively (though sometimes more subtly) as it does upon the lower-class slum dweller.

Finally, most social scientists have seen in the riots a protest against conditions of ghetto life. And blacks themselves see the riots as spontaneous protests against unjust social conditions (Campbell & Schuman, 1968). Many riot participants reported that they expect the riot to improve conditions by dramatically arousing concern and capturing the attention of the white population—and particularly the attention of officials (Sears & Tomlin-

son, 1968). Social scientists who view riots as social protest do not necessarily intend to imply, however, that participants consciously planned to riot in order to obtain specifiable goals. But it is clear that black ghetto residents have called attention to their plight by using the same means that other poor and oppressed peoples have used so often in the past: by violently striking out

against the symbols of their discontent.

Theory and research. An adequate explanation of collective behavior must meet three requirements, according to Smelser (1968): specification of the aspects of behavior that need explanation; description of the behavior at two conceptual levels—the social and the psychological; and specification of the interaction among the several psychological and social determinants of the behavior being dealt with. Empirically the two levels—the social and the psychological—interact, of course, but it is imperative not to confuse the shifting from one conceptual level to another

with satisfactory explanation.

What aspects of riots demand an explanation from theories dealing with this form of collective behavior? Several suggestions can be made. First, can antecedent and concomitant conditions be specified with sufficient precision to recognize that a particular set of conditions lead to riots, other conditions lead to different forms of collective behavior (such as social movements), and still other conditions lead to alternative forms of individual reactions? Second, why do riots occur where and when they do: in some places instead of others (city, region of the country), and at a particular time in history (the 1960s instead of the 1950s)? A third aspect of riots requiring explanation is differential participation among persons. Some persons actively engage in the rioting; others are less actively involved; still others are uninvolved observers; and some are active counter-rioters. Among the active rioters, variation exists also in degree and kind of activity engaged in—looting, assault, arson, etc.

Other features of riots deserving explanation are the content of relevant beliefs or attitudes prevalent among riot participants prior to and during the rioting, and the relationships among the rioters themselves, including the roles of formal and informal leader. A crucial problem in riots is the understanding of the change in behavior that seems attributable to being present in a crowd. Further, what is the characteristic pattern of control activity, and to what degree of effectiveness were control measures

employed (both official and unofficial)?

Finally, what of the sequelae to the riots? What are the consequences of riots—immediate and long-term, direct and indirect? What are the psychological, social, and political consequences to

groups that actively engaged in the rioting, and consequences to other sectors of society? In a word, what did the riots accomplish?

Organization of the present issue. Hopefully, the present issue of this journal will provide answers to some of the questions posed above. The issue was organized to reflect the view that an adequate explanation of riots requires coordination of conceptual systems, frames of reference, and empirical data taken from several social science disciplines. Content of the issue was designed to range from an analysis of factors emerging in the interaction of participants within the riot situation itself, to a consideration of variables at the individual (psychological) level, to a discussion

of broader social and political factors.

In accord with this organization, the first paper (Marx) deals with some of the emergent properties of interaction in the riot situation, with emphasis on the role of the police. Then several papers consider psychological characteristics of rioters (Caplan; Forward and Williams; Tomlinson; Sears and McConahay). These papers are representative of a larger number of empirical studies that have been conducted during the past few years, using theoretical concepts at the psychological level to help explain the riots. Other papers (Fogelson; Iglitzin) discuss the riots in a broader context, including a consideration of chronic grievances that reflect structural characteristics of our society, and a view of riots from the perspective of the role of violence in the political process. Consequences of the riots for the small businessman in the ghetto is the topic of another article (Aldrich and Reiss). Finally, one chapter (Shellow) provides a glimpse of the possibilities that exist for social scientists to promote social change both by influencing policy makers and by engaging in direct social action. Each of these articles is reviewed briefly in one of the four sections constituting the remainder of this paper: (1) Interaction Processes (Marx), (2) Individual Factors (Caplan; Forward and Williams; Tomlinson; Sears and McConahay), (3) Social System Factors (Fogelson; Iglitzin), and (4) Aftermath (Aldrich and Reiss; Shellow).

This issue of the journal will have achieved its goal if the articles to follow contribute in some small measure towards the formulation of more satisfactory explanations of the phenomenon of riots and contribute towards social action designed to ameliorate deplorable life conditions of which riots are merely sympto-

matic.

Interaction Processes

Many analyses of riot behavior start with an examination of factors inherent in the situation itself that might account for the

behavior of participants. Once a disturbance is underway, emerging from the dynamics of the social interaction process are psychological mechanisms that help provide an explanation for behavior often viewed by nonparticipants as senseless, irrational, or bizarre. Classical analyses such as that of Le Bon (1895) emphasized factors such as anonymity, contagion, and suggestibility as important explanatory factors—and contemporary research has indeed demonstrated the effectiveness of these variables in modifying individual behavior. Beyond those factors due to the process of social interaction among participants themselves is another element within the disturbance situation that may play an important role in affecting participants' behavior: interaction between riot participants and agents of social control.

The specific types of precipitating events in the 1960 riots were so extremely diverse as to lead the Kerner (1968) Commission to remark that the precipitating event merely served as a "trigger"—implying that the particular nature of the event was unimportant as a determinant of resulting disorders. Now it is true that most people participating in the riots had not themselves even observed the precipitating event, and many were unaware of the nature of the triggering stimulus. It should be noted, however, that almost always the precipitating incident involved an altercation between ghetto residents and the police. The most frequent category of precipitating events in outbreaks between 1964–1968 was found in the analysis by Downes (1968) to be: "killings, arrest, interference, assault, or search of Negro men

(and women) by police."

In the first article in this issue, Marx presents a penetrating analysis of police behavior-past and present-in riot situations. He analyzes behavior of the police not only during the phase of the precipitating incident but throughout the course of the riot. Discussing police behavior during racial disturbances in historical perspective, Marx notes a definite change for the better in recent police conduct, as compared to police behavior prior to the 1960s. In earlier periods of our history, the police were decidedly less impartial during race riots. It was not uncommon, formerly, for policemen openly to demonstrate their sympathy for whites during race riots, sometimes even to the point of actively joining in the rioting. Although there were variations according to region of the country, type of disorder, level of control, and the like, it seems quite clear that police behavior in earlier racial disorders cannot be characterized as neutral. Police behavior was much improved in the 1960s for several reasons, perhaps one of which was that the recent riots were not interracial in the way earlier disturbances were. Nevertheless, police were often unsuccessful in controlling recent disorders, and in many instances seem to have exacerbated the situation.

Failure of social control can be traced to several causes that are discussed by Marx. One of the most basic problems—and a chronic one—is the deterioration of police-community relationships to such an extent that most ghetto residents attribute little legitimacy to the police. In the area of more specific reasons for the lack of police success, many instances of inappropriate control strategies are cited, such as failure of police to negotiate with rioters, mass firing in response to sniping, and over-reaction to minor incidents due to anticipation or fear of a disorder erupting. Other sources of the failure of police during the riots are lack of coordination among control units and a breakdown of organization within agencies.

Marx makes the cogent point that both parties involved—the police and the rioters—are equally subject to psychological phenomena (such as emotional contagion, spread of rumor, panic, and lessening of inhibitions) that usually are invoked to account for the behavior of rioters only. Clearly, psychological factors emerging in the interaction process are applicable both to the rioters and to the agents of social control. Marx concludes his paper with a discussion of a question of great import for a demo-

cratic society: who controls the agents of social control?

Individual Factors

Several articles in the present issue report research focusing on the characteristics distinguishing riot participants (or sympathizers) from less militant ghetto residents. This type of research has typically employed the survey method of data collection, obtaining self-reports from a sample of persons some time after the riot has occurred.

First of all, Caplan reviews and integrates several empirical studies. Then, studies exploring in depth important psychological concepts are reported by Forward and Williams, by Tomlinson, and by Sears and McConahay. The middle-range theory offered by Sears and McConahay integrates a considerable amount of available data on the relation between a person's psychological characteristics and his tendency to participate in riots.

Caplan provides an integrative review of several empirical investigations conducted in connection with the 1960 ghetto riots. Several interview studies collected similar data from residents of different riot areas, making possible a reasonable comparison of results across studies. Consistency among these studies is quite impressive, providing a vivid portrait of the riot participants.

Characteristics of rioters, as compared with nonrioters, clearly refute the "riffraff theory," which holds that rioters are the irresponsible deviants, the emotionally disturbed, or the criminals of the community. A long history of personal failure and lack of integration into political and social institutions accounts for the rioting, according to this explanation. Empirical results from several studies contradict such a view: rioters did not differ from nonrioters in absolute income; rioters were not the hard-core unemployed; rioters were better integrated than nonrioters into the community, socially and politically; and rioters were not recent immigrants to the city. Moreover, the militants were more politically informed and active, though they distrusted the political system. One significant area in which rioters and nonrioters differed was in feelings of racial pride as evidenced by positive stereotypes and attitudes toward black history and culture held by the rioters.

Caplan interprets these findings as indicating that "the militants are not rebelling against the system itself but against the inequities and contradictions of the system." The militant is certainly not a lone voice in the ghetto wilderness: from one-third to one-half the respondents in various studies expressed support for riots, though a smaller percentage was actively involved in rioting. Caplan concludes that a profound change in self-concept has occurred within the black community; the "new ghetto man" has emerged. Lack of improvement in objective conditions of life is incongruent with this more positive self-image, and this discrepancy is a crucial source of frustrations and dissatisfactions con-

tributing to the recent riots.

The next two articles treating riots at the individual level of explanation present more intensive reports of research on characteristics of rioters and nonrioters than presented in Caplan's review. One of the most significant differences between the "new ghetto man" and his predecessor seems to lie in the area of perceived effectiveness of self in relation to the world. Specifically, instead of passively accepting fate, he believes that he can influence his future. One instrument assessing this attribute of self is an Internal-External Control Scale, which measures the extent to which an individual believes that reinforcements are contingent on his own actions. In Forward and Williams' paper this concept, which appears to have considerable explanatory power, is explored in some detail. Several theories of riots make use of a concept similar to the internal-external control index.

In their study reported here, Forward and Williams obtained data from high school students prior to the occurrence of a riot—entirely fortuitously—and related characteristics of individuals

(measured before) to attitudes (measured after) toward the riot. Among others, one scale estimated the person's feelings of control over his own future (personal control), one scale measured a general belief in Protestant Ethic values (control ideology), and one scale indicated the tendency for a person to believe that his condition is due to personal inadequacies or to the socioeconomic system (individual-system blame).

Results of the data analysis showed that persons who reacted most favorably to the riot had scored highest on personal control items from the internal-external control scale, though scores on control ideology (general Protestant Ethic values) did not differentiate between persons having favorable and unfavorable riot attitudes. A very interesting result was found for the self-system blame scale: after the riot, militants tended to blame the external

system more, but the nonmilitants blamed self more.

Results of the Forward and Williams study support Caplan's blocked-opportunity theory, as contrasted to the alienation-powerlessness theory. Persons who experienced a greater sense of personal effectiveness (believed they had ability to control or influence their lives) preferred to employ violence; those who felt powerless were less militant. In accord with other studies, the rioters were not those persons most socially, educationally, or economically depressed.

Another attempt aimed toward an analysis of characteristics of individuals is reported in Tomlinson's article. Here again, a more intensive report is presented dealing with some of the areas included in Caplan's overview of empirical studies. Tomlinson's research entailed assessing (in a somewhat indirect fashion) degree of militancy among a sample of respondents living in Watts. Attitude toward the Black Muslim organization was used as the

operational definition of degree of militancy.

Tomlinson compared three groups of respondents—militants, conservatives, and uncommitted—on a variety of demographic and attitudinal measures. Of the three groups, more of the militants were young, male, urban-born, urban-socialized, and better educated. Employment status seemed unrelated to militancy. Militants made up 30 percent of the sample; they were more active politically, were more willing to support either conventional or violent means of advancing the Negro's cause, reported more discrimination, and were more likely to report having personally experienced misbehavior from the police. Militants were more favorable about the riot and placed the responsibility for change upon the whites.

Tomlinson draws the interesting implication from his data that a simplified riot ideology has emerged which receives its justification from perceptions of social and economic deprivation. As Caplan pointed out in his review, a large segment of the black population expresses sympathy with the riots or with the motivation behind the riots. Tomlinson notes that there is a portion of the population—the militants in his sample—who are quite sympathetic to the idea of violent protest, and that the elementary riot ideology of the militants has spread across the country. This ideology views riots as legitimate and effective means of dramatically calling attention to problems that would otherwise be ignored. Tomlinson expresses pessimism that anything could have been done at the local, state, or federal level to prevent the riots of the 1960s. The mood of the ghettos-including the creation of a riot ideology-must needs run its course, according to this analysis. In concluding, Tomlinson expresses the opinion that the use of violence in some form or other is likely increasingly to assume social and ideological legitimacy in the eyes of the black community unless there is a change in the basic attitudes and values of white Americans concerning equal citizenship for blacks.

Sears and McConahay propose a rather general and quite parsimonious social psychological theory to account for the riots of the 1960s. Among the crucial questions that must be answered by any attempt to explain riots is: "Why did it happen at this time?" Sears and McConahay address themselves to this question by documenting the major demographic changes in the American Negro population. These changes include a major migration from the rural south to the urban north, increased youthfulness of the population, and an improvement in the absolute level of education. These demographic changes have implications at the psychological level, and it is to the potential mediating factors that link broad demographic factors and riot behavior that Sears

and McConahay address their theoretical efforts.

Two mediating variables are suggested: increased militancy of socialization and an increase in relative deprivation. Having been reared in the north, young blacks are more aggressive, willing to express hostility, and independent toward whites, relative to their southern counterparts. Moreover, it is suggested that public events such as civil rights demonstrations have a greater effect on the young. Among the northern-reared there is also the feeling that conventional institutions are unresponsive in dealing with ghetto grievances. As for the second factor, relative deprivation, data exist demonstrating that blacks have experienced rising expectations concerning their life situation, in conjunction with the belief that the nature of the social system prevents realization of these higher aspirations. It is asserted that the result of such a state of affairs is directly instrumental in leading to attacks upon

the white social system. Data cited by Sears and McConahay are consistent with studies reviewed in Caplan's article in indicating a strong relation between unfulfilled expectations and propensity

toward rioting.

It is worth noting that several of the psychological explanations of riots—blocked opportunity, absolute and relative deprivation, enhanced expectations—imply the existence of individual frustration, i.e., the blockage of movement toward a desired goal. Many such individual-level explanations can fairly readily be cast into the frustration-aggression framework. In these psychological-level theories, the motivational factor leading to riots is apparently the frustration-aggression mechanism, a causal relation that has received extensive confirmation in research at the individual level (Berkowitz, 1962; Buss, 1961) as well as in cross-national research at the social system level (Feierabend & Feierabend, 1966).

Social System Factors

Many explanations of riots look for underlying causes in antecedent social, economic, and political conditions, rather than in the current psychological characteristics of participants. Exemplifying this approach are the empirical studies of Lieberson and Silverman (1965), Spilerman (1969), and the general theory of collective behavior expounded by Smelser (1962). The articles in this issue by Fogelson and by Iglitzin consider the role of broad factors at the social system level as contributors to the 1960 ghetto riots.

With Fogelson's article we move, then, beyond the specific psychological characteristics of participants discussed in the four preceding articles. Fogelson marshals data in support of the thesis that the ghetto riots can best be understood as a manifestation of grievances within the experiences of ghetto residents. In most recent urban disorders, rioting, looting, arson, and assault were usually all seen together. Discussing each of these aspects of the riots, Fogelson maintains that ghetto grievances are explicable and even meaningful in the context of these acts of violence.

White Americans' prejudice, discrimination, and indifference toward the plight of black Americans are asserted to be the basic underlying causative factors responsible for the rioting. The sense of camaraderie among riot participants—a fact noted by several observers—can be seen as a consequence of the perception by participants of their common fate as blacks. The looting Fogelson attributes to the existence of absolute and relative economic deprivation caused by racial discrimination, poor education, and a shortage of unskilled jobs. Noteworthy about arson, in Fogelson's

opinion, was its over-all pattern of selectivity, with unscrupulous ghetto merchants in particular bearing the brunt of attack. Several aspects of consumer exploitation of ghetto residents are documented, such as higher prices for inferior quality goods. Finally, assault is seen as a reflection of black racism and territoriality, characteristics of the larger society now accepted by blacks too.

To two major questions which no doubt have occurred to persons seeking to understand the 1960 ghetto riots, Fogelson offers some suggestive answers. First, why have blacks resorted to riots when other ethnic minorities (Irish, Jews, Mexican, Japanese) who also experienced economic deprivation and discrimination have not rioted? Second, why did the riots not occur at earlier times when conditions were much worse? Fogelson points out that discrimination against blacks has been more prolonged and pervasive than against other minorities, that blacks were less well prepared psychologically and culturally to meet the discrimination, and that segregation was less voluntary. As for timing of the riots, probably important factors were the civil rights laws that made continuing abuses less tolerable, and the rising expectations resulting from observing the country's economic prosperity (though black citizens seem to obtain little benefit).

Fogelson interprets the 1960 riots as a protest against the system's abuses rather than as an attempt to overthrow it, an interpretation in agreement with the conclusion reached by other authors in this issue. He emphasizes that, in light of the long-standing and pernicious grievances of ghetto residents, it is remarkable that the rioters exercised considerable restraint. This restraint is interpreted to mean that blacks are alerting society to abuses that are not being adequately dealt with through conven-

tional channels.

The second article to examine riots by using a very broad perspective is that of Iglitzin, who views riots as only one of many aspects of violence seen within a political system. Several sources of violence—psychological, social, and political—are discussed, with particular emphasis being placed upon the importance of political sources of violence. Clearly, our present understanding of violence in its many forms is quite inadequate—and any attempt to provide a unitary theory seems unlikely to prove satisfactory.

The gap between our gentle democratic ideal in the United States and the actual violence recurring throughout the American experience is glaringly apparent. Iglitzin points out that, contrary to the belief of many Americans, violent conflict seems in fact an integral and necessary part of the democratic process. According

to democratic theory, conflict should be resolved by approved, institutionalized means; but, unfortunately, these mechanisms are often unresponsive. Hence, although conflict has undeniably harmful immediate consequences, the long-term effect of political violence may be salutory if it forces a re-examination of the system and a readjustment of its values. In the broad perspective of the political system, then, in spite of the harmful short-term effects that may ensue, riots can be viewed as a symptom that serves a useful function in the democratic process.

Aftermath

In assessing the accomplishments of the eighteenth and nineteenth century riots, Rudé (1964) concluded that in terms of immediate gains they "achieved comparatively little," though they sometimes led to later movements that did have significant success. Whether this will also stand as an accurate description of the ghetto riots of the 1960s remains to be seen. As reported in Tomlinson's paper in this issue, most blacks believed that the riots harmed relations between the races. In one survey (cited by Silver, 1969), forty-one percent of whites favored stronger repres-

sive measures to prevent riots.

Within the last few years rioting has decreased; as Tomlinson and as Forward and Williams suggest in their papers in this issue, it may be that black militants have concluded that riots are not the most effective tactic to advance their cause. The guerrilla warfare that many observers predicted would supplant the riots of the 1960s seems not to have materialized, although numerous news reports across the nation in the fall of 1968 appeared partially to confirm these predictions. An analysis of these incidents yielded, however, the conclusion that "... sniping reports have been generally exaggerated and the recent suggestion of a new 'trend' of racial violence based on the events of last summer are highly questionable (Knopf, 1969)."

The catharsis concept would predict that the occurrence of riots should decrease the probability of subsequent violence, a prediction seemingly supported by the decrease in frequency of riots during the past few years. Contrary to the catharsis prediction, a number of studies have found that the expression or observation of aggressive acts does not "drain away" pent-up aggressive impulses and thereby make further aggression less likely; instead, the likelihood of subsequent aggression increases (e.g., Bandura & Walters, 1963; Berkowitz & Rawlings, 1963; Mallick & McCandless, 1966). Aggression and observation of aggression

tend to decrease inhibitions against expressing further aggression.

(See also Berkowitz, 1968.)

Although aggression in most instances does not seem to serve a cathartic function in the sense of decreasing the probability of further aggression, it has been claimed to be cathartic in a much broader sense of the term. Among those holding this view is Frantz Fanon, the Algerian psychiatrist, who believes that violence is a "cleansing force" for the individual; he asserts that violence frees the oppressed person from "his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect (Fanon, 1968)." Responses given in postriot interviews support this claim: there is evidence of enhanced feelings of racial pride and self-respect among blacks after riots, even among those who did not actively participate (Kerner, 1968).

Turning now from the consequences of riots for the rioters themselves, we should not overlook the effects of the riots on the primary target of the rioters—the small business firms in the ghetto area. The Aldrich and Reiss article in this issue provides some relevant information on the effect of riots on small business, by an analysis of data from a sample of firms in three riot-torn cities. The immediate objective consequence of the riots on small businesses was very serious. Twenty-four percent of the businesses were substantially affected in areas where riots had occurred. The response of insurance companies to such extraordinary losses was to cancel policies in riot areas and increase rates elsewhere.

Aldrich and Reiss are pessimistic concerning the long-term implications for small businesses of the behavioral and attitudinal changes apparently produced by the riots. Businessmen have moved sharply toward a more conservative position concerning law and order (e.g., most now report the belief that the police are too lenient). The use of protective devices in business firms has increased twice as much in riot as in nonriot areas. Moreover, an alarming number of businessmen in riot areas now keep a gun, thereby increasing the possibility of an incident that could precipitate a larger disorder. Many inner-city stores now display bricked-up windows, and in some stores the customer must knock before being allowed to enter. The authors note that one gets the image of business being conducted from an armed camp—an ever more accurate image of American society at large.

Among the many consequences of a series of riots, none would seem to be more certain than a report from a commission assigned to investigate them. In his article in this issue, Shellow provides a fascinating behind-the-scenes glimpse of the role of social scientists working with the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission). It is clear that social

scientists did have a significant impact on the commission's report (Kerner, 1968), though its final form was hardly a scientific document, and hence differed somewhat from what the social scientists working with the commission would have ideally desired. That the report did at least serve an important educational function for the public is undeniable, although it fell far short of providing a satisfactory analysis and interpretation of the riots. It is obvious that a riot commission works under inherent constraints of a political and organizational nature, and that it serves a number of functions in addition to the scientific one (Lipsky & Olson, 1969). Unfortunately, a commission normally does not possess the political power to ensure implementation of its recommendations. As a consequence, the many reports of riot commissions appointed since 1900 can not be credited with having been responsible for significant social change.

That social science should attempt to provide an explanation for riots is an assertion with which most social scientists would readily agree. Beyond explanation lies the even more difficult region of action. Here the rather abstract and orderly world of theory and research collide with the concrete and untidy world of policymaking and administration; there are limitations imposed by political realities, difficulties of unexciting day-to-day operations, and frustrating obstacles to implementing programs based

on theory and research.

In his article in this issue, Shellow urges social scientists to become more actively engaged in programs of social change and in influencing public policy—in spite of the troubles this may entail. He sees a need for social scientists to become involved—not only in an advisory role on matters of public policy, but also in attempts to bring about social change through the initiation and management of programs of direct action. As an example of a direct action program initiated and conducted by a social scientist, Shellow describes the program he has designed with the goal of improving police-community relations in Washington, D.C. A great deal more direct action work of this sort on the part of social scientists is badly needed.

Conclusions

Articles in this issue discuss the problem of riots from different vantage points and from different levels of analysis. All the factors mentioned by the authors are doubtless implicated in the causal network leading to riots. We hope that this issue at the very least makes clear that riots elude simple and superficial explanation and that an adequate analysis certainly demands recognition of the principle of multiple causation. Ghetto riots are only symptomatic of the urgency and magnitude of problems confronting black Americans. Roots of current urban disorders penetrate into the basic economic, political, educational, and social structure

of our society.

With some differences in detail and emphasis, most explanations of riots have stressed the role played by objective socioeconomic deprivation or by felt (psychological) deprivation in generating the frustration and anger that presumably predispose persons toward riotous behavior. According to this type of explanation, appropriate social change necessitates nothing short of eliminating the sources of extreme dissatisfaction in the ghetto community. Social justice for the entire population must be assured in order to alleviate underlying conditions responsible, in the final analysis, for riots. In accordance with analyses of this sort, the Kerner Commission (1968) recommended a wideranging series of programs designed to improve conditions of life for black Americans living in urban ghettos: more jobs, better education, more and better housing, and improvement of the welfare system.

Even if considerable funds for comprehensive deployment in the ghetto were immediately forthcoming (which seems unlikely), it would be unrealistic to believe that a dramatic or far-reaching impact on the individual lives of ghetto residents could be produced quickly and easily. Wants are likely to continue to exceed satisfactions for the foreseeable future, given the reasonable assumption that wants will accelerate at a faster rate than satisfactions can possibly be forthcoming. Sustained relative deprivation and sustained frustration for the American ghetto poor therefore seem to be in store for some time to come. Under these circumstances, the forecast of continuing social conflict and

violence made by many observers seems unavoidable.

Assuming the likelihood of continuing conflict, we obviously need to learn how to deal constructively with chronic conflict in such a way as to increase the probability that its consequences will ameliorate instead of worsen conditions within the black community and will heal instead of aggravate the cleavage between racial groups. As Iglitzin stresses in her article in this issue, conflict and violence are part of the political process and cannot always be construed as undesirable for a society. Many social scientists would not advocate the total abolition of conflict among groups comprising a social system, even if our scientific knowledge were sufficient to render it feasible. The positive benefits of "creative disturbance" (Waskow, 1966) and of "conflict and its resolution" (Loomis, 1967) have long been recognized by students

of the social system (e.g., Coser, 1956). At the same time, emphasis should be placed on the large areas of common interest existing between conflicting groups; superordinate goals have been shown to increase the cooperation between groups in conflict (Sherif, et al., 1954). Clark (1965) has stressed that social change in the United States is more apt to be acceptable if the majority group is convinced that continued subordination of the Negro harms not only the minority group but the entire nation-white citizens as surely as black citizens.

If the goal of science is to understand, predict, and control, then it is readily apparent that social scientists are still some distance short of the mark with regard to riots. In spite of obvious limitations, perhaps theoretical and empirical work in the social sciences can shed enough light on riots to ensure that numerous preconceptions and contradictory "commonsense" analyses held by policy-makers and the public do not forever remain un-

challenged.

REFERENCES

BANDURA, A., & WALTERS, R. H. Social learning and personality development. New York: Holt, 1963.

BERKOWITZ, L. Aggression: A social psychological analysis. New York: McGraw-Hill,

Berkowitz, L. The study of urban violence: Some implications of laboratory studies of frustration and aggression. American Behavioral Scientist, 1968, 2,

BERKOWITZ, L., & RAWLINGS, E. Effect of film violence on inhibitions against subsequent aggression. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1963, 66, 405-412.

BOWEN, D. R., & MASOTTI, L. H. Civil violence: A theoretical overview. Unpublished manuscript, Civil Violence Research Center, Case Western Reserve University, 1968.

Buss, A. H. The psychology of aggression. New York: Wiley, 1961.
CAMPBELL, A., & SCHUMAN, H. Racial attitudes in fifteen American cities. Supplementary Studies for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Government Printing Office, 1968.

CLARK, K. Dark ghetto. New York: Harper and Row, 1965.
COSER, L. The functions of social conflict. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956.

Downes, B. T. Social and political characteristics of riot cities: A comparative study. Social Science Quarterly, 1968, 49, 504-520.

EDELMAN, M. Myths, metaphors and political conformity. Psychiatry, 1967, 30, 217-228.

FANON, F. The wretched of the earth. New York: Grove Press, 1968. (Trans. by Constance Farrington).

Feierabend, I. K., & Feierabend, R. L. Aggressive behaviors within polities, 1948-1962: A cross-national study. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1966, 10, 249-271.

Fogelson, R. Violence as protest: An interpretation of the 1960's riots. Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 1968, 29, 25-42

GRIMSHAW, A. D. Three views of urban violence: Civil disturbance, racial revolt, class assault. American Behavioral Scientist, 1968, 2, 2-7.

KERNER, O., et al. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. New

York: Bantam, 1968.

KNOPF, T. A. Sniping—A new pattern of violence. Trans-Action, 1969, 9, 22-29. LE BON, G. Psychologie des foules. (1895). Transl. The crowd. London: Unwin, 1963. LIEBERSON, S., & SILVERMAN, A. R. The precipitants and underlying conditions of race riots. American Sociological Review, 1965, 30, 887-898.

LIPSKY, M., & OLSON, D. J. Riot commission politics. Trans-Action, 1969, 6, 9-21. LOOMIS, C. P. In praise of conflict and its resolution. American Sociological Review,

1967, 32, 875-890.

MALLICK, S. K., & McCandless, B. R. A study of catharsis of aggression. Journal

of Personality and Social Psychology, 1966, 4, 591-596.

MURPHY, R. J., & WATSON, J. M. The structure of discontent: The relation between social structure, grievance, and support for the Los Angeles riot. In N. E. Cohen (Ed.), The Los Angeles riots: A socio-psychological study. New York: Praeger, 1970.

RUDE, G. The crowd in history, 1730-1848. New York: Wiley, 1964.

SEARS, D. O., & TOMLINSON, T. M. Riot ideology in Los Angeles: A study of

Negro attitudes. Social Science Quarterly, 1968, 49, 485-503.

SHERIF, M., HARVEY, O. J., WHITE, B. J., HOOD, W. R., & SHERIF, C. W. Intergroup conflict and cooperation: The robbers cave experiment. Norman, Oklahoma: Institute of Group Relations, 1954.

SILVER, A. A. Official interpretations of racial riots. In R. H. Connery (Ed.),

Urban riots. New York: Vintage, 1969.

SMELSER, N. J. Theory of collective behavior. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1962.

SMELSER, N. J. Essays in sociological explanation. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968.

SPILERMAN, S. The causes of racial disturbances: A comparison of alternative explanations. Discussion paper, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1969.

TURNER, R. H. The public perception of protest. American Sociological Review,

1969, 34, 815-831.

WASKOW, A. I. From race riot to sit-in, 1919 and the 1960's. New York: Doubleday, 1966.

Civil Disorder and the Agents of Social Control¹

Gary T. Marx Harvard University

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

Juvenal (VI.347)

The mob quails before the simple baton of the police officer, and flies before it, well knowing the moral as well as physical force, of the Nation whose will, as embodied in law, it represents.

The Police and the Thieves, 1856.

Most of our municipalities appear to be organized solely for social service. In the presence of a mob their police officers are as helpless as their school teachers or their hospital interns.

Newspaper Report on 1919 Riot

Now, I'm not saying that the community, the people in the community of Harlem, were blameless. There was bottle-throwing, but when people throw bottles, when they throw bricks, it's the responsibility of the police to arrest, or at least restrain the culprits, the guilty parties, not indiscriminately to shoot into hotel windows and tenement houses. Not to beat people who are merely walking down the street.

James Farmer, 1964

Sure we make mistakes. You do in any war.

Police Commissioner of New York City, 1964

I don't want to hear anything you [Negro director of Human Relations Commission, counciling need to use black officers] have got to say; you're

¹An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1968 American Sociological Association meetings. I am grateful to the M.I.T.-Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies for support and the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.

part of the problem. We know how to run a riot and we are going to handle it our way.

Deputy Chief of Police, Los Angeles, 1965

[The local police chief] rushed into his office and, grabbing the rifle . . . and two boxes of ammunition, he shouted, "They've shot one of my officers. We're going to get every son-of-a-bitch down there. I'm getting goddamned tired of fooling around."

State Police Report, 1967

If you have a gun, whether it is a shoulder weapon or whether it is a hand gun, use it.

Director of Newark Police, over the police radio, 1967

To the [riot] commissioners and public alike we'd ask one question: When a law enforcement officer, faced with the extremely dangerous task of quelling what is in fact an armed rebellion, is the target of snipers' bullets, rocks and bottles, just exactly what constitutes "undue force?" Were any of the commissioners who accuse police of using undue force on the firing line? Do they really know what they are talking about? Use of the term "undue force" is an exercise in tortured semantics that police refuse to accept. Not only is the charge without merit, it is an insult to brave men who risked their lives for the public and equally unacceptable to reasonable people.

New Jersey State Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, 1968

In the final analysis [in spite of poor judgment, excessive use of firearms and a manifestation of vindictiveness on the part of police] the responsibility for the loss of life and property that is the inevitable product of rioting and mass lawlessness cannot be placed upon those whose duty it is to enforce the law and protect the free of our society.

Report of Essex County (N.J.) Grand Jury Investigation of Riot Deaths, 1968

It seems . . . that it is not what you do, but how you do it and what you call it.

John Steinbeck, 1961

The number of popular and scholarly perspectives that can be brought to bear on the interpretation of civil disorder seems limited only by the breadth of one's imagination and reading. Among some of the more prominent are those that stress the increased radicalism of social movements as they evolve, the relevance of a world revolutionary struggle, the importance of an external war, limited political access, various types of frustration, conspiracies, and agitation, the mass media, relative deprivation and heightened aspirations, frontier traditions and a history of racial and labor violence, lower class and criminal sub-cultures and youthful, Hobbesian, biological, or territorial man. Many of these factors can be fitted into Smelser's (1962) useful value-added model of the determinants of collective behavior.

Despite the undeniable relevance of some of these perspec-

AGENTS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

B reau of toni. a

tives, they all focus on factors in the pre-disorder situation conducive to violence. They also tend to correspond to a particular left or right wing ideology. Thus conservatives tend to see disturbances as meaningless, irrational events caused by agitators activating the degenerate character of the lower classes, while liberals are more likely to see them as spontaneous patterned protests caused by deprivation. However, there is one perspective which finds support among both the extreme left and right, and which seeks the cause in the actual disturbance situation. This is the view which suggests that the police cause riots. (To be sure, ideological groups differ on the particular mechanism they emphasize—the right blaming the police for being too soft, the left blaming them for being too harsh.)


Unintended Consequences of Social Action

One of the justifications for social research is that it goes beyond our common sense views of the world. Merton (1957) suggests that an important task of social research is to point out the latent or unintended consequences of human action. Thus, corrupt as early twentieth-century political machines were, they were important in the assimilation of Irish and other immigrants; and prostitution, whatever its moral implications, may make an important contribution to family stability. However, there are more interesting cases where unintended consequences are the direct opposite of intended ends. Thus we have learned that propaganda designed to reduce prejudice may actually reinforce it, that youth institutions may create juvenile delinquents who are later made into knowledgeable and embittered criminals by the prison system, that mental hospitals may encourage mental illness, that schools can impede learning, that welfare institutions may create dependency, and that doctors sometimes injure or even kill patients.

In the same fashion, a review of police behavior in civil disorders of a racial nature through the summer of 1967 suggests a number of instances where the behavior of some social control agents seemed as much to create disorder as to control it. After a consideration of police behavior in earlier racial disturbances, the present paper examines some of the forms and contexts in which

control behavior has had these unintended consequences.

This paper does not argue that police are the main cause of racial disorder. Indeed, police are one of the most scape-goated and stigmatized groups in American society and many parallels may be drawn between them and ethnic minorities. Yet, as Gertrude Stein noted, the answers one gives depends on the questions



one asks. There are certain questions about civil disorders that can only be answered by considering the general nature of the police-black community relationship and the interaction that occurs between these groups during a disturbance. These questions have to do with the course, pattern, intensity, and duration of the disturbance.

As Park and Blumer and later students have noted, collective behavior has an emergent character to it. It involves elements that can't very well be predicted by a static consideration of the pre-disturbance variables mentioned in the beginning of the paper. Civil disorder involves a social process of action and counter-action. It is here that a consideration of police behavior is relevant.

Police Behavior in Historical Perspective

As Allen Grimshaw (1963) has noted, police have been criticized for brutality and ineffectiveness in most twentieth-century racial disturbances. Any critical evaluation of recent control prac-

tices must first be put in historical perspective.

In reading about police behavior in earlier twentieth-century interracial violence, I found several reoccurring themes: (a) the police were sympathetic to (white) rioters and sometimes joined the riot themselves, (b) police often failed actively to enforce the law, and (c) when police did try to maintain law and order this

often was not done in a neutral and impartial manner.

Some of the following discussion is based on reports of groups with vested interests other than (or in addition to) the dispassionate pursuit of truth. The highly charged emotional nature of civil disorder and the fact that it may cover wide areas makes research difficult. Traditional norms of police secrecy may require undue reliance on the reports of others, who are interested in overstating police misbehavior. The usual methodological strictures about this kind of historical data apply. At the same time, the very unusualness of the events leads to their receiving greater attention, making analysis somewhat easier. Social control behavior is further difficult to, describe because in any one disturbance it may change markedly over time and may vary depending on the control unit in question.

Police as Rioters

Racial disorders are more likely during periods of social change—as the increased indignation of the oppressed confronts the threat to the status quo felt by the dominant group (Blumer,

1958; Shibutani & Kwan, 1965). Police represent the dominant group whose power is threatened, and tend to be recruited from those parts of the population most likely to hold negative stereotypes and to be in direct competition with blacks. It is thus not surprising that in the past police involvement in racial violence was sometimes on the side of the (white) mob rather than against it. This involvement has varied from statements of support to active participation in violence directed against non-lawbreaking

Negroes.

The August 1900 New York race riot, one of the first of the twentieth century, was precipitated by a Negro killing a plain-clothes policeman after the latter grabbed his woman and accused her of being a prostitute. The subsequent riot was partly led by the predominantly Irish police. In what was called a "Nigger Chase" policemen and other whites dragged blacks off streetcars and severely beat them on the street, in hotels and saloons. At the time, a white observer felt that the ambition of the police seemed to be to "club the life out of" any Negro they could find. The New York Daily Tribune printed a cartoon of a massive Tammany tiger in a police uniform swinging a club. In the background was huddled a bloodied Negro (Osofsky, 1963).

The 1906 Atlanta riot growing out of the move to disenfranchise blacks saw police arresting Negroes who had armed for self-defense and an officer shooting into a crowd of Negroes. The head of a seminary where blacks sought asylum was beaten by a

police official (Franklin, 1965, p. 433).

Some of the worst instances of official rioting may be seen in the relatively well-documented East St. Louis riot of 1917, which was triggered by the killing of two policemen. In an act called "a particularly cowardly exhibition of savagery" by a Congressional investigating committee, police shot into a crowd of Negroes huddled together and not offering any resistance. Some of the soldiers led groups of men and boys in attacks upon Negroes (Rudwick, 1966). Police relayed false reports of black reprisal attacks on the outskirts of the city, in order, according to the Post-Dispatch, "to scatter the soldiers so that they would not interfere with the massacre (Rudwick, 1966, p. 87)." Police also confiscated the cameras of newsmen because they had incriminating evidence. Guardsmen followed the cues of the police department. Some gave their weapons to the mob. Following the shooting of two blacks by "khaki-uniformed" men, rioters, according to a press account, "slapped their thighs and said the Illinois National Guard was all right (Rudwick, 1966, p. 48)." After indicating a number of instances of official complicity, the congressional investigating committee stated, "Instead of being guardians of the peace they [the police] become a part of the mob . . . adding to the terrifying

scenes of rapine and slaughter (Grimshaw, 1963, p. 274)."

The Chicago Commission on Race Relations, while noting the unusual circumstances of the 1919 riot, felt that "certain cases of discrimination, abuse, brutality, indifference, and neglect" on the part of police were "deserving of examination." The "certain cases" included things such as a policeman approaching a Negro who lay wounded from mob attack, with the words, "Where's your gun, you black — of a —? You damn niggers are raising hell." Whereupon the officer then reportedly knocked the Negro unconscious and robbed him. There was also cited a case of a Negro who after asking police for protection was searched and clubbed by them and shot when he attempted to run away. (See the Chicago Commission on Race Relations, 1923, pp. 35, 38–39.)

In the 1919 Knoxville, Tennessee, disorders troops "shot up" the black section of town following an unsubstantiated rumor that Negroes had killed several whites. According to John Hope Franklin, a Negro newspaper declared, "The indignities which colored women suffered at the hands of these soldiers would make

the devil blush (Franklin, 1965, p. 475)."

In Tulsa, Oklahoma, May 31, 1921, after fighting broke out between whites and Negroes over the latter's effort to stop a lynching, local police invaded the Negro area and did much damage.

The 1943 Detroit riot was preceded by interracial violence at the Sojurner Truth Homes where police openly sided with whites and joined in fighting Negroes trying to move into public housing. During the 1943 riot, claims were made to the effect that "rather than protecting stores and preventing looting, the police drove through the troubled areas, occasionally stopping their vehicles, jumping out, and shooting whoever might be in a store. Police would then tell Negro bystanders to 'run and not look back.' On several occasions persons running were shot in the back (Grimshaw, 1963, p. 277)." It was claimed that police forced Negroes to detour onto Woodward Avenue, a street where violence against blacks was very intense.

A study of the 1943 Detroit riot reports the case of a black man shot as he fled a streetear attacked by a mob. The man ran to a policeman and shouted, "Help me, I'm shot!" He later stated, "The officers took me to the middle of the street where they held me. I begged them not to let the rioters attack me. While they held me by both arms, nine or ten men walked out of the crowd and struck me hard blows. Men kept coming up to me and beating me, and the policemen did nothing to prevent it." This is followed a few pages later by the report of a white who stated, "A gang of Negroes suddenly seemed to assemble from nowhere at

all. They dragged me from the car and were roughing me up when three policemen appeared and rescued me (Lee and Humphrey, 1943, pp. 3, 30; Shogan and Craig, 1964)."

Passive Police

More common than police rioting was police passivity. In a useful article on conditions conducive to racial disorders Dahlke stresses the relevance of weak agents of external control, police who either cannot or will not take aggressive efforts to uphold law and order (Dahlke, 1952). As with lynch violence, such a situation characterized many earlier racial disorders. Even when they desired to take action, police were usually understaffed and lacked the appropriate means to quell the disorders. Technical incapacity mixed with a non-aggressive control ideology and sympathy for the rioters often produced inaction. In the case of recent disturbances, it should be noted, the administrative confusion that has contributed to the disorders certainly has not implied approval of the violence; this article and much pre-1964 material on racial violence really deal with one-sided pogroms and bi-racial rioting and not with current disturbances which have more the character of colonial uprisings.

The 1904 Statesboro, Georgia, riot started when a mob entered the courtroom and overpowered the militia, whose rifles were not loaded "in tender consideration for the feelings of the mob." Two Negro prisoners were burned alive and a "wholesale terrorism" began. The leaders of the mob were not punished

(Franklin, 1965, p. 433).

The congressional investigating committee studying the East

St. Louis riot reports:

The testimony of every witness who was free to tell the truth agreed on condemnation of the police for failure to even half-way do their duty. They fled the scene where arson and murder were in full swing. They deserted the station house and could not be found when calls for help came from every quarter of the city. The organization broke down completely and so great was the indifference of the few policemen who remained on duty that the conclusion is inevitable that they shared the lust of the mob for Negro blood, and encouraged the rioters by their conduct. (cited in Grimshaw, 1963)

Rudwick notes, "At least six or seven guardsmen stood around like 'passive spectators' during the hanging at Fourth and Broadway, and ignored pleas to save the victim's life. A few blocks away at Collinsville and Broadway a bloodied Negro sought the protection of eight guardsmen. Their mute answer was to turn bayonets on him, forcing the victim back into the arms of five

assailants (Rudwick, 1966, p. 76)." There are reports of lawmen

"laughingly held captive" while the mob attacked blacks.

Organization on the part of both the police and militia seemed to break down as they scattered throughout the city without officers. Fraternization with the mob was common and not conducive to efforts at restraint. Many soldiers openly stated they "didn't like Niggers and would not disturb a white man for killing them." It was reportedly a common expression among them to ask, "Have you got your nigger yet? (Grimshaw, 1963, p. 281)." The day after the riot as an ambulance came to remove part of the burned torso that a soldier was exhibiting to throngs of people with the words, "There's one nigger who will never do any more harm," a crowd of militia men "saluted . . . with shouts of merriment (Rudwick, 1966, p. 67)."

In Longview, Texas, in July 1919, police did not intervene when a group of whites with iron rods and gun butts beat a black man suspected of writing an article in the *Chicago Defender* on lynching. Nor did they try to stop the mob from burning a number

of blacks' stores and homes (Waskow, 1966, p. 17).

Local authorities and police lacked the resources to control a riotous mob bent on lynching in Omaha in 1919. Some policemen surrendered their clubs and guns peacefully when the mob demanded them.

The 1919 Chicago riot was triggered by the drowning of a black swimmer who drifted across the "line" separating the "white" water from the "black" water. A white policeman refused to arrest the white thought (by Negroes) to be responsible for the death and then proceeded to arrest a Negro on a white man's complaint. Police were accused of leaving the scene of rioting on "questionable excuses." The Chief of Police and the Mayor refused to ask for troops, although the former acknowledged that his force was insufficient (Chicago Commission on Race Relations, 1923, pp. 39, 40). Outside pressure finally compelled the Mayor to ask the Governor for aid.

The following report on the 1919 Washington, D.C. riot clearly indicates something of the social process involved in the development of a collective definition conducive to violence on the part of both blacks and whites which is found in many early disorders. Blacks arm for self-defense and out of indignation while whites interpret police behavior as granting them permission to use violence against blacks with little fear of being sanctioned.

Failure of police to check the rioters promptly, and in certain cases an attitude on their part of seeming indifference, filled the mob with contempt of authority and set the stage for the demonstration the following night. In the early hours of Monday morning the attacks on Negroes were

carried into sections where the black population is heavy. The whole negro element of Washington suddenly became aware of a war on their race. . . . By Monday night the colored population held themselves to be without police protection. The mob elements among the blacks armed for war, while many of the better element of their race armed in obedience to the first law of nature. (An anonymous article in The Outlook, 1919, as quoted in Grimshaw, 1963, p. 277.)

W. E. B. Dubois charged that the Washington police intervened to stop the violence only when whites began to get the worst of it

(Waskow, 1966, p. 34).

In Detroit in 1943 the NAACP took the position that, "There is overwhelming evidence that the riot could have been stopped in Detroit at its inception Sunday night had the police wanted to

stop it (Lee and Humphrey, 1943, p. 73)."

Beyond police passivity in the face of attacks on Negroes, officials were criticized for delays in calling out higher levels of force and for the hesitancy to use force against whites. According to some sources the disturbance stopped only when troops appeared and a shoot-to-kill order was given wide publicity (Grimshaw, 1963, p. 283). The "inactivity" involved in the failure to call out higher levels of force is very different from that involved in failure of control agents to act once they are on the scene. Although at a more abstract level, the consequences may be much the same.

In the Cicero disturbance of 1951, the mob roughed up a black man attempting to move into an apartment, attacked the apartment, burned his furniture, and was "completely out of control." These activities were not prevented or hampered by the local police who were present. In fact, the local Chief of Police earlier had told the black man that he needed a permit to move in and threatened to arrest him if he tried to move in. The disorders continued until after the decision of the Governor of Illinois to

send out National Guard troops (Grenley, 1952).

Police Partiality

In spite of well-documented instances of police involvement in rioting and police failure to take decisive action, an image of general police inaction or complicity is incorrect. In most cities efforts were made toward the control of violence. However, when police did try to maintain law and order, this was frequently not in a neutral and impartial manner. Given white control of police and a tradition of differential law enforcement, such partiality is not surprising. Partiality was often involved in the precipitating incident as well as in the police arresting on charges of rioting

Negroes who were beaten by the mob or those who armed for selfdefense. The pattern of stopping Negro attacks on whites was much more common than the reverse.

During the 1900 New York riot, local police courts were filled to capacity—but only with Negroes. A magistrate criticized the police and asked to see "some of the white persons who participated in the riot." His request was fulfilled when a white teenager was brought in for trying to trip a policeman (Osofsky, 1963).

In East St. Louis, "after a number of [white] rioters had been taken to jail by the soldiers under Colonel Clayton, the police deliberately turned hundreds of them loose without bond, failing to secure their names or to make any effort to identify them (Grimshaw, 1963, p. 274)."

A report on the 1919 Washington, D.C. riot notes:

Although the aggressors were white mobbists led by white men in the uniform of the United States, ten Negroes were arrested for every white man arrested. (Seligmann, 1919, p. 50)

In a 1919 Phillips County, Arkansas, disturbance, according to the Negro view (later supported by affidavits of whites present at the time), whites fired from autos and then burned a church where a black tenant farmer's union was meeting. This spurred a week of violence. A few whites and many Negroes were killed. According to Waskow (1966), "hundreds of Negroes . . . were charged with murder or arrested as 'material witnesses' or for 'investigation' (pp. 121-142)." No whites were arrested at all except for one who was believed to be on the Negroes' side. Even the U.S. Army seemed less neutral here than in other disturbances. According to the Arkansas Gazette, the troops were anxious to get into battle with blacks in order to prevent a supposed plan to kill whites (a plan "discovered" by telling tortured Negroes what to confess to).

During the 1919 Chicago riot, twice as many Negroes as whites appeared as defendants although twice as many Negroes were injured. The State Attorney of Cook County stated:

There is no doubt that a great many police officers were grossly unfair in making arrests. They shut their eyes to offenses committed by white men while they were very vigorous in getting all the colored men they could get. (Chicago Commission on Race Relations, 1923)

In a telling example, Walter White reports:

In one case a colored man who was fair enough to appear white was arrested for carrying concealed weapons, together with five white men and a number of colored men. All were taken to a police station; the light colored man and the five whites being put in one cell and the other colored men in another. In a few minutes the light colored man and the five whites were released and their ammunition given back to them with a remark, "You'll probably need this before the night is over." (White, 1919)

A criminologist expressed the belief that the police showed greater readiness to arrest blacks than whites because the officers felt they were "taking fewer chances if they 'soaked' a colored man (Chicago Commission on Race Relations, 1923, p. 35)."

After soldiers and sailors beat Mexican-Americans in the 1943 Los Angeles zoot suit riot, police who had been onlookers would move in and arrest the Mexicans for vagrancy or rioting. Military authorities were reportedly lax in not canceling leaves (*Time* magazine, June 21, 1943).

In writing about the 1943 Detroit riot, Supreme Court Justice

Thurgood Marshall suggests:

The trouble reached riot proportions because the police once again enforced the law with an unequal hand. They used "persuasion" rather than firm action with white rioters, while against Negroes they used the ultimate in force: night sticks, revolvers, riot guns, submachine guns, and deer guns. (Marshall, 1943)

Differential law enforcement can also frequently be seen in the different sentences received by white and black arrestees and, at another level, in the failure to punish control officials in those cases where force was misused. Grand juries and official investigating commissions have tended to label police killing of Negroes "justifiable homicide." The point of view expressed by the New York police department in its annual report about the 1900 race riot, whereby "the city was threatened with a race war between white and colored citizens. . . . prompt and vigorous action on the part of the police . . . kept the situation under control," was typical of most post-riot inquiries (Osofsky, 1963). (Prominent exceptions to this tendency to whitewash disturbances were the reports of the congressional committee that investigated East St. Louis and the Chicago Commission on Race Relations.)

Variation in Control Behavior

In this effort to characterize control behavior in collective interracial violence prior to the 1960s, I do not mean to suggest that these themes of police rioting, inaction, and partiality were always present, nor that when they were present they applied to all actions of all policemen. Among striking examples where such a characterization does not apply are the 1919 Charleston riot between Negro and white sailors and the 1935 and 1943 Harlem riots. In Charleston, neutral police behavior may partly be understood by the fact that the rioting white sailors were outsiders not

a part of the constituency of local authorities (Waskow, 1966). In Harlem only blacks were involved, so the issues of partiality and white police joining the riot are less relevant. The Harlem riots were in many ways the precursors of recent disorders (Fogel-

son, 1968).

Even where control behavior was the worst, heroic action on the part of some officials could be noted, as can cases of the police failing to interfere or arrest Negroes who had beaten whites. Nor should it be forgotten that often, as the Mayor of Detroit said in 1943, "The police had a tough job. A lot of them have been beaten and stoned and shot." And beyond being unprepared for their task and usually undermanned, they were the recipients of various insults about their lineage, manhood, and the nature of their maternal relationships. Under such conditions some observers might choose to emphasize their degree of restraint.

Significant variation in control behavior can often be found to be dependent on things such as region of the country, type of disturbance, nature of the issues, unit of control, and time period. Other factors being equal, conscientious impartial action

to maintain law and order has been more likely where the rioting whites were not local citizens, where the disturbance was an insurrection against the local government as well as a black pogrom, where a strike or labor issue was involved, when the precipitating incident did not involve a Negro killing a police officer, and where

only blacks rioted.

While conscientious impartial action is related to effectiveness, it is not synonymous with it. Among factors that seemed related to effective control are prior training, experience and planning, strong leadership from command officers and local government, the maintenance of organization and discipline within the control organization, the rapid mobilization of large numbers of personnel, and the use of Negro as well as white agents of

control.

Control behavior has tended to be better the higher the level of control agency (state police, militia, and the U.S. Army) and the later one gets into the twentieth century (1900, 1919, 1943). In many cities disturbances came to an end with the appearance of outside forces and, except for the state militia in East St. Louis, relatively few criticisms of unprofessional behavior or ineffectiveness were directed against them. This was even more true of the U.S. Army than of the state forces. This is related to the fact that the army and state units often came in fresh at the end of a riot cycle. As outsiders they were uninvolved in local issues and perceived as being neutral. Their larger numbers, superior training,

and military organizational structure better suited them for cop-

ing with such disorders.

However, in considering the dynamics of the riot, rather than an abstract score card of police behavior, the effect of well-publicized instances of police brutality, inaction, or partiality, no matter how unrepresentative (and they often were all too representative) was often sufficient to escalate greatly the level of rioter activity. Such misbehavior to Negroes became symbolic of past injustice and part of a generalized belief justifying self-defense and retaliatory violence, while whites interpreted it as giving them license to attack blacks.

The 1960s: Some Changes in Police Behavior

In spite of the variation and qualifications noted above, in accounts of earlier disturbances the themes of police rioting, inactivity, and partiality could often be noted. Perhaps they were particularly apparent because they contrast rather markedly with police behavior in recent disturbances. We have come a long way since the 1863 New York Draft Riot where, when the president of the police board was asked about taking lawbreakers into custody he reportedly replied, "Prisoners? Don't take any. Kill! Kill! Kill! Put down the mob." Riots are now triggered when police kill or injure a Negro, rather than vice versa. Police have been much quicker to take action and this action has generally been more restrained than previously. The law has been enforced much more impartially. Particularly in the North, there are few reports of police failing to stop interracial assaults or of police firing into unarmed non-combative crowds. Considering the absolute number, size, intensity, and duration of recent disorders, there has probably been much less police rioting, less brutality, and relatively less injury inflicted upon Negroes by the police; this is all the more salient since police have been provoked to a much greater extent than earlier and have many more opportunities to use force legally against blacks than they did in previous

Where police rioting has been present—as in Watts, Newark, and Detroit—this tends to be primarily in the later stages of the disturbance as police are unable to control the disorder and as they become subject to the same collective behavior phenomena as blacks (such as the breakdown of social organization, rumor, panic, innovative efforts to handle strain, etc.).

This contrasts with earlier disorders where police rioting was present from the beginning of the disturbance. That police be-

havior has shown considerable improvement, of course, should give no cause for rejoicing, since numerous, well-documented instances of undue and indiscriminate use of force, often deadly, can be cited.

In trying to account for these changes in police behavior, changes in the police and in the type of disorder must be considered. Police now are more professionalized and have better resources. Perhaps equally important, the task of maintaining law

and order now involves suppressing blacks.

Just as the nineteenth-century emergence of a bureaucratic police force with fluid organization capable of rapid concentration greatly reduced the fear of riots, mobile units and modern communications have made it easier for the police to take rapid action. In some cases the availability of non-lethal weapons may have inhibited the use of deadly force. These factors work both ways, however. One reason a large crowd gathered so rapidly in Newark was that the beating of the cab driver involved in the initial incident was broadcast over the taxi radio system, drawing a caravan of taxis. The monitoring of police radio calls by rioters has occasionally been reported. In Newark there were reports of looters and snipers using "CBR" (Citizens' Band Radio). We can also note civil rights groups photographing activities of police as well as the reverse. In recent anti-war demonstrations some protestors could be seen wearing helmets, thickly padded jackets, gas masks, in a few cases accompanied by their own German shepherds. The pattern of neutralizing social control devices and the continual readjustment of deviants and social controllers as new technology emerges is a fascinating and unwritten story.

But beyond such technical factors is modern society's decreased tolerance for internal disorder and the ethos of the contemporary police department. The complexity and interdependence of contemporary society may have increased its vulnerability to civil disorder; at any event, its tolerance for internal violence has certainly been decreasing since 1900 (Waskow, 1966). American traditions about non-governmental interference in private

violence have tended to disappear.

Just as blacks have the misfortune of being poor when most other groups aren't, they have the misfortune of being a lower-class urban migrant group at a time when tolerance for the violence characteristically associated with such groups is less than ever. The state has increasingly come to monopolize the means of violence. To a degree that can't be very precisely measured, earlier police behavior transcended racism and must be seen in the context of police ambivalence about the control of private violence.

Citizenship rights in theory, and to an ever greater extent in practice, have been extended to all people, even the ethnically stigmatized lower classes. While this stress on the inclusion of the lower class, at least as far as blacks are concerned, can no longer be used (as many have tried to use it) to explain the presumed decline of violence in American society, it is still useful in accounting for the restraint shown them by authorities once violence breaks out. Police departments increasingly have come to stress universalistic criteria of law enforcement, as well as affective neutrality and limits on the use of force. An additional factor contributing to police restraint may be the presence of the press—in contrast to their role in earlier disturbances where the irresponsible concern of the media with Negro crime and especially rape of white women did much to raise tensions (Waskow, 1966).

To interpret these changes only in light of abstractions such as professionalization would be naive. The police today, while in many ways different from the police in 1917, are also dealing with a very different kind of racial violence. Rather than whites attacking Negroes under the guise of an ideology of white supremacy held by the police, we find Negroes attacking stores and police under the guise of an ideology clearly not held by the latter. The task of restoring law and order today coincides with the repression of Negroes, rather than of whites as earlier. Thus, that the police have been more ready to take action is not surprising. Similarly the greater neutrality of the police (in the form of enforcing the law equally, regardless of the attributes of the law breaker) may partly relate to the fact that in these almost all black disturbances, few whites have been involved. Yet acknowledging such factors should not lead to a wholly cynical denial of the changes that have occurred. Police, particularly in the North, have often controlled white mobs bent on attacking civil rights demonstrators. During riots they have arrested white youths (usually on the perimeter of the disturbance area) looking for confrontations with blacks.

Given the above factors one might be led to believe that police would have been much more successful in quelling recent disorders than in the past. This is not to argue that police behavior has always been effective or humane. While the old adage told me by a veteran police official that in the past "the riot didn't start until the police arrived" may seem less true today, this is certainly not to say that the riot now stops when the police do arrive—though this has sometimes (as in the Kercheval area of Detroit in 1966 and earlier at Trumbull Park in Chicago) been the case. One observer suggests "policemen everywhere claim they know of a hundred riots squelched for every one that gets out of hand

(Wills, 1968, p. 37)." For documentation on two incipient riots that didn't happen, see Wenkert, Magney, and Neel (1967), and Shellow and Roemer (1966). It is nevertheless ironic that although police are technically better prepared to control disorders and have a greater will to do so, they often have been unsuccessful. Control is more difficult now than in earlier race riots because of the greater use made of private weapons and the fact that merely separating whites from blacks and protecting black areas from white invasion is not sufficient for stopping the riot (Janowitz, 1968, p. 10). But in addition two important factors here are the general nature of police-black community relations and the actual behavior of police during the disturbance.

Police-Community Relations

In its riot analysis (inspired by what it felt were failings in the reports of the New Jersey and National Riot Commissions) the New Jersey State Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (1968) finds a "growing disrespect for law and order" to be "one of the root causes" of recent civil disorders. While much in this document could be disputed by social scientists, there is an element of truth here, although the adjective "white" might have been added to "law and order." There may be less consensus among ghetto youth on the legitimacy of the police than in the past. Increasing technical proficiency and a more professional ethos are thus undercut by the decreasing respect potential rioters may hold for

the police (Bouna and Schade, 1967).

Developments within the black community have meant that even the most "enlightened" police riot behavior has sometimes been ineffective. As blacks have gained in power and selfconfidence through civil rights activity, and have become more politicized, the legitimacy granted police has declined. This is especially true for many of those most prone to participate in the disorders. For many of this group, police are seen as just a group of white men, meaner than most, who are furthermore responsible for the historical and current sins of their racial group. From the point of view of one youth in Watts, "The policeman used to be a man with a badge; now he's just a thug with a gun." This change in view is clearly in the eye of the beholder rather than in the behavior of the police. Though it may be true that relatively less capable people are being recruited for police work, by most criteria police are better than ever before. Ironically, indignation against the police has risen as police behavior has improved. During a five-year period in which the Chicago Police Department became increasingly professionalized, one study notes no change in police perception of how the public viewed them (Wil-

son, 1967).

To be sure, this negative view is held by only a minority of the black community, but it is held disproportionately by the most riot-prone group. For the general Negro community, complaints of police brutality are matched by the demand for greater police protection and indignation over the behavior of Negro law-breakers.

The New Jersey Governor's Select Commission on Civil Disorder (1968) notes that "there was virtually a complete breakdown in the relations between police and the Negro community prior to the disorders. . . . Distrust, resentment and bitterness

were at a high level on both sides (p. 143)."

Indeed, for some blacks police come to be seen as an occupation army. Silver (1967) suggests the concomitant of this view when he notes that, for many whites in the face of black unrest, "Police forces come to be seen as they were in the time of their creation—as a convenient form of garrison force against an internal enemy (p. 22)." As the various (largely unanalyzed) organizational ties between the police and the Department of Defense become stronger, the view of the police as a counterinsurgency force takes on added significance. In reviewing police preparations for future riots, a journalist notes, "One would think the police were readying for war. Or waging it (Wills, 1968)."

Useful parallels can be drawn to the way police were often seen in other ethnically mixed societies during tense periods (such as India and Pakistan in 1948, or Cyprus or Israel more recently). Police are viewed not as neutral representatives of the state upholding a legal system but as armed representatives of their ethnic communities. At this point, whatever obedience police can command emerges primarily out of gun barrels and not out of respect for them or the law and order they are enforcing. Even here the symbolic hatred that police may inspire can inhibit the effectiveness of threats of force. In such situations using ethnically alien police to stop an ethnically inspired riot may be equivalent to attempting to put out a fire with gasoline.

In such a context control agents may not be successful even when they "refrain from entering the issues and controversies that move the crowd, remain impartial, unyielding, and fixed on the principle of maintaining law and order"—one of "an effective set of principles for troops to control a rioting mob" suggested by Smelser (1962, p. 267). This is precisely because even in being neutral the police are in one sense not being neutral. By the mere act of maintaining white (or the status quo) law and order the police have in fact entered "the issues and controversies" and on

a side likely to aggravate potential rioters. As Joseph Lohman, a former police scholar and official has noted, "The police function to support and enforce the interests of the dominant political, social, and economic interests of the town (Neiderhoffer, 1967, p. 13)."

Police Behavior in Recent Disturbances

As noted, earlier police inaction in riots has generally given way recently to decisive police action. Yet many disorders have escalated, not as in the past because of what police failed to do, but precisely because of what they have done. Here racial liberals and conservatives have switched in their indictments of the police. Where liberals earlier complained that police were indecisive and not tough enough, complaints of excessive use of force are now common—while conservatives suggest the opposite. In another reversal the same U.S. marshals who were looked upon favorably by liberals when they protected civil rights activities in the South, became the enemy during the march on the Pentagon. Many conservatives who expressed pleasure over the presence of the marshals in Washington were indignant when they were in the South.

I have found it useful to organize police behavior that was ineffective or seemed to have the effect of creating rather than controlling the disorders into the following three categories: (1) inappropriate control strategies, (2) lack of co-ordination among and within various control units, (3) the breakdown of police organization. The remainder of the paper is concerned primarily with police behavior up to the end of the summer of

1967.

Inappropriate Control Strategies

Crowd dispersal.² Here I wish to consider ideas held by some control officials about disorderly crowds and the kind of police action that has flowed from such views. In the spirit of Gustav Le Bon it is sometimes assumed that crowds are uniformly likeminded, anarchic, irrational, and hell-bent on destruction. From this it may follow that all people on the street are seen as actual or potential rioters, that crowds must always be broken up, that a

²Data on disorders in Plainfield, Jersey City, and Elizabeth, New Jersey; Cambridge, Maryland; Detroit, Newark, Cincinnati, Dayton, New Haven; Rockford, Illinois; and Milwaukee which are not referenced are from material in the files of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner, et al., 1968). Some of the ideas in this section have profited from discussions with and were jointly developed by Robert Shellow, Lou Goldberg, and Dave Boesel.

riot will not terminate unless it is put down, and that only a technical approach involving the use of massive force is adequate.

In all too many cases police have not gone beyond a 19th century riot manual (Molineux, 1884) which stated "crushing power, exercised relentlessly and without hesitation is really the merciful, as it is necessary, course to be pursued (cited in Garson,

1969)."

Police were often responsible for the formation of the initial crowd by responding to fairly routine incidents with a large number of squad cars with loud sirens and flashing lights. In some cities, applying the traditional strategy of dispersing the crowd had unanticipated consequences and served to escalate and spread the disorders. The control problem then shifted from a crowd to guerrilla-like hit and run activities more amenable (technically if not humanly, given innocent bystanders and the minor crimes) to city clearing tactics. In commenting on new riot training, a national guard officer stated, "We ran through all that crowdcontrol crap again. Hell, I was in Detroit two weeks and I never once saw a crowd (Wills, 1968, p. 55)."

While the formation of a crowd at the beginning seemed to be an important factor in most disturbances, it does not follow that crowds should always be dispersed, nor that when they are dispersed, force is the only means that should be used. While the crowd itself may be conducive to a lessening of inhibitions, the anger it feels may be heightened and released by precipitous police action. Here it may be useful to distinguish a series of pre-

cipitating or initiating events.

In New Haven in 1967, for example, after some initial minor violence the crowd's mood was still tentative. A small crowd walked down the street toward police lines. As the perimeter was reached, police fired three canisters of tear gas. The crowd then

ran back breaking windows and began to riot seriously.

According to a report on the 1964 Harlem riot, following the efforts of New York City's tactical patrol force to clear an intersection by swinging their clubs and yelling charge as they plowed into the crowd and broke it into smaller segments, "Hell broke loose in Harlem (Shapiro and Sullivan, 1964)." The angry but otherwise peaceful crowd then began pulling fire alarms, starting fires, and beating whites.

In Englewood, New Jersey, police efforts to force Negro bystanders into houses, whether or not they were the right house, angered and sparked violence on the part of young men. In Rockford, Illinois, the first instances of rock and bottle throwing were inspired by police efforts to clear a late-night bar crowd off the

streets.

A peaceful rally protesting school practices in Philadelphia was violently broken up by the civil disobedience squad using riot plan number three. This elicited a violent response from the Negro youth. The superintendent and the president of the school board subsequently blamed the police for starting a riot (Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 18, 1967).

Contrary to official riot control manuals and (usually) the wishes of higher authorities, as police encounter a crowd they may break ranks, raise their night sticks above their shoulders, and hit

people on the head rather than the body.

Beyond the issue of police provoking a hostile but as yet nondestructive crowd to retaliatory violence or providing a symbolic act and serving as a catalyst for the expression of the crowd's anger, the members of the crowd, once dispersed, may do more damage than the crowd itself. This may be somewhat equivalent to jumping on a burning log in efforts to put out a fire, only to see sparks and embers scatter widely. In both Milwaukee and New Haven, disorders were spread in this fashion; scattered bands of rioters presented police with a more difficult control situation than the original crowd.

An additional problem may emerge if police lack the power to clear the street or, as in Detroit, to control it once it has been cleared. In Newark after an angry crowd pelted the police station with rocks, bottles, and a few fire bombs, police made several sorties into the crowd using their clubs, and each time withdrew back to the station. Such a seesaw motion, in demonstrating police ineffectiveness and the crowd's parity with control officials, may

have emboldened rioters.

Failure to negotiate. The treatment of disorders as strictly technical problems of law and order to be solved only by force has meant that negotiations and the use of counter-rioters were often ruled out. Such iron-clad rules, popular in many police circles, completely obscure the variation in types of disorder. Where the disturbance seems apolitical, unfocused, and primarily expressive and is not related to current issues or demands, and where there is no minimal organization among rioters and no one willing to take counter-riot roles, there would seem to be no alternative, from the perspective of the authorities, to the graduated use of force. However, where the disturbance develops out of a very focused context involving specific issues (the demand for finding promised jobs, a particular instance of police brutality, discrimination by a business firm, disagreement over school policies, etc.), where grievances are clearly articulated and demands are present, where there seems to be some organization among rioters, and

where actual or would-be spokesmen and potential counter-rioters come forth, the disturbance may be stopped or dampened by entering into a dialogue, considering grievances, and using counter-rioters. To resort only to force in such a situation is more likely to inflame the situation and increase the likelihood of future disorders.

The refusal to negotiate and use strategies other than a white show of force may have had disastrous consequences in Watts. The director of the Los Angeles Human Relations Commission had worked out a plan to send in 400 black plainclothes officers and several hundred anti-poverty workers to make inconspicuous arrests and spread positive rumors ("the riot is over") and to withdraw white officers to the perimeter. Young gang leaders promised to use their influence to stop the riot and were led to

believe that these conditions would be met.

The deputy chief of police rejected this proposal, stating among other things that he was not going to be told how to deploy his troops and that, "Negro police officers are not as competent as Caucasian officers and the only reason for sending them in would be because they have black skins and are invisible at night." To the director of the Human Relations Commission he said, "I don't want to hear anything you have got to say, you're part of the problem. We know how to run a riot and we are going to handle it our way." In response to the promises of gang leaders to stop the riot, he stated, "We are not going to have hoodlums telling us how to run the police department." And, "We are in the business of trying to quell a riot and we haven't got time to engage in any sociological experiments (McCone, et al., 1965, pp. 59, 61, 63, 65)." Following this refusal a full scale riot ensued.

All blacks as noters. Just as it is sometimes erroneously assumed that all men at a gay bar are gay or all women standing on certain street corners at a particular time are prostitutes, so to the police any black person out on the street during a period of civil disorders may be suspect. In some cities, orders to clear an area and the panicky use of force (along with beliefs about the efficacy of getting tough) have resulted in the indiscriminate application of force to anyone with a black face, including innocent bystanders, government officials, policemen in civilian clothes, ministers and Negro youth trying to stop the disorders.

In noting police inability to differentiate rioters from spectators, an observer of the 1964 Harlem disturbance notes, "The result was injuries to spectators and, in many cases, conversion of spectators into players (Shapiro and Sullivan, 1964, p. 57)." A factor related to failure to negotiate and the treatment of all

black people on the streets as rioters involves official response to counter-rioters. In many cases they were not used at all, or, once

mobilized, their efforts were frustrated.

Previous role relationships have an important effect on behavior in disaster situations. While collective behavior is essentially defined by the emergence of new norms, it nevertheless occurs within a context of ongoing familial, religious, economic, political, and social relationships. In many cities the resources of the black community were effectively used in counter-riot activities—quelling rumors, urging people to go home, and trying to channel

indignation into less destructive protest.

During the summer of 1967 in such cities as Tampa, Florida, and Elizabeth, New Brunswick, and Plainfield, New Jersey, police were even ordered out of the disturbance area and local residents successfully patrolled the streets. The issue of whether or not police should be withdrawn is a complex one that far transcends the simplistic rhetoric of its opponents and supporters. While it was successful in the above cities, in several other cities it had the opposite effect. However, what is not really at issue is the fact that there existed a sizeable reservoir of counter-riot sentiment that could have been activated in the place of, or along side of, other control activities. This counter-riot sentiment was generally not counter-protest and in many cases represented considerations of strategy rather than principle. But motivation aside, failure to use counter-rioters effectively may have prolonged a number of disturbances.

In Cincinnati, despite an agreement between the mayor and black leaders that the latter would be given badges and allowed to go into the riot area to help calm things, police refused to recognize the badges and arrested some of them on charges of loitering. A somewhat similar situation existed in Milwaukee. In Newark the mayor and governor gave permission to Negro volunteers to go among the people in efforts to calm the situation. Their activities were inhibited by enforcement personnel. According to the governor, they "were chased around so much by people who suspected them as participating in the riot that they had to abandon their efforts (Governor's Select Commission on Civil Disorders,

1968, p. 120)."

Beyond the general confusion in the disorders and a racially inspired (if not racist) inability to differentiate among types of Negroes, this police response was related to a view of the disorders as a technical problem to be met only by a show of force and a feeling that police competence and jurisdiction were being infringed upon. That counter-rioters were often black activists, and in some cases gang youth, may have accentuated this feeling.

Official anticipation. Thus far, the disorders considered have involved the pattern of riotous or at least disorderly Negro behavior followed and sometimes encouraged by the official response. However, there were other instances where the dynamics of the disturbance worked in the opposite direction. Here authorities (with poor intelligence reports) precipitated confrontation by anticipating violence where none was imminent and by overreacting to minor incidents that happened to occur during a major

riot elsewhere.

While adequate planning and preparation are vital to effective control, they may help create a state-of-siege mentality, increase susceptibility to rumors, and exert a self-fulfilling pressure. This is particularly true when they are found with a gettough, act-quickly philosophy. Following the Newark riot, fourteen cities in the surrounding area had some type of disorders; after Detroit, eight additional Michigan cities reported disorders. An important factor (rather than, or in addition to, psychological contagion) in the spread of violence from major urban centers to outlying communities was the expectation of a riot-and subsequent overreaction on the part of white authorities.

In New Jersey a month and a half before Newark erupted, there were reports of planned violence, and counter-plans were designed. On June 5, 1967, the police chiefs of more than 75 New Jersey communities met in Jersey City to discuss the supposed plans of militant blacks to foment violence. Jersey City, Newark, and Elizabeth were reportedly given "triple A" ratings for violence over the summer. Plans to coordinate control efforts were set up and procedures for calling in the National Guard and state police gone over. Riot control training was held in a number of

When Newark finally erupted, prior rumors were confirmed in the minds of many local officials in other communities and fears of anticipated violence were acted upon. In one New Jersey city, officials reacted to the rumor that Stokely Carmichael was bringing carloads of black militants into the community, although Carmichael was in London at the time. In Jersey City, 400 armed police occupied the black area several days before any disorders occurred. In Englewood, where police out-numbered participants three to one, black residents had earlier been angered by riot control exercises in which the wind had blown tear gas into surrounding Negro homes. In Elizabeth, police greatly increased patrols in the black area and residents expressed opinions such as, "The community felt it was in a concentration camp." The appearance of armed police patrols increased the likelihood of confrontation and greatly strained relations with local Negroes. Whatever an individual's feeling about civil rights, to have his neighborhood saturated with armed men in uniform in the face of minimal, sporadic, and even no disorders, often created indignation. A frequent demand was for police withdrawal or less visible show of arms. In six of seven New Jersey cities (that had disorders at the time of Newark) chosen for study by the riot commission, removal of police from the ghetto signalled an end to violence.

Sniping. While much sniping was attributed to control agents firing at each other, fire-crackers, and the snapping of broken power lines, response to the sniping that actually did exist was inadequate. Mass firing by men on the ground at buildings, often using their private weapons, without an adequate system of accounting for ammunition spent and not under the command of a superior officer, created much havoc, killed and wounded many innocent people, and helped escalate the violence. Such firing no doubt drew counter-fire from angry Negroes bent on retaliation or who viewed their counter-fire as self-defense, in some cases creating the very sniper fire it was supposedly trying to stop. The fact that changes in policy from not shooting to shooting looters during the Detroit riot were not announced may have increased the death toll. In a related context, if people don't hear an order to disperse because they are too noisy, that doesn't affect the legality of their arrest-according to guidelines put out by the San Francisco police department (1963, p. 4).

The use of force. In the use of force in quelling a disturbance, the police have traditionally faced a dilemma. To underreact out of concern with heightening tensions, because of technical incapacity, or because the seriousness of the situation is not appreciated, may permit disorders to spread rapidly as new norms conducive to disorderly behavior emerge and as people see that they can break rules without fear of being sanctioned. On the other hand, to use too much force too soon may create incidents and escalate the disorders as bystanders become involved and the already involved become ever more indignant. In cities such as Watts, Newark, and Detroit, police departments moved from a pattern of underreaction to overreaction, in each case inadvertent-

ly contributing to the disorders.

In Detroit a factor that came to be known as the "blue flu" may have been relevant. Prior to the riot, in an abortive unofficial strike many officers had called in sick. It has been suggested that some policemen in their anger and in order to demonstrate their importance to the city went beyond the policy of departmental restraint in underreacting during the initial disorders, in some cases even encouraging people to loot. This police strike did not

have the tragic consequences of the 1919 Boston police strike. In fact, according to several pre-riot sources, reports of crime actually went down when the police were out on strike.

There are two independent issues in the much-debated role of force in quelling civil disorders. One has to do with the effect of threats of force on the outbreak of disorders and the other with its

effect on the course of a disturbance once it has started.

The tensions which generate riots are not likely to be reduced by a tough-talking mayor or police chief. Such rhetoric would seem to have little deterrent value and may help further to polarize the atmosphere and create fear in blacks of genocide and plans for self defense (which are then likely to be taken by police as proof of the need to be even tougher). However, once disorders have begun, a get-tough policy may be more "effective." (Although the criteria of effectiveness are by no means clear; and effectiveness, if defined simply as the cessation of the disorders, may conflict radically with other cherished values of the society.)

The example of Milwaukee shows that an early display of overwhelming force can stop the disorders-though the closing of airports and highways, the presence of 4,800 national guardsmen, 800 policemen, and 200 state police after about 150 youths broke windows and looted after a dance seems rather out of proportion. Similarly, indiscriminate lethal force will temporarily scatter a crowd. A group of angry blacks protesting a segregated bowling alley in Orangeburg was broken up (in the largest single bloodletting thus far) when state police fired without warning into the unarmed group, killing three and wounding 27 others (many of

whom were shot in the back).

While such force may temporarily break up the crowd (ethical considerations aside), it may create martyrs and symbolic incidents which galvanize social-movement support. Witness the cases of Lafayette and the Parisian National Guard firing on unarmed demonstrators in 1791, the Boston Massacre in 1770, the calvary's riding down peaceful demonstrators at Peterloo in 1819, the firing on unarmed petitioners at the Winter Palace in 1905, and General Dyer's massacre of Indians at Amritsar. A fruitful area of study is the sociology of martyrdom and the conditions under which repression will arouse sympathy on the part of larger audiences. Important issues here would seem to be whether the repression is directed against non-violent or violent demonstrators and whether the protest involves a moral issue easily seen to be consistent with the basic values of the larger society.

Unfortunately, it can't very well be said scientifically that those control practices most offensive to humane sensibilities are also those least likely to be effective, although neither can the opposite be said. Strong moral grounds clearly exist for opposing such policies, but very little is known about the likely short- and

long-run consequences of different control strategies.

We can hypothetically differentiate between control practices that may have no effect on the disorders, those that cause them to escalate, and those that reduce or stop them. Empirically trying to sort these out is, however, very hard. Given the lack of sophisticated analysis with a reasonable sample, examples can be selectively chosen to show the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of almost any given strategy. In the case of the "get tough perspective" these often are embarrassingly time-bound. Thus two cities often cited, Miami (whose police chief stated, "When the looting starts, the shooting starts") and Philadelphia ("They take your attempts to meet their demands as a sign of weakness; you have to meet them with absolute force") subsequently have experienced disorders.

There is a curious confusion in the image of man held by proponents of a get-tough policy. On the one hand, they assume that the potentially riotous individual is cold and calculating, carefully weighs the consequences of his actions, and hence will be frightened by the potentially strong sanctions. On the other hand, rioters are simultaneously thought of as completely wild and

irrational people caught up in an "insensate rage."

In a related context students of criminal behavior in American society have consistently noted that harsh sanctions and capital punishment are not effective deterrents for many offenses. Some research in other countries has reported curvilinear relationships between hostile outbursts and repression (LeVine, 1959; Bwy, 1968). Student and anti-war protests are beyond the scope of this paper yet much of what has been said about police behavior during city racial disorders applies here as well. As a brief aside we can particularly note their role in aiding the success of

student protests.

The state of our social engineering knowledge is admittedly limited; however, if one wanted to structure the world to be sure that university disturbances would occur, one could learn a lot by watching the unintended consequences of the behavior of university administrators. One pattern that applied to a great many disorders up to 1968 is as follows. A small number of students, often with a cause or issue that doesn't actively interest the mass of their fellows, plan or actually carry out limited peaceful protest action. The university administration tries to restrict the protest; it prevents freedom of speech and action, or it arbitrarily and without due process singles out certain activists for punishment, or it calls the police to break up a demonstration. With these administrative actions the nature of the unrest changes quantitatively and qualitatively. A basic issue now becomes free speech or police brutality or rights of due process. Latent tensions may result in additional issues such as the quality of education coming to the surface, issues which had nothing to do with the original problem or the university response. Greater unity among the protestors develops; the mass of uncommitted moderate students are drawn to their side (often in spite of initially opposing them or being indifferent to the original issue); liberal faculty and organizations in the outside community respond in like fashion. The dynamics of the situation thus involve the move from a small peaceful protest to a large disorderly and disobedient protest. (In student demonstrations abroad, use of police has often had similar consequences; in the case of France and Germany see Crozier,

1968, and Mayntz, 1968.)

In this move from limited to general protest, aged if sometimes crew-cut university administrators, confronted with a novel situation, are pulled between conservative boards of regents, trustees, and public, and the liberal academic community. They vacillate, act inconsistently and unpredictably, and may fail to grasp the essence of the situation they are confronted with; they may make undocumented (and certainly unwise) statements about the role of communists, off-campus agitators, and trouble makers; they may be unable to differentiate kinds of student demonstrators. Various deans and university officials make statements and offer interpretations that may contradict each other; agreements reached between student and authorities may be overruled or distorted by other authorities. As at Berkeley and Columbia, administrators may fail to accept the recommendations even of their own faculty or faculty-student committees set up to deal with the crisis. Students perceive university administrators as being confused, bungling, arrogant, hypocritical, and acting in bad faith; this strengthens student feelings about the legitimacy of their cause.

Finally, when authorities do act by calling in the police, police often conform to the strategy of the demonstrators, seemingly unaware that such a strategy, if not completely self-defeating, at best has no win consequences for the authority structure. There are two important issues in using police in campus disorders: first, the fact that the conflict is stopped by the naked power of the state, contrary to hallowed ideals of a liberal university; and second, the fact that insulted and provoked police sometimes lose control and use undue and discriminate force, thus greatly increasing the disorders. Some private schools such as Chicago, Brandeis, Roosevelt, and Reed where the police have not been called in to "solve" conflicts (partly because such schools are not under as strong external pressure from the public and government to do so) have avoided the degree of disruption and disorder, the residue of bitterness, and the concessions to students that have been present at schools such as Berkeley, Wisconsin, San Francisco State, Columbia, and Harvard where the police were called in.

Lack of Co-ordination Among Control Units

The historical fact that the United States did not develop a specialized national riot police as in France and Italy has probably meant prolonged disorders and greater injury and death. The constitutional delegation of the police function to states and our forty thousand separate police units means that initially each city

must rely on its own inadequate resources.

In the face of major, unanticipated disorders involving a wide area and large numbers of people engaged in hit-and-run guerrilla-like tactics, local decentralized autonomous American police, organized primarily to fight crime, control traffic, and keep the peace were usually ineffective. The control of such disturbances requires training and activity that are almost opposite in nature to those needed for normal police operations (Turner, 1968), and necessitates calling in other control units differing in training, organizational structure, ethos, and familiarity with the local area. Not surprisingly difficulties often emerged as a result.

Whereas the inability to admit failure, bureaucratic entanglements, petty rivalries, and political considerations all delayed the calling out of higher levels of force, the lack of prior planning and an unclear chain of command meant further delays once other control agents finally did arrive on the scene. Local, state, and national guard units did not merge easily. Guard units, accustomed to acting in patrols, were fragmented and guardsmen were isolated from commanding officers; police, who were usually organized as one- or two-man autonomous patrol units, were to become disciplined members of military units, relying on commands from superiors and not on their own discretion. While officers from different units were together, they were often responding to separate orders. In Newark the three enforcement agencies were issued separate orders on weapons use. In commenting on the use of his men, a national guard commander in Detroit noted, "They sliced us up like balony. The police wanted bodies. They grabbed guardsmen as soon as they reached armories, before their units were made up, and sent them out-two on a firetruck, this one in a police car, that one to guard some installation." This meant that "a young man without a car of

radio, without any knowledge of the city, could get stranded far away from any officer, without food or cigarettes, convinced (often rightly) that no one remembered where he was. . . . The guard simply became lost boys in the big town carrying guns (Wills,

1968)."

Technical as well as social communications problems contributed to ineffective co-ordination of control activities and clearly furthered the disorders. Regular radio frequencies were heavily overtaxed, and local police, state police, and the National Guard operated on different frequencies. Though this had been a problem two years earlier in Watts, little had changed by the time of Detroit and Newark. In the beginning stages of the latter, state police were unable to get a clear definition of riot perimeters or where activity was heaviest. They could not obtain information about the movement of local police patrols or citizens' calls and were obliged to follow local police and fire trucks responding to calls (Governor's Select Commission, 1968). Inability to communicate was a factor in police and guardsmen firing at each other and in the belief in widespread sniping.

Poor communication within departments also had serious consequences (Cohen and Murphy, 1967; Conot, 1967). One reason the Los Angeles police department failed to employ sufficient manpower when needed was the reluctance of subordinate commanders to expose themselves to ridicule and downgrading by possible overreaction. While the Los Angeles police possessed some of the most skilled investigators in the world, trained to deal with master criminals, they could not get a true picture of what was happening in the early stages of Watts. Early on the third day of the riot, field forces knew the situation was out of control but the downtown command post was still optimistic. This is the classic problem of information flow in a bureaucracy. This highly professional department was unable to admit that a handful of what it considered hoodlums could create a major disturbance

that it couldn't control.

In Plainfield, contrary actions by county and city police greatly inflamed the disorders. Plainfield had a relatively political disturbance with meetings and negotiations between blacks and city authorities alternating with violence. At one such meeting, under the auspices of community relations personnel and with city police understanding, several hundred men gathered in a county park to discuss their grievances and to choose leaders to represent them. During the meeting the violence had greatly subsided. However, this was shortlived, as the meeting was abruptly terminated by county police who said they could not meet in the park without a permit. This incensed the young men. Within an hour violence flared-that night a patrolman was killed and the

destruction reached its highest point.

Further conflict among different levels of authority emerged in Plainfield between the police and local and state officials. Police felt "left out," "tired," and "poorly treated," and threatened to resign en masse (and to some observers almost mutinied) following their exclusion from negotiations which led to the release of arrested rioters, a policy of containment following the killing of a fellow officer, and the stopping by a state official of a house-to-house search for stolen carbines. The New Jersey riot inquiry felt that the circumscription of local police activities was such "as virtually to destroy the department's morale . . . [and] to limit seriously the effectiveness of the force (Governor's Select

Commission, 1968, pp. 150, 153)."

In still other cases, as in Los Angeles, Boston, and New York, agreements reached by mayor's special representatives, human relations officials, and police-community relations officers who had rapport with rioters were not honored by other policemen, creating great indignation and a sense of betrayal. In Los Angeles, the police community relations inspector was reportedly not called into the inner circle of police advisors. The chief of police was unaware that his department had been represented at an important community meeting held during the riot. A potentially ugly incident might have emerged in Detroit (May 21, 1968) when mounted police outside a building tried to drive supporters of the Poor People's March back into a building, while police on the inside were trying to drive them out. In Rockford, Illinois, in 1967, as people poured out of bars that were closing, police tried to drive them off the street that other police had already barricaded. In Birmingham in 1963, police circled several thousand blacks, on one side swinging their clubs and from the other side turning water hoses on them, catching bystanders as well as protesters-though this was no doubt all too well-coordinated.

Breakdown of Police Organization: One Riot or Two?

An additional source of police ineffectiveness and abuse stems from the breakdown of organization within enforcement agencies. In most discussions of recent riots, undue emphasis has been given to the behavior of rioters. The normal concepts used to analyze collective behavior have been applied to them—emotional contagion, the spread of rumors, panic and the expression of frustration, the lessening of inhibitions, and innovative efforts to handle certain kinds of strain. Yet in several major disturbances, this perspective might equally be applied to the police.

Police, lacking training and experience and often uncertain of what they were to do, sometimes became fatigued (frequently working 12 hour or more shifts with insufficient rest periods and nourishment); they were thrown off balance by the size of the disturbance and by being drawn frantically from one area to another, in some cases for false alarms seemingly co-ordinated with attacks and looting. As large numbers of people taunted, defied, insulted, and attacked them and they saw their fellows injured and in some cases killed, patience thinned and anger rose. Rumors about atrocities committed against them then spread.

Police may come to take violent black rhetoric and threats (which are partly related to expressive oral traditions, ritual posturing, and political in-fighting) too literally-as the lack of police killed by snipers and even reports that some snipers may have misfired on purpose, and the lack of attacks on known racists might imply. The belief may spread that they are in a war and all black people are their enemy. Traditional misconceptions about riotous crowds may contribute to an exaggeration of the dangers confronting them. As police control of the "turf" is effectively challenged and rioters gain control of the streets by default, the word may spread (as in Watts, Newark, and Detroit) that rioters have "beat the police." Losing face, humiliated by their temporary defeat and with their professional pride undermined, police may have a strong desire for revenge and to show

In a context such as the above, superior officers may lose the power to control their men. The chain of command and communication between and within enforcement agencies, often unclear to begin with, may completely break down. The most dangerous part of the disturbance is now at hand as the environment changes from a riot to a war. Some police behavior seems as much, or more, inspired by the desire for vengeance, retaliation, and "to teach the bastards a lesson" as by the desire to restore law

and order.

The words of Lee and Humphrey, written shortly after the 1943 Detroit riot, are clearly relevant twenty-six years later: "War is to the army much what civilian outbreaks are to the police. Both offer socially acceptable outlets for the residuum of aggressiveness characteristic of each (Lee and Humphrey, 1943,

p. 114)."

On the third day of the Detroit riot, an officer was overheard telling a young black on a newly stolen bicycle, "The worm is turning." And turn it did as the police took off their badges, taped over squad car numbers (this, of course, greatly reduced the number of complaints filed), and began indiscriminantly and excessively using force against rioters, bystanders, and in some cases each other. The death and injury toll climbed rapidly. Some of the firing stopped only when control officials ran out of ammunition. At this time the Algier's Motel killings and "game" occurred. One of the police officers involved in this incident stated, "there was a lot of rough-housing, you know, everything just went loose [following the killing of a police officer on the third day of the riot]. The police officers weren't taking anything from anyone (Hersey, 1968, p. 134)." This would seem to be something of an understatement.

According to one high police official in secret testimony, by the fourth day of the riot "the police were out of control." There are some reports of police keeping looted goods taken from prisoners, robbing them, and of doing damage to "soul brother" stores spared by the rioters (Governor's Select Commission, 1968). Claims of brutality filed included charges of the mistreatment of women and the carving of initials on prisoners. It should be noted that such behavior occurs in spite of official riot control manuals stressing restrained use of force, and (usually) in spite of the wishes of higher authorities. Recent control manuals, while leaving something to be desired in their conceptual approach to collective behavior, stress the controlled and graduated use of force (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1967; Mombiosse, 1967; also see Westley, 1956).

The attacking of fellow officers took two forms. It was either accidental or willful—as in the case of the beating of Negro police officers thought to be civilians because they were in plainclothes. For an example of the beating of an off-duty officer in Newark (New York Times, July 14, 1967) and the case of two black plainclothes officers beaten when the New York tactical patrol force "stampeded a crowd, . . . flailing vigorously with clubs," see Shapiro and Sullivan (1964, p. 93). A related incident not involving force occurred in Watts where a Negro plainclothesman (sent incognito to scout the Watts riot) hailed a radio car to make his report. The officer inside leaned out and asked him, "What you

want, shitass jigaboo? (Wills, 1968)."

The chairman of the Newark Human Rights Commission reported that ". . . men were being brought in, many of them handcuffed behind their backs, being carried like a sack of meal, and the fifth policeman would be hammering their face and body with a billy stick. This went on time after time. Many times you would see a man being brought into the police station without a mark on his face and when he was taken out he was brutally beaten (Governor's Select Commission, 1968, p. 118)." It has been said in jest, although there is an element of truth in it, that

Newark was a classical race riot except the Italians wore blue uniforms.

Police may come to see rioters and suspected rioters, like those convicted of crimes, as having forfeited their civil rights. In Watts an officer responded to a black pedestrian who complained about being stopped on his way home from work: "Don't yell at me; you lost your rights a couple of days ago (Cohen and Murphy,

1967, p. 195)."

There often seemed to be a tendency for police behavior to become progressively worse as the disorders wore on. In Watts, Newark, and Detroit this was partly related to the entrance of higher level control units into the disturbance. The assignment of guardsmen to accompany policemen may be seen by the latter as offering a chance to reverse earlier humiliation and gain revenge for injury and death suffered by the police. At the same time, inexperienced guardsmen, isolated from the authority of their commanding officers, may become subject to the same collective behavior phenomena as police and blacks, further adding to disorder-creating activities.

The head of the Detroit police, a former reporter, was hesitant to call out the guard, noting, "I've been on too many stories where the guard was called up. They're always shooting their own people"; and "Those poor kids were scared pissless, and they scared me (Wills, 1968, pp. 43, 44)." Calling them out was,

however, a necessity to gain federal troops.

What is especially tragic is that the symbols of police legitimacy become the cloak under which much indiscriminate force is exercised upon the Negro community. It is a mistake to attribute such behavior only to the desire for revenge or to a hatred of Negroes, because part of it would seem to be equivalent to the behavior of front line soldiers who in their first combat experience kill many of their own men. That the breakdown of police organization transcends racism may also be seen in police response to student protests (such as at Columbia University) and various anti-war demonstrations.

It is important to recognize that not only was police behavior in the latter stages of several major riots brutal and probably ineffective, but that such acts were not idiosyncratic or random. They were woven into a social fabric of rumor, panic, frustration, fatigue, fear, racism, lack of training, inexperience, and the breakdown of police organization. While such a situation creates widespread fear in the Negro community and may inhibit some rioters, it can lead to (and partly results from) escalation in the level of black violence. There is an interaction process with gradual reciprocal increases in the severity of action taken on both sides. The

fact that police abuses were most pronounced in Newark and Detroit, where disturbances were the most serious, does not imply a one-sided causal interpretation. Here we see the emergent character of the disorders.

Just as the belief that blacks want to kill police spreads among police so the opposite view may spread among black people. According to one account, Negro spectators in Harlem were "convinced that the policemen were the aggressors, in spite of the bricks, bottles, rubbish cans, and Molotov cocktails which flew around the intersection." According to an elderly woman, "They want to kill all of us; they want to shoot all the black people." A man agreed: "They wouldn't do all this gunslinging and clubbing

on 42nd Street (Shapiro and Sullivan, 1964)."

An additional element in the misuse of official force is the view held by some policemen that they can (and indeed must) "hold court in the street," given the presumed leniency and complexity of the legal system (Reiss & Bordua, 1967). Gathering evidence that will hold in court during mass disorders and demonstrations is difficult; those arrested can often be charged with nothing more than a misdemeanor; sentencing for riot offenses tends to be lighter than for similar offenses committed in nonriot situations. The use of violence in such situations may also be related to the policemen's effort to save face and their belief that respect for their authority must be reestablished (Westley, 1953).

The breakdown of police organization and misuse of force did not happen to anywhere near the same extent in all cities that had disturbances. An important question for analysis is why in Watts, Newark, and Detroit—but not in Cincinnati or Boston? The conditions under which such police behavior appears are not well understood. There would seem to be a relationship to things such as training, the extent to which the police share social characteristics with and disagree with or are threatened and offended by the issues raised by protestors, the extent of injuries and provocation faced by police, the size and stage of the riot, the clarity of orders stressing restraint, the tightness of the command structure and whether civilian monitors and high level government and police officials are on the scene, whether or not it is made clear to police that they will be punished for misbehavior, and whether or not police expect disturbance participants to be sufficiently punished by the legal system. That there was a breakdown of police organization in two of the most "professional" (according to the standards of the International Association of Chiefs of Police) departments in the United States, Los Angeles and Chicago, suggests that this issue goes beyond what is usually understood as police professionalism. In fact it may even be that

less "professional" police departments such as Boston's have greater flexibility and a less zealous approach to potential threats to "law and order," permitting them to show greater restraint and making them more effective during a tense period.

Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?

One of the central intellectual problems for social analysis is the basis of social order. If one resolves the question of social order by relying on shared values and the internalization of standards, then this is not seen as an issue. Yet even those who answer the question of social order by stressing the importance of external force usually ignore it. In several of the major disturbances, after a period of time the tragic answer to the question of "who guards the guards" almost seemed to be "no one."

In at least one case, however, the answer to this question was higher level authorities. In a border city whose chief of police wanted ". . . to get every son-of-a-bitch down there; I'm getting goddamned tired of fooling around," the highly professional restraint of state police and National Guard commanders seemed to prevent a police-initiated slaughter in the aftermath of minor disorders following a speech by H. Rap Brown. In the judgment of these higher level commanders, the best control of the disorders was seen to lie in controlling the local police. The original disorders to an important extent grew out of exaggerated fears that Negroes were planning an attack on the downtown area and a state-of-siege world view among white authorities. The police chief was enraged by the wounding of a police officer which had followed instances of "white night-riding" and several shots fired by a deputy sheriff at H. Rap Brown as he walked toward the dividing line between the white and black areas. The white local volunteer fire department refused to put out a fire of unknown origin at a Negro school that had been the center of controversy, resulting in several square blocks being burned down. The National Guard then effectively neutralized the local police force and protected the Negro community, action which clearly contradicts the view of a monolithic, oppressive white control force. In another instance—the 1964 Harlem disturbance—James Farmer felt "the police were hysterical" and reportedly appealed to Governor Rockefeller to send the National Guard to "protect the citizens of Harlem (Shapiro and Sullivan, 1964, pp. 71, 83)."

One of the manifestly unfair aspects of social organization is that those with official power are usually also those (or are intimately tied to those) who possess the power to sanction the misuse of this power. One means by which the police traditionally have been controlled is through the courts by the exclusionary rule, whereby illegal means used in gaining evidence or making arrests are grounds for the dismissal of a case. However, this rule only applies when convictions are sought (a factor often beyond the control of the police). In addition many police abuses do not involve the gathering of evidence. The closeness of the police to the courts and their inter-dependence may inhibit the regulatory role of the former, particularly at lower levels.

Individuals can also bring costly and time consuming civil damage suits against the police, although those most likely to need redress may be least likely to have the resources necessary for a long court struggle—and establishing proof is difficult. The anonymity and confusion of a crowd situation and the tendency to remove badges make identification of offending officials unlikely. In the rare cases where police are criminally prosecuted

for riot offenses, juries tend to find in their favor.

Police have also been controlled through direct political means. The rise of "good government"-inspired civil service reforms and the decline of the urban political machine makes this less likely today. Most of the now defunct Civilian Review Boards met with great police resistance, had no formal enforcement

power, and could not initiate inquiries.

The means of control favored by the police is self-regulation, in a fashion analogous to specialized professions such as medicine or law. It is argued that police work is highly technical and only those who practice it are competent to judge it. Internal review mechanisms have been inadequate to say the least; there is evidence to suggest that, like the rest of us, the police can resist anything but temptation. Knowledge that they are unlikely to be subjected to post-riot sanctioning may have lessened restraints on their use of violence. In many departments there is a strong norm of secrecy surrounding police misbehavior; even when known, infractions often go unpunished.

The consequences, costs, and benefits of various means of regulating the police have not been carefully studied. It is clear from some of the data considered in this paper and from more recent events such as the Chicago Democratic Convention, the Pecple's Park episode in Berkeley, and attacks on groups such as the Black Panthers that the control of the police is sometimes not much affected by the courts, various other checks and balances, internalized norms of fair play, nor internal police organization. The question of control and responsiveness of the police is cer-

tainly among the most pressing of domestic issues.

It has been often suggested that the most hideous crimes have been committed in the name of obedience rather than rebel-

lion. In the Gordon Riots of 1780, demonstrators destroyed property and freed prisoners but evidently did not kill anyone, while authorities killed several hundred rioters and hanged an additional twenty-five. In the Réveillon Riots of the French Revolution, several hundred rioters were killed, but they killed no one (Couch, 1968). Up to the end of the summer of 1967, this pattern was being repeated; police, not rioters, are responsible for most of the more than one hundred riot deaths that have occurred. To an important extent this pattern stems not from differences in will, but from the greater destructive resources of those in power, from their holding power to begin with, and from their ability to sanction. In a related context, the more than one hundred civil rights murders of recent years have been matched by almost no murders of racist whites. (Since 1968, this pattern may be changing.)

As long as racism and poverty exist American society needs relentless protest. It also needs police. It is increasingly clear that police are unduly scapegoated, stereotyped, and maligned; they are, as well, under-paid, under-trained, given contradictory tasks, and made to face directly the ugly consequences of the larger society's failure to change. It is equally clear that solutions to America's racial problems lie much more in the direction of redistributing power and income, eliminating discrimination and exploitation, than in changing the police. Nevertheless, one important factor in heeding the Kerner Commission's plea (1968) to "end the destruction and the violence, not only in the streets of the ghetto but in the lives of the people" is surely more enlightened

police behavior.

REFERENCES

BLUMER H. Race prejudice as a sense of group position. Pacific Sociological Review, 1958, 1, 3-7.

BOUNA, D., & SCHADE, T. Police riots and the inner city and police and urban unrest. Unpublished manuscript, Western Michigan University, 1967.

Bwy, D. Dimensions of conflict in Latin America. American Behavioral Scientist,

1968, 2, 39-50.

CHICAGO COMMISSION ON RACE RELATIONS. The Negro in Chicago. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1923.

COHEN, J., & MURPHY, W. Burn, baby, burn. New York: Avon, 1967. CONOT, R. Rivers of blood, years of darkness. New York: Bantam, 1967.

COUCH, C. Collective behavior: An examination of stereotypes. Social Problems, 1968, 15, 310-321.

CROZIER, M. French students: A letter from Nanterre ca folie. Public Interest, 1968, No. 13, 151-159.

DAHLKE, A. Race and minority riots—A study in the typology of violence. Social Forces, 1952, 30, 419-425.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. Prevention and control of mobs. Washington, D.C., 1967.

Fogelson, R. Violence as protest: An interpretation of the 1960's riots. Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 1968, 29, 25-42.

Franklin, J. H. From slavery to freedom. New York: Knopf, 1965.

Garson, D. The politics of collective violence. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1969.

GOVERNOR'S SELECT COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (New Jersey). Report for Action, 1968.

GRENLEY, W. Social control in Cicero. British Journal of Sociology, 1952, 3, 322-388.

GRIMSHAW, A. Actions of police and the military in American race riots. Phylon, 1963, 24, 271-289.

HERSEY, J. The Algiers Motel incident. New York: Bantam, 1968.

JANOWITZ, M. Social control of escalated riots. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Center for Policy Study, 1968. KERNER, O., et al. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.

New York: Bantam, 1968.

LEE, A. M., & HUMPHREY, N. O. Race Riot. New York: Dryden, 1943.

LEVINE, R. Anti-European violence in Africa: A comparative analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1959, 3, 420-429.

MARSHALL, T. The gestapo in Detroit. Crisis, 1943, 50, 232-234.

MAYNTZ, R. Germany: Radicals and reformers. Public Interest, 1968, No. 13, 160-172.

McCone, J. A., et al. Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles riots. Volume II: Chronology. Los Angeles, 1965.

MERTON, R. Social theory and social structure. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957.

MOLINEUX, E. L. Riots in cities and their suppression. Boston: Headquarters, First Brigade, 1884.

Momboisse, R. Riots, revolts, and insurrections. Springfield, Ill.: Thomas, 1967.

Neiderhoffer, A. Behind the shield. New York: Doubleday, 1967.

New Jersey State Patrolmen's Benevolent Association. A challenge to conscience. Maplewood, N.Y., 1968.

OSOFSKY, G. Race riot, 1900, a study of ethnic violence. Journal of Negro Education, 1963, 32, 16-24.

REISS, A., & BORDUA, D. Environment and organization: A perspective on the police. In D. Bordua (Ed.), The police. New York: Wiley, 1967.

RUDWICK, E. Race riot at East St. Louis, July 2, 1919. Cleveland: World, 1966.

SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT. Police control of riots and demonstrations. San Francisco, 1963.

SELIGMANN, H. J. Race war. New Republic, 1919, 20, 48-50.

SHAPIRO, F. C., & SULLIVAN, J. W. Race Riols. New York: Crowell, 1964. SHELLOW, R., & ROEMER, D. V. The riot that didn't happen. Social Problems, 1966, 14, 221-233.

SHIBUTANI, T., & KWAN, K. H. Ethnic stratification. New York: Macmillan, 1965.

SHOGAN, R., & CRAIG, T. The Detroit race riot. Philadelphia: Chilton, 1964.

SILVER, A. The demand for order in civil society: A review of some themes in the history of urban crime, police, and riots. In D. J. Bordua (Ed.), The Police. New York: Wiley, 1967.

SMELSER, N. Theory of collective behavior. New York: Free Press, 1962.

TURNER, C. C. Planning and training for civil disorder. The Police Chief, 1968, 35, 22-28.

WASKOW, A. I. From Race riot to sit-in: 1919 and the 1960's. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1966.

WENKERT, R., MAGNEY, J., & NEEL, A. Two weeks of racial crisis in Richmond, California. Survey Research Center, Univ. of California, Berkeley, 1967.

WESTLEY, W. A. Violence and the police. American Journal of Sociology, 1953, 59, 34-41.

Westley, W. A. The formation, nature, and control of crowds. Defense Research Board, Canada, 1956.

WHITE, W. F. Chicago and its eight reasons. Crisis, Oct., 1919, 18, No. 6. WILLS, G. The second civil war. New York: New American Library, 1968.

WILSON, J. O. Police morale, reform and citizen respect: The Chicago case. In D. J. Bordua (Ed.), *The police*. New York: Wiley, 1967.

Pathical authorization of the Control Report of the C

The state of the second state of the state o The second secon

The New Ghetto Man: A Review of Recent Empirical Studies¹

Nathan Caplan University of Michigan

What clearly emerges from the recent research findings on Negroes is a picture of a new ghetto man: a black militant who is committed to the removal of traditional racial restraints by open confrontation and, if necessary, by violence; a ghetto man who is very different in his actions and sympathies from the Negro of the past and from the white ghetto dwellers of an earlier period in this country's history. He is a ghetto man whose characteristics are seldom recognized and understood by most white Americans. It is our purpose here to describe him based on existing empirical data—to determine what he is like as a person, how large a segment of the Negro community he represents, what he wants, and how he intends to get it.

Profile of the Black Militant

Political authorities tend to categorize militants who advocate social and economic change through open confrontations as "riffraff"—irresponsible deviants, criminals, unassimilated migrants, emotionally disturbed persons, or members of an underclass. The riffraff theory sees these militants as being peripheral to organized society, with no broad social or political concerns;

¹Adapted from a paper presented at the Second International Congress of Social Psychiatry, London, August, 1969.

it views the frustration that leads to rioting or other forms of militant confrontation as simply part of a long history of personal failure.

It is not difficult to understand why protestors are generally labelled in these terms. By attributing the causes of riots to individual deficiencies, the riffraff theory relieves white institutions of most of the blame. It suggests that individual militants should be changed through psychotherapy, social work, or, if all else fails, prolonged confinement. If protesting militants can be publicly branded as unable to compete successfully because of personal reasons, then their demands for system changes can be declared illegitimate with impunity. Authorities would have the right to use punitive and coercive forms of control in place of working to ameliorate structural deficiencies and injustices.

The data show, however, that the militants are no more socially or personally deviant than their nonmilitant counterparts. In fact, there is good reason to believe that they are outstanding on some important measures of socioeconomic achievement. Tomlinson (1968) concludes from his study that the militants are "the cream of urban Negro youth in particular and

urban Negro citizens in general (p. 28)."

The Extent of Militancy

The available data run counter to the commonly held belief that militancy is characteristic of only a small fraction of the Negro community. Militancy in pursuit of civil rights objectives represents a considerable force in the ghetto. Its support ap-

proaches normative proportions.

As shown in Table 1, in a group of studies using related criterion variables about one third to one half of the ghetto residents surveyed express support for riots and militant civil rights positions. The proportion of persons reporting active participation in riots is less, but the data across studies are equally consistent if differences in methodology and data sources are taken into consideration. Based on random probability sampling of general population, survey data show the level of self-reported riot participation to be 15 percent for Watts (Sears and McConahay, 1970a), and 11 percent for Detroit (Caplan and Paige, 1968a). In Newark, where only males between the ages of fifteen and thirty-five were sampled, 45 percent of the respondents reported riot activity (Caplan and Paige, 1968a). The riot participation figure for males in the same age group from the general population sample surveyed in Detroit is practically identical with the Newark findings.

Interpolating from arrest records, Fogelson and Hill (1968)

TABLE 1
ATTITUDES EXPRESSED BY NEGROES RELATING TO RIOTS

Attitudes Expressed	Percent Study Sample	Locale and Source
A. RIOT SYMPATHY		
Do not view riots as		Nationwide, Fortune, 1967
"essentially bad"	50%	(Beardwood, 1968)
essentially bad	54%	Fifteen American Cities
In sympathy with rioters Believe riots are helpful	The second of	(Campbell and Schuman, 1968)
	30%	Houston, 1967 (McCord and
	30%	Howard, 1968)
	540/	Oakland, 1967 (McCord
Believe riots are helpful	51%	and Howard, 1968)
B. RIOT PARTICIPATION		The state of the s
Active participation in		Watts (Sears and Mc-
Watts riot	15%	Conahay, 1970a)
	THE BOLLET TO DO THE U	Detroit (Caplan and Paige,
Active participation in	11%	1968a)
Detroit riot	45%	Newark (Caplan and Paige,
Active participation in		1968a)
Newark riot	(males, age 15-35)	Six major riot cities, 1967
Active participation in	Market Survive Survive	(Fogelson and Hill, 1968)
riots	20%	Nationwide, Newsweek poll
Willingness to participate		(Brink and Harris, 1966)
in riots	15%	(Brink and Hairis, 1700)
Advocated use of violence	15%	Fifteen American Cities
salling to the Language		(Campbell and Schuman 1968)

estimated that 20 percent of ghetto residents participated in riots that occurred in their cities. Finally, two studies involving surveys in a number of different cities report that 15 percent of the ghetto population advocate or express willingness to participate in riots (Brink and Harris, 1966; Campbell and Schuman, 1968).

In most of these studies, riot sympathy and riot participation related to age and sex. The militant, particularly the rioter, is usually young and most likely male. In so far as it is possible to determine from the available literature, the differences between militants and nonmilitants to be discussed here hold up after age and sex are controlled.

Income—Absolute

According to one variety of the riffraff theory, the rioter is a member of a deprived underclass, part of the "hard core" unemployed—often out of work for long periods of time or chronically unemployable because he lacks skill or education. Having lost contact with the job market and all hope of finding work, he is economically at the very bottom of Negro society.

Data from the major research studies do not support this hypothesis. There is no significant difference in income between rioters and nonrioters. In fact, income and militancy are related only in the way Karl Marx predicted: In the main, the black lumpenproletariat is quiescent, not militant. The available data show that those in the lowest socioeconomic position are the least militant and the least likely to riot (Murphy and Watson, 1970; Caplan and Paige, 1968a; Darrow and Lowinger, 1967; Shulman, 1967).

The poorest of the poor are also low on those variables which show relationships with active protest. Caplan and Paige (1968a) found that the lowest income group tends to score low on black pride and more readily accepts the traditional deprecating Negro stereotypes. Campbell and Schuman (1968) reported a surprising degree of job satisfaction among those who are the most economically disadvantaged. Brink and Harris (1966) found that approval of "Black Power" was lowest among those in the poorest group. Only 13 percent of their low-income respondents approved of the term, compared with 31 percent in the lower middle-income and 26 percent in the middle and upper-income groups. Apparently, continued injustice and the severe withdrawal of resources increase a deprived group's dependency behavior and approval of those who control scarce resources. These findings argue strongly against an "underclass" or strictly economic interpretation of militancy and violent protest in the ghetto.

Income—Relative

Objective poverty in the sense of destitution is not the only issue associated with economic standing which has drawn research attention. The subjective meaning of one's wealth, or the absence of it, in relation to what others have, may also be important in producing the frustration that leads to unrest and rioting.

The widening gap between income levels of whites and blacks often has been cited as a possible cause for the present social unrest. The assumption is that members of the black community are concerned not so much with what they have as with what they feel they deserve compared with the whites. Attention to the discrepancy arouses a sense of social injustice that generates the frustration leading to rioting.

In order to examine the relation of the racial economic gap to riot participation, Caplan and Paige (1968b) asked respondents whether they thought the income gap between Negroes and whites was increasing, remaining the same, or decreasing. They found that 45 percent of the rioters but 55 percent of the nonrioters said the gap was *increasing*. Although the difference between these groups is small, it is opposite in direction to what one would predict on the basis of a relative deprivation hypothesis. More important, when these respondents were questioned about the income gap between the wealthier and poorer Negroes, these percentages were reversed. Fifty-five percent of the rioters and 45 percent of the nonrioters said the gap between the very poor and the higher income level Negroes was increasing.

Thus the rioters are particularly sensitive to where they stand in relation to other Negroes, not to whites. If the "black capitalism" idea, as presently formulated, is carried out seriously as a remedial step to prevent further rioting, it is likely to increase this income gap among Negroes and thereby produce disturbing

consequences.

Education

McCord and Howard (1968) found that educational attainment had no linear relationship to participation in civil rights activity although college-educated respondents in their study were the least opposed to the use of violence. Campbell and Schuman (1968) reported no relationship between education and expressed favorability toward riots. Conversely, Tomlinson (1970) found that militants in Watts had attained a higher level of formal education than their more conservative neighbors. Marx (1967) reported a linear relationship between education and militancy—the higher the respondent's education, the greater the likelihood that he would score high on militancy measures. Forty-two percent of the militants in his study had attended college.

There was a slight tendency for the Watts riot participants to be better educated than the nonparticipants but the difference is too small to be statistically reliable (Murphy and Watson, 1970). Finally, Caplan and Paige (1968a) reported that rioters in Detroit and Newark were significantly higher on an educational

achievement scale than the nonrioters.

Thus, while the average rioter was likely to be a high school dropout, data show that the average nonrioter was more likely to be an elementary school dropout. There is a significant relationship between schooling, militancy, and riot activity, but it is the militants and rioters who are better educated.

Employment

A major difficulty arises in interpreting the relationships between employment and militancy because researchers use varying definitions of unemployment and different criteria for ranking occupational skill levels. It is clear from the available evidence, however, that the militants are not the hardcore unemployed. Rather, the militants, particularly the rioters, have greater job dissatisfaction since they are continually on the margin of the job market, often employed but never for long.

Murphy and Watson (1970) found a tendency for unemployment to be higher among those who were active during the Watts riot although there was no relationship between riot sympathy and employment. Fogelson and Hill (1968) reported a 25 percent unemployment rate among riot arrestees and pointed out that this is about the same level of unemployment as in com-

parable samples in the open community.

In Detroit, Caplan and Paige (1968a) found that the unemployment rate for rioters and nonrioters was practically identical, about 31 percent. But in Newark where the respondents were all young males, unemployment was higher among rioters: 31 percent as compared to 19 percent. Further, in Newark the rioters held higher job aspirations than nonrioters and were also more likely to blame their employment failures on racial barriers rather than on personal deficiencies. The same study showed that the rioters were not chronically but only temporarily unemployed and were marginally related to the labor force, i.e., persons who tended to move in and out of the labor force several times throughout the year.

Social Integration and Values

Political theories often emphasize that the militant is isolated or cut off from the rest of the community. More parochial views speculate that the militant is a social deviant who is alienated from the more responsible elements and forces in the social environment. The data from these studies, however, do not support such views. At least two of the major studies show that the Negro who is militant in the pursuit of civil rights objectives is more likely to be the person best integrated into the black community.

Marx (1967) found a positive relationship between militancy and the number of organizational memberships held. In Detroit and Newark, Caplan and Paige (1968a) reported a similar relationship and, in addition, found that rioters socialized with their neighbors and others in the community more frequently than nonrioters. Finally, Marx (1967) and Caplan and Paige (1968a) demonstrated that the militants were more strongly identified with Negro cultural values and civil rights objectives than those

in the black community who neither support nor participate in

militant activities.

Neither Murphy and Watson (1970) nor Caplan and Paige (1968a) found any relationship between church attendance and riot participation. Marx (1967), however, found that militancy

and church attendance related negatively.

Several of the studies included questions intended to show whether or not militancy and rioting are related to differences in support for an important American value: belief in work and the Protestant ethic. Rioters and nonrioters were virtually identical in their responses to most of these questions (Caplan and Paige, 1968a). About 75 percent of both groups in this study expressed the belief that hard work rather than luck or dependence upon help from others was important for achieving a successful life. Similarly, about 65 percent of the sample studied by Marx (1967) agreed that Negroes could get ahead through hard work.

Fogelson and Hill (1968) found that the crime rate for the riot arrestees was similar to that of the community as a whole. They did, however, report a difference with respect to the types of past offenses. Rioters tended to have committed less serious crimes.

Socialization

Several of the studies include information about some important elements of adjustment. The possibility that the frustrations of the militant may be caused by inadequate socialization because of family disorganization or migration has been investigated. Data on family background are available only in the study by Caplan and Paige (1968a) which found that there was essentially no difference between rioters and nonrioters in the presence of an adult male in the home during formative years.

Region of socialization has also been related to militancy in a number of different studies but the direction of the relationship is opposite to the riffraff hypothesis that rioters are most likely to be found among recent migrants to the urban area. On the contrary: The militant is no parvenu to the city. Rather, he is the

long-term resident who knows urban life best.

Watts respondents born in California were more favorable to the riot (Murphy and Watson, 1970) and more likely to participate in it (Sears and McConahay, 1970a) than those who migrated to the area. Rioters in Detroit and Newark were more likely than nonrioters to have been born and raised in the North (Caplan and Paige, 1968a). In Detroit, six out of ten of the rioters, in contrast to three out of ten of the nonrioters, were born in that city. The distinction between region of socialization and riot participation is even more clearly drawn in the Newark data from the same study. There almost half of the nonrioters but only a quarter of the rioters had been born and raised in the South.

The readiness of the long-term northern-born ghetto resident to participate in riot activity is even more clearly defined in Fogelson and Hill (1968). In addition to finding that the arrestees were more likely to be northern born, they also discovered that the highest proportion of northern-born rioters and the lowest proportion of southern-born rioters were arrested on the first day of rioting. The arrestees on and after the third day represented the highest proportion of southern born and lowest proportion of northern born. Fogelson and Hill also noted a tendency for the southern born to be involved in less flagrant aspects of the riot. They were least likely to have been charged with "assault" and most likely to have been arrested for looting.

Finally, in their study of the meaning of "Black Power" carried out in Detroit, Aberbach and Walker (1968) found that northern-born Negroes more frequently define this concept in militant, political terms. Southern-born Negroes were less likely to view the slogan favorably and less likely to interpret it in a

militant context.

Black Consciousness

Possibly the characteristic of the new ghetto man which has the most etiological significance for understanding the rise of militancy is his Black Consciousness. Both the Detroit and the Newark studies indicate that rioters have strong feelings of racial pride and even racial superiority (Caplan and Paige, 1968a, 1968b). They not only have rejected the traditional stereotype of

the Negro but also have created a positive stereotype.

In both cities, rioters were more likely to view their race more positively than nonrioters on racial comparison items involving dependability, smartness, courage, "niceness," etc. For example, about one-half of rioters but less than one-quarter of nonrioters felt Negroes were "more dependable" than whites. Responses in these studies reflect a higher level of black pride among rioters; those who attempted to quell the disturbance and control the level of destruction deviate in the opposite direction. When the sample was divided into rioters, the uninvolved, and counter-rioters, the rioters were highest and counter-rioters were lowest on several measures of racial pride. Furthermore, half of the rioters and only a third of the nonrioters preferred to be called "black" rather than "colored," "Negro," or "Afro-American." Similarly, Caplan and Paige (1968a, 1968b) found a tendency for rioters to be stronger in the belief that all Negroes should study Negro history and

African languages in the high schools.

Marx (1967) reported that militants prefer Negro newspapers and magazines, are better able to identify Negro writers and civil rights leaders, and have a more positive appreciation of Negro culture than nonmilitants. Darrow and Lowinger (1967) also encountered feelings of a new, positive Negro self-image among the rioters they studied. Consequently, these authors argue against the psychoanalytic interpretations of rioting which hold that participants release aggression associated with self-hatred.

This positive affirmation of racial identity is found not only among the militants but is widespread throughout the Negro community (Campbell and Schuman, 1968). Ninety-six percent of the sample in this study agreed that "Negroes should take more pride in Negro history." Also, four out of ten of the respondents thought that "Negro school children should study an African lan-

guage." (italics mine).

Thucydides said long ago that social revolution occurs when old terms take on new meanings. The wisdom of this statement is apparent in the dramatic, recent change of the meaning for the term "black"—a word that has become a badge of intense pride which borders on racial superiority: "Black is Beautiful."

Attitudes Towards Whites

The fact that racial pride is so high in the black community and the suspicion that it may play a causal role in the rise of militancy raise questions about Negro attitudes towards whites. Do black pride and the desire for black self-development go hand-in-hand with white hatred? What is the overall attitude of the ghetto toward whites?

Although there are some slight inconsistencies in the findings, in general militancy does not appear associated with increased hostility toward whites; the black community as a whole is not markedly anti-white nor preoccupied by social cross-

comparison with whites.

Marx (1967) found that militancy and anti-white attitudes were inversely related. The variables which were most closely related to militancy-intellectual sophistication, high morale, and a positive self-image—correlated negatively with anti-white sentiment. Marx concluded that "they don't hate (whites), but they don't like them either (p. 179)." In an earlier study, Noel (1964) also found that those lowest in anti-white feelings were the most militant proponents of civil rights action. Although he presents no supporting data, Tomlinson (1970) also reported that

the militants in the Watts study are not notably anti-white.

Murphy and Watson (1970) reported a slight tendency for the economically better-off riot participants to be more hostile towards whites. Caplan and Paige (1968a) similarly found the rioters to be slightly more anti-white, but equally hostile to more affluent Negroes. Also, it should be pointed out that several attempts to test if rioters are more likely to use whites as social comparative referents have found no support for this possibility.

When considered in the aggregate, the Negro community is probably far less anti-white than most whites are prepared to believe. Campbell and Schuman (1968) found little evidence of anti-white hostility in their study. Only 13 percent of their respondents wanted to live in an all black or mostly black neighborhood; only 6 percent believed that American Negroes should establish a separate black nation; and only 9 percent felt that Negroes should have as little as possible to do with whites. Furthermore, only 6 percent wanted Negro children to go to only Negro schools and 5 percent preferred to have only Negro friends. On the basis of responses to these and a number of similar items, Campbell and Schuman concluded: "Negroes hold strongly, perhaps more strongly than any other element in the American population, to a belief in nondiscrimination and racial harmony (p. 17)."

In general, these findings are not different from the results of earlier studies. Noel and Pinkney (1964) found that 41 percent of Negroes sampled in four cities expressed no particular antipathy toward whites. Among the respondents in the nationwide survey by Brink and Harris (1966), 80 percent reported that they preferred to work with a racially mixed group; 68 percent preferred to live in an integrated neighborhood; 70 percent preferred to have their children attend school with white children; and only 5 percent supported Black Nationalism. Only about 4 percent of Marx's (1967) total sample supported pro-nationalistic statements.

In the Murphy and Watson (1970) and Caplan and Paige (1968b) studies, anti-white sentiment was most intense among riot participants when associated with perceived discrimination practices which restricted social and economic mobility for Negroes. Neither social envy of whites nor material greed motivates men to riot, but rather anger over the conditions that produce—and the practices that sustain—barriers denying Negroes the same freedoms and opportunities available to whites.

Political Attitudes

Almost all recent studies of Negro communities have included political items in their interview schedules and, without exception, the data show that militants are politically more sensitive and better informed than nonmilitants. They are not, however, politically alienated. What they want is what is already

guaranteed by law, not a new political system.

Tomlinson (1970) reported that, compared with nonmilitants, militants in Watts were politically more active, more likely to refer to the riot in "revolutionary" terms, and less distrustful of elected officials. Marx (1967) found that almost twice as many militants as nonmilitants voted during the 1960 presidential election (31 percent vs. 17 percent). Sears (1970) and Sears and McConahay (1970b) reported that Watts arrestees and riot participants expressed greater political discontent and were more cynical of the responsiveness of local political powers to Negro grievances than nonrioter samples.

Caplan and Paige (1968a) found that rioters were more familiar with the identification of political personalities, more distrustful of politicians, and more likely to cite anger at politicians as a cause of the riot. In Newark, 44 percent of the rioters and 34 percent of the nonrioters reported "almost never" when asked if local government could be trusted "to do what is right." In Detroit, 42 percent of the rioters but only 20 percent of the nonrioters cited "anger with politicians" as a major cause of the riot.

The kinds of discontents that are felt most intensely by the militants reflect feelings that are widespread throughout the Negro community. Sears (1969) reported that 45 percent of the random sample of Watts residents said that "elected officials cannot generally be trusted (p. 21)"; this figure compares with 17 percent of a comparable white sample. Despite these discontents with political representation and the domination of the political system by whites, there is no evidence of broad rejection of the political system itself. Brink and Harris (1966) found that 74 percent of the Negroes in their sample expressed the desire to attain civil rights objectives through existing political channels. Also, Campbell and Schuman (1968) found no evidence indicating that Negroes want a new form of political functioning.

Fate Control

The final characteristic of the militant that must be given special emphasis can be called fate control or the power to maintain control over those environmental forces that affect one's destiny. Although none of the researchers conceptualize this variable as such, several findings imply its distinct character as well as its significance to the emergence of militancy in the ghetto.

For example, Marx (1967) identifies "intellectual sophistication" as one of the three variables most strongly related to militancy. He describes intellectual sophistication as greater knowledge of the world and a way of looking at the world. Two important related factors that make up this variable are a broad liberated world outlook and a great sensitivity to the way social factors shape human behavior. In essence, Marx stresses that the militant is more likely to be cognitively correct about the external forces that influence his behavior and how they impede his ability to effectuate personal goals.

Meyer (1968) concluded that Miami-area Negroes who scored high on militancy possess ". . . a strong feeling that they can and should shape their destinies (p. 22)." He based his interpretation on the association between the respondents' scores on militancy and their sense of personal and political efficacy. In a survey study of Los Angeles Negroes, Ransford (1968) found that "powerlessness," which he defines as "a low expectancy of control over events (p. 583)," was strongly related to the respondent's willingness to use violence. Those with the highest scores on

powerlessness held the highest commitment to violence.

Crawford and Naditch (1968) reexamined Ransford's data along with data from two other survey studies. By combining powerlessness with Rotter's internal-external schema, they found that the more militant respondents were characterized by a high sense of personal efficacy and low control over external forces that affect the probability of achieving personal goals. Employing a similar analytical framework, Gurin et al. (1969) found a marked tendency for militancy among Negro students to be associated with the belief that they could not reach personal goals because of external or social systemic constraints. Finally, the blockedopportunity theory which emphasizes environmental rather than personal factors as the cause of riots (Caplan and Paige, 1968b) is supported by the survey data from that study which found that rioters desire increased mastery over the distribution of resources rather than the mere acquisition of resources. For a more extensive discussion of this concept see the Forward and Williams (1970) article in this issue.

Conclusions

There is a surprising degree of empirical regularity and basic

coherence to the findings discussed here, even though they come from studies carried out in several parts of the country by different investigators employing various methodological approaches. This agreement allows us to draw some important conclusions with reasonable comfort and confidence in their validity, conclusions which should help achieve a better understanding of the militant and a safer evaluation of his behavior.

1. Militancy in the pursuit of civil rights objectives represents a considerable force within the ghetto. Its support approaches normative proportions and is by no means limited to a deviant and irresponsible minority.

2. The militant is a viable creature in search of practical responses to arbitrary institutional constraints and preemptions which deny him the same freedom and conventional opportunities as the white majority. He is the better educated but underemployed, politically disaffected but not the politically alienated. He is willing to break laws for rights already guaranteed by law, but under ordinary circumstances he is no more likely to engage in crime than his nonmilitant neighbor. He is intensely proud of being black, but neither desires revenge from whites nor is socially envious of them. He has little freedom or resources to effectuate his personal goals, but strongly desires freedom and ownership of his own life. Indeed, this new man of the ghetto is also the man of paradox.

3. The characteristics of the militants together with the large proportion of ghetto blacks who share their views certainly indicate that the fight for civil rights will not end with the recent riots. Even though the time and place of their occurrence may not be predictable nor their instrumental value always clear, the riots are neither random events nor marginal, temporary phenomena. The militants must be taken seriously

and not simply treated as troublemakers.

4. With candor and a few frills, the Kerner Commission cited white racism as the major cause of ghetto riots. Undoubtedly, white racism is a root issue, but it has been present for over three hundred years and, therefore, is insufficient as a sole explanation of riots of such magnitude and intensity as occur at this point in time. The logic of scientific proof would require that we look for causal factors whose relationships are more contemporaneous.

The findings reviewed here suggest that Negroes who riot do so because their conception of their lives and their potential has changed without commensurate improvement in their chances for a better life. In the midst of squalor and despair, Negroes have abandoned the traditional stereotypes that made nonachievement and passive adaptation seem so natural. Rather, they have developed a sense of black consciousness and a desire for a way of life with which they can feel the same pride and sense of potency they now derive from being black. Without these changes in self-perception, the demands to be regarded and treated as an individual with the same liberties as white Americans would never have reached the intensity that they have today. If this interpretation of the research is correct, it could be argued that the riots and other forms of civil rights protest are caused by the self-discovery of the American Negro and his attempt to recreate himself socially in ways that are commensurate with this new image. This battle for greater personal rights can be expected to continue as long as the Negro's political, social, and economic efficacy is not aligned with his new and

increasing sense of personal potency.

5. The limited data available at this time do not permit us to make fine grain projections about the maturation pattern of riot activity, the future forms of other protest activity, or their outcome. Possibly the most that one can say at this time about the meaning of these outbreaks is: First, they are more similar to the early slaveship uprisings than they are to the white-initiated interracial riots that occurred after World Wars I and II. Ghetto-locked blacks are claiming ownership of their behavior and are demanding the freedom and opportunity necessary to control their destiny. They are interested in 'white blood' or the glorification of violence. Second, it seems safe to conclude that the riots represent an elementary form of political activity. But, it must be emphasized that the political objectives are conservative. The militants are not rebelling against the system itself but against the inequities and contradictions of the system.

If this nation is serious about the application of democratic principles to human affairs, then it must increase the power of the black man to improve his position beyond anything now possible in American society. The stereotype of the Negro-which for seven generations has been used to destroy his initiative, motiva-tion, and hope—is a reality apart from what these studies show him to be. He emerges in these studies as more American than those who built the ghetto and those who now maintain it. Unless this nation acts now to redress the balance in social and economic distance between the races, we will probably have lost forever the ideal of the democratic prospect and, like other nations in the past, will resort to what C. P. Snow calls "hideous crimes in the name of obedience." It is clear that the Negro will not give up the struggle for a better life. Unlike the Negro in the past, the present ghetto dwellers have neither the psychological defenses nor the social supports that permit passive adaptation to barriers that prevent implementation of their potential capabilities. In a sense, they are the hearing children of deaf parents.

REFERENCES

ABERBACH, D., & WALKER, L. The meanings of black power: A comparison of white and black interpretations of a political slogan. Paper presented at the 1968.

Beardwood, R. The new Negro mood. Fortune Magazine, 1968, 77, 146-152.

BRINK, W., & HARRIS, L. Black and white. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966.

CAMPBELL, A., & SCHUMAN, H. Racial attitudes in fifteen American cities. Supplement Studies for The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Government Printing Office, 1968.

CAPLAN, N. S., & PAIGE, J. M. In O. Kerner, et al. Report of The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. New York: Bantam Press, 1968, 127-137. (a)

CAPLAN, N. S., & PAIGE, J. M. A study of ghetto rioters. Scientific American,

August 1968, 219(2), 15-21. (b)

CRAWFORD, T. J., & NADITCH, M. Unattained and unattainable goals: Relative deprivation, powerlessness, and racial militancy. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, San Francisco, California, 1968.

DARROW, C., & LOWINGER, P. The Detroit uprising: A psychosocial study. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis, New

York, 1967.

FOGELSON, R. M., & HILL, R. B. Who riots? A study of participation in the 1967 riots. Supplement Studies for The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Government Printing Office, 1968.

Forward, J., & Williams, J. Internal-external control and black militancy. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26(1).

GURIN, P., GURIN, G., LAO, R., & BEATTIE, M. Internal-external control in the motivational dynamics of Negro youth. Journal of Social Issues, 1969, 25(3), 29-53.

MARX, G. T. Protest and prejudice: A study of belief in the black community. New York:

Harper and Row, 1967.

McCord, W., & Howard, J. Negro opinions in three riot cities. American Behavioral Scientist, March/April, 1968, 11(4), 24-27.

MEYER, P. Negro militancy and Martin Luther King: The aftermath of martyrdom. Washington, D.C.: Knight Newspapers, 1968. MURPHY, R. J., & WATSON, J. M. The structure of discontent. In N. E. Cohen (Ed.), The Los Angeles riots: A socio-psychological study. New York: Praeger, 1970.

NOEL, D. L. Group identification among Negroes: An empirical analysis. Journal

of Social Issues, 1964, 20(2), 71-84.

NOEL, D. L., & PINKNEY, A. Correlates of prejudice: Some racial differences and

similarities. American Journal of Sociology, 1964, 69(6), 609-622.

Ransford, H. E. Isolation, powerlessness, and violence: A study of attitudes and participation in the Watts riot. American Journal of Sociology, 1968, 73, 581-591.

SEARS, D. O. Political attitudes of Los Angeles Negroes. In N. E. Cohen (Ed.), The Los Angeles riots: A socio-psychological study. New York: Praeger, 1970.

SEARS, D. O., & McConahay, J. B. Riot participation. In N. E. Cohen (Ed.), The Los Angeles riots: A socio-psychological study. New York: Praeger, 1970. (a) SEARS, D. O., & McConahay, J. B. The politics of discontent. In N. E. Cohen

(Ed.), The Los Angeles riots: A socio-psychological study. New York: Praeger, 1970. (b)

SHULMAN, J. Ghetto residence, political alienation and riot orientation. Unpublished manuscript, Cornell University, 1967.

TOMLINSON, T. M. The development of a riot ideology among urban Negroes.

American Behavioral Scientist, March/April, 1968, 11(4), 27-31.

TOMLINSON, T. M. Militance, violence, and poverty: Ideology and foundation for action. In N. E. Cohen (Ed.), The Los Angeles riots: A socio-psychological study. New York: Praeger, 1970.

Internal-External Control and Black Militancy¹

John R. Forward² and Jay R. Williams

Research Center for Group Dynamics University of Michigan

Any theory that hopes to account for the occurrence of ghetto riots and urban violence in the 1960s must be able to explain the social-psychological changes taking place in the new generation of black urban youth. These changes are so intensive and extensive that in his review of the empirical riot literature in this issue, Caplan (1970) has gone so far as to suggest that a new ghetto man is emerging, one who is radically different from his predecessors.

One of the most important changes concerns the way in which the new ghetto man views himself in relation to his world. Whereas formerly most ghetto residents were inclined to accept their fate passively and to acquiesce to the external social and

¹This essay was a 1969 co-winner of the second annual Gordon Allport Intergroup Relations Prize, made possible by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith and awarded by SPSSI. Collection and analysis of 1967 data were made possible by a grant from the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. Our thanks go to the many persons who made this study possible but in particular to our colleagues Carleton Guptill, who labored hard during the data gathering stage of the project, and to Edgar Epps, who graciously shared his data with us; to Dr. Epps's staff, Steven Schwartz and Judith Kovan Cohen, who answered our questions and made many useful suggestions; to Charles Betsey, who recruited and supervised our black interviewers, and to Dale J. Helland, who brought the divergent pieces of information together for analysis.

economic forces which shape the ghetto, the new man is coming to see himself as capable of direct and effective action towards changing the oppressive conditions under which he lives. Moreover, instead of accepting the old stereotypes about his condition being the result of his own inherent weaknesses and lack of motivation, the new ghetto man is becoming increasingly aware of the social and economic forces that lock him into the ghetto: he can appraise more realistically the sources of the discriminatory barriers that block him from developing and utilizing his abilities.

Internal-External Control and Willingness to Use Violence

The statement above includes a number of specifically social-psychological concepts such as self-esteem, social comparison, and frustration-aggression. But the concept that is most central is internal-external control (IE), developed originally by Rotter within his theory of social learning and subsequently applied to a variety of human behaviors in social settings (Rotter, 1966). As defined by Rotter, internal control refers to a person's belief that reinforcements, social or otherwise, are contingent upon his own actions, or more generally the belief that one can shape to some extent his own fate. External control refers to the belief that reinforcing events occur independently of one's own actions and that the future is determined more by chance and luck than by purposive behavior.

The importance of the IE concept for understanding the psychological basis for an acceptance of and a willingness to engage in violence is demonstrated by the fact that most of the major theories of riot causation make use of the concept in one form or another. For example, in relating his expanded version of relative deprivation theory to urban unrest, Pettigrew (1967) states that the key to understanding the timing (why now?) aspect of unrest is that recent advances are being viewed by Negroes as gains due to their own increasing sense of internal control over their lives and not simply as gains granted coincidentally or paternalistically by outside agencies. It is with this change that the ever-present "want-get" gap of relative deprivation theory becomes significantly related to a readiness to use violence in the pursuit of civil rights objectives when other means appear to be futile.

However, while most theories agree on the significance of the IE concept, at least two important theories make opposite predictions about how it is related to a willingness to use violence among ghetto residents. The blocked-opportunity theory (Caplan & Paige, 1968), like Pettigrew's (1967) version of relative deprivation

theory, predicts that those with the greatest sense of internal control are most willing to use violence. On the other hand, alienationpowerlessness theory (Ransford, 1968) predicts that those who are lowest in internal control and who have the strongest feelings of subjective powerlessness are most disposed to resort to violence.

Two Theories of Riot Participation

Blocked-Opportunity Theory. The blocked-opportunity theory views the ghetto riots as a violent reaction among young Negroes towards the racist attitudes and practices of the dominant white society. According to this theory, persons most likely to be riot participants are those who have high aspirations for their own lives and believe in their ability to achieve these goals but who also perceive that it is discrimination and not their own inadequacy which prevents them from effecting their goals (Caplan and

Paige, 1968).

Support for this theory is found in several studies. Some years ago Gore and Rotter (1963) reported that black students who were willing to take part in civil rights demonstrations showed higher internal control scores than students unwilling to participate. Marx (1967) found that his measure of militancy was positively related to a combination of positive self-image and a greater awareness of the external constraints which keep black people in a disadvantaged social position. In their studies of the Newark and Detroit riots of 1967, Caplan and Paige (1968) found that riot participants were distinguished from nonrioters by their strong feelings of racial pride and by their attribution of blame for not getting ahead in society to discrimination rather than to sources within themselves. Caplan's review of riot studies (Caplan, 1970) clearly demonstrates that rioters are those with the strongest sense of personal efficacy but who see little chance at present of exercising control by conventional political means. These data provide support for the prediction that the riot participant is most likely to be a person with a strong belief in internal control but also a belief that external forces are largely responsible for his inability to exercise this control in important areas of life.

Alienation-Powerlessness Theory. The alienation-powerlessness theory (Ransford, 1968) presents a different picture of those most disposed towards violence and rioting. Three antecedent conditions are stressed. The first is structural isolation—persons who live in segregated ghettos are relatively more isolated from the institutions and norms of the dominant society; such people are therefore more likely to resort to violent action rather than more conventional means to express grievances or to register protest. The second factor is the feeling of subjective powerlessness (low internal control) which may or may not be related to the objective condition of powerlessness associated with structural isolation. The third factor contributing to the predisposition to engage in rioting is a feeling of racial dissatisfaction—a feeling that one's position in society is inferior or even illegitimate because of prej-

udice and segregation.

In an empirical test of the theory using data gathered from various districts in Los Angeles including Watts, Ransford (1968) found strong support for the hypothesis that all three factors have an independent and additive effect on willingness to engage in violence. In particular, he found that those who reported most willingness to engage in rioting scored lowest for internal control on the Rotter IE Scale (Rotter, 1966). These data support the prediction from alienation-powerlessness theory that riot participants are more likely to be those whose feelings of low internal control and racial dissatisfaction lead them to react explosively and unpredictably to their condition of isolation whenever the opportunity for violence is present.

A New Look at Internal-External Control

Part of the problem of the relationship between IE and violence may be due to conceptual ambiguity and the inability of the original Rotter IE Scale to tap all of the dimensions of the concept, especially as it applies to segregated minority populations. In an excellent reanalysis of the IE concept and its application to black populations, Gurin, Gurin, Lao, & Beattie (1969) have disentangled some of these difficulties. One example is that a high external control score on the part of a ghetto person may indicate a realistic appraisal of external forces at work in the ghetto rather than the more commonly assumed belief that events are due to fate or chance. Also, a high internal control score for a ghetto resident may indicate strong feelings of worthlessness and self-blame for the negative aspects of his existence rather than a feeling of personal efficacy in its more common positive sense.

In a factor analysis of the original items from Rotter's IE Scale administered to Negro populations, Gurin et al. (1969) found that two distinct factors emerged. The first factor included almost all of the items with a first-person referent; it seems to tap the individual's feeling of internal control over his own future (personal control). The second factor, including items with a third-person referent, appears to measure an individual's more general beliefs about the relationships among ability, effort, and success in the society at large (control ideology). For example, a

sense of internal personal control is defined by endorsement of the item, "When I make plans, I am almost certain I can make them work." Endorsement of the item, "People will get ahead in life if they have the goods and do a good job," defines the internal end of the control ideology dimension. Presenting data from high school and college samples, Gurin et al. show that although black students endorse the Protestant Ethic (control ideology) items equally as strongly as white students, black students show lower

scores on the personal control items.

To relate the internal-external concept more specifically to the racial situation, Gurin et al. created an additional set of items. A factor analysis produced several factors, the central one being individual-system blame. This factor measures a person's tendency to attribute his depressed condition either to his own perceived inadequacies and failings or to the socio-economic system which maintains the ghetto. The Gurin et al. data (1969) show that a high score on system blame, in this case an external orientation, is associated with greater participation in civil rights activities among black college students and with the belief that collective rather than individual action is needed to combat exclusion and discrimination.

Revised Predictions

In the light of Gurin et al.'s reanalysis of the IE concept we can revise the predictions made earlier. A clear contradiction remains for predictions of the relationship between personal internal control and tendencies towards violence made by the two theories under consideration. Blocked-opportunity theory predicts that rioters and militants will have a stronger sense of personal control than nonmilitants, whereas alienationpowerlessness theory predicts the opposite—that rioters will have a much weaker belief than nonrioters in their ability to control

events and outcomes in their own personal lives.

For the third-person items on the Rotter IE Scale, which are assumed to measure a general belief in Protestant Ethic values about work and rewards, a clear prediction is possible from alienation theory but not from blocked-opportunity theory. The assumption made by alienation-powerlessness theory that rioters and militants are structurally isolated from the institutions and value systems of the larger society leads to the prediction that militants will score lower than nonmilitants on the control ideology items. For blocked-opportunity theory, the much weaker prediction is made that rioters and militants will endorse the Protestant Ethic values represented by the control ideology items equally if not more than nonmilitants. The assumption underlying this prediction is that militants are just as concerned as nonmilitants with striving for a place in the socio-economic system

and with gaining a share of its rewards.

For the individual-system blame factor on the Gurin et al. IE Scale, both theories predict that rioters and militants will show a strong tendency to blame the system for their depressed ghetto existence and that nonmilitants will tend more to turn the blame inwards onto their own perceived inadequacies and lack of motivation. Since the scoring for individual-system blame is keyed for the individual blame or internal items, low internal scores are

predicted for those most willing to use violence.

Although the predictions are the same for this factor, the dynamics assumed for system blame by militants are different for the two theories. Under the assumptions of blocked-opportunity theory, system blame stems from a realistic appraisal of system roadblocks; presumably, violent action is seen as instrumental for the ultimate removal of these obstacles. By contrast, the assumption of alienation-powerlessness theory is that system blame and violence against it is part of a blind outburst of rage by men who feel incapable of any other action. Additional data will be required in order to distinguish the dynamics behind the choice of low internal items on the Gurin et al. IE Scale.

A Sample of Young Black Students and a Riot

A unique opportunity to test predictions occurred in 1967 during the Detroit riot. For about a year prior to the riot, a large amount of data had been collected from several inner-city high schools in Detroit as part of a study of Negro academic achievement (Epps, 1969). Among the data collected were questions concerning background, future educational and occupational aspirations, and family, plus many personality and attitudinal scales including both the Rotter (1966) and the Gurin et al. (1969) IE scales. The data were collected in three waves: student data in September and November of 1966, and data from interviews with parents (mostly mothers) in March of 1967.

Within five days of the start of the riot in July 1967 and before the sniping had ended, black interviewers were in the riot area interviewing students and former students from one high school located in the heart of the riot area. (In fact, at the time the National Guard was using the high school as their headquarters.) Since background data were already available, the interview concentrated on students' perception of the riot—how they defined it, how it started, who was responsible, what would happen, and in

general whether it was seen as a good or a bad thing. Because the riot was still underway, responses were spontaneous, very heterogeneous, and relatively uncontaminated by mass media opinion

about the riot.

For interviewing, a subsample of 93 students was selected from an original 1-in-5 random sample of the riot area high school. The criterion used for selection of the subsample was that at least two waves of the Epps data had been completed. The subsample matched the overall school sample with respect to size and age—46% of the subsample and 47% of the total sample are male and the median age for both is fifteen years. The subsample was also representative of the school on several important socioeconomic indices, including education and occupation for both mother and father of interviewee, family composition, and family size. However, the subsample had a greater proportion of students with non-working mothers (47% as compared with the sample's 30%).

In four days of interviewing under very difficult conditions, 71% of the interviews were completed. One respondent personally refused the interview; the parents of five more refused to allow their teenagers to be interviewed. The remaining missing cases were those where families had moved, were out of town, or could not otherwise be located. Interviews were conducted in the homes

of the respondents.

Independent Variables

The major independent variable, internal-external control, was represented by the three measures already discussed. The first is the score based on first-person items from the Rotter IE Scale (Rotter, 1966) and referred to here as personal control. The second IE measure consists of third-person items from the Rotter Scale and is here labelled control ideology. The third measure is the specially constructed IE Scale for racial situations (Gurin et al., 1969) and is designed to assess individual-system blame. The Gurin IE Scale is the only measure to be administered in both the 1966 student motivation study (Epps, 1969) and the 1967 riot study. All other independent measures were collected in the 1966 student study before the riot.

A further set of variables was included that measured attitudes and personality characteristics closely related to the major IE measures. In addition to the first-person Rotter items, feelings of personal control were measured by a personal efficacy scale used by Coleman and his associates in their study of educational opportunity (Coleman, et al., 1966). The items reflect the degree

to which a person perceives that he is able to have an effect on the world around him. Also related to the personal control dimension is a composite measure of alienation and fear of success constructed by Epps (1969) which included several items from Rosen's Achievement Value Scale (Rosen & D'Andrade, 1959) and some items from Srole's (1956) Anomie Scale. A measure closely related to the individual-system blame dimension of the Gurin IE Scale is the criticism of education index (Moore & Holtzman, 1965) which assesses the extent to which students see their education as rele-

vant or irrelevant to their needs and aspirations.

A final set of independent variables included measures that should help to distinguish between assumptions which are made by the theories but are not directly related to the IE concept. For example, blocked-opportunity theory predicts that militants are highly motivated in terms of advancing themselves within the system: alienation-powerlessness theory views militants as lacking in this motivation and as objectively and subjectively outside of the larger social system. Several variables provide an opportunity to test these assumptions. Grade-point average and scores from the Standard College Aptitude Test measured academic achievement and ability, respectively, while achievement motivation was measured by the TAT measure of need for Achievement (Atkinson, 1958). Ín addition, measures of educational and occupational expectations were available. Alienation-powerlessness theory predicts very low scores on these measures for militants and riot supporters: blocked-opportunity theory predicts higher scores for militants than nonmilitants.

In the analyses which follow, the high/low categories for all independent variables were determined by a median split of the

entire sample.

A Measure of Riot Attitude

The main dependent measure consists of a coding of the immediate reactions to the Detroit riot reported by students living in the riot area. Responses to the question, "What do you think has been happening in Detroit in the last few days?", were coded into three broad evaluative categories which produced a reliable measure of attitude towards the riot. It was found that although responses to this broad open-ended question predicted the responses to more specific questions about the causes and possible consequences of the riot, the reverse was not always the case. The three categories will be labelled GOOD, BAD, and UNCER-TAIN. Inter-coder agreement between two independent coders was 92% for this question.

Seven of the 65 respondents fell into the GOOD category; they defined the riot as a justifiable expression of Negro rage and frustration or as a means to wake up the larger community to the plight of the ghetto. It may be noted that these young black students who reacted positively to the riot comprise only 11% of the subsample interviewed. However, in terms of possible riot participation, this is not an unreasonable figure since typically between 10 and 15% participation by ghetto residents has been found in other riot studies (Caplan, 1970).

Twenty-one respondents fell into the BAD category; these students felt the riot was wrong, was hurting the people in the ghetto, or was hurting the cause of civil rights. The remaining 37 respondents were included in the intermediate UNCERTAIN category, which is a mixed bag of puzzled, uncertain, indifferent,

and don't know responses.

Although these categories represent verbal reactions to the riot and are not measures of actual participation, because of their central location and the intimate knowledge of the riot revealed in other questions there can be little doubt that all respondents were in contact with rioting at one time or another, either as

participants or observers.

Finally, the distinctive nature of the present data cannot be overemphasized. That all the independent measures were collected before the riot began is not only unusual but it avoids the confounding of responses to independent and dependent measures which occurs when both are obtained at the same time and after an event like a riot.

Personal Control and Control Ideology: Results from the Rotter Scale

For this analysis, the total score on the Rotter IE Control Scale was divided between two factors—the personal control factor which includes all first-person items and the control ideology factor which includes most of the items having a third-person referent. Table 1 shows that there was a strong relationship between personal control scores obtained from black senior high school students in 1966 and their reactions to the Detroit riot in the following year. Persons who reacted positively to the riot had the highest scores for personal control and those reacting negatively had the lowest scores. No differences were found among riot attitude groups for scores on the control ideology items. It may be noted also that no significant differences were found for the total scores on the Rotter Scale ($\chi^2 = 1.92$).

TABLE 1
INTERNAL-EXTERNAL CONTROL (ROTTER SCALE)
AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE RIOT

		Evaluation of Riot			
	GOOD %	UNCERTAIN %	BAD %	x ²	Þ
Personal Control					The Late
HIGH	100	57	24	40.07	
LOW	0	33	67	13.07	< .01
Control Ideology					
HIGH	57	54	47	Walter T	
LOW	43	38	53	0.66	ns

Note.—for GOOD-N = 7, UNCERTAIN-N = 37, BAD-N = 21. Percentages are by column with missing data excluded.

The results for personal control provide support for the prediction from blocked opportunity theory that young black militants in the ghetto are those who have developed some confidence in their ability to shape events in their own lives if they are given the chance. They are not defeated fatalists with strong feelings of subjective powerlessness, as predicted by alienation-powerlessness theory. The results for control ideology, which measures a general belief in the Protestant Ethic value of the relationship of ability and work to future rewards, provide no strong support for either theory of riot causation. Perhaps, though, the finding of no difference between riot supporters and nonsupporters in strength of Protestant Ethic beliefs is more compatible with the assumptions of blocked-opportunity theory than with those of alienation-powerlessness theory which unequivocally predicts that riot supporters are those who are isolated from the influence of the institutionalized values of the dominant society.

Self versus System Blame: Results from the Gurin IE Scale

Whereas a high internal control score on the Rotter IE Scale is assumed to measure strong positive feelings of self efficacy, a high internal score on the Gurin IE Scale reflects a negative tendency among ghetto residents, a tendency to attribute the blame for their condition to themselves rather than to external factors. Table 2 shows the results for two administrations of the Gurin Scale—the first in late 1966 before the riot and the second during the riot in July 1967. For the relationship between 1966 scores and riot attitudes, those reacting favorably did not differ significantly from those reacting unfavorably to the riot; however,

TABLE 2 INTERNAL-EXTERNAL BLAME (GURIN I/E SCALE) AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE RIOT

TO PARTICULAR OF	Evaluation of Riot			χ ² Partitions ^a		
		UNCERTAIN %	BAD %	χ ² overall	χ_1^2 (good × bad)	χ^2_2 (good + bad × uncertain)
Internal Blame	853308	T ODERWIND T		Sonia		
Before Riot (1966)						
HIGH	43	68	29	10.09**	0.43	9.66**
LOW	57	27	71	10.07	0.13	
Internal Blame						
During Riot (1967)					
HIGH	0	68	50	11.81**	5.25*	6.56**
LOW	100	30	50	11.81	3.23	0.50

Note.—For GOOD-N = 7, UNCERTAIN-N = 37, BAD-N = 21. Percentages are by column with missing data excluded.

The overall χ^2 is partitioned into two independent interactions (see Castellan, 1965). Degrees of freedom are 2 for the overall χ^2 and 1 for each partitioned χ^2 .

*p < .05; **p < .01.

both these groups had significantly lower internal-blame scores than persons who reported that they were puzzled, confused, or uncertain about what was going on during the riot. The results for the 1967 post-riot administration of the Gurin Scale replicate the 1966 findings except that in addition, people in the GOOD riot evaluation category had significantly lower internal-blame scores than persons in the BAD category. This latter is the original prediction made by both theories of riot causation discussed above.

Apparently, those who oppose the riot are not less willing to place the blame for their ghetto existence on outside sources than those who viewed the riot with approval. This suggests that the main difference between these two groups is not so much in attitudes toward civil rights and discrimination as in beliefs about the instrumental use of violence to gain these ends. Unfortunately, we have no data to test this idea at the present time, although further results presented below may help to clarify this question.

A striking finding which may not be obvious from Table 2 was the degree to which the mean scores for individual-system blame among riot attitude categories polarized over time. While the mean scores for the BAD and the UNCERTAIN groups shifted towards higher internal-blame scores, the mean score for the GOOD category showed a significant shift in the opposite direction—towards greater external-system blame. For the BAD category the 1966 mean was 8.11 compared with 9.25 in 1967 $(t = 2.06, df\ 20, p < .06)$. For UNCERTAIN, the mean in 1966

was 9.91 and in 1967 10.58 (t = 1.80, df 36, p < .10). However, for the GOOD category, the means were 7.57 in 1966 and a very low 4.33 in 1967 (t = 2.27, df 6, p < .08). So it seems that the effect of the riot was to increase dramatically the degree to which young black militants blamed external sources for their plight while it had an opposite effect on nonmilitants who tended to direct even more blame towards themselves than before the riot. This finding is similar to a difference found between rioters and nonrioters in a larger study which included the Detroit riot and which showed that while rioters blamed the riot on police, merchants, and other external sources, nonrioters were more inclined to blame the riot on internal sources, such as drunkenness, shiftlessness, and the desire to get something for nothing (Caplan, 1970).

Achievement and Achievement Motivation

Several findings using measures of academic achievement and achievement motivation provide further support for the main finding and help to enrich the description of the young black ghetto militant. Although riot supporters did not differ from nonsupporters in their expectations for future educational and occupational success, as predicted by the blocked-opportunity theory, they did show slightly higher grade-point averages ($\chi^2 = 3.06, p < .10$). Also, on the TAT measure of need for Achievement, persons who evaluated the riot positively showed much higher scores than those who evaluated the riot negatively (Table 3). Shown also in Table 3, riot supporters had lower scores on the combined alienation-fear of success measure than did persons in other riot attitude categories. These findings are consistent with the results for personal efficacy, again supporting the assumptions of blocked-opportunity theory and providing no support for alienation-powerlessness theory. Consonant with the earlier finding that young black militants tend to be more aware of the social forces which hinder the attainment of their goals is the finding that militants had higher scores on the criticism of education index (Table 3). This measure assesses the degree to which students see the educational system as a hindrance or as irrelevant to their own needs and personal future.

Social Class and Class Attitudes

Among the variables measuring different aspects of socioeconomic status, the strongest relationship emerged between riot attitude and amount of education received by the mother of the respondent (Table 3). Mothers of young black militants were

TABLE 3
ADDITIONAL PREDICTORS OF ATTITUDE TOWARD THE RIOT

	GOOD %	Evaluation of Riot UNCERTAIN %	BAD %	x ²
need Achievement (TAT)	the most	STREET,		
HIGH	71	18	19	9.04*
LOW	29	78	81	
Alienation-Fear of Success				
HIGH	0	51	62	8.30*
LOW	100	46	38	5.50
Criticism of Education				
HIGH	71	46	19	7.27*
LOW	29	54	81	Her warm
Mothers' Education				
HIGH	71	16	19	9.27**
LOW	29	80	67	No september
Lower Class Attitudes	n trailistante			
HIGH	14	43	57	5.01+
LOW	86	51	33	

Note.—Column percentages, missing data excluded.

better educated than mothers of nonmilitants. Finally, a scale measuring attitudes toward work, money, etc., that are commonly associated with lower socioeconomic class membership showed somewhat lower scores for persons in the GOOD riot attitude category (Table 3). These findings support the assumptions of both blocked-opportunity and relative deprivation theories that black militants are not recruited from the most socially and economically depressed sectors of the ghetto society.

The Young Black Militant: An Emerging Profile

The overall picture of the young black riot supporter that emerges from this study is very similar to that presented by Caplan (1970) in his analysis of the new ghetto man. Because of the extreme youth of our respondents it may be more accurate to say that our profile is of the future ghetto man.

The most important set of social psychological characteristics which distinguish the young black militant from his cohorts has to do with his conception of himself in relation to the world around him. The young militants, male or female,³ no longer ac-

^{*}p < .05; **p < .01; +.05 < p < .10.

³It should be noted that sex of respondent bore no systematic relation to the dependent variable classification (overall $\chi^2 = 0.50$), that in fact there were 3 females and 4 males in the GOOD category and roughly equal numbers as well in the UNCERTAIN and the BAD categories.

cept the fatalistic stereotype that their ghetto existence is a result of their own inherent weaknesses or inability to improve themselves. Compared with nonmilitants, the riot supporters have very strong beliefs in their ability to control events in their own lives and to shape their own future. However, this radically new sense of self-efficacy in militants is juxtaposed with an increasingly realistic perception of those external barriers of discrimination, prejudice, and exploitation which block any chance of actualizing

their capabilities and of realizing their aspirations.

The combination of a heightened sense of personal effectiveness and the shift from self to system blame may help to explain the willingness of young ghetto militants to resort to violence as a means of forcing a change in the opportunity structure which at present excludes them. On the one hand, the increased sense of personal efficacy leads to greater frustration with the conditions that imprison them and also to a greater willingness to initiate and maintain violent action as one means of fighting these conditions. On the other hand, the growing tendency to blame the system rather than themselves provides militants with sources of justification for the use of violence.

Militant but not Revolutionary

Although the young black militants in this study advocate the use of violence in the form of rioting, there was little evidence that they are either revolutionary or that they reject the values and institutions of the dominant society. The occupational and educational expectations of militants were no different from those of nonmilitants; they plan to continue to participate in the present educational and occupational structure. Also, there were no differences between militants and nonmilitants in their generalized beliefs in the Protestant Work Ethic-still a major value system in the dominant society. More to the point, militants showed a much higher need for achievement and much lower scores for alienation and fear of success than nonmilitants. These are motivational characteristics which have distinguished successful men in many areas of achievement in the larger community. Finally, even though young militants were highly critical of the education they are receiving, in terms of actual academic achievement they are somewhat ahead of the nonmilitants.

This evidence does not support the notion that young black militants who endorse violence are either revolutionaries or dropouts from the system. On the contrary, young militants display those characteristics which would mark them as persons most likely to succeed within the system if success were possible for

them. Ghetto militants are more likely to come from the upper rather than the lower strata of ghetto life.

Are Those Opposed Non-Violent Activists?

The finding that those opposed to the riot were equally as likely as those in favor of it to blame the system rather than themselves suggests the possibility that the opponents were activists who differed from militants only in their views on the use of violence to advance the cause of equality and justice. However, subsequent data failed to support this interpretation. For example, of the three riot attitude groups, those in the BAD category were lowest in personal control, lowest in achievement motivation, lowest in willingness to criticize their education, and highest in feelings of alienation and fear of success. So it is unlikely that their tendency to blame the system is due to a concern with civil rights or to a strong desire to change the system. Perhaps their system-blame (which was greatly reduced during the riot) stems from a more general tendency to attribute all events to external sources, rather than from the perception of external barriers, as evidenced by the militants.

Violence and Powerlessness

There is little doubt that our results provide substantial support for the blocked-opportunity theory of riot causation and little support for the alienation-powerlessness theory. What factors may help explain some of the differences in results between our study and that of Ransford (1968), in which strong support

was found for alienation-powerlessness theory?

The first factor is methodological. Whereas Ransford used the total score of the Rotter IE Scale as his measure of powerlessness, we divided the scale into two parts-personal control and control ideology. Although we found no differences in the total Rotter IE score between positive and negative riot evaluators, we did find a difference on personal control items in a direction opposite to that found by Ransford. It is possible that some of the higher external scores for rioters in the Ransford study are due to a confounding of system blame and fate control on the control ideology items of the Rotter scale. Using the Gurin et al. version of the IE Scale, which is directly applied to racial situations, we were able to obtain a much better measure of individual versus system blame.

A second factor concerns the populations sampled by the two studies. Our sample was restricted to youths, aged from 12 to 18

years, from one section of the Detroit riot area; while Ransford's sample consisted of male heads of households aged from 18 to 65 in three separate areas of Los Angeles, one of which was Watts. Middle-class Negroes are much more heavily represented in the

Ransford sample than in ours.

It is quite possible that the age differences between the two populations studied may account for differences in results for internal-external control. For example, although at the present time the young militants in our study show considerable confidence in their own ability to control events, further experience with discrimination and ghetto oppression may, as they grow older, lead to disillusionment and to the development of subjective feelings of powerlessness.

The Future Black Militant

Attempting to project the future development of the young black militants represented in our study is a difficult undertaking, both because of the lack of data and because of the rapid social changes that are taking place. One line of evidence suggests that the present characteristics of the young militants will change only slightly as they grow older. In his study of black militants across a broad age range, Marx (1967) found that militants were more aware of their social environment and also had a more positive self-image than nonmilitants. However, in their study of black college students, Gurin et al. (1969) found that high scores on racial militancy (support for confrontation tactics) showed a strong positive relationship with system-blame but a negative relationship with personal control. This finding points most directly to the possible future of the young black militants studied here. As Gurin et al. suggest, the present racial situation may be forcing a choice between individual and collective expressions of effectiveness on the part of better educated and more highly motivated black militants. Since the young militants in our study are those who are most likely to go on to higher education if they get the opportunity, it is quite possible that their presently strong sense of personal efficacy will decline somewhat in favor of a greater emphasis on system blame and on the necessity of collective confrontation tactics for achieving their goals. It should be noted that this process of polarization between individual and collective modes for the expression of control is very different from the processes of individual isolation and powerlessness which are assumed by Ransford to contribute to a willingness to use violence among lower-class ghetto residents.

Some Policy Implications

The present study shows that those at the vanguard of ghetto militancy are those who are highly motivated and extremely confident of their own ability to shape their future, but aware that the socio-economic system is working against them to prevent them from achieving their goals. This suggests that young militants would be very responsive to any changes that would expand the opportunity structure for them and reduce the amount of discrimination and exploitation they face. It is likely that the reduction of white racist attitudes (an inexpensive policy) is not as important as the creation of actual social and economic opportunities in which young Negroes can exercise initiative and apply their abilities in situations where system rewards are reasonably related to ability and effort.

It is also apparent that young black militants are not necessarily young drifters or delinquents-the opposite seems to be the case. Because of this, the present policies of containment by force in the ghettos may accomplish nothing except the acceleration of the movement of young black militants towards the type of collective action and confrontation that is currently being practiced by black militant organizations. It will be unfortunate if this

is the only choice society is prepared to offer to them.

REFERENCES

ATKINSON, J. W. (Ed.) Motives in fantasy, action and society. Princeton: Van Nos-CAPLAN, N. The new ghetto man: A review of recent empirical studies. Journal trand, 1958.

of Social Issues, 1970, 26. CAPLAN, N. S., & PAIGE, J. M. A study of ghetto rioters. Scientific American, August 1968, 219(2), 15-21.

Castellan, N. J. On the partitioning of contingency tables. Psychological Bulletin, COLEMAN, J., CAMPBELL, E., HOBSON, C., McPartland, J., Mood, A., Weinfeld, F., & York, R. Equality of educational opportunity. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966. 1965, 64, 330-338.

Epps, E. G. Family and achievement: A study of the relation of family background to achievement orientation and performance among urban Negro high school students. Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1969.

Gore, P. M., & Rotter, J. B. A personality correlate of social action. Journal of Personality, 1963, 31, 58-64.

GURIN, P., GURIN, G., LAO, R., & BEATTIE, M. Internal-external control in the motivational dynamics of Negro youth. Journal of Social Issues, 1969, 25 (No. 3), 29-54.

MARX, G. T. Protest and prejudice: A study of belief in the black community. New York:

Harper and Row, 1967.

MOORE, B. M., & HOLTZMAN, W. M. Tomorrow's parents: A study of youth and their families. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1965.

Pettigrew, T. F. Social evaluation theory: Convergences and applications. In D. Levin (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation, 1967. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967.

RANSFORD, H. E. Isolation, powerlessness and violence: A study of attitudes and participation in the Watts riot. American Journal of Sociology, 1968, 73, 581-591.

ROSEN, B. C., & D'ANDRADE, R. G. The psychological origins of achievement motivation. Sociometry, 1959, 22, 185-218.

ROTTER, J. B. Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 1966, 80, 1-28.

SROLE, L. Social integration and certain corollaries: An exploratory study. American Sociological Review, 1956, 21, 709-716.

Ideological Foundations for Negro Action: A Comparative Analysis of Militant and Non-militant Views of the Los Angeles Riot¹

T. M. Tomlinson
Office of Economic Opportunity, Washington, D.C.

In August, 1965, the date of the Los Angeles riot, most Negro militants did not fulfill the criteria necessary to be identified as a formal political group. They did not have and did not belong to organizations having a systematic political ideology, nor did they have any articulated programs for social change. The NAACP was and remains conservative, and SNCC was publicly identified as a biracial group whose announced purpose was the political organization of Negro residents in the rural South. The Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) and the Black Panthers had not been heard from, and most of the currently popular local nationalist groups were nonexistent. In the main, those blacks who are now called radical were simply militantly—i.e., vigorously and aggressively—pro-Negro; their militance lay in their endorsement of Negro action that served to provide an image of black strength against white society.

In the eyes of most black and white citizens, the Black Muslims were the only exponents of black radicalism. And in 1965 this was the only such organization receiving national attention

¹This essay was a 1969 co-winner of the second annual Gordon Allport Intergroup Relations Prize, made possible by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith and awarded by SPSSI.

from the news media. The Muslims, with their incredible but systematized world view (Essien-Udom, 1962), attracted only a small membership, but a much larger number of people were sympathetic to their position of aggressive defiance of white society. Malcolm X was stumping the country with his fiery preaching of the evils of whites and white-dominated society. Though frightening many blacks and whites, he served to awaken a long dormant sense of black identity, especially among the youth. It should be understood that support for Malcolm X and the Muslims did not stem from agreement with the Muslim's leader, Elijah Muhammed, nor with his program. The unifying principle was race, and racial identity determined attitudes rather than commitment to ideology.

With his death Malcolm X achieved a martyr's status, and today the anniversary of his death is marked in many cities by formal ceremony. He is a figure with whom many black youth identity in spirit. This paper will draw upon the spirit of Malcolm X and the Black Muslims, not their words and deeds, to make its

point.

Method

Sample

Data on which this paper is based were obtained following the Los Angeles "riot" from interviews conducted with two samples of respondents in Los Angeles County in late 1965 and early 1966. The first sample was composed of 586 Negroes living in the large (46.5 square miles and 80% black) area of south central Los Angeles sealed off by a curfew imposed during the conflict. The sampling was done by randomly choosing names from the 1960 census lists, then over-sampling poverty level census tracts by a cluster sampling procedure to compensate for the initial underrepresentation of low-income respondents.

The second sample was made up of 586 whites residing in six communities in Los Angeles County, half of which were racially integrated and half non-integrated, with high, medium, and low socioeconomic levels. The sampling procedure was the same as that used with the Negro respondents, except that no compensa-

tion (i.e., over-sampling) was necessary for low income.

Interviews in the curfew area were carried out by projecttrained Negro residents of south central Los Angeles. Similarly trained white interviewers were used in the "white" sample. Different questionnaires were constructed for the two samples, but whenever appropriate the same questions were used in both instruments. The interviews were long (averaging about two hours); however, interest was very high and the refusal rate very low. Checks were run on the possible biases introduced by the interviewer's own views; these did not give unusual reason for concern. The main emphasis of this paper is on Negro opinion, and the white sample is not referred to except when explicitly indicated.2

Criterion of Militance

Negro respondents were asked: "How well do you think the Black Muslims are doing? Are they doing "well," "fairly well," "nothing," "harm," or "don't know how they do." The a priori meaning of the categories "well," "fairly well," and "does harm" is clear; "does well" and "fairly well" indicate support or sympathy for the Muslims and "does harm" indicates antagonism toward them. The categories "don't know how they do" and "does nothing" reflected opinions with no straight-forward positive or negative evaluation."

tive or negative evaluation. Three groups of respondents were identified from the Muslim evaluation question: "militants" (those expressing a positive evaluation of the Muslims), "conservatives" (those expressing a negative evaluation of the Muslims), and "uncommitted" (those expressing neither a positive or negative evaluation). Combining respondents according to this procedure resulted in 169 militants (30%); 196 conservatives (35%); and 189 uncommitted (35%). This is not to say that the Muslims were the preferred organization of 30% of the sample; in fact, if respondents had been asked to rank the organizations in order of preference, the Muslims would undoubtedly have finished last (Marx, 1967).

Validation of the Criterion

In addition to the question rating performance of the Muslim organization, respondents were asked for their evaluation of the Muslim leader, Elijah Muhammed, and a local Muslim minister, John Shabazz. Although the proportion of those who are positive about the Muslim organization (as well as Muhammed and Shabazz) is reasonably stable across the questions (from 22% to 30%), the proportions of those who express no opinion varies considerably (from 17% to 55%). The item asking about the

²A complete description of the research method and instrument design appears in T. M. Tomlinson and D. L. TenHouten, "Method: Negro Reaction Survey," in Nathan E. Cohen (Ed.), The Los Angeles riots: A socio-psychological

study. New York: Praeger, 1970.

This interpretation is based on the finding that when respondents' attitudes toward four civil rights organizations are correlated, the most common response alternative for those who replied "does nothing" appeared to be "don't know how they do" rather than "does harm."

Black Muslims contained the fewest number of "no opinion" responses (17%), indicating that the Muslim organization was more familiar to respondents than names of the organization's

spokesmen.

There was a tendency for the militants and conservatives to separate their evaluation of the Muslim organization from the evaluation of Elijah Muhammed. Among the militants who evaluated the Muslim organization postively, 52 percent evaluated Muhammed positively and 10 percent evaluated him negatively. Of those who were uncommitted in their evaluation of the Muslims, 68 percent were also uncommitted in their evaluation of Muhammed. Among the conservatives who said the Muslims did harm, only 5 percent subscribed to the contrary notion that Muhammed does well—63 percent said he does harm.

Among the three groups, the uncommitted were most consistent in their view of the Muslims and their leaders. The militants, while viewing the organization positively, assessed the Muslim leader as either an unknown quantity or as impotent in his role of leader. This view seems to be shared by the conservatives, who, while strongly derogating the Muslim organization, were less hostile to Muhammed. These data provide additional support to the assertion that support (or antagonism) for the

Muslims is based on sympathy (or hostility) to their visible public

position rather than the characteristics of the Muslim belief sys-

Other checks on response consistency were made and, in summary, they indicated that the criterion question tapped a dimension of response running consistently through the various Muslim items. Respondents who felt that the Muslims were doing well or fairly well (militants), also said that the Muslims represented them (Gamma = .82), most often endorsed Elijah Muhammed (Gamma = .72) and the local Muslim leader John Shabazz (Gamma = .63), and felt that the Muslim news organ Muhammed

Speaks presented a fair picture of Negro problems.

Respondents who felt that the Muslims did harm (conservatives) agreed that the Muslims did not represent them, derogated Elijah Muhammed and John Shabazz, and saw Muhammed Speaks as unfair in its portrayal of Negro problems. Those who responded to the criterion question by saying that the Muslims did nothing or that they didn't know how the Muslims were doing (uncommitted) were mixed in their appraisal, on the one hand being equivocal in their evaluation of both the Muslim organization and its leaders, but at the same time strongly rejecting the Muslims as their representatives.

Comparisons Among the Groups

Demographic Profiles

Comparison of the three groups on a variety of demographic

variables yielded the following results:

Sex. The militant group contained a significantly (p < .001)higher proportion of males (58 percent) than the conservatives

(40 percent) or the uncommitted (43 percent).

Age. Militants tended (p < .08) to be younger than the conservatives and the uncommitted, 45 percent of them being under 30 compared with 32 percent and 37 percent for the conservatives and the uncommitted, respectively.

Employment. There were no clear differences among the groups with regard to employment status; about 70 percent of all

three groups are employed.

Education. Sixty-three percent of the militants, 57 percent of the conservatives, and 53 percent of the uncommitted had completed high school; over twice as many militants had a college degree than did conservatives and uncommitted (7 vs. 3 percent).

Area of Origin. Fifty-five percent of the militants, 62 percent of the conservatives, and 66 percent of the uncommitted were born

in the south.

Area of Socialization. Seventy percent of the militants and 63 percent of conservatives and uncommitted grew up in middlesized or large cities.

Residential Tenure in Los Angeles. Sixty-nine percent of the militants, 70 percent of the conservatives, and 55 percent of the uncommitted have lived in Los Angeles for more than ten years.

Political Identification. There were no differences among the groups: 90 percent of the entire sample claimed Democratic party

affiliation.

Self-Described Social Class. About 40 percent of all three groups claimed working-class status. Middle-class status was claimed by 28 percent of the militants, 37 percent of the conservatives, and 35 percent of the uncommitted. Twenty percent of militants, 11 percent of the conservatives, and 14 percent of the uncommitted identified themselves as lower class.

Religious Involvement. Both the militants and the uncommitted professed to a greater degree of religious involvement (31 percent) than did the conservatives (18 percent). About the same proportion of each group (40 percent) indicated low involvement in

religious matters.

Self-Image. Although it is a personality attribute, self-image

is included at this point to round out the profile of the three groups. Militants more often (52 percent) cited personal attributes which placed them in a position of advantage vis-à-vis whites than did the conservatives (43 percent) or the uncommitted (42 percent). On the other hand, the conservatives cited the fewest number of negative attributes (17 percent vs. about 23 percent for the others). Nevertheless, the largest proportion of all three groups share at least one positive claim: their ability to cope with

their problems.

In sum, most of the respondents were born in a Southern urban setting and migrated to Los Angeles at an early age. More militants than conservatives or uncommitted were young, urbanborn, and urban-socialized males. The militants tended to be somewhat better educated and more positive in comparing themselves to whites than were the conservatives or uncommitted. The groups' view of their own political and economic status is remarkably similar, although a few more militants than conservatives and uncommitted disclaim middle-class status and claim lower-class status.

Since the issue of unemployment has been introduced as an explanatory variable in civil disorders and since much attention has been given to the business of providing jobs for potential rioters, it is useful to consider the differences, if any, in at least the

gross characteristics of employment in the three groups.

Controlling simultaneously for age and sex, the employment rates for militants, uncommitted, and conservatives are quite similar. There is scant evidence to suggest a differential job status for the militants compared to the conservatives and uncommitted. There was a very modest tendency for militant youth to be the least employed of any age-sex group within the three groups, but the difference is so small and so clearly related to age as to be of no practical significance. It seems safe to conclude that employment status, per se, is unrelated to the possession of militant, conservative, or uncommitted attitudes about Negro action. This is not to say that qualitative differences in jobs may not have contributed to the formation of attitudes about acceptable protest

^{&#}x27;A measure of self-image was computed from responses to the question, "What do Negroes have that whites don't?" Responses were coded in positive, neutral, and negative categories in terms of the degree to which the attributes reflected advantage or disadvantage vis-à-vis whites. For example, responses like "poverty," "more children," "a harder way to go," and "nothing" were coded as perceptions of disadvantage in relation to whites. Responses like "better able to cope with adversity," "able to make money go farther," "better athletes," "better able to have fun," and "rhythm" were coded as positive attributes relative to whites.

forms. A meaningless job may be the lot of the militant more often than the conservative, or vice versa, but these data do not provide such information. Suffice it to say that being employed apparently neither contributes to nor detracts from the development of militance. Employment status is evidently also unrelated to whether a man will riot or not. Caplan and Paige (1968) found only marginal and highly variable differences in employment history and job status of rioters and nonrioters. In agreement with data presented here, they found that rioters were not the hard-core unemployed, but were unhappy with their jobs (50 percent of the Newark rioters were unskilled workers). Thus the meaningful distinction may be in terms of the qualitative nature of the job, rather than whether a man has a job or not. Should this be true, then the various jobs programs may have little mitigating impact on social disorder or the development of political militancy unless careful attention is given to wage levels, employment guarantees, and job status.

Grievance Level

Discrimination. Perception of discrimination was measured in the areas of housing, landlord, school, job, welfare, garbage collection, parks, and the fire department. There were no significant differences among the groups in any of these areas. At least 70 percent and as many as 90 percent of all the respondents believed that discrimination existed in housing, jobs, schools, and the practices of landlords.

In the less-known and less-publicized areas of welfare, garbage collection, parks, and the fire department, there was a marked drop in claims of discrimination by all groups, but an increasing indication of a positive association between militance and grievance rates. Table 1 indicates that the differences in grievance level between militants and non-militants are rather

> TABLE 1 OF DISCRIMINATION

	MILITANCY AND PERCEPTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION Source of Discrimination							
	E SERON	Unpublicized Sources			urces			
esponserie			ed Sources Landlords	Schools	Welfare	Fire Dept.	Park Dept.	Garbage
	Housing	Jobs	Landiorus		48	48	40	36
Militant	88	91	75	75 71	38	41	23	29
Uncommitted	90	87	65	70	34	46	27	26
Conservative	87	83	67		based o	- a t	otal of	554 rep

Note.—Entries represent the percent saying "yes," based on a total of 554 replies from the sample of 585 (about 3 percent responded "don't know").

substantial for each of these areas, save the fire department. Thus the popular and well-publicized issues produce uniformity of opinion that cuts through political position, but in those areas which are not traditional sources of grievance, the evidence suggests that militants experience or claim higher rates of discrimina-

tion—thereby reflecting their greater discontent.

Police Behavior. Clear differences emerge among the militants, the conservatives, and the uncommitted in their experience of police behavior. The differences lie not so much in beliefs about the existence of certain types of police malpractice, but in the claims of having personally experienced the police misbehavior. A majority of Los Angeles Negroes did not trust the police—more militants felt this way (63 percent) than conservatives (54 percent) or uncommitted (51 percent)—and most of the respondents believed that the police were guilty of grave misconduct.

Moving to specific examples of police misbehavior, respondents were asked whether they believed certain types of malpractice occurred and if so whether it had happened to them. Table 2 presents a composite of the responses to the several questions on police behavior. With the exception of the responses to the "lack respect" question, there were no significant differences among the

TABLE 2
MILITANCY AND POLICE MALPRACTICE

Type of Malpractice	Percent Believing Malpractice Occurs Degree of Militancy				
	Militant	Uncommitted	Conservative		
Lack of Respect*	82	66	70		
Search Cars	74	66	66		
Roust and Frisk	79	68	69		
Unnecessary Force	71	65	61		
Beat Up People	70				
Search Homes	45	63	65 45		

Percent Experiencing Malpractice Degree of Militancy

The state of the s	AND RESIDENCE OF THE PARTY OF T	Degree of Williamcy		
Type of Malpractice	Militant	Uncommitted	Conservative	
Lack of Respect*	35	21	31	
Search Cars**	40			
Roust and Frisk**	37	14	22	
Unnecessary Force**		19	21	
Post II- De-1	17	5	9	
Beat Up People	10	2	5	
Search Homes	10	2	10	

Note.—For Belief responses the total number of responses, including "No's" and "Don't knows," but excluding "No Answer," was 547. For Experience responses N ranged from 388 to 448.

^{*}p < .05; **p < .01.

three groups in their beliefs about police malpractice. Uniformly, however, the militants were highest in their rate of belief about all forms of police misbehavior. The conservatives and uncommitted

expressed very similar rates of belief.

Turning to the question of whether the respondents themselves had experienced the misbehavior, the militants claim personal contact at a rate about twice that of the conservatives and from two to three times that of the uncommitted. Much of this contact occurs around the automobile: the highest rates of claimed experience, "stop and search" and "roust and frisk," usually involve automobiles.

The lowest rate of complaint about police contact comes from the uncommitted, from those who are apparently the least involved in the issue of grievance redress or strategies for redress. Part of this absence of commitment to redress or redress strategy may stem from their lower rates of unpleasant experience at the

hands of the authorities.

It remains an open question whether the higher rate of contact with the police breeds militance and resentment, or whether militancy brings the respondent more frequently into contact with the police. It may well be a combination of both events, i.e., young aggressive males tend to behave in a manner that brings them to the attention of the police, and, after an experience with the police, they become more embittered about police behavior and consequently more militant in their attitudes. On the other hand, the conservatives and the uncommitted have fewer of these contacts perhaps because there are more among them who are older and female, thus less likely to be "cruising" in automobiles. All these groups believe that police misbehavior occurs, but the probability of personally experiencing the undesirable police behavior is higher for the young males, i.e., the militants. In any event the rate of direct contact with the police seems to be an important contributor to the development of defiant militancy. It should be noted that as the types of police behavior become more exotic and generally more physical, the claims of personal experience drop. The proportional differences among the groups are fairly constant, but the absolute number of respondents claiming to have had the experience declines. This suggests that claims of the respondents are factual. The rates of claimed experience match the a priori expectations: common types of police misbehavior receive high rates, uncommon types receive low rates.

News Media

The news media have become important sources of information about Negro problems. The media may think they are objective, but they are often under scrutiny by Negro citizens who make their own evaluations of the fairness of their presentations about Negroes. In this section, respondents' replies on the press, television, and radio are evaluated in terms of the tripartite distinction.

Television and Radio. Respondents were asked to state whether television and radio treated problems of concern to blacks fairly or unfairly. Although a majority (57 percent to 81 percent) in each group felt that television and radio were fair, markedly more militants reported the media as unfair (42 percent and 39 percent for television and radio respectively) than did either the conservatives (19 percent and 19 percent) or the uncommitted (31 percent and 30 percent). The uncommitted fell midway between the militants and the conservatives in their evaluation, and thus supply evidence that being uncommitted is not synonymous with "blissful ignorance."

Newspapers. The same pattern did not emerge from the data on the newspapers. Questions were asked about three newspapers—two Negro-managed papers (The Herald Dispatch and the Sentinel) and one white-managed paper (The Los Angeles Times). There were no differences among the three groups in their appraisal of the white daily, but each viewed it as the least fair news organ of those considered (including T.V. and radio). Only 41 percent of the militants and 48 percent of conservatives and uncommitted thought the white daily was fair in its treatment.

of Negro problems.

In contrast, the two Negro-managed papers received large majorities for fairness (70 percent and 90 percent). The one Negro paper receiving the least support had often endorsed extreme views on race relations and had editorialized on behalf of the Muslims. Thus, in addition to a general effect of race on evaluations, there was also evidence of conservative antipathy toward a Negro publication which supported radicalism. But where no such ideological or political considerations existed, the pull of race in positive perceptions of fairness was very strong, viz., the 90 percent support for the "non-radical" Negro paper. The influence of counter-radical opinions is also evident in the evaluation of the Muslim news organ, Muhammed Speaks. Seventy percent of the militants viewed Muhammed Speaks as fair in its representation of the Negro, while only 17 percent of the conservatives (but 42 percent of the uncommitted) assented to that view.

It seems clear from these data that the issue of nationalism (radical militance) is one that serves to split the opinions of Negroes. When the viewpoint represented by the Negro press is basically a pro-black position uncontaminated by radical sym-

pathies, the majority of the Negro community endorses its reporting. If, however, there is evidence of radicalism or black nationalism in the reporting, then a sizeable proportion of the Negro citizenry perceive the paper as unfair. Nonetheless, more black people sympathize or approve of a newspaper with a "radical" but pro-black bias than approve of a newspaper with a "white" bias.

Social Contact and Social Distance

There are two questions of central importance in the area of social contact and distance: (1) whether contact is related to attitudes of militance or conservatism, and (2) whether militant pro-black attitudes also mean anti-white attitudes.

Data bearing on the first question are presented in Table 3. The first point to be noted is that over half of the total sample

TABLE 3 MILITANCY AND SOURCE OF SOCIAL CONTACT WITH WHITES (PERCENTAGES)

	Dances and	Attend	Visit in	Stay in home	Restau- rants and bars	Go on trips	Two or more contact sources	N
	parties	Movies	home ho	Home		4	37	83
Militant	20	7	18	6	10	4	29	82
Uncommitted	13	6	28	4	16	0	54	76
Conservative	7	0	28	3		NO DE	ALL DE LA COLOR	$\frac{76}{241}$

Gamma = -.04; $\chi^2 = 25.58$, df = 12, p < .02.

denied having done anything socially with whites. Of those who do interact, conservatives have the greatest amount of contact, 54 percent of them having had contact in two or more categories of interaction in contrast with 37 percent of the militants and

29 percent of the uncommitted.

Militants have the greatest amount of contact at dances and parties, while conservatives and uncommitted had higher rates of contact in the homes of whites. There was a slight tendency for the uncommitted more often to make contact with whites in restaurants and bars than the militants and the conservatives. These data make sense in terms of the age-sex variables, e.g., young males more often appear at mixed parties than any other age-sex group, while older people more often visit friends.

There is, however, no straightforward support for the notion that militance may be a product of extreme isolation from white contact, for the uncommitted are the most isolated. However, the conservatives appear to have a good deal more contact than either the militants or the uncommitted. Thus, contact is positively related to anti-radical attitudes, but radicals are not necessarily

the most isolated (from whites) of the black community.

Turning now to the question of whether pro-black attitudes correlate with anti-white attitudes, the data suggest a qualified "yes." A majority (66 percent to 77 percent) of the respondents in all groups trust "some whites"; only about 10 percent of each of the three groups will go so far as to say they trust "most whites." But the militants trust "no whites" at a rate about twice (24 percent) that of the conservatives (13 percent) or the uncommitted (14 percent).

TABLE 4
MILITANCY AND SOCIAL CONTACT WITH WHITES

	Degree of Militancy					
Type of Contact	Militant	Uncommitted	Conservative	N		
Have good white friends*	25	42	38	381		
Eating with whites distasteful**	13	4	4	522		
Party with whites distasteful*	32	19	22	472		
Intermarriage distasteful**	39	25	21	478		

Note.—Cell entries indicate the percentage saying "yes"; row N is the total number of responses, including "No" but excluding "No answer."

*p < .05; **p < .01; Testing militant versus non-militant.

A sharper indication of the relations between blacks and whites and the interaction between contact and militancy is shown in Table 4. These data may be summarized as follows:

- (1) When asked if they had any good friends who were white, the majority of the entire sample said "no." Significantly (p < .02) fewer of the militants claimed good white friends than did the conservatives or uncommitted.
- (2) Few of the respondents found it distasteful to eat with whites, yet three times as many militants as non-militants subscribed to this view. (p < .001).
- (3) The majority of the sample found all-white parties tolerable but the militants again expressed significantly more distaste for such an event. (b < .05).
- (4) Only slightly more of the entire sample would find it more distasteful to intermarry than to attend an all-white party. Again, however, the militants had a significantly higher rate (p < .005) of rejection of intermarriage than the conservatives or uncommitted.⁵

⁵It is worth noting that even in the eyes of militants, intermarriage carries nowhere near the negative affect observed in the Los Angeles whites, 78 percent of whom said it would be distasteful to marry a Negro (Morris and Jeffries, 1969).

Taken together, the data on contact and social distance indicate a moderate relationship between militancy—that is, a pro-Negro bias—and antagonism toward whites. There is a significant relationship between militant attitudes and attitudes about racial contact, militancy being associated with greater social distance and reduced social contact. Whether militancy produces the distance and prevents the contacts is difficult to assess. It is plausible that older people would have had a sufficiently greater number of opportunities for contact to account for the disparity in the sheer number of interaction events recorded for each group. But age does not account for all the variance of social contact, since the uncommitted-who also are older than the militants-have a lower rate of contact than either the militants or the conservatives. The uncommitted may find it more difficult to move in the white world for reasons having to do with differential social access and skill, for, as will be seen, the uncommitted tend to be less socially sophisticated and less politically knowledgeable than either the militants or conservatives.

The central point, in any case, is that the militants' greater distaste of interacting with whites in social situations appears to have a deliberate and ideologically-based flavor. To some extent the militant is deliberately renouncing (or denouncing) the white world and purposefully avoiding contact and interaction. This tendency is not as yet pronounced, but its seeds are clearly visible (viz., the response to the "intermarriage" item). It seems unlikely, however, that self-imposed social isolation of Negroes from whites will soon approach the level which characterizes similar behavior

of whites toward Negroes.

Political Attitudes

Conceptualization of riots as a legitimate form of protest should be related to disillusionment with political institutions and figures and a feeling of impotence to bring about social change through traditional avenues of influence, e.g., voting or non-violent protest. To understand the Negro's view of his political life, one must first understand how his view differs from that of the whites, for it is the difference between blacks and whites that illustrates the extent of the "relative deprivation" of the blacks. This difference is evidenced in items which follow.

As reported in the Los Angeles surveys, twenty-five percent more whites than Negroes trust people generally—87 vs. 62 percent. Twenty-nine percent more whites than Negroes trust elected officials-79 vs. 50 percent. Fifty-one percent more whites than Negroes trust police—92 vs. 41 percent. (Note that whites trust police more than they trust people generally and blacks trust police less than they trust people generally.) Thirty-three percent more Negroes than whites subscribed to the statement "public officials don't much care what people like me think"—60 vs. 27 percent. Thirty-one percent more Negroes than whites subscribed to the statement "voting is the only way people like me can have a say about how the government runs things"—78 vs. 47 percent.

Compared with whites, Negroes in this study feel greater political disillusionment and impotence to bring about change through conventional channels such as voting or pressure on

elected officials.

Returning to the tripartite analysis, the groups did not differ in their response to the question, "Do you agree with the statement 'public officials don't care much about people like me'?" Sixty percent of each group replied in the affirmative. In response to the question, "Is voting the only way people like me can have a say about how the government runs things?", fewer of the miltants (74 percent) than the conservatives (82 percent) or the un-

committed (80 percent) agreed.

Significantly fewer (p < .05) militants reported trust of elected officials (45 percent) than did conservatives (58 percent) or the uncommitted (56 percent). When asked if they trusted Negro elected officials, 60 percent of each group replied "yes." The noteworthy difference in the responses to those two questions lies in the sharp increase in positive assessment by the militants, from 45 percent for "elected officials" to 60 percent for Negro elected officials. The militants appear to be responding along racial or "black identity" lines, whereas the conservatives and the uncommitted respond in an undifferentiated manner to both questions. Thus in the context of general Negro disaffection with and alienation from elected officials, the militants are more deeply dissatisfied than the non-militants and, in the abstract, more likely to endorse Negro than white political officials.

Political Institutions. The government program that might be expected to have the greatest visibility to blacks is the "War on Poverty." In response to the question, "What do you think of the War on Poverty, will it help a lot, help a little, or have no effect?", significantly more enthusiasm (p < .01) is registered by the conservatives, 54 percent of whom thought the poverty program would help a lot (compared to 41 percent of the militants and 38 percent of the uncommitted). Taken together, however, the data indicated quite strong anticipations of help from the poverty program: from 88 percent to 95 percent of each group expressed at least moderate hopefulness about the program's impact.

Measures of views of local, state, and national legislative bodies (Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, the California

State Legislature, and the United States Congress) indicated that support for all three institutions is generally positive, though the militants and uncommitted were significantly less enthusiastic than the conservatives. There was also a predisposition to be less positive about state or local institutions than about Congress. The uncommitted (43 percent very favorable) perceived the U.S. Congress almost the same way as the militants (also 43 percent very favorable) and both were quite different from the conservatives (60 percent very favorable).

Political Activity. Seventy-eight percent of both the conservatives and the uncommitted and 73 percent of the militants claim to have voted in the 1964 presidential election. The slight difference between the militants and non-militants is entirely accounted for by the age difference between the two groups (i.e., fewer of the

militants were of voting age than the non-militants).

A measure of informed and effective voting behavior was acquired by asking the respondents how they had voted on the California Fair Housing Proposition during the 1964 election. Proposition 14, as it was called, required a "no" vote to signify approval of fair housing, and the wording of the proposition was in itself a controversial issue into which some people read a delib-

erate attempt to fool the less-educated ghetto residents.

Responses to this question, in addition to tapping voter information, permitted a determination of the extent to which militance relates to a complex "nationalist-separatist" ideology. Such an ideology endorses racial separation and would call for a "yes" vote by the militants. The data, however, show the opposite. Militants voted as a bloc (90 percent) for open housing (i.e., they voted "no" on Proposition 14). The strongest evidence for a negative racial bias is found in the voting behavior of the conservatives, only 74 percent of whom voted "no." In this case, the presumption is that many conservatives either followed an "Uncle Tom" line or were the least informed about the subtle wording of the proposition. The charge of Tom-ism is supported by the fact that 84 percent of the uncommitted voted "no" despite consistent indications that they were the most uninformed of the respondents.

In sum, the militants appear to be at once more politically angry, more race conscious, and perhaps even more sophisticated than either the uncommitted or the conservatives, but they do not appear to be following a rigid separatist ideological line. Rather, they endorse a basically pro-Negro position that features encouragement of and alignment with any action which will further the "cause." The conservatives, on the other hand, provide evidence of a somewhat Tom-ish position which may be interpreted as a relative unwillingness to move aggressively against the wishes of white society. The uncommitted in many instances appear more similar to the militants than the conservatives, but it is difficult to interpret the meaning of this posture. A reasonable view might be that they simply represent the position of the average, politically uninvolved citizen; that is, they are neither ideologically hawkish nor dovish vis-à-vis race issues. They seem to occupy a midpoint position which is slightly biased in the direction of militancy by the residual resentment growing out of the natural conditions of their life situation.

Riot Evaluation and Participation

The Riot as a Protest. Each respondent was asked this question: "Various words have been used to describe what happened; what word or term would you use in talking about it [the riot]?" Though slightly short of statistical significance (p < .10), the militants used the word "riot" less frequently and used words from a revolutionary lexicon more frequently than the non-militants. The militants were about evenly split in their choice of terms: 47 percent said "riot," 48 percent said "revolt," "insurrection," or like words. In contrast, 56 percent of the conservatives and 60 percent of the uncommitted said "riot," while only 36 percent of each used a revolutionary word. Thus, the militants more often conceptualized the riot in terms of a politically oriented, violent (revolutionary) activity. The conservatives and uncommitted tended to view the event as a "violent public disorder" (i.e., a riot), presumably devoid of political intent.

The tendency of the groups to attach differential political and racial meaning to the riot is further seen by their response to the question, "Was the riot a Negro protest?" Seventy percent of the militants, 61 percent of the conservatives, and 55 percent of the uncommitted replied affirmatively. The number of respondents in each group who refused to answer is also worth noting. Only 8 percent of the militants, compared with 19 percent of the uncommitted and 15 percent of the conservatives, did not respond to this question. Not only were the militants more willing to subscribe to the protest concept, but they were also more likely to have a position on the issue. In sum, there is a clear majority opinion by the entire sample that the riot was a Negro protest, but the militants subscribed to this view more strongly and provided it with a revolutionary interpretation to a greater extent than the non-militants, especially the uncommitted.

Participation. Two measures of personal activity in the riot were made. One was a direct request for degree of activity, and the second was an indirect measure asking the respondent to state the events he had witnessed during the riot. In the first in-

stance respondents were asked whether they had been "very active" or "not active" during the riot. The proportions who said they were "very active" are low overall, but the militants (9 percent) nevertheless claimed very active participation at a rate twice that of the conservatives (4 percent) and over four times that of the uncommitted (2 percent). Combining the "very active" and "somewhat active" categories, 34 percent of the militants but only 20 percent of the conservatives and 16 percent of the uncom-

mitted claimed some active participation in the riot.

Turning to the indirect measure, the respondents were asked a series of questions on whether they had seen a variety of riotconnected events, ranging from having seen crowds of people to having seen shooting. The assumption was that the more events seen, the more likely the respondent was to have been in the area, and, further, the more severe the types of events witnessed (e.g., burning and shooting), the more likely he was to have been actually involved in the street action. The question form allowed an assessment of participation without demanding self-incrimination by the respondent; it was less susceptible to the deliberate distortion that may have accompanied the direct question.

MILITANCY AND RIOT EVENTS WITNESSED (PERCENTAGES)

THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO	Degree of Militancy				
eve nomek	Militant	Uncommitted	Conservative	N	
Events	THE INTERIOR	THE REAL PROPERTY.	59	519	
Crowds	70	64	58	524	
Stores Looted**	66	49	61	535	
Stores Burned**	72	54	28	508	
Stones Thrown**	44	25	23	488	
Shooting*	28	17	ALL THE ALL STREET		

Note.—Row N is the total of responses, including "No," but excluding "No answer." *b < .05: **b < .01.

Table 5 shows the percentage of persons who claimed to have seen the events described. The majority of the entire sample appears to have witnessed the major events of the riot: crowds, stores looted, and stores burned; but, in each instance, more militants claim to have viewed these events than non-militants. The lowest rate of events observed is claimed by the uncommitted who are uniformly and often markedly different from the militants.

The largest proportional difference among the groups occurred when they were asked if they had seen stones being thrown: 44 percent of the militants, but only 25 percent of the uncommitted and 28 percent of the conservatives said they had observed stonethrowing. This difference seems closely related to the age and sex differences of the groups, i.e., young males are more likely to hurl rocks or see them hurled than older males or females. Young males are also more likely to be on the scene where stones get thrown—that is, gathered in groups on the street or at intersections where they have access to passing automobiles. To the extent that stone-throwing set the stage for later, more destructive events of the riot, the militants seem to have been more involved in the generative stage of the riot than the non-militants.

In any event, the militants were evidently the most involved in the events of the riot, and the uncommitted the least involved. Sympathy with radical organizations is therefore related to higher degrees of personal involvement in the events of the riot. This is not to say that the conservatives or uncommitted were uninvolved;

each group had a substantial roster of participants.

Riot Evaluation. The respondents were asked to evaluate the riot from a number of different positions. Separate evaluations were made of the riot and its events, of those who supported the riot, of those who were against the riot, and of perceptions of com-

munity support.

Responses to the question, "Now that the riot is over how do you feel about it?", were coded in terms of the positive or negative affect implied in the evaluation. The militants were significantly (p < .01) more favorable in their appraisal of the riot than were the conservatives or uncommitted (49 vs. 36 vs. 25 percent very favorable). Only 27 percent of the militants were distinctly unfavorable, compared with 43 percent of the uncommitted and

40 percent of the conservatives.

The difference between the militants and non-militants is even more pronounced in their evaluation of the events of the riot. Coding the positive or negative affect implied by the nature of the liked and disliked events indicated that 47 percent of the militants and 22 percent of the non-militants spoke of the riot in favorable terms. About 75 percent of the non-militants said they liked nothing about the riot, while 51 percent of the militants gave the same reply. The militants cited "everything" as liked at more than twice the rate of the uncommitted and almost six times the conservatives. In the same vein, almost twice as many militants as non-militants liked the idea of gaining revenge on whites.

On the other side of the coin, virtually everyone found some aspect of the riot to deprecate. Here there were no clear differences among the groups; rather, the data reflect a common fear-oriented response apparently not influenced by ideology. Close to 60 percent of the sample is contained in two categories of dislike, "killing" and "burning and destruction." Taken together, the

data indicate that although there is a clear bias associated with militancy in appraising the positive aspects of the riot, there is a common feeling among all the respondents about the negative features which transcends ideological positions. The riot had features which pleased the militants, but it also had features which instilled fear in most of the citizenry regardless of their

orientation to grievance redress. Looking now at the respondents' perceptions of who was for and who was against the riot, there was no clear sense of a difference between the groups. There was some tendency for the militants to cite negatively-valued groups (i.e., criminals, politicians, irresponsible persons) less often as supporters than the non-militants, but the overall picture is one of considerable agreement among all the respondents about the (positive) nature of the supporters.

There was a similar absence of clear differences in the appraisal of those who were against the riot. Militants less often cited "religious and old people" or "positive groups" as against the riot than the non-militants, thus implying a higher rate of perceived support from positive reference groups than the non-

The responses to the "like" and "dislike" questions were coded for the implied affect and a composite evaluative response made up from the two questions. The results indicated that the militants significantly more often cited events which have an affectively positive meaning than did the non-militants (p < .001). About twice as many militants (46 percent) as non-militants approved of the supporters; only 33 percent of the militants frankly disapproved, compared with over 50 percent of the nonmilitants.

Community Support and Participation. If the riot is to have meaning for the Negro "cause" and if the militants are the segment of the black community most interested in defining the riot as a meaningful political event, then one might expect them to see (or project) greater support among the Negro citizenry at large than would be found among the non-militants. Indications of the perceptual difference should be found in the proportion of the Negro community estimated by the three groups to have participated in the riot and to have supported the riot.

There was a slight tendency for the militants to make higher estimates of community participation than non-militants, but the differences were not pronounced. The largest difference existed at the lower estimate (0-10 percent participation), with fewer militants (46 percent) estimating the lowest rate than conserva-

tives (56 percent) or the uncommitted (51 percent).

The influence of militancy becomes somewhat more pronounced in the estimates of community support for the riot. The militants gave about 10 percent fewer very low estimates and about 10 percent more very high estimates of support than the non-militants. The three groups were quite similar in their estimates of the middle range of perceived support.

The estimates of community antagonism toward the riot complement the data on community support. Compared to the non-militants, the militants gave fewer high estimates (37 vs. over 50 percent) and more low estimates (25 vs. 17 percent) of community antagonism. Again the non-militants were similar at all levels in their estimates of the proportion of the community who

were against the riot.

On balance, the militants appear to have viewed the community as lending greater support to the riot than the nonmilitants, but the differences were not marked and in the context of factually strong community sympathy, provide little support for the notion that militancy distorts or inflates perceptions of community backing for violent events. Militants in this sample seem to have a firm hold on reality, in that they do not seriously over-

estimate citizen support for racial combat.

Evaluation of the Riot Outcome. A tabulation of responses to the question, "Will the riot help or hurt the Negro's cause?", indicated significant (p < .001) differences among the groups. More militants than non-militants (51 vs. 43 percent) thought the riot helped the cause. However, the greatest difference lay in estimations of whether it would hurt the cause: 20 percent of the militants and 26 percent of the uncommitted, in contrast to 40 percent of the conservatives, thought the riot would hurt. The militants and the uncommitted voiced expectations of "no change" at similar rates (about 30 percent), while only 17 percent of the conservatives felt that nothing would change as a result of the riot.

As a whole these data indicate: (1) militants were somewhat more hopeful than non-militants that the riot will help the Negro cause, (2) conservatives were far more likely than militants or uncommitted to see the riot as hurting the Negro cause, and (3) conservatives were the least prone to take a neutral view of the

riot. For good or for ill, the conservatives expected change.

Respondents were then asked whether the riot would increase or decrease the gap between the races. Fewer militants than nonmilitants (see Table 6) thought the riot would increase the gap and more thought it would decrease the gap. These data also clearly indicate that militancy is not closely associated with antiwhite feelings (although as previously noted, the level of trust is very low); the general expectation (or perhaps, wish) of the mili-

TABLE 6
OVERALL ESTIMATE OF POST-RIOT CHANGE IN GAP
BETWEEN NEGROES AND WHITES
(PERCENTAGES)

ios cossilien	Increase	Decrease	No change	N
Militant	23	36	41	145
Uncommitted	26	21 20 21	53	157
Conservative	32	29	39	167
				469

 $\chi^2 = 12.22, df = 4, p < .02.$

tants is that race relations will improve after the riot and that blacks and whites will end up closer rather than farther apart. However, the largest proportion of each group felt that no change would take place, and that the gap, such as it is, would remain the same. Note, however, the replies of the uncommitted: 53 percent expected "no change" (compared to 41 percent of the militants and 39 percent of the conservatives) and only 21 percent expected a decrease in the gap. Thus, the uncommitted seem to be responding in a manner suggesting cynicism or alienation; as many of them saw it, nothing had an effect on the relationships between blacks and whites. This view, in turn, helps to explain their lack of commitment to any strategy for redress.

Respondents who had indicated expectations of change were asked further about the sources of change—will they take place in whites, blacks, or both races? In response, 65 percent of the militants and 52 percent of the conservatives, but only 38 percent of the uncommitted expected the principal source of change to be alterations in white awareness and feelings. In contrast, 44 percent of the uncommitted and 41 percent of the conservatives, but only 23 percent of the militants, expected the changes to take place in both races or in Negroes alone. Of those who subscribed to the latter sources of change, from two to three times more expected change in both races than expected change in Negroes alone.

Evidently, the three groups view post-riot race relations somewhat along the following lines. The conservatives articulated a wide number of potential sources for change; they identified, in roughly similar proportions, Negro and white (or both) sources for the change. The uncommitted and conservatives placed considerable emphasis on reciprocal alterations in attitudes, although the conservatives (26 percent) did so less often than the uncommitted (32 percent).

The militants are far more inclined than either the conserva-

tives or uncommitted to see Negro problems as stemming from white behavior. They more sharply aimed their perceptions of sources of change at alterations in the behavior and attitudes of whites; only 6 percent saw Negro attitudes as altering (or needful of alteration) because of the riot. Thus from the militant's point of view it is the whites, not the Negroes, who must (or will) change.

When asked what Negroes themselves must do to get ahead, the majority of all groups opted for conventional approaches to success in a white world ("get jobs," "education," etc.) although the militants are slightly less (59 percent) inclined than the uncommitted (68 percent) or the conservatives (65 percent) to cite these avenues for advancement. The groups subscribe rather equally (all at about 20 percent) to the idea that Negroes must engage in political demonstrations. A small minority of the sample said that violence is the preferred alternative; but nine percent of the militants sanctioned violence as the approved mode of change, while only one percent of the conservatives and one-half of one percent of the uncommitted approved of this approach. (The absolute number is small but the differences are impressive.) Further, when asked to make a forced-choice between negotiation, non-violence, and violence as modes of effective protest, 30 percent of the militants chose violence as compared to nine percent of the non-militants.

One implication of these differences becomes apparent in answers to the question of whether they thought a riot would happen again in Los Angeles. Of those who responded to the question, 65 percent of the militants and about 53 percent of the non-militants said a second riot would occur. However, 39 percent of the sample refused to answer the question. The highest rate of non-response was found in the militants (44 percent), lowest among the conservatives (35 percent), with the uncommitted falling between (41 percent).

It is difficult to make sense of these data on ideological grounds; one might have expected the militants to take a uniformly aggressive stance on the issue, and most certainly to have expressed an opinion. They may have been uncertain or less willing to share their views on this particular subject. In any case, even failure to respond implies that the possibility of a second riot was not ruled out. Thus, differential response rates notwithstanding ing, more militants than non-militants either assert that a second riot will occur or will not rule out that possibility.

Whether a second riot actually will occur in Los Angeles is not the question. The central point is that there exists in Los Angeles, and probably in every major urban center in the North, a significant number of individuals whose grievance level is sufficiently high to promote the development of violent redress strategies. These individuals make up a cadre of profoundly disaffected, racially aware persons who have interpreted the Los Angeles riot as a political phenomenon. Such an interpretation gives substance and ideological justification to urban disorder as a vehicle for social change.

Summary and Postscript

The relationship between positive attitudes toward the radical Negro organization, the Black Muslims, and a variety of indices usually thought of as reflecting a "militant" position on Negro-white relationships has been documented. It also seems clear that neither support nor antagonism toward the Muslims is a straightforward product of ideology; the organization and its leaders are differentially evaluated. Both support and antagonism—but especially support—appear to be based more in racial identification with an assertive black organization than on an ideological commitment to Muslim leaders or to the Muslim theological and political tenets. Implicit in this distinction is a measure of the respondent's attitude toward racial protest, which in turn serves to separate militant from conservative exponents of Negro action. The material that supports this assertion may be summarized as follows:

(1) Militants, those identified by their radical sympathies, make up 30 percent of the sample and are most often found among male youth. They are more likely to be brought up in an urban setting, somewhat better educated, long-term residents of the city (over 10 years), equally or more involved in religion, and in possession of a more positive self-image. They are as equally likely to be working as the non-militants and tend to be more sophisticated politically.

(2) Militants are the most deeply aggrieved and claim to have had higher rates of personal contact with the police under conditions usually

(3) Militants are more likely to view the communication media as unfair in their portrayal of Negro problems.

(4) Militants are not markedly anti-white, but they are considerably more disenchanted with whites than are the non-militants.

(5) Militants are the most active politically and more likely to endorse advancement of the Negro cause by any method necessary: they will not only support all conventional civil rights activity but will lend disproportionate approval to use of violent means. Three times as many militants (30 percent) as non-militants endorse the use of violent rather than non-violent means in pursuit of social change.

(6) In describing the riot, militants are more likely than non-militants to use a term from the revolutionary lexicon. By a ratio of almost two-to-one they claim to have participated actively in the riot. They have a

much more favorable view than the non-militants of the riot and its events, but there is little tendency to project that view onto the community at large by claiming larger rates of community support for the riot. They are more hopeful of positive change in race relationships, which undercuts the notion that they are clearly antagonistic to whites. (That is, they look for and apparently desire an improvement in Negro-white relations.)

(7) Finally, the militants place responsibility for change clearly in the laps of the whites. The non-militants tend to take the view that both races must change to achieve rapprochement, but the militants clearly

ascribe the locus of change to whites.

Now, what are the implications of these data and how do they help us to understand "civil disorder" and the "urban crisis"? One must keep in mind that the differences between militants and non-militants are those of proportions; a majority of the entire Negro population is aggrieved, angry, and disaffected. For example, blacks and whites in the Los Angeles study show dramatic differences in the level of trust of elected officials and police. Negroes have far higher rates of perceived political disenfranchisement and perceived impotence to bring about change. At the same time, however, they appear to be deeply committed to bringing about change; and that is a cornerstone of social unrest.

The climate that fostered the 1965 riot was not peculiar to Los Angeles; it was endemic in American society and in the Northern urban centers particularly. The Los Angeles riot simply lowered the kindling point for later events by disinhibiting a riot response to the conditions of Negro life that had always existed. It would seem, therefore, that a sort of simplified riot ideology had taken form, justified in terms of social and economic deprivation and united on the grounds of the commonality of racial identification. Support, or at least sympathetic understanding, of the causes (justifications) of riots characterizes a large segment of the Negro population (Campbell & Schuman, 1968). Within this segment are imbedded a group of sophisticated, activist, young people who have provided the riot with political interpretations of purpose. It should be emphasized that this is not a description of a conspiracy, however much the rhetoric of revolution is used. It is a description of a portion of the population that for a variety of historical and current reasons is susceptible to the idea of violent protest. That idea emerged in its clearest form in the aftermath of the Los Angeles riot and, taking root in the soil of pervasive Negro discontent, spread across the country.

What could have been done about the riots? Was it possible for local, state, or federal governments to have responded in such a way as to truncate the eruptions? From the viewpoint of this

paper the answer is clearly "no." It is by now well documented that the principal agent provocateur of urban disorder is the mood of the ghetto—not communists, hoodlums, recent migrants, or Muslims (Caplan & Paige, 1968; Sears & Tomlinson, 1968; Tomlinson, 1968). That mood represents a collective and contagious idea or a frame of mind that justifies impulses to social violence on behalf of social change. Jailing of provocative persons will not alter this mood; it only exacerbates it. Perhaps more important, the creation of a riot ideology implies that little could have been done to stem the tide of urban disorders until they ran their course. There were no immediate responses within the repertoire of any agency or person which were (and are) sufficient to expunge the outrage that gave and continues to give birth to collective black rebellion, except fear of the burning and killing, and that came only after the riot had occurred.

Perhaps this view seems overly simple, but consider the alternatives which have been offered to explain the riots of the Sixties. Since 1965, riots have occurred in cities with every type of administrative structure. They have occurred in model citiesindeed Detroit was a well known "model city." They have occurred in cities receiving relatively large sums of poverty money and in ones receiving small amounts. They have occurred in cities with compact ghetto enclaves (e.g., Cleveland-Hough) and in cities in which the ghetto was distributed over a large area (e.g., south central Los Angeles). They have occurred in cities with relatively high Negro employment and wage rates (Detroit) and in cities with relatively low Negro employment rates (Los Angeles, specifically Wests). They have occurred in cities with large prospecifically Watts). They have occurred in cities with large pro-

portions of Negroes and cities with low proportions.

The only evidence of differences among cities which can systematically be associated with riot occurrence is the size of the black population, i.e., riots are more likely to occur in cities with large Negro populations than in those with small populations (Downes, 1968). Such a finding hardly serves to illuminate the issue and, as time goes on and disturbances continue, will itself probably fade as an explanatory variable. There is evidence of an increasing incidence of small-city violence as well as a change in the pattern or style of expression. Sniping incidents, which could be construed politically as a variation on the theme of guerilla be construed politically as a variation on the theme of guerilla warfare, appear to have replaced collective behavior as the method of expression (Riot Data Review, 1969). Sniping does not depend upon or call for mass action; one man with a gun is sufficient to carry out the act, and he can do it anywhere. It is no longer necessary to wait for the chance events that trigger a major riot; any man can now engage in his own private revolution.

Clearly, what produces riots is not related to the gross political or economic differences among cities (Spilerman, 1969). What produces riots is that most Negro Americans share a belief that their lot in life is unacceptable, and a significant minority feel that riots are a legitimate and productive mode of protest. What is unacceptable about Negro life does not vary much from city to city, and the differences in Negro life from city to city are at all odds irrelevant. The unifying feature is the consensus that Negroes have been misused by whites, and this perception exists

in every city in America.

But, it might be asked, what about the conservatives and the uncommitted? Won't they exert a restraining influence? The militants are a minority, and the number of those who endorse violence is smaller still. How, then, can riots assume the form of a popular movement without general support? But support is not all that slim, and it is growing each day that white America refuses to remove the social conditions that produce the grievances. Remember further that the uncommitted's view of the world is more closely akin to the militant's than to the conservative's. The essential difference seems to be that the uncommitted exhibit much greater evidence of withdrawal and cynicism than the militants. Thus, the world of black Americans seems to be composed of three somewhat overlapping groups. Two groups, the militants and conservatives, are deeply involved in the "cause," and differ less in their displeasure with their lot in society than in their range of approved strategies for grievance redress. The third group, the uncommitted, is not yet involved to the extent of the militants and conservatives, but does appear to be more inclined to a militant than a non-militant view

The central difference between the militants and the uncommitted, aside from the differential involvement, lies in their respective attitudes toward the riot. The uncommitted are generally the least favorable of the three groups, and the least active in the riot. The data suggest that this lack of enthusiasm grows out of a general feeling among the uncommitted that the issue is a hopeless one which is not under any circumstances susceptible to change. Should the riot assume the shape of a legitimate and effective method of grievance redress (and it appears that it has), then it might be expected that the uncommitted would find themselves in a

position of reassessing their view.

It seems clear that the riot is viewed by a healthy minority of Negroes, regardless of ideological persuasion, as a legitimate and effective method for calling attention to Negro problems and dramatizing the plight of inner city residents. Thus, whether the uncommitted and, for that matter, the conservatives will muster to

the cause of the militants depends both on the response of white society in relieving the social conditions that produce black anger, and on the success of the militants in achieving the goals that so far have eluded the conservative strategies. It should also be clear that the longer white society remains immune to requests for equal citizenship and remains unwilling to permit freedom of choice and movement for all Negro citizens, the more likely it is that violent redress, whatever its form, will assume social and ideological legitimacy in the eyes of the total Negro community. Thus whites must make the necessary move if the ideological foundations of violence are to be obviated. They will have to give up their cherished shelter of racism if the Negro's faith in the democratic process is to be restored. Money alone will not stop racial violence; only a change in the basic attitudes and values of white America can serve that purpose. Whites can no longer hope to buy their way out of the American dilemma.

REFERENCES

CAMPBELL, A., & SCHUMAN, H. Racial attitudes in fifteen American cities. Report prepared for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1968.

CAPLAN, N., & PAIGE, J. A study of ghetto rioters. Scientific American, 1968, 219,

DOWNES, B. T. Social and political characteristics of riot cities: A comparative study. Social Science Quarterly, 1968, 49, 504-520.

Essien-Udom, E. U. Black nationalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. MARX, G. Protest and prejudice: A study of belief in the black community. New York:

MORRIS, R., & JEFFRIES, V. The white reaction study. In N. E. Cohen (Ed.), The Los Angeles riots: A socio-psychological study. New York: Praeger, 1970.

Los Angeles riots: A socio-psychological study. New York: Praeger, 1970.

RIOT DATA REVIEW. Sniping incidents—A new pattern of violence? Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence, Brandeis University, No. 3, 1969.

SEARS, D. O., & TOMLINSON, T. M. Riot ideology in Los Angeles: A study of Negro attitudes. Social Science Quarterly, 1968, 49, 485-503.

SPILERMAN, S. The causes of racial disturbances: A comparison of alternative explanations. Institute for Page 27th, On Payerty, Discussion Paper 44-69:

explanations. Institute for Research on Poverty, Discussion Paper 44-69; University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, 1969.

Tomlinson, T. M. The development of a riot ideology among urban Negroes.

American Behavioral Scientist, March-April, 1968, 27-31.

The control of the co

Cally of the later of the later

The property of the property o

AND THE LEADING AND ADDRESS OF A STATE OF A

The first of the second of the

Racial Socialization, Comparison Levels, and the Watts Riot¹

David O. Sears
University of California, Los Angeles

and John B. McConahay
Yale University

One of the reasons most Americans have been so disturbed by the urban race riots of the 1960s is that they are such an utterly new phenomenon in twentieth-century America. There has been virtually no precedent whatever for these mass eruptions by the black population in the United States. The long years of slavery were only infrequently, and ineffectually, punctuated by slave rebellions. The abrupt relaxation of institutionalized slavery brought with it relatively few instances of violence perpetrated by newly freed blacks upon their former masters. And the 100 long years since Emancipation, filled with almost uninterrupted frustration and privation for black Americans, witnessed only rare

¹The research on which this paper is based was conducted under a contract between the Office of Economic Opportunity and the Institute of Government and Public Affairs at UCLA. The coordinator of the Los Angeles Riot Study was Nathan E. Cohen. Some of the data have appeared in an earlier technical report (Sears and McConahay, 1970). We wish to express our gratitude to the many people who worked on the study, particularly to Diana TenHouten, Paula Johnson, T. M. Tomlinson, Ronald Abeles, and Esther Spachner. Computing assistance was obtained from the Pomona College Computing Center and the Health Sciences Computing Facility at UCLA.

outbreaks of mass violence by blacks against whites and against the white-dominated social system. Historically, mass violence by American blacks against their oppressors has been rare, and until recently it has never posed an important threat to the stability of American society. In this context, the riots of the mid-1960s are novel and shocking.

Population Changes

To learn what has caused this sharp departure from historical passivity, let us look at how black Americans have changed in other respects. Most obviously, there have been major demographic changes. In the late nineteenth century, the black population of America was rural, agrarian, Southern, only semiliterate, and had been residentially stable for many years. Today, it is urban, industrial, national, moderately well educated, and residentially mobile. Although this change is by now well known, it is easy to forget just how dramatic it has been.

Region. In 1910, at the beginning of the major migration from South to North, only 11% of the American Negro population lived outside the South. By 1966, this had increased to 45%. Migration to the Pacific states such as California was particularly late, so that California was less than 1% black in 1910. As late as 1940 only 1% of the nation's blacks lived in all the Western states; by 1966, 8% did (Bureau of Labor Statistics; 1967; Taeuber and

Taeuber, 1966).

Urbanization. Most of this migration has been to the large urban centers of the North and West, and from the rural South to Southern cities. Consequently a predominantly rural population became highly urbanized: in 1910, 29% of the Negroes lived in metropolitan areas; and in 1966, 69% did. Whites, more urban to begin with (48% in 1910), have become urbanized at a much slower rate (64% in 1966). And in the North and West, the areas most responsible for the riots, Negroes have become almost completely urbanized: in 1960, 93% lived in metropolitan areas (whereas fewer than 70% of the whites did). And today the migration into Northern cities is no longer from the farms: of the non-whites who moved to Los Angeles in the 1955–1960 period, 72% came from some other metropolitan area (Taeuber and Taeuber, 1966).²

Education. The deficiencies in Negroes' educational opportunities are now well known. However, recent increases in edu-

²Migration to Southern cities still tends to be from rural areas. In the same period, only 29% of those moving to Atlanta came from metropolitan areas.

cational attainments are dramatic. In 1940, Negro males aged 25 to 29 averaged 6.5 years of education; by 1962, the average was 11.0 years. This has not eliminated the racial differential, but it has reduced it: in 1940, whites had on the average 4.0 more years of education than blacks, but by 1962 the difference was only 1.5 years (Taeuber and Taeuber, 1966). The number of years does not provide an adequate index to the quality of education, of course, but this considerable increase in the average length of a black man's time in school is bound to affect his literacy and his sophistication.

Youth. The higher birth rate of Negro mothers has produced a black population markedly younger than the white. In 1966 the median age of Negroes was 21.1 years, and of whites, 29.1 years

(Kerner, O. et. al., 1968, p. 238).

To summarize, then, the Negro population has become much more urbanized, Northernized, and considerably better-educated. It is a young and physically vigorous population. Yet it remains highly segregated, crammed into relatively small and deteriorated urban areas, underemployed, and underpaid. It is also a population generally regarded as inferior by the white majority.

Riot Participation and the New Urban Black Man

Have these demographic changes been responsible, in part, for the rioting? One test is simply to determine whether or not the young Northern urban better-educated blacks have been more prominent in the rioting than those representing the earlier pat-

tern of Negro life.

Our data come from a sample survey conducted in the South Central black ghetto in Los Angeles during late 1965 and early 1966, soon after the Watts riot of August, 1965. Two samples will be discussed here: a representative sample of adults (age 15 and up) living in the area cordoned off during the riot (the "Curfew Zone sample," n = 586), and an accidental sample of blacks arrested during the riot, contacted through lawyers providing free legal aid ("Arrestee sample," n = 124). All these respondents were interviewed by black interviewers living in the Curfew Zone. Persons who were most involved in the riot were identified in three ways: (1) Arrestees; (2) in the Curfew Zone sample, those "active" in the riot by self-report; and (3) also in the Curfew Zone sample, those reporting they had seen at least four of the following

³For a more detailed account of the procedure, see Tomlinson and Ten-Houten (1970).

five events: shooting, stone-throwing, burning of stores, looting

of stores, and crowds in the street.

The young were considerably more likely than the old to be involved in the Watts riot, both in terms of self-reported activity and in viewing riot events. Table 1 gives the data for the Curfew

TABLE 1
RIOT PARTICIPATION AS A FUNCTION OF CURRENT AGE
AND REGION OF ORIGIN

Office Administration of the Control	The state of the s	U.S. Charles and the Control of the		
Age				
15-29	30-44	45+	All ages	
37%ª	9%	0%	28%	
19	17	117	19	
24	21	15	20	
32%	18%	14%		
		Annual Francisco		
52%	43%	25%	48%	
37	21	17	26	
20	28	21	25	
41%	30%	20%		
	37%° 19 24 32% 52% 37 20	37% ^a 9% 19 17 24 21 32% 18% 52% 43% 37 21 20 28	37%° 9% 0% 19 17 17 24 21 15 32% 18% 14% 52% 43% 25% 37 21 17 20 28 21	

Note.—"Natives" are those born in Los Angeles or arriving before age 17. N on

which these percentages are based is 586.

The entry is the proportion active in the riot of those meeting the age and migrancy conditions specified. Thus, 37% of young natives reported themselves active, the remaining 63% said that they were not.

Zone sample. The Arrestee sample was primarily composed of young people, and was considerably younger than either the Curfew Zone sample or the South Central Los Angeles area as a

whole (Sears and McConahay, 1969).

Those who were native to Los Angeles were considerably more likely to have been active in the rioting than Southern migrants and in-migrants from Northern cities. This too is shown in Table 1. Reported elsewhere (Sears and McConahay, 1970) are data which indicated that recency of migration also diminished participation. Considering the youngest of our age groups (age 15–29), 37% of those who had been born in Los Angeles or who arrived before age 7 claimed activity, while only 17% of those who had arrived in Los Angeles within the previous five years said they had been active.

With respect to education, on the other hand, there was little or no relationship to riot participation. In fact, there was virtually

no relationship between riot participation and any such indices of socio-economic status.

The Social Psychology of the New Urban Black Man

The rioters thus seem to fit the portrait of the new urban black man. Whereas the Southern rural "Negro" of 1900 was not likely to go to war against the ruling white population, the young Northern urban blacks of the 1960s are geared for battle and for confrontation.

Demographic changes do not by themselves produce behavioral changes, however. What social psychological changes might they have produced that would mediate their effects on behavior? More specifically, what social psychological changes have oc-curred that were sufficiently profound to spur a sudden surge of rioting? Here, we wish to focus particularly upon the effects of age and of area of socialization. The remainder of this paper is de-

voted to spelling out possible changes in the attitudinal effects of early socialization and in comparison levels, and to some prelim-

inary tests with our data from the Watts riot.

First, the socialization of blacks in the rural South of years gone by emphasized repression of hostility against whites and against institutions dominated by white authority. It did not, needless to say, encourage outspoken criticism, disagreement, or confrontation. And this socialization had lifelong effects upon the behavior of Negroes. We hypothesize that black socialization has become substantially more militant, especially in the North. Perhaps open anti-white feeling has always been less dangerous in the North; but partly, as well, the young of today are imitating the open confrontations with authority seen in the civil rights battles of the late 1950s and early 1960s. According to this view, then, the riots represent just one manifestation of a wider ten-dency to express open hostility against whites, and to become more independent of their wishes.

Second, migration from the rural, poverty-stricken South to the more affluent and better educated North has raised blacks' expectations. Hence the possibility arises that disappointments in the North yield a sense of relative deprivation. We wish to test for evidence of relative deprivation and for its possible role in

instigating rioting.

This greater participation of Northern natives and the absence of substantial relationships between indicators of social class and riot participation have been typical findings of recent riot studies. See the Report of the National Advisory Commission (Kerner et al., 1968), and Murphy and Watson (1970).

A third possible consequence of being reared in Northern ghettos is one that ought to be raised, but is unfortunately not one we can directly address with empirical evidence. The residential segregation of Northern metropolitan areas has largely restricted blacks to small, deteriorating, compact urban ghettos. Among the numerous effects this could be expected to have is an exceptional lability of attitudes bearing on matters of common concern. For example, one might expect parental influence over racial attitudes to be diluted, on the grounds that peers are so accessible that youngsters spend much more time with their friends and correspondingly less with their families than in more isolated suburban areas. Hence it would seem likely that inter-generational attitude change would occur more readily with changes in events, that norms would change more rapidly, that consensuses could form and reform more quickly, and so on. For these reasons one might expect a more widespread "generation gap" between older, Southern-reared parents and young ghetto-reared offspring than in less densely concentrated residential areas.

Racial Socialization

The Psychology of Enduring Dispositions. To test the possibility that contemporary Northern urban socialization was a key factor in the rioting, we must first consider more generally the question of the enduring effects of socialization. From the growing mass of data on attitudes of the American public at our disposal, it is beginning to appear that certain kinds of attitudes represent enduring dispositions. Other attitudes appear to be much more transitory and meaningless, even declining to the status of what one writer has called "non-attitudes (Converse, 1963)." Let us consider this contrast in more detail.

One might pose a number of criteria by which longstanding attitudinal dispositions could be contrasted with transitory and ephemeral preferences: (1) acquisition earlier in life; (2) greater stability; (3) greater internal consistency; and (4) ability to control opinion formation on other issues. As research has accumulated, it has begun to appear that most attitudes fitting these criteria refer either to groups or to persons. In contemporary America, most salient among these are, perhaps, those attitudes referring to political party, to racial issues, to nation, and to some particularly well-known political personalities. Let us here merely suggest some of the evidence for this contention (see Sears, 1969a, for a more detailed treatment).

There is now convincing evidence of the early acquisition of racial attitudes (Proshansky, 1966), nationalism (Hess and

Torney, 1967), and political partisanship (Greenstein, 1965; Hess and Torney, 1967). Whether or not children acquire these in anything like their adult form is not so clear; still, most children do not acquire attitudes on other political and social matters until later on (Sigel, 1968), and these early preferences show a certain stability, consistency, and ability to determine other opinions (Hess and Torney, 1967; Sears, 1969a). And it seems clear that early familial influence is more marked on the child's racial attitudes and party identification than in a whole host of other areas, partly because the parents' racial and partisan attitudes are a good deal clearer to the child than any of their other political and social attitudes (Jennings and Niemi, 1968; Niemi, 1969). The same holds for parents' presidential preferences; these probably are the political and social attitudes most clearly communicated by parents to their children.

By these several standards, then, it appears that attitudes referring to political party, race, nation, and some public personalities are acquired earlier than are other social and political attitudes. These attitudes appear also to be more stable over both long and short terms. Panel studies have demonstrated shortterm stability most convincingly. For example, Converse (1964) has shown that racial attitudes and party identification are more stable over two or four year periods than are any of a variety of other political attitudes tested. The stability of presidential preferences through a campaign is well known (Lazarsfeld, Berelson,

and Gaudet, 1948; Benham, 1965).

Longer-term stability is more of an unknown, since longitudinal studies of attitudes have been conducted only on a few rather specialized, and usually highly politicized, samples (cf. Bloom, 1964; Newcomb et al., 1967). Retrospective reports can yield some information, and relatively few respondents do report having changed parties (Campbell et al., 1960, p. 147). Another imperfect, but somewhat edifying, test of stability is to look at persons subjected to major environmental changes, especially changes from one attitudinally homogeneous environment to another. For example, social and geographic mobility may not influence party or racial attitudes as much as is generally believed (Barber, 1965; Campbell et al., 1960; Sears, 1969a). Marriage may have substantial effects and thus may be an exception in this respect, but the change of environment it involves is considerably more proximate and immediate, and the affective ties more complex, than is the case for most other environmental changes—even so, the data on its effects are not yet very clear (Sears, 1969a).

Systematic tests of the relative internal consistency or controlling power of various kinds of attitudes have been less common. What indications are available suggest that by both criteria, the predispositions described above tend to be more coherent and

powerful (Converse, 1964; Sears, 1969a).

Contemporary Northern Socialization vs. Earlier Southern Socialization. It seems, then, that group-related predispositions are acquired rather early in life and are maintained with considerable persistence. To account for adult differences in attitude, consequently, one must look first at differential socialization experiences in childhood and adolescence. What specifically differentiates the contemporary socialization of Northern urban blacks

from that of the rural South of an earlier era?

There are few hard data on this point, but there are many impressionistic accounts. Let us consider Pettigrew's (1964) representative treatment. He contrasts Northern and Southern socialization in terms of differential mechanisms for coping with the hostility engendered by white authority and white racism. Open expression of hostility against whites has traditionally been quite dangerous in the South, and so traditional Southern socialization of Negroes emphasized its repression. It was expressed only in the very muted and diluted forms he describes as reflecting "moving away from the oppressor": aggressive meekness, spiritualism, passivity and withdrawal, passive acquiescence to whites, social insulation, and such extreme forms of escapism as addiction to drugs or alcohol. In some cases excessive denial of aggression against whites has produced "emotional dullness."

In contrast, Northern socialization has placed less premium upon the control of hostility against white authorities. Northern blacks generally agree that police brutality is widely practiced (see Raine, 1970; Campbell and Schuman, 1968; among others). Even so, the norms for black behavior in the North do not restrict

assertiveness as much as they do in the South.

Systematic data to document this contrast are not very plentiful. Brink and Harris (1966) found Southern Negroes more contented than Northern Negroes on a wide variety of measures (e.g., regarding housing, school integration, transportation, police, white business, etc.). Northerners also were more likely to favor "black power," and to say that the struggle for Negro rights was going "too slow." Beardwood (1968) has presented more recent data showing that Southern Negroes feel less anti-white and are less likely to feel that violence is necessary. So it appears that currently there is less discontent in the South, and also less militancy. Whether or not this is a consequence of differential socialization is hard to tell without more detailed analysis. Our data below will address this question.

A related hypothesis is that the younger generation is being

socialized into a more militant frame of mind, from a variety of sources, than were its elders. There is some evidence that dramatic public events have a more marked effect upon youthful attitudes than they do upon the attitudes of older people (Wolfinger, 1965; Sheatsley, 1966; Campbell et al., 1960). One would therefore expect young Negroes to have been more profoundly influenced by the very visible and salient confrontations of the late 1950s and early 1960s between blacks and unsympathetic white authority. The televised civil rights marches, the publicity about court cases, and the confrontations between federal authority and Southern obstructionists very likely contributed to greater radicalism and militancy among Negro youth. Presumably they also had some effect, but perhaps not as dramatic, upon older blacks.

Our analysis tests these hypotheses in terms of two predictions: (1) the young Northern-reared black man is more disaffected toward conventional institutions and their white incumbents than are older and migrant Negroes; and (2) the Watts riot occurred in part because of widespread feelings that conventional mechanisms of grievance redress were not responsive to the needs

of ghetto residents.

The Disaffection of the New Urban Black Man. Our data reveal considerable evidence of the greater disaffection of the young Northern urban blacks. Their mistrust of elected officials is a clear example. Our respondents were asked whether or not one could trust "elected officials" and "Negro elected officials." Both youth and Northern socialization were closely related to mistrust. Among the young natives (those aged 15–29 who arrived in Los Angeles before they were 7), 38% felt they could trust both kinds of officials. At the other extreme, 66% of the old migrants (those aged 45 and over who arrived in Los Angeles at age 30 or later) said they could trust both kinds of officials.

The pattern is the same, though not always quite so marked, on numerous other dimensions of attitude toward white authority: a generalized scale of political disaffection (e.g., "How do you feel about the way you are represented?"), attitudes toward white liberals (e.g., California Governor Brown, or the Democratic party), evaluations of white officeholders (e.g., President Johnson, Los Angeles City Councilman Gibson, or Los Angeles County Supervisor Hahn) and of legislative bodies (Congress, the state

⁵Sheatsley (1966) has argued that these events had a conservatizing effect on the same generation of young Southern whites.

These data and the others to be presented in this section are given in considerably greater detail in Sears and McConahay (1970). Our purpose here is to illustrate the findings rather than present them exhaustively.

legislature, etc.). In all cases, the young proved to be more disenchanted with government, though not significantly so in each case; in most cases those brought up in Los Angeles were more disaffected than the migrants, though significantly so only in the

case of generalized disaffection.

There were two important exceptions to this pattern. One concerns aspects of local government: evaluation of local welfare agencies (e.g., Bureau of Public Assistance), perceived discrimination in local agencies (e.g., school system, fire department), attitude toward the local political structure (e.g., the Mayor and City Council), and perceived fairness of mass media in covering Negro problems. Migrancy affected none of the four scales generated to measure these concerns; age had only a marginally significant effect upon evaluations of the local political structure

(p < .10) and no effect in the other cases.

However, a closer look reveals that youth and nativity alike contribute to hostility toward the most salient white incumbents in local politics. For example, the young natives were more antagonistic than the old migrants toward Los Angeles Mayor Yorty and Chief of Police William Parker, each of whom had a wide reputation for being unsympathetic to Negro demands (Sears, 1969b). These data appear to indicate that genuine, reality-based grievances about the failures of local government agencies (see Jacobs, 1966) produce disaffection from local government among older and migrant citizens that approaches the more intense generalized disaffection of the young native. A mother of five children, aged 40, does not have to be a sophisticated political ideologue to be embittered about the Aid to Dependent Children program or to perceive racial discrimination in a school system that is a model of de facto segregation. Thus, the greater immediacy of and familiarity with the failures of local government appear to override the usual disposition of the somewhat older and migrant Negro not to criticize white authority very much.

Attitudes toward black leadership constituted the other exception to the generational and origin gap in militancy. Four evaluation scales were used: (1) militancy (e.g., the Black Muslims), (2) local black politicians (e.g., Congressman Hawkins, Councilman Bradley), (3) civil rights groups (e.g., NAACP, SNCC), and (4) assimilationists (e.g., Ralph Bunche, Thurgood Marshall). The young were more militant, did not differ from the old regarding black politicians or civil rights groups, and were less favorable to assimilationists. Thus, the younger blacks were not more disaffected than their elders toward black leadership, with the sole exception of traditional assimilationist leaders. And

they were in fact more enthusiastic than their elders about such

militant groups as the Muslims.

Natives also were not more disaffected than migrants toward black leadership. In fact, they were slightly (p < .10) more favorable to black politicians and assimilationists than were migrants, though they did not differ in terms of Muslims or civil rights

groups.

Finally, the young natives were significantly more likely to endorse the use of violence in redressing Negroes' grievances. When given a choice of violent protest, nonviolent protest, or negotiation, the young natives were twice as likely as young migrants to choose violence. This is a further indication of the young native's greater willingness to assert himself and aggress openly against white authority.

In short, the young natives were more politically disaffected in a variety of respects than older and migrant respondents. However, the new generation was not particularly disaffected with respect to black leadership, and young and old respondents alike expressed considerable unhappiness with the work of local

government.

Rioters' Attitudes Toward Mechanisms of Grievance Redress. The second question is whether or not this disaffection in fact had some causal role in precipitating the rioting. Such causal relations cannot be established in any rigorous sense from retrospective correlational data. However, if disaffection was essentially uncorrelated with rioting, it would seem much less likely to have played a causal role. What in fact was the relationship between riot participation and the several versions of disaffection cited above? Here we shall merely present some representative findings; for a more complete presentation of the data, the reader is referred to our original report (Sears and McConahay, 1970).

The riot participants differed from nonparticipants both in being more disaffected in general terms, and in being particularly disaffected from local government. The generalized disaffection is illustrated by the fact that 35% of those who said they trusted neither elected officials nor Negro elected officials were active in the riot, by self-report; whereas only 14% of those who said they trusted officials on both items were active. Thirty-eight percent of the Arrestees, against 50% of the Curfew Zone sample, said

they trusted elected officials.

Each of our indexes of disaffection with local government (see above) was also closely related to riot participation. Selfreported riot activity was strongly related to disaffection from the local political structure, unfavorable evaluations of local welfare agencies, perceived discrimination in local government, and unfavorable evaluations of the fairness of local media in dealing with

Negro problems.

Perhaps the most graphic demonstration of the special disaffection rioters had with local mechanisms of grievance redress is given by the item, "If you were treated unfairly by the police, what would you do about it?" Replies were divided into those reflecting conventional civics-course trust in the system (e.g., report it to the authorities, take it to court, file a complaint with the police department) and those reflecting despair and cynicism (e.g., do nothing, what can you do, self-defense, take revenge). Self-reported riot activity was considerably higher among those giving the cynical response (30% active) than among those giving the trusting response (18%), and the cynical answer was much more likely to emerge from Arrestees (41%) than Curfew Zone respondents (29%).

However, this appears to reflect a despair about the process of redressing grievances rather than simply hostility against the rioters' adversaries in the disturbance, such as the police. Selfreported riot activity was only marginally related to our scale measuring belief in widespread police brutality against Negroes (p < .10), unrelated to attitudes toward the police chief, and modestly related to the view that the authorities handled the riot badly. The fact that attitudes toward the police do not clearly differentiate participants and nonparticipants implies two things: that the special antagonism expressed by riot participants toward local government is not simply a rationalization for their rioting, because the police would be an even more convenient target for rationalization; and that, in addition, grievance against the police was more widespread than that against any other civic agency

(the rioters were not alone in expressing it).

There is some other evidence suggesting the causal role of this disaffection toward local government and its services. Some of the more salient alternative explanations for the correlation can be ruled out by our data. First, as indicated above, it does not seem to be simply a rationalization for counter-normative behavior (the rioters were not much more antagonistic to the police than nonrioters, and the police would have been a convenient target). Additional evidence that it is not merely post facto rationalization is that rioters did not adopt more than non-rioters the various complex mythologies that justified the riot, e.g., that the riot was a directed protest against white racism (Sears and Tomlinson, 1968; Tomlinson, 1970). For example, 66% of the Arrestees, 68% of the active in the Curfew Zone sample, and 62% of the inactive in the Curfew Zone sample agreed that it was a "Negro protest." Moreover, the special disaffection of the rioters focused upon the local situation. Rioters and non-rioters alike generally had praise for the national administration, for the Democratic party, for the poverty program, and so on. The differential disaffection did not show up there. Nor did it emerge with respect to black leadership. Self-professed riot activity was related to antagonism toward assimilationists, but only marginally related to attitudes toward black politicians, and not at all related to evaluations of civil rights groups. And the riot participants actually approved of the Muslims significantly more than did nonparticipants. So the hostility of the rioters toward local white authority and institutions did not merely reflect a generalized biliousness; it tended to be specific to local white authority and institutions.

The participants were also distinctive in feeling that the riot had been aimed at specific persons and institutions rather than at impersonal conditions. As mentioned above, they joined in the general feeling that it had been a deliberate, purposeful protest. The rioters' personalizing of the protest provides some further evidence for the role of disaffection from local authority structures. And, finally, those respondents who were most disaffected about local institutions were also most optimistic about the outcome of the riot; they expected the riot to bring whites to their senses, and that it would make whites more attentive to Negro problems

(Sears and McConahay, 1970).

Relative Deprivation and Comparison Levels

A basic assumption in theories of relative deprivation and social evaluation is that a state of deprivation or unfavorable evaluation has motivating properties (Pettigrew, 1967). It is here proposed that one motivating force for the violent outburts of the mid-1960s was an unfavorable comparison between the attainments of the young Northern natives and those which they ex-

pected or thought they deserved.

That blacks in general felt relatively deprived in the early 1960s seems clear. Pettigrew (1967) has shown that in 1963 the American black community was generally in a state of rising expectations regarding their general life situation and with regard to such a state of their states. to such specific areas as income, housing, and education for their children. At the same time, black Americans were not satisfied with their current status. Our hypothesis is that the combination of this relative deprivation and the widespread feeling that the social structure allowed no means of improving outcomes or redressing grievances led to an attack upon the symbols of the white social structure. Here we wish to consider what light this perspective can shed on the general finding that the young natives

were most involved in the rioting.

First, let us consider a somewhat more formalized version of the relative deprivation hypothesis, deriving from Thibaut and Kelley's (1959) notion of "comparison level" (CL). This concept was proposed to account for the manner in which an individual evaluates his outcomes in a given social interaction. It embodies all of the usual features of the relative deprivation idea, emphasizing evaluation of one's life situation not in terms of its absolute value, but in terms of the way one's present condition compares with the condition of salient others. In addition to this, however, Thibaut and Kelley have proposed that such evaluations are also affected by the outcomes one has experienced in the past. They have defined the CL (1959, p. 81) as being "some modal or average value of all outcomes known to the person (by virtue of personal or vicarious experience), each outcome weighted by its salience (or the degree to which it is instigated for the person at the moment)." This modal or average value, the CL, is a neutral point on a scale of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Outcomes falling above CL will be satisfying (regardless of how the "independent observer" might evaluate them), and those falling below will not be satisfying.

Among the variables Thibaut and Kelley hypothesized to affect CL, two are most important for our understanding of the riots. First, experienced outcomes are expected to be highly salient and hence to carry great weight in the location of the CL. Second, perceived extent of control over one's outcomes is proposed to affect the range of groups and other persons whose outcomes vi-

cariously influence an individual's CL.

Comparison Levels and Relative Deprivation of Northern and Southern Blacks. We might expect the joint operation of the experience and perceived control (power) factors to produce the following effects:
(1) Northern natives should have a higher CL than Southern-reared migrants to the North, and (2) Northern natives should be in a state of relative deprivation (outcomes below CL), while Southern migrants should be in a state of relative satisfaction (outcomes above CL).

The first of these expected effects rests upon the further assumption that outcomes are objectively worse for black people in the South than in the North. This has been demonstrated in numerous studies, and there is a consensus in the black community that this is so. When asked, "Do you think that Negroes are generally better off in Los Angeles than in the South?", 67% of our respondents replied that things were better in Los Angeles,

while only 6% thought things were worse in Los Angeles than in the South. The black man growing up in the South experiences only these lesser outcomes and brings a lower CL with him when he migrates to the North. Blacks reared in the North have experienced the better outcomes for most of their lives. Thus, their CL's are likely to be higher than those of Southern migrants.

Indeed, most empirical studies do show Northern blacks to have considerably higher expectations and aspirations than Southern blacks. Parker and Kleiner (1966) found that the Northern-reared aspired to higher status occupations than did the Southern-reared. When residents of Philadelphia were offered a hypothetical choice between a low-paying white collar job and a high-paying blue collar job, 57% of the Southern migrants chose the white ce'lar position, but 69% of the native-born and 78% of

the Northern migrants preferred the white collar job.

Furthermore, the Northern- and Southern-reared young people in our sample (those 15-29 years of age) differed significantly in their optimism regarding the attainability of additional education they desired. Over 90% of both groups said that they wanted more education, both Northern- and Southern-reared young people wanting an average of four additional years of schooling. However, 83% of the Los Angeles natives felt they would reach this goal, as compared with only 63% of the Southern

migrants (p < .005).

The second expected effect, a difference in relative deprivation between Northern natives and Southern migrants, derives from the difference between the two groups with regard to the social structure of the region in which they received their socialization. Thibaut and Kelley proposed that greater perceived control over one's outcomes affects the CL by increasing the number of reference groups whose outcomes one vicariously experiences. One implication of this is that in societies with heavy emphasis upon ascribed status, the range of persons and groups whose outcomes contribute to an individual's CL is quite limited, whereas in achieved status systems the range is much broader. Thus, we might propose that the individual reared in the North, where there is more emphasis upon achieved status and where the caste lines are blurred, would compare himself with a greater range of persons, including affluent white society, than would a black person reared in the South.

When he came to the North, the Southern migrant would evaluate his new experiences by using a CL which was low, not only because of his poor past outcomes, but also because of the narrow range of the people and groups (mostly Negro) with whom he compared himself while in the South. Since his new outcomes would be well above his CL, he would (temporarily, at least) be

in a state of relative satisfaction.

On the other hand, the young Northern urban black person's CL would be higher than the Southern migrant's because of his past experiences, and above his actual outcomes because he compares himself with whites as well as blacks. For example, a black person who compared himself to whites with similar educational attainments would find his outcomes below those of this reference group; e.g., in 1966, whites with a grade school education earned an average of \$1,099 more than blacks with the same education. Furthermore, as education increased, whites' advantage increased to \$3,095 among those with a college degree (Bureau of Labor

Statistics, 1967).

To examine the relative deprivation hypothesis further, we constructed a measure of deprivation by combining the responses to two questions: "What kind of work are you doing?" and "If you could have any job, what would you most like to do?" The responses to each question were grouped into nine steps according to the NORC prestige ratings of the occupations given. The rank of the present job was subtracted from the rank of the job the respondent would most like to have, creating a nine-step distribution ranging from 0 (wanted a job of the same rank or less compared to his present job) to 8 (wanted a job which was 8 ranks above his present job). Those scoring 0 on this measure (30%) were said to be satisfied; those scoring 1-3 were said to be moderately deprived (35%); and those scoring 4-8 were said to be highly deprived (35%). Los Angeles natives and migrants to Los Angeles from other Northern areas were significantly more deprived on this measure than were Southern migrants ($\chi^2 = 28.86$, 4df, p < .001). Among the young, the effect of region of socialization was even more pronounced. Natives (36%) and Northern migrants (32%) were almost twice as likely as Southern migrants (17%) to score as highly deprived.

Thus, it appears that Northern natives and Southern migrants to the North differ in their aspirations, their optimism, and their satisfaction with their life experiences. The natives have higher aspirations, are more optimistic, and feel more deprived of the rewards they see whites getting than do their brothers who

have recently arrived from the South.

Relative Deprivation and Riot Participation. Now we turn to the question of whether or not this state of relative deprivation is related to participation in the riot. We know that the strains of higher aspirations can produce psychopathology (Parker and Kleiner, 1966). It appears that these strains can also produce

social violence. Of those who were optimistic about attaining additional education, 29% reported themselves active in the riot, and 42% scored high on the events-witnessed scale. The pessimists were lower on both indexes: 15% on self-reported activity and 24% on events witnessed. The differences were highly significant

(b < .001 in each case).

Relative deprivation, as we measured it, was also related to riot participation. Sixteen percent of the satisfied reported themselves active. This increased to 25% of the moderately deprived and 31% of the highly deprived ($\chi^2 = 9.89, 2df, p < .01$). Among the young, the differences between the deprived and the satisfied were even greater (20%, 40%, and 44%, respectively). The deprived and satisfied did not differ significantly on the eventswitnessed index. As deprivation increased, the number of events witnessed also increased. However, the differences were not large

enough to be significant.

The role of powerlessness, or lack of control over one's outcomes, has already been alluded to above. Respondents who felt they could not trust local authority, or who felt they could "do nothing" if abused by the police, tended more often to be involved in the riot. This corroborates findings reported by others. Ransford (1968), in another survey of blacks in South Central Los Angeles, found the greatest endorsement of violence among those who felt dissatisfied relative to the treatment accorded whites and other reference groups, who felt powerless, and who had little social contact with whites. Crawford and Naditch (1968) extended the contact with whites. tended this analysis, proposing that degree of perceived power-lessness would determine whether the dissatisfied would strike out in violence, or would attempt to use conventional procedures of grievance redress. They reanalyzed Ransford's data and found that the dissatisfied who felt subjectively powerful were indeed more likely to have engaged in civil rights demonstrations, whereas endorsing violence was most common with dissatisfaction and felt page 11 and 12 and 13 and 14 and 14 and 15 and 16 and 1 felt powerlessness.

Summary

The basic hypothesis offered here is that the outbreak of mass violence was an almost inevitable consequence of the major population changes that American Negroes have been undergoing in recent years.

See Murphy and Watson (1970) for additional discussion of the role of interracial contact.

(1) The most important of these population changes have been the movement from the South to the North, the movement from rural areas to the largest metropolitan centers, and the rapid rise in the average level of education, in combination with the extreme youth of the black population.

(2) Individuals from the "new" background (the young natives of Northern cities) were considerably more active in the riots than were those

from the "old" background (the older migrants from the South).

(3) Two principal socio-psychological mediators were offered to explain this finding: the attitudinal and behavioral effects of changes in black

racial socialization, and of differential comparison levels.

(4) Evidence was presented that early racial socialization produces predispositions that tend to endure through life. For Negroes, contemporary Northern socialization is generally thought to involve more abrasive and assertive norms of behavior toward white authority and white-dominated social institutions than does Southern socialization, particularly that of earlier times. Data from the Watts riot suggest that young Northern natives were more disaffected from the political structure, and were more likely to endorse violence, than were older and migrant residents. The disaffected were also considerably more likely to have been involved in the riot.

(5) The Northern natives also appear to feel more deprived than do the Southern blacks. And dissatisfaction in this sense was related to par-

ticipation in the riot.

It goes without saying that no single explanation or set of explanations is likely to be adequate for such complex and massive social events as the recent race riots. However, the evidence presented here suggests that fundamental and irreversible social changes in the location and characteristics of the black population have produced important social-psychological changes within individual blacks. These, in turn, have increased enormously the probability that blacks will respond to white racism with intransi-

gence, vigorous protest, and even violence.

The further implication is that the apparently centrifugal movement represented by the Deacons, the Black Panthers, and the wavering attachment of some young militants to the American political and economic system are not epiphenomena; nor are they merely representative of a small minority's peculiar and disreputable ideas. They symbolize, although in more extreme form, the direction being taken by young ghetto natives throughout the country. Our data suggest that the direction and thrust of this movement are irreversible without extreme measures that white Americans presumably would not condone. The question appears to be whether or not institutional America, and the white population more generally, are prepared to accept the new "black man" as a replacement for the old "Negro." There seems to be little chance that the latter will return.

REFERENCES

BARBER, J. A., JR. Social mobility and political behavior. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1965.

BEARDWOOD, R. The new Negro mood. Fortune, 1968, 78, 146 passim.

BENHAM, T. W. Polling for a presidential candidate: Some observations on the 1964 campaign. Public Opinion Quarterly, 1965, 29, 185-199.

BLOOM, B. S. Stability and change in human characteristics. New York: Wiley, 1964. Brink, W., & Harris, L. Black and white. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966.

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. Social and economic conditions of Negroes in the United States. BLS Report No. 332. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967.

CAMPBELL, A., CONVERSE, P. E., MILLER, W. E., & STOKES, D. E. The American

voter. New York: Wiley, 1960.
CAMPBELL, A., & SCHUMAN, H. Racial attitudes in fifteen American cities. In Supplemental studies for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968.

Converse, P. E. Attitudes and non-attitudes: Continuation of a dialogue. Paper presented at the meeting of the International Congress of Psychology, Washington, D.C., August, 1963.

CONVERSE, P. E. The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In D. E. Apter (Ed.), Ideology and discontent. New York: Free Press, 1964.

CRAWFORD, T. J., & NADITCH, M. Unattained and unattainable goals: Relative deprivation, powerlessness, and racial militancy. Paper presented to the

American Psychological Association Convention, September, 1968. GREENSTEIN, F. I. Children and politics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965. Hess, R. D., & Torney, J. V. The development of political attitudes in children. Chi-

cago: Aldine, 1967.

JACOBS, P. Prelude to riot: A view of urban America from the bottom. New York: Random House, 1966.

JENNINGS, M. K., & NIEMI, R. G. The transmission of political values from parent to child. American Political Science Review, 1968, 62, 169-184.

KERNER, O. et al. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. New York: Bantam, 1968. LAZARSFELD, P. F., BERELSON, B., & GAUDET, H. The people's choice (2nd ed.).

New York: Columbia University Press, 1948. MURPHY, R. J., & WATSON, J. M. The structure of discontent: The relationship between social structure, grievance, and support for the Los Angeles riot. In N. E. Cohen (Ed.), The Los Angeles riots: A socio-psychological study. New York:

NEWCOMB, T. M., KOENIG, K. E., FLACKS, R., & WARWICK, D. P. Persistence and Praeger, 1970. change: Bennington College and its students after 25 years. New York: Wiley, 1967.

NIEMI, R. G. Collecting information about the family: A problem in survey methodology. In J. Dennis and F. W. Frey (Eds.), Political socialization: A reader of theory and research. New York: Wiley, 1969, in press. PARKER, S., & KLEINER, R. J. Mental illness in the urban Negro community. New York:

PETTIGREW, T. F. A profile of the Negro American. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1964.

PETTIGREW, T. F. Social evaluation theory: Convergences and applications. In D. Levine (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation, 1967. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967.

PROSHANSKY, H. M. The development of intergroup attitudes. In L. W. Hoffman & M. L. Hoffman (Eds.), Review of child development research, Vol. 2. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1966.

RAINE, W. J. The perception of police brutality in South Central Los Angeles. In N. E. Cohen (Ed.), The Los Angeles riots: A socio-psychological study. New York: Praeger, 1970.

Ransford, H. E. Isolation, powerlessness, and violence: A study of attitudes and participation in the Watts riot. American Journal of Sociology, 1968, 73, 581-591.

SEARS, D. O. Political behavior. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology. (Revised ed.). Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1969. (a)

SEARS, D. O. Black attitudes toward the political system in the aftermath of the Watts insurrection. Midwest Journal of Political Science, 1969, 13, 515-544. (b) SEARS, D. O., & McConahay, J. B. Participation in the Los Angeles riot. Social

Problems, 1969, 17(1), 3-20.

SEARS, D. O., & McConahay, J. B. The politics of discontent: Blocked mechanisms of grievance redress and the psychology of the new urban black man. In N. E. Cohen (Ed.), The Los Angeles riots: A socio-psychological study. New York: Praeger, 1970.

SEARS, D. O., & TOMLINSON, T. M. Riot ideology in Los Angeles: A study of

Negro attitudes. Social Science Quarterly, 1968, 49, 485-503.

SHEATSLEY, P. B. White attitudes toward the Negro. Daedalus, 1966, 95, 217-238. Sigel, R. S. Image of a president: Some insights into the political views of school children. American Political Science Review, 1968, 62, 216-226.

TAEUBER, K. E., & TAEUBER, A. F. The Negro population in the United States. In J. P. Davis (Ed.), The American Negro reference book. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:

Prentice-Hall, 1966. THIBAUT, J. W., & KELLEY, H. H. The social psychology of groups. New York: Wiley,

TOMLINSON, T. M. Militance, violence, and poverty: Ideology and foundation for action. In N. E. Cohen (Ed.), The Los Angeles riots: A socio-psychological study. New York: Praeger, 1970.

Tomlinson, T. M., & TenHouten, D. Method: Negro reaction study. In N. E. Cohen (Ed.), The Los Angeles riots: A socio-psychological study. New York:

Praeger, 1970.

WOLFINGER, R. E. The development and persistence of ethnic voting. The American Political Science Review, 1965, 59, 896-908.

Violence and Grievances: Reflections on the 1960s Riots

Robert M. Fogelson

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

In the urban violence of the 1960s, once the police and the blacks confronted one another, the rioters filled the streets, defied the patrolmen, denounced the authorities, threatened the reporters, and participated in other forms of low-level violence which prepared the way for the more serious attacks on property and persons. They also broke into stores in the ghettos—and only into stores and only in the ghettos—and in an open, unashamed, and orderly manner, stole the merchandise; they often deliberately burned the looted stores, sometimes accidentally destroying the adjacent buildings. At the same time the rioters not only assaulted white passers-by and overturned their automobiles but also tossed bricks and stones, hurled Molotov cocktails, and, in Los Angeles, Newark, Detroit, and a few other cities, fired rifles at local policemen and other law enforcement officials (Conot, 1967; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1964; Hayden, 1967; Kerner et al., 1968; Shapiro & Sullivan, 1964). By the time the rioters were finished the ghettos were in shambles and white society was in shock.

The violence differed somewhat from one ghetto to another. The differences between the Los Angeles (1965), Newark (1967), and Detroit (1967) riots, on the one hand, and the Rochester (1964), Chicago (1965), and Cleveland (1966) riots, on the other, are obvious. They can be measured by scores killed, thousands

injured and arrested, and millions of dollars of property destroyed. Less obvious, but more noteworthy, are the differences among the riots of similar magnitude. There was more looting in Cleveland than in Rochester and Chicago, more burning in Los Angeles than in Newark, and more sniping in Detroit than in all the other cities combined. Given the diversity of the black ghettos, this is not surprising. What is surprising is that no matter where the riots erupted, the rioters engaged in similar violence—namely, rioting, looting, arson, and assault. And these acts of violence—particularly the looting and arson, the sources of the riots' most memorable slogans and symbols—transformed the triggering in-

cidents into full-scale disorders.

This transformation was not inevitable. For well over a century Americans (especially adolescent members of ethnic minorities) have intermittently challenged police authorities without provoking widespread disorder. The Puerto Rican and black gangs organized in New York, Chicago, and other cities after World War II are a recent case in point (Salisbury, 1958; Yablonsky, 1962). Not every confrontation between the police and the blacks has led to full-scale rioting. Indeed, Jay Schulman, sociologist, who studied the Rochester ghetto has observed that for each serious disturbance in Rochester's Third and Seventh wards, there have been at least a dozen potential precipitating events. And not all the rioters were inspired by the triggering incidents. If the available evidence is reliable, very few actually witnessed the initial confrontation—though many more probably heard the rumors that spread through the ghettos afterwards (Cohen & Murphy, 1966; Kerner et al., 1968). Thus, unlike the outbreak of the riots, the subsequent course cannot be explained simply as a manifestation of the blacks' intense resentment of the police.

Nor can the looting, arson, and assault be explained as simply a consequence of the breakdown of public order. It is true that rioting generated an atmosphere conducive to looting, arson, and assault; and it is also true that looting, arson, and assault enhanced the opportunities for rioting. But according to the extensive historical and sociological literature on European and American disorder, neither looting nor arson, and not even assault, is an automatic consequence of the breakdown of public order. There are too many instances of rioting without looting, arson, and assault, of looting without arson, and even (witness events in Chicago during the winter of 1967–68) of looting without rioting. If the available literature suggests anything at all, it is that there are no predetermined patterns of violence in riots (Dynes & Quarantelli, 1968). And if this rule holds true in America nowadays—as I believe it does—the violence of the 1960s riots

can only be understood as a manifestation of the grievances of the

black ghettos.

The riots can be partially explained without reference to the ghetto's grievances. The great majority of the riots erupted on those hot and humid summer days which leave most Americans extremely irritable, if not highly inflammable, very long on resentment and equally short on patience (Kerner et al., 1968; Waskow, 1966). Also, like many Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, and other lower- and working-class people whose lives revolve around peer groups and whose homes lack space for neighboring, many blacks spend a great deal of their leisure time on the streets (Drake & Cayton, 1945; Gans, 1962; Whyte, 1943). Hence they were already on hand at the time of the triggering incidents. And once the riots were underway the black mobs assumed many of the extraordinary characteristics attributed to mobs in general by the French social-psychologist Gustave Le Bon more than half a century ago (1895). That is, they exhibited a touch of the demonic a sense of overwhelming power and a feeling of excitement bordering on abandon-which encouraged the rioters to act according to the passions of the crowd rather than the rules of the society.

But the significance of summer weather, social class, and crowd psychology can easily be exaggerated. To begin with, the relationship between these variables and the riots is ambiguous. The number of disorders which have erupted in the spring and fall (as well as on temperate summer days) has increased year by year. Although Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, and other lower- and working-class groups also socialize on the streets, only blacks have resorted to violent protest. Too, the mobs have displayed restraint and selectivity; this stands in sharp contrast to the observations of Le Bon (1895), thus supporting Rudé (1964) and Tilly (1966) in questioning his theories. What is more, summer weather, social class, and crowd psychology are fairly constant variables. The weather may vary from one summer to another, but each will have its hot and humid days; in those periods the blacks will seek relief and company on the streets; and if from time to time they engage in rioting, they will behave as rioters. This, it seems to me, is just another way of saying that if

there are riots there will be violence.

These variables cannot possibly account for the critical features of the riots. They cannot explain why, according to the findings of field surveys and analyses of arrest sheets, the rioters were a substantial minority of the blacks fairly representative of the young adult males, and received considerable support in the ghettos (Fogelson & Hill, 1968). Nor can they explain why if the newspaper accounts, police reports, and other firsthand descriptions are trustworthy, the rioting and assault were so restrained, the looting and arson so selective, and the disorders as a whole so articulate (Fogelson, 1968b). In other words, these variables do not enhance our understanding of the riots because they do not define them as violent protests against genuine grievances in the black ghettos. If any doubts remain about this interpretation after six summers of rioting, they should be dispelled by the many blacks who have pointed out that the violence was directed at the

sources of their most profound grievances. These conclusions should not be carried too far. The rioters were not always restrained and selective, nor was the violence unaffected by matters other than ghetto grievances. Among the most noteworthy were the availability of targets, the intensity of resentment, and the consequences of destruction. The rioters rarely attacked jails and courthouses because these facilities are located outside the ghettos and not because they are satisfied with the system of criminal justice. The rioters generally burned down stores rather than schools because consumer exploitation is even more humiliating and infuriating than inferior education. And the rioters normally spared their own homes and apartments (Detroit in 1967 being a major exception) not because they are content with their accommodations but because inadequate accommodations are better than none at all. Notwithstanding these qualifications, the rioters chose their targets with a consistency which suggests that a look at the violence will reveal the nature of the grievances and thereby clarify the meaning of the riots.

Rioting

Of all the types of violence, the most common was rioting itself. By rioting I mean milling in the streets, defying the patrollemen, denouncing the authorities, threatening the reporters, violating the curfews—all of which created the setting for more serious attacks on property and persons. Less destructive than looting, arson, and assault, rioting was no less important. To begin with, rioting not only provided the first outlet for the rioters but also stimulated them to seek other outlets later on. What is more, rioting went on all through the riots, though it was more prominent just after the triggering incidents and less prominent once the looting, arson, and assault were underway. Besides, rioting, as an analysis of the arrest sheets indicates, attracted especially the young adult males, born and raised in the ghettos, who reached maturity in the 1950s and 1960s.

The rioting was characterized not only by resentment, bravado, and excitement, but also by a few other less predictable yet more revealing emotions and attitudes. There was an out-

pouring of fellow-feeling, of mutual respect and common concern, which was well described by black psychiatrist, Harold Jones, as camaraderie (McCone Commission, 1965). And there was a display of what Governor Richard J. Hughes of New Jersey denounced as "carnival spirit" but what was actually exhilaration so intense as to border on jubilation. Finally, there was a sense of pride, purpose, and—in spite of or perhaps because of the ransacked stores, smoldering buildings, and police and military patrols—accomplishment (Rustin, 1966). Camaraderie, jubilation, and accomplishment were, I realize, only a few of the many emotions and attitudes exhibited by the rioters—nor, it goes without saying, are they unique to the 1960s riots. But few others which are witnessed so rarely in the ghettos were observed so frequently in the riots that a brief discussion of them may well en-

The outpouring of camaraderie was triggered not only because the rioters issued the protest and faced the danger together but also because the rioting revealed the common fate of blacks in America. For most blacks, and particularly northern blacks, racial discrimination is a highly personal experience. They are denied jobs, refused apartments, stopped-and-searched, and declared ineducable because—or so they are told—they are inexperienced, unreliable, suspicious, and culturally deprived—and not because they are black. Few blacks are persuaded by these reasons, but only the most confident or intransigent are absolutely convinced that all employers, landlords, policemen, and teachers are prejudiced. The rest are left to wonder from time

hance our understanding of the rioting.

to time whether they themselves are not somehow inadequate (Baldwin, 1963; Ellison, 1966; Kardiner & Ovesey, 1951), whether other blacks are not somewhat at fault, and whether racial subordination and segregation are not, as many whites believe, partially justified.

But once thousands of blacks rushed into the streets and joined in the riots, they realized that all blacks have suffered similar injustices; that racial discrimination, though personal in its impact, is social or institutional in its origin. They also realized that Malcolm X told his audiences time and again: "You don't catch hell because you're a Methodist or a Baptist . . . a Democrat or a Republican . . a Mason or an Elk. . . . You catch hell because you're a black man (Breitman, 1965)." These realizations removed all doubt that color and nothing else prevents them from enjoying the full rights and privileges of American citizens. Their common predicament revealed in the rioting, blacks looked again at one another and saw only brothers.

The display of jubilation was generated by more than simply the frenzy of the rioting, the defiance of the law, and (by the

rioters' criteria) the success of the riots; it was also generated by the extreme clarity of the conflict. The blacks' struggle for social justice is widely endorsed in America today; nowhere except in the rural South are ordinary civil rights withheld, and even there white supremacy is on the defensive. Yet most blacks learn that employers have few if any decent jobs, landlords few if any decent apartments, and government agencies nothing but forms. If the nation's ideology and tradition honor progress and equality, the blacks wonder, why does everything change so slowly and why are they still at the bottom? Who is responsible-individuals or institutions, whites or blacks, everyone or no one? Lacking answers to these questions, most blacks find it extremely hard to identify their oppressors and, by striking out directly against them, relieve their frustration (Pettigrew, 1969).

But once the rioting erupted, and especially once the local police and national guard occupied the ghettos, the situation changed radically. The conflict was clear; the issue, joined. Blacks were allies and whites—especially white patrolmen, merchants, and passers-by-were enemies; there were no shades and no neutrals. The target at hand, the blacks focused their resentment, released their hostility, and, for a long moment, knew

great jubilation.

The sense of accomplishment was not derived from a profound passion for destruction or doctrinaire commitment to revolution but rather from a singularly successful attempt at communication. For well over half a century blacks had repeatedly resorted to marches, appeals, pickets, petitions, demonstrations, and other nonviolent protests to call attention to their grievances. Yet if the public statements of many moderate black leaders are reliable, these protests had relatively little impact (Scoble, 1966;

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1966).

The effect of the rioting was quite another matter. This time white society did pay attention (even if many of its leaders did nothing but denounce the rioters and suppress the rioting). Reporters and cameramen rushed into the ghettos; elected and appointed officials followed behind; sociologists and other scholars arrived shortly after. The president established a riot commission; so, to list only a few, did the governors of California and New Jersey and the mayors of Detroit and Chicago. Henceforth the riots and, by implication, the ghettos were urgent issues; ghetto characters were national celebrities; ghetto conditions, national scandals. With reason, though without mercy, young militants boasted that they had accomplished in days what older moderates had failed to do in decades (Cohen & Murphy, 1966). And for many blacks—who had long assumed, rightly or wrongly, that once white America was fully aware of the injustices of ghetto life it would promptly rectify them—this was no mean accomplishment.

Looting

Aside from rioting, looting was the most common and least serious type of violence. It was directed at property and not people (which makes it ironic that many of the blacks killed during the riots were looters); and it was inexpensive compared with arson. However, looting happened in just about all the riots; and it attracted a large and broad segment of the ghetto populationincluding, according to the arrest sheets and firsthand descriptions, middle-age men and women as well as young male adults and teenagers (Cohen & Murphy, 1966; Fogelson & Hill, 1968).

The character of the looting was revealing. The looters did not steal furtively as if ashamed, but openly as if convinced that the merchandise was theirs all along; they felt no remorse, only regret, if caught by the police. Nor did they take food as often as clothing, furniture, appliances, and other durable goods; they were driven not by starvation but by acute and chronic economic deprivation (Hayden, 1967; Rustin, 1966; Shapiro & Sullivan, 1964). Scores of blacks made this point during and after the rioting. But few did so more clearly than one woman from Philadelphia who, loaded down with clothing stolen during the 1964 riot, replied to an appeal for restraint by the local NAACP president: "Listen man, this is the only time in my life I've got a chance

to get these things (Berson, 1966)."

For a great many blacks—the roughly 40 percent or ten million classified impoverished by the Social Security Administration this deprivation is absolute. It is worse on southern farms than in the northern cities. But even there, according to a recent Department of Labor survey of a dozen ghettos all over the country, fully ten percent of the blacks are unemployed, about three times the national average. This figure, the department acknowledged, is a gross underestimate. Moreover, around seven percent of the employed work part-time because they cannot find full-time jobs, and about 21 percent of the full-time workers earn less than sixty dollars a week. Combined into a single index, these findings show that fully one-third of the blacks are unemployed, underemployed, underpaid, or otherwise "sub-employed" (U.S. Department of Labor, 1967b). Some—though, as several studies have recently revealed, far fewer than are eligible—supplement earnings with unemployment insurance, welfare payments, and other Public assistance. But these allotments are so small that nowhere, not even in New York and California, the two most generous states, do they raise the recipients' incomes above the poverty level (Cloward and Pivin, 1966; Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Los Angeles, 1965). For these people looting offers a unique opportunity to acquire goods otherwise unattainable.

For most blacks—the other fourteen million or 60 percent, less a few college graduates and government employeesdeprivation is relative. Blacks have made considerable economic progress since World War II: their income has more than doubled and their occupational range has been markedly upgraded. Yet these advances largely reflect the economy's overall expansion and structural transformation, plus the black migration from the rural South to the urban North. Vis-à-vis the whites, the blacks have gained little (Batchelder, 1964; Miller, 1964). They earn only 60 percent as much nationally, an increase of roughly ten percent since 1947 (and an uneven one at that); and they do only slightly better in the large eastern and western cities. Compared with whites, they are much more likely to be found in unskilled, semiskilled, and menial service jobs than in skilled, managerial, entrepreneurial, and professional positions. Even with the same education and training, blacks are not paid as much as whites for the same work. As Herman P. Miller of the Census Bureau has written (1964), "White men earn more simply because they are white." For Americans, white and black, who regard goods as a sign of status and manhood, relative deprivation is as sore a grievance as absolute deprivation and as good a reason for looting.

Despite a rash of books and studies, there is no simple explanation for this situation. It is clear that economic deprivation is not a reflection of personal immorality and even, as Elliot Liebow (1967) has shown, that what seems to be laziness or unreliability may often be physical or mental illness. Yet it is also clear that economic deprivation is more than just a function of inferior education and inadequate training, the comforting assumption which underlies the government's manpower program. If the recent exposés of the New York, Boston, Los Angeles, and Washington public schools (Kohl, 1967; Kozol, 1967; Martyn, 1965; Passow, 1967) are accurate, many blacks receive an inadequate education. And if the situation whereby thousands of unskilled blacks are unemployed while thousands of semi- and highly-skilled jobs are unfilled is indicative, many blacks are improperly trained as well. According to the Department of Labor, however, black high school graduates are more likely to be unemployed than are white dropouts, and blacks regardless of qualifications are less likely to hold white-collar positions than are whites (U.S. Department of Labor, 1966). Without denying the relevance of inferior education and inadequate training then, it is fair to conclude that there are other reasons for economic

deprivation in the ghettos.

One reason is racial discrimination, a practice which denies blacks employment opportunities because they are black. Racial discrimination is much less common now than ever before. By virtue of civil rights agitation, fair employment legislation, and enlightened corporate management, the United States has made impressive progress toward eradicating discrimination in the last few decades; no longer do the great majority of employers, private and public, pursue policies by which blacks are hired last and fired first—as well as relegated to the least responsible and remunerative positions (Drake & Cayton, 1945; Myrdal, 1944). But despite these advances racial discrimination is still all too common today. According to the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, it is extremely widespread—indeed just about ubiquitous in the apprenticeship programs of most craft unions (and especially the building trades); it is also common though not as widespread in the personnel practices of corporate enterprise; and it is even known though quite rare in the civil service procedures of government agencies (City of New York Commission on Civil Rights, 1967; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1961 and 1966). Real and imagined, racial discrimination severely restricts the blacks' employment opportunities.

Another reason for economic deprivation is statutory unemployment, a policy which deprives blacks of jobs because they have criminal records. How this works can be briefly described. A large and growing number of firms, including truckers and department stores as well as banks and insurance companies, require that employees be bonded; the surety companies, for all their claims that each application for bonding is considered on its own merits, reject most applicants with criminal records (Shapiro, 1966; U.S. Department of Labor, 1967a). Also, most municipal, state, and federal agencies require that applicants for civil service positions state whether they have ever been arrested or convicted; the civil service administrators, for all their claims that no one is rejected outright for a minor offense, discriminate against most applicants with criminal records. These practices strike particularly hard at black males because the overwhelming majority of them—between 50 and 90 percent, according to the President's Crime Commission—have been arrested at one time or another. Hence statutory unemployment—which is probably more pervasive now than ever before—sharply reduces the number of jobs

available to blacks.

Yet another reason for economic deprivation is residential

segregation, the process which confines urban blacks to the central cities. This process—which, as Karl and Alma Taeuber have shown (1966), has accelerated considerably in the recent past and is now common to American cities in every region and of every size—has a profound impact on the blacks' economic status. The increase in new jobs today, and especially in the semiskilled manufacturing and service jobs for which many blacks are well qualified, is not taking place in the central cities. Rather, the increase is taking place largely in the outlying suburbs which systematically exclude blacks. Hence few blacks are aware of suburban employment opportunities and, given the distance between the ghettos and the suburbs and the time and cost of commuting, even fewer can take advantage of them. Combined with business decentralization, a long-term and probably irreversible trend, residential segregation seriously inhibits the blacks' economic progress too.

Even if these artificial barriers were removed, many blacks would be stymied by the severe shortage of unskilled and semiskilled jobs which pay enough to support a family above the poverty level. For this the federal government bears a heavy responsibility. The postwar administrations have placed so high a priority on controlling inflation, as opposed to maintaining full employment, that private enterprise cannot operate at capacity. Democratic and Republican alike, they have also proven so reluctant to raise taxes—except of course for military purposes that the public sector simply cannot pick up the slack. Notwithstanding sustained economic expansion, the rate of unemployment has therefore averaged four to five percent for whites and fully twice as high for blacks since 1947 (U.S. Department of Labor, 1966). An exceedingly conservative estimate, this figure would probably be considered a national emergency in most of the industrialized countries of Western Europe. Which means that overall unemployment, often aggravated by inferior education and inadequate training, is one more reason for economic deprivation in the ghettos and, by implication, for widespread looting in the riots.

Arson

Less widespread than looting, arson was more destructive. It did not occur in as many riots (not, to cite one, in the Newark riots), nor did it engage as large or broad a group of ghetto residents (to be specific, none other than teen-age and young adult males). By the same measure, arson left much more damage and even took a few lives (Fogelson & Hill, 1968). The selectivity of

the arson was especially noteworthy. According to most observers, the arsonists burned only stores, particularly stores which charged excessive prices and sold inferior merchandise. They did not intentionally fire houses, churches, or, somewhat more surprising, schools, hospitals, and other government facilities. The arsonists also bypassed shops which displayed signs reading "Blood Brother" or just plain "Blood" or otherwise identified the owners as blacks (Berson, 1966; Cohen & Murphy, 1966; Hayden, 1967; Kerner et al., 1968; Rustin, 1966; Shapiro & Sullivan, 1964). This selectivity can be exaggerated: a few private homes and black-owned shops were deliberately destroyed. But, in view of the ferocity of the riots, what is remarkable are not the exceptions but the overall pattern and pervasive and intense sense of

consumer exploitation underlying it.

To most blacks consumer exploitation means two distinct though closely related things. First, most ghetto merchants are whites who live outside the black community and are indifferent to its welfare. As a middle-age militant, echoing Malcolm X and other black nationalists, told an interviewer after the Buffalo riots of 1967, the white shopkeepers "are siphoning off all the money and taking it out of the neighborhood and suck the neighborhood." borhood dry; that is the main grievance there (Besag, 1968)." Second, and even more important, most ghetto merchants are unscrupulous: they charge excessive prices, sell inferior merchandise, and otherwise exploit customers. As a respectable woman informed her pastor after the Los Angeles riots of 1965, "It dawned on me at the height of the hysteria, as I was passing a certain store, that I have been paying on my present television set for more than five years; and that store owed me five televisions; so I got three and I still believe they own me two." For most blacks consumer exploitation is a personal as well as a social grievance; it weakens the purchasing power of their families and at the same time undermines the economic position of their communities.

Many, if not most, ghetto merchants are, as the blacks protest, white—though precisely how many varies from one city to the next and from one enterprise to another. Even in Harlem, perhaps the oldest and most stable ghetto in the United States, whites own about 50 percent of the businesses and an even higher percent of the large-scale retail businesses.² And in Cleveland's

Testimony of the Reverend Hartford Brookins, McCone Commission

Here I have accepted an estimate by James Heilbrun, assistant professor of economics at Columbia University, who has made an extensive study of the Harlem economy.

Hough District and Chicago's West Side, which were transformed from ethnic ghettos into black ghettos after World War II, the percentages are probably even higher. Very few white merchants, as the blacks complain, reside in the ghettos and not many more are interested in the welfare and future of these communities. But few white merchants live and work in the same neighborhoods anywhere else, and, as militants are the first to point out, few black merchants are more involved. What is crucial about the ghetto merchants is not their color but their exploitative practices.

The price of food, clothing, hardware, and other everyday items (including housing, which is a special case) is slightly higher in black ghettos-and, for that matter, in low-income neighborhoods generally. The quality is somewhat lower too. The situation is even worse with regard to furniture, appliances, and other durable goods bought on installment plans (which, common thought to the contrary, the poor purchase as a means of what David Caplovitz (1963) aptly calls "compensatory consumption"). The poor, and particularly the black poor, have little or no credit; to acquire these goods they are forced to enter into a deviant market where door-to-door peddlers and high-pressure salesmen prevail upon consumers to overextend themselves and overcharge them in the process. In this way many blacks drift into permanent debt. Worse still, should the merchandise prove faulty, as it often does, the blacks are seldom aware of the legal remedies—which in all fairness are not very effective anyway. Further, should the blacks miss their payments as they sometimes do, the finance companies repossess the goods, exact the remaining charges, and occasionally even garnishee the buyers' wages. The blacks, in Caplovitz's (1963) phrase, not only pay more, they also get less (Berson, 1966; Kerner et al., 1968; Federal Trade Commission, 1968).

Some ghetto merchants are unscrupulous: they feel little or no compunction about exploiting customers in order to market merchandise. To this end, as studies of black (and other low-income) communities in New York and other cities reveal, these merchants engage in a wide range of unethical practices. Among the most flagrant are the following: "bait-ads," misleading advertisements offering furniture sets (which are either incomplete or badly rundown) at incredibly low prices; "switch sales," sales techniques designed to persuade customers to buy much more expensive versions of the merchandise described in the bait-ads; "hidden costs," extra and often exorbitant costs effectively concaled from anyone but a lawyer by the complex wording of the installment contracts; "substitute merchandise," inferior and sometimes damaged merchandise delivered in place of the mer-

chandise selected in the stores (Caplovitz, 1963). Precisely how many ghetto merchants engage in one or another of these practices is not known, though probably a great many do. What is known is that these and other closely related practices contribute

considerably to consumer exploitation in the ghettos.

Not all ghetto merchants are unscrupulous, however. But so precarious is their economic position that, with few exceptions, they too are obliged to charge higher prices, sell shoddier goods, and engage in other exploitative practices. Due to the longstanding reluctance of most regional and national chain stores to establish branches in the ghettos, most merchants there are smallscale businessmen with low credit ratings. They cannot buy in bulk to save on material costs; nor can they borrow money from reputable financial institutions except at very high, if not prohibitive, interest rates. Also, given the traditional unwillingness of underwriters to handle stores in the ghettos, the merchants cannot obtain fire and burglary insurance except at premiums so high as to be nearly extortionate. And the prices of space, labor, utilities, and miscellaneous items are not substantially lower, if lower at all, in black ghettos than in comparable white communities (Federal Trade Commission, 1968; President's National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas, 1968). So long as these extra costs oblige the ghetto merchants to raise prices and lower quality to stay in business, the wholesalers, banks, insurance companies, and other external economic institutions must share the responsibility for consumer exploitation.

If even scrupulous merchants engage in exploitative practices, why do most blacks still patronize them? The answer is that they have little or no choice. First of all, few blacks have the leisure, know-how, mobility, and confidence to take advantage of mercantile competition. They do not have the time to shop around and compare prices from one neighborhood to another; nor do they have the expertise to distinguish between genuine bargains and clever frauds. They are often isolated from the large downtown and suburban shopping centers; and they are sometimes reluctant—in view of their experience, understandably so—to shop outside the ghettos. Even more important, most blacks, and particularly unemployed and irregularly employed blacks, lack the money and credit to take advantage of marketing mechanisms. Their immediate demands are so pressing they cannot patiently wait for special sales; their limited incomes are so uncertain they cannot slowly save for major expenditures. They cannot meet the credit standards of the department stores and discount houses; nor can they borrow funds from reputable financial institutions at reasonable rates (President's Committee on Consumer Interest, 1965). For these reasons most black consumers find the opportunities available to most white consumers well beyond their means.

Consumer exploitation is thus a function of the relative poverty and inadequate credit of the consumers and the unethical practices and high expenses of the merchants. Consumer exploitation is also more pervasive, poignant, and, if the riots are indicative, explosive in the black ghettos than anywhere else in urban America. It is more pervasive because nowhere else except in the rural South and the Appalachian "hollows" are consumers quite so impoverished and merchants quite so unscrupulous. It is more poignant because the least affluent, including the unemployed and the welfare recipients, are the most exploited—an increasingly common pattern in America. Lastly, it is more explosive because the merchants, and especially the large-scale and hardgoods merchants, are predominantly white. For though their practices are not necessarily any worse, their presence leads the blacks to define consumer exploitation in racial terms. This combination of white merchants and exploitative practices in the black ghettos generates the intense resentment expressed through arson in the riots.

Assault

Only assault remains to be considered. By assault I mean the whole range of violence directed at people as opposed to property, and including attacking white passers-by, overturning automobiles, tossing bricks and stones, hurling Molotov cocktails, firing rifles at law enforcement officials. Somewhat less common than rioting, assault was considerably more complicated. It is one thing to grab a brick and in a moment's anger throw it at a passing car; it is quite another to take a rifle, find a protected spot, and shoot at a policeman. Each act reflects a different degree of disaffection; each conveys a different message to the society; and, as the analysis of the arrest sheets reveals, each attracts a different sort of person (Fogelson & Hill, 1968). But these complications should not be allowed to obscure one of the salient points of the riots. That is that assault, like rioting, exhibited certain features which on careful examination clarify the motives of the rioters and illuminate their grievances and ideologies. Among the most noteworthy are a virulent strain of racism, a profound sense of territoriality, and a marked degree of restraint.

To say that assault manifested a virulent strain of racism is not to imply that all blacks treated all whites in the same way. Some blacks warned whites to stay away from the ghettos, others

left them alone provided that blacks vouched for them, and still others went to the aid of whites. And though some blacks badly beat newspaper reporters, several others released them unharmed -after exacting promises that the journalists would tell the blacks' side of the story. The blacks also attacked passers-by with less anxiety than they attacked law enforcement officials; and they fought policemen with more ferocity than they fought national guardsmen and federal soldiers (Cohen and Murphy, 1966; Fogelson, 1968b; Shapiro and Sullivan, 1964). These differences aside, most blacks made little or no attempt to distinguish among the whites-to be white was to be guilty; the cry "Get Whitey! was altogether indiscriminate—any white would do. Ironically, so many of the riots erupted in the evening that most whites caught up in them were passers-by rather than merchants and others with a heavy stake in the ghettos. Black racism made Bedford-Stuyvesant, Hough, and Newark's Central Ward almost, though clearly not quite, as dangerous for whites as white racism once made East St. Louis, Chicago, and Washington dangerous for blacks.

Black racism is no less offensive than white racism, but in view of the blacks' experience it is more understandable. For three and a half centuries most whites have regarded blacks as blacks and not as fellow Americans or even, in some cases, as fellow men. Even today white racism—though intellectually and morally on the defensive—is fairly common, and not only in the rural South. It pervades the urban North too, particularly the North's trade unions, school systems, police departments, and real estate markets. Some time ago, as a result, the blacks, like other minority groups, absorbed (or perhaps adopted) the racist perceptions of white society. Until quite recently too the blacks accepted the racist standards of white society, which relegated them to the bottom of the racial hierarchy (Isaacs, 1963; Kerner et al., 1968; Rose, 1949). This they no longer do. The nationalist message carried by Elijah Muhammad, Malcolm X, and Stokely Carmichael, has permeated the ghettos. If black is good, the nationalists reason, white is evil. Applying this reasoning, many blacks have concluded that, as one put it, "Whitey is our only real enemy (Yablonsky, 1966)." What is novel about black racism is not that it reflects the racist perceptions of white society but that it endorses the racist standards of black nationalism.

To claim too that assault unleashed a profound sense of territoriality, it is not enough to argue that the rioters did not roam outside the ghettos. After all, their principal targets, the police and the merchants, were accessible inside the ghettos, and the rioters' protective coverings, their numbers and anonymity, were

not available elsewhere. Once the riots were underway, more-over, the police were quick—and increasingly so each year—to cordon off the ghettos, while the blacks for their part were apparently unwilling to attempt a break-through in order to attack peripheral targets (Hayden, 1967). Hence it is also necessary to point out that the rioters engaged in assault as a protest against the presence of whites in the ghettos. "Watcha doin' up in Harlem, White Britches?" a black youth asked a New York Times reporter; "Teach him to keep his ass out of Watts," several blacks cried as they beat a white motorist (Cohen and Murphy, 1966; Conot, 1967; Shapiro & Sullivan, 1964). The rioters, the evidence suggests, resorted to assault not only to call attention to their grievances but also to even the score with the whites and drive

them out of the ghettos. Narrowly construed, territoriality is not particularly admirable, but, again in view of the blacks' situation, it is certainly understandable. Ever since the great migration of the early twentieth century, whites have rigorously excluded blacks from the greater part of urban America. Even today most builders, realtors, banks, insurance companies, and property owners are determined to reserve suburbia for whites. Meanwhile, white voters in the name of personal freedoms and property values have rejected open housing in one community after another. Thus for blacks, and especially northern blacks, territoriality is nothing new (Abrams, 1955; Myrdal, 1944; Weaver, 1948). What is new is that many blacks, far from protesting territoriality, are now preaching and even practicing it. If blacks must live in the ghettos, they reason, blacks must control the ghettos, their schools, houses, jobs, police, indeed all their institutions. Here is the ideology of selfdetermination, an ideology which stresses not a political separatism, not a black nation in Africa or a Muslim state in America, but rather black control of the ghettos. And this ideology, more than anything else, has transformed the blacks' long-standing resentment of segregation into a profound sense of territoriality.

To say that assault displayed a marked degree of restraint too is not just to observe that the rioters attacked relatively few whites. Very few whites live in black ghettos, not many more work there, and most blacks did not riot in white neighborhoods. Moreover, the blacks did attack passers-by and law enforcement officials, and often with terrible brutality. For these whites—though not, of course, for the great majority safe in the suburbs—the situation was extremely dangerous. But even for them it was seldom fatal. Of the thousands of white civilians, policemen, guardsmen, and soldiers involved in the riots, very few were killed and even fewer were deliberately killed. Indeed, the num-

ber of whites killed in all the 1960s riots is lower than the number of blacks killed in the East St. Louis race riots a generation ago (Rudwick, 1964; Waskow, 1966). The reason is fairly simple. In none of the recent riots, not even in the Los Angeles, Newark, and Detroit riots, did the blacks attempt to murder the whites—to frighten them, beat them, and injure them, yes; but to murder them, no. Nor did the blacks assault the whites in the recent riots with anything like the savagery with which the whites massacred

the blacks in an earlier time.

The blacks' restraint, which is one of the few reassuring things about the riots, has three major implications. First, despite the tragic history of racial subordination and segregation in the United States, most blacks have not yet written the whites off as fellow Americans or fellow men. Second, despite the deprivations and indignities of ghetto life, most blacks have not yet reached the conclusion that white America and white Americans are beyond salvation. And third, despite the apocalyptic visions of the nationalists, most blacks have not yet accepted the proposition that blacks and whites cannot share the same moral community. In view of the longstanding tradition of interracial rioting in the United States, this restraint is quite remarkable and highly impressive. It has one other implication: if the mood of the ghettos is accurately reflected in the acts of the rioters—and I believe it is—the blacks disaffection (though not their dissatisfaction) is probably somewhat less acute than is commonly thought.

The riots made it quite clear, however, that disaffection is mounting rapidly. The blacks' patience is not inexhaustible, their confidence is not boundless, and, as one rioter said toward the end of the Los Angeles riots, "[We've] been holding out for a long time, a long time; giving the white man a chance." However, it is not clear how much longer whites can count on the ghetto's restraint. Nor, even conceding the exceptionally high level of tolerance for violence in the United States, is it clear how much longer the blacks can count on the society's restraint. Restraint must be mutual, and—as the behavior of the New Jersey National Guard, in one case, and the Detroit rieters, in another, revealed—it is extremely difficult to sustain under riotous conditions (Kerner et al., 1968). In any event, the blacks—divided by an attraction to black nationalism and a commitment to American pluralism—are being pulled in one way by restraint and in another by racism

³Quoted in a series of interviews taken shortly after the Los Angeles riots under the auspices of UCLA, transcripts in the possession of Professor Nathan Cohen who kindly allowed me to read them.

and territoriality. If the riots, and especially the assaults, are indicative, they are moving in an ominous direction.

Further Questions

Granted that the violence of the 1960s riots was a manifestation of the grievances of the black ghettos-and that the rioting, looting, arson, and assault were a function of racial discrimination, economic deprivation, consumer exploitation, and involuntary residential segregation—two additional questions must be raised. First, if it is true—and I think it is—that many other ethnic minorities have suffered these grievances at one time or another, why have only the blacks resorted to full-scale rioting? Second, if it is also true—and again I think it is—that the blacks were worse off in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, why have they rioted for the first time in the 1960s? To phrase these questions somewhat differently: why have so many blacks protested in a manner unprecedented not only for other ethnic minorities but for themselves as well? Unfortunately, satisfactory answers cannot be offered at this point. The traditional histories of individual ghettos are extremely sketchy, and, what is worse, comparative study of the histories of ethnic minorities is scarcely underway (Blau & Duncan, 1967; Glazer & Moynihan, 1963; Osofsky, 1966; Spear, 1967). But a few differences can be discerned, and some explanations can be suggested.

There is little doubt that many other ethnic minorities have suffered these grievances at one time or another. The Irish were discriminated against in Boston in the 1840s and 1850s; so were the Jews and Italians in New York in the 1890s and 1900s, and the Mexicans and Japanese in Los Angeles in the 1910s and 1920s. The European immigrants were also depressed by chronic underemployment and extreme poverty in the nineteenth century; and the Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and in some cases native Americans are not much better off in the twentieth. The European immigrants were exploited by ghetto merchants too (Handlin, 1951, 1959, 1964); and if the blacks are more deeply and widely caught in the installment economy today, so are most Americans whatever their background. Lastly, the Irish, Jews, and Italians were once confined, at least in part involuntarily, to rundown neighborhoods in the central cities; and so are the Mexicans and Puerto Ricans a generation or two later (Caudill, 1963; Fogelson, 1967; Handlin, 1951, 1959; Rischin, 1962; Sexton, 1965). Yet of all these minority groups, only the blacks have resorted to wide-

spread violent protest.

Although a satisfactory explanation must await further his-

torical and sociological studies of American minority groups, a few differences can be observed at this time. For one, the blacks have encountered more pervasive and prolonged racial discrimination than any other minority group; and they have probably been less adequately prepared, culturally and psychologically, to cope with it. Secondly, the blacks are better off today than the European immigrants were a generation or two ago, but so is everyone else; and, by the standard economic indicators, they are much worse off than the whites. Third, the blacks are more susceptible to consumer exploitation now than the European immigrants ever were; and, by virtue of the predominance of white merchants, they are more inclined to regard it as a racial issue. And fourth, unlike the Irish, Jews, Italians, and even the Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, the blacks-and not only the firstgeneration blacks—are segregated by a process which is essentially involuntary (Elkins, 1959; Handlin, 1964; Marx, 1967; Weaver, 1948; Wirth, 1922). These differences do not fully explain why the blacks have engaged in full-scale rioting. But they clearly indicate several ways in which these grievances are more pronounced in the black ghettos now than they were in the ethnic

Nor is there much doubt that the blacks were worse off in earlier historical periods than in the 1960s. Racial discrimination -whether de facto school segregation, "Jim Crow" public accommodations, restrictive real estate covenants, job ceilings for "the colored"—was everywhere more comprehensive and systematic then. So was economic deprivation: whether measured by unemployment levels, occupational distribution, or overall earnings, blacks were less well off—absolutely and relatively—in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. Consumer exploitation was not as pervasive, if only because the installment economy was not as widespread; but otherwise the ghetto merchants, who were even more likely to be white a generation ago, were no more scrupulous. Finally, involuntary residential segregation was not only as common; it was also defended as desirable or at least inevitable by most whites and sanctioned and even promoted by most officials (Abrams, 1955; Handlin, 1964; Mayor's Commission on Conditions in Harlem, 1936; Miller, 1964; Myrdal, 1944). And yet most blacks, though far from passively accepting these conditions, did not resort to widespread rioting except in Harlem in

Again, though a satisfactory explanation must await further studies of the black ghettos, a few observations can be made at this point. First, many blacks are more outraged now by racial discrimination because the expansion of civil rights in the recent

past has rendered the remaining abuses more visible and less tolerable. Second, many blacks are more frustrated by economic deprivation because the unprecedented prosperity of the economy since World War II has underscored the fact that they are not receiving their fair share. Third, many blacks are more infuriated by consumer exploitation because the extraordinary spread of the installment system in the last few decades has made the ghetto's dependence on white merchants more obvious and less acceptable. And fourth, many blacks are more incensed by involuntary residential segregation not only because they have been denied the right to live outside the ghettos but also because they have repudiated the ideology which deprives them of the choice (Breitman, 1965; Conot, 1967; Isaacs, 1963). Again, these observations do not fully explain why so many blacks have engaged in fullscale violent protest for the first time in the 1960s. But they do at least suggest several reasons why these grievances are more offensive than ever in the ghettos.

Conclusions

Reasons may be obscure, but results are clear. The blacksor at any rate a substantial minority of them-refuse to tolerate racial discrimination, economic deprivation, consumer exploitation, and involuntary residential segregation any longer. Instead they intend to call attention to their grievances, to share in the benefits of affluent America, to even the score with white merchants, and ultimately to gain control over their communities. They have long tried to do so through elections, demonstrations, education, training, and other conventional channels; and they will probably continue to do so. But the riots made it quite clear that where the blacks find these channels obstructed they will not be confined by them. Nor will they be bound by the fear of arrest, the concern for personal safety, the commitment to orderly social change, the trauma of white racism, and the other restraints on rioting in the United States (Fogelson, 1968a). Under these circumstances it is not remarkable that a significant minority of the blacks are now prepared, even determined, to resort to violence until their grievances are redressed.

What is remarkable is that thus far the rioters have been so restrained and selective. By restrained I mean that for all the rioting and assault, very few blacks attempted to kill white passers by, policemen, or national guardsmen. And by selective I mean that for all the looting and burning, even fewer sought to destroy banks, insurance companies, courthouses, and city halls. For all the violence and destruction, most blacks struck out exclusively

against local policemen, ghetto merchants, and other obvious sources of their grievances. A few radicals aside, they did not renounce membership in American society; nor did they challenge its basic economic organization or political legitimacy. The rioters did not lack the opportunities either. Although the police, National Guard, and in some instances federal soldiers cordoned off the ghettos and otherwise contained the rioters, their restraint and selectivity were essentially self-imposed. In other words the violence was directed at the system's abuses and not the system itself because the rioters were trying to alert the society rather than overturn it.

Whether the blacks will remain restrained and selective—or whether they will arm themselves and murder whites, loot stores and burn buildings outside the ghettos, and in effect resort to rebellion rather than protest—is hard to tell. But if this course is to be avoided, the responsibility lies not only with the blacks but also with the whites. It is incumbent upon the blacks to abide by the unwritten, yet effective, rule whereby American society tolerates the rioting precisely because it is restrained and selective. They must realize that terrorism will be met with repression and that the outcome will be worse for them than for anyone else. The whites, for their part, must recognize that in a democracy social justice is the fundamental precondition for public order—and not vice-versa. It is incumbent upon the white majority to eliminate racial discrimination, economic deprivation, consumer exploitation, and involuntary residential segregation as quickly and as completely as possible. And not solely to prevent rioting by the blacks or even to preserve order in the ghettos, but also to establish a closer relationship between the principles and the practices of American democracy.

REFERENCES

ABRAMS, C. Forbidden neighbors. New York: Harper, 1955.

BALDWIN, J. The fire next time. New York: Dial Press, 1963. BATCHELDER, A. B. Decline in the relative income of Negro men. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1964, 78, 525-548.

Berson, L. E. Case study of a riot: The Philadelphia story. New York: Institute

of Human Relations Pamphlet Series, Number 7, 1966. Besag, F. The anatomy of a riot: Buffalo, 1967. Buffalo: University Press, 1968. Blau, P. M., & Duncan, O. D. The American occupational structure. New York:

BREITMAN, G. (Ed.) Malcom X speaks. New York: Grove Press, 1965. CAPLOVITZ, D. The poor pay more: Consumer practices of low-income families. New

CAUDILL, H. M. Night comes to the Cumberlands. Boston: Little, Brown, 1963.

CITY OF NEW YORK COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. Bias in the building industry: An updated report, 1963-1965. New York, 1967.

CLOWARD, R. A., & PIVEN, F. F. A strategy to end poverty. The Nation, 1966, 202. 501-517.

COHEN, J., & MURPHY, W. S. Burn, baby, burn! The Los Angeles race riot, August

1965. New York: Avon, 1966.

CONOT, R. Rivers of blood, years of darkness. New York: Bantam, 1967.

DRAKE, ST. C., & CAYTON, H. R. Black metropolis: A study of Negro life in a northern city. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1945. DYNES, R., & QUARANTELLI, E. L. What looting in civil disturbances really means.

Transaction, 1968, 5, 9-14.

ELKINS, S. Slavery: A problem in American institutional and intellectual life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959.

ELLISON, R. Harlem is nowhere. In Shadow and act. New York: Random House,

1966. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. Report on the 1964 riots. Washington, D.C., 1964.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION. Economic reports on installment credit and retail sales practices of District of Columbia retailers. Washington, D.C., 1968.

FOGELSON, R. M. The fragmented metropolis: Los Angeles, 1850-1930. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967.

FOGELSON, R. M. Violence as protest. Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 1968, **29**, 25–42. (a)

FOGELSON, R. M. From resentment to confrontation: The police, the Negroes, and the outbreak of the nineteen-sixties riots. Political Science Quarterly, 1968, **83**, 217-247. (b) FOGELSON, R. M., & HILL, R. B. Who riots? A study of participation in the 1967

riots. In Supplemental studies for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Washington, D.C., 1968.

GANS, H. J. The urban villagers. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1962.

GLAZER, N., & MOYNIHAN, D. P. Beyond the melting pot. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1963.

HANDLIN, O. The uprooted. Boston: Little, Brown, 1951.

HANDLIN, O. Boston's immigrants. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959.

HANDLIN, O. Fire-bell in the night. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964.

HAYDEN, T. Rebellion in Newark. New York: Vintage, 1967. INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES.

Hard-core poverty and unemployment in Los Angeles. Washington, D.C., 1965. ISAACS, H. R. The new world of Negro Americans. New York: Vikings, 1963. KARDINER, A., & OVESEY, L. The mark of oppression. New York: Norton, 1962.

KERNER, O. et al. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. New York: Bantam, 1968.

KOHL, H. Thirty-six children. New York: New American Library, 1967.

KOZOL, J. Death at an early age. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1967.

LE Bon, G. Psychologie des foules (1895). Translated, The crowd. London: Unwin,

LIEBOW, E. Tally's corner. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967.

MARTYN, K. A. Report on education to the governor's commission on the Los Angeles riots. McCone Commission Archives, 18, 1965.

MARX, G. Protest and prejudice: A study of belief in the black community. New York:

Harper and Row, 1967. MAYOR'S COMMISSION ON CONDITIONS IN HARLEM. The Negro in Harlem: A report on social and economic conditions responsible for the outbreak of March 19, 1935. New York City Municipal Archives, 1936.

McCone, J. A. et al. (Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles riots), Vio-

lence in the city: An end or a beginning? Los Angeles, 1965.

MILLER, H. P. Rich man, poor man. New York: Crowell, 1964.

Myrdal, G. An American dilemma. New York: Harper and Row, 1944.

OSOFSKY, G. Harlem: The making of a ghetto. New York: Harper, 1966.

Passow, A. H. Toward creating a modern urban school system: A study of the Washington, D.C. public schools. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1967. Pettigrew, T. F. Racially separate or together. Journal of Social Issues, 1969, 25 (1), 43-69.

PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CONSUMER INTEREST. The most for their money: A report of the panel on consumer education for persons with limited incomes. Washington,

D.C.: 1965.

PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL ADVISORY PANEL ON INSURANCE IN RIOT-AFFECTED AREAS. Meeting the insurance crisis of our cities. Washington, D.C., 1968.

RISCHIN, M. The promised city: New York's Jews 1870-1914. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962.

ROSE, A. M. The Negro's morale. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949.

RUDE, G. The crowd in history. New York: Wiley, 1964.

RUDWICK, E. M. Race riot at East St. Louis July 2, 1917. Carbondale, Ill.: Southern

Illinois University Press, 1964. Rustin, B. The Watts "manifesto" and the McCone report. Commentary, 1966,

41, 29-35. Salisbury, H. The shook-up generation. New York: Harper, 1958.

Scoble, H. M. Negro leadership study: Tentative findings. Paper written for the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity, 1966.

SEXTON, P. C. Spanish Harlem. New York: Harper, 1965.
SHAPIRO, F. C. A reporter at large. The New Yorker, 1966, 42, 181-198.
SHAPIRO, F. C. & SULLIVAN, J. W. Race riots: New York 1964. New York: Crowell, 1964. SPEAR, A. H. Black Chicago: The making of a Negro ghetto, 1890-1920. Chicago: Uni-

versity of Chicago Press, 1967. TAEUBER, K. E., & TAEUBER, A. F. Negroes in cities. Chicago: Aldine, 1966.

TILLY, C. À travers le chaos des vivantes cités. Paper presented to the Sixth World Congress of Sociology, Evian-les-Bains, France, September, 1966. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS. Hearings held in Detroit, Michigan, December 14-

15, 1960. Washington, D.C., 1961. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS. Hearings held in Cleveland, Ohio, April 1-7, 1966.

Washington, D.C., 1966.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. The Negroes in the United States-Their economic and social situation. Bulletin No. 1511, June 1966. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. A report on manpower requirements, resources, utilization, and training. In Manpower Report of the President. Washington,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. A sharper look at unemployment in U.S. cities and slums. WASKOW, A. I. From race riot to sit-in: 1919 and the 1960s. Garden City, New York: Washington, D.C., 1967. (b)

Doubleday, 1966.

WEAVER, R. C. The Negro ghetto. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1948. WHYTE, W. F. Street corner society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943.

WIRTH, L. The ghetto. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1922.

YABLONSKY, L. The violent gang. New York: Macmillan, 1962. YABLONSKY, L. Negro youth gangs and violence. New Republic, 1966, 154, 10-12. •

Violence and American Democracy

Lynne B. Iglitzin University of Washington

America: a symbol of freedom and discussion, rational thought, tolerance of new ideas, equality and justice for all.

America: a symbol of violent brawls, unrestrained vigilante activity, forcible suppression of minority or political undesirables.

The American creed enhances the dignity and worth of the

individual. ITEM: The forcible internment and evacuation of the Japanese on the West Coast during World War II . . . the degrading practices and oppressive atmosphere of ghetto life . . . the bureaucratization and consequent commercialization of

modern man's daily existence.

The American creed embodies the idea of persuasion, not force, to get one's ideas accepted. Governments, said John Locke, should operate with the consent of the governed in the decisions which affect them. ITEM: The disenfranchisement of millions, whether forcibly due to requirements of race, residence, or age, or voluntarily because they feel alienated and indifferent to the very government itself.

The American creed, as spelled out in the First Amendment, stresses free speech, wide-ranging and rational discussion, all of which implies a tolerance of new, perhaps unpleasant or threatening ideas. ITEM: The periodic convulsions in our history, often occurring in the aftermath of war, which have clamped down on radical protest against the actions of the Establishment . . . the Alien and Sedition Laws . . . The Red Scare . . . McCarthyism.

The American creed enshrines the concept of law (a government of laws, not of men) but has failed to realize that the law itself can be an oppressive instrument used by those in power to justify the status quo. An ethical dilemma is created when violence is used to support, as well as attack, the democratic system, when a double standard is used to judge violence: the violence of the State (police, military) has been approved and legitimated, whereas the private violence of individuals and groups has been condemned. Undoubtedly, the increasing virulence of dissent today is due to a growing awareness that this double standard is no longer tenable. Even when overt physical violence is deplored the more subtle, covert forms of violence inherent in the very system itself are ignored or glossed over.

What is the significance of this juxtaposition between the gentle nature of the American creed and the violent nature of the American experience? Does the one give the lie to the other? Can democracy and violence coexist in a society? Must violence continue to be an integral part of the American scene in the future, as it has in the past? Such are the searing questions which face us

today.

The above few illustrations from American history are sufficient to point up the gap between the American creed, which establishes criteria for an ideal democracy, and the reality of the day-to-day workings of the American system. To the degree that such a gap exists, a climate conducive to violence is created. The use of violence can neither be denounced and deplored, nor simply suppressed. Ironically, as shall be seen, the occurrence of violence, and particularly the threat of its occurrence, may prove salutary to both the democratic process and the democratic ideal. It is thus imperative that we search for psychological and biological clues to the roots of violence, as well as explore the social and political setting in which violence occurs. Only in this way can we hope to understand violence and, perhaps, to be able to place it in its proper perspective as an instrument for good, as well as evil, in our society.

The Nature of Violence

When men behave violently, they are invariably trying to settle the numerous conflicts, hostilities, and antagonisms which arise among them. The resolution of most types of conflicts is through peaceful, institutional methods, but should such non-violent pressures fail to resolve the conflict, one side or the other may resort to violence. Violence can be defined as coercive behavior which results in harm and destruction to others. Violent behavior may be directed at either animate or inanimate objects. It may be evinced by overt physical action or by intangible psy-

chological or mental behavior. Violence represents one way in which an individual (or group) involved in a conflict seeks to remove an object he sees as blocking fulfillment of his goals.

Types of Violence

The most obvious form of violence is overt physical assault on another person or group of persons. This is what is commonly meant by violence: a perpetrator who physically harms or injures someone else. Such activity may be undertaken for a variety of motives ranging from fear and panic to sadistic pleasure, but the end result is always harm and perhaps total destruction of another human being. Such behavior is universally banned as illegitimate and illegal. Yet there are some overt acts of physical violence, both individual and group, which are institutionalized and thus legitimized by the social system. Corporal punishment of children by parents or teachers, the use of force by police and by soldiers in wartime, murder of rival gang chieftains or members of feuding families or clans have all been sanctioned at various times by different elements within most societies.

Harder to recognize, but potent nonetheless, is the covert, psychological violence which assaults another's self-esteem and dignity. Anthropological sources are replete with references to the destructive harm which can be inflicted by psychological forces. The magical incantations of the witch-doctor, when fully believed in by the members of the tribe, can succeed in causing grave terror, illness, even death to the intended victim. Psychologists testify to the mental harm inflicted on children by parents who, wittingly or not, use their superior mental powers to destroy a child's self-confidence—as well as to the insecurity that comes from not being sure that one is loved. Divorce courts are filled with those who have mastered the art of inflicting psychological violence on each other—the process has even been given a name, "mental cruelty." Such covert violence, when it is recognized as such, is also universally condemned.

There also is a type of covert violence which may be institutionalized within a society as part of its prevailing system of values and beliefs, no less potent in its capacity to wreak harm and injury, whether it is unintentional, misguided, or actually planned as such. Social systems based on caste, slavery, colonialism or those that tolerate urban ghettos include as part of the socialization process for their members a fundamental violation of individ-

ual dignity and integrity.

¹I am indebted for the distinction between "overt" and "covert" violence to N. Garver's "What Violence Is" (*The Nation*, June 24, 1968).

The definition of violence must be broad enough to include not only specific actions deliberately intended to injure others, but also intangible behavior, even non-action, which has the same result. For example, current American policies on abortion which result in discrimination between those who, being rich, can afford to go abroad to have an expensive operation and those who are poor and thus must choose between having an unwanted child or risking one's life, surely do violence to the latter group.

Threat and Violence

No discussion of the use of violence as a tool for resolving conflict can neglect the significant role played by the threat of its use to gain compliance. In fact the threat of violence, which puts individuals, groups, or nations in fear of harm or destruction, is recognized by common law as one mode of assault and is illegal, even when no overt act is alleged. This is well illustrated in the famous U.S. Supreme Court Case, Dennis v. US (339 US 162), and other subsequent cases relating to the Smith Act, in which individual members of the Communist Party were convicted for conspiring to organize a group to teach in the future the violent overthrow of the government. For the threat to be effective the person menaced must feel that the threat is not idle, that the other would really impose the sanctions he promises. The coercive power in non-violent demonstrations is enhanced by the threat of violence, since the "power structure" fears that the nonviolent movement may turn violent and thus reacts to the nonviolence. This phenomenon has spread from the civil rights movement to the peace movement, where police violence has been characteristic of anti-draft protests (e.g., Oakland, October, 1967) and more generalized anti-establishment protests (e.g., Chicago, August,

There is a correlation between the threat of violence and its actual occurrence: the more effectively the threat is used, the less the probability that overt violence will break out. Peaceful demonstrators, such as pickets or marchers, expect results to come about due to a change of heart in the opponent. But significant changes often occur less for that reason and more because the opponent fears the threat of violence and rushes to mollify the protestors. If actual violence does occur, it comes solely because the threat crystallizes into such reality in the opponent's mind that he uses violence to put it down. Many times it is this violent outbreak, rather than the peaceful demonstrations that preceded it, that succeeds in winning the day for the protestors. For example, peaceful marches by black men, women, and children to the courthouse in Selma, Alabama in March, 1965, to try to register

to vote, attracted much public attention and dismay as they were met by tear gas, night sticks, and whips wielded by Alabama state troopers. The subsequent deaths of a Selma Negro and a white Unitarian minister from Boston, Reverend James J. Reeb, escalated the level of violence and secured sympathetic press and television coverage around the world. This meant that a much larger group of hitherto neutral bystanders was drawn into the sphere, an example of what E. E. Schattschneider (1960) has called the contagiousness of conflict. Looking back at the turmoil of the early years of the civil rights struggle as well as the violencefilled summers of the mid-1960s, from the relative calm of the summers of 1968-69, it is interesting to speculate that the dynamics of the threat of violence have been at work. Experience with riots in most major Northern cities has certainly induced both fear and respect among white power-holders as to black willingness and capability to utilize violence. Undoubtedly, some of the changes that have come about, not only in material conditions but also in beliefs and attitudes, are in response to the effective use of the threat of violence. However, if a point is reached where the general public comes to view the use of violence as mass disorder, the threat can lose its effectiveness in preventing violence. As the rioting on the nation's campuses has shown, authorities receive public sanction to retaliate with whatever degree of force they deem necessary. The resulting atmosphere of heightened fear and tension serves only to antagonize and further polarize the community without securing any real gains for the disadvantaged groups. Televised violence has not helped the students' cause!

Variations in Violence

Students of violent conflict (Boulding, 1962; Coser, 1956; Mack and Snyder, 1957; Schattschneider, 1960; Simmel, 1955) have attempted to isolate a number of variables which affect the intensity and the conflict of the more in intensity and likelihood of violence. For one thing, the more integrated into the society the individuals or groups involved, the less likely the conflict is to be violent. Studies of group behavior (Berelson and Steiner, 1964; Coleman, 1967) substantiate the readiness with which those who feel apart from and unidentified with the community will overstep the bounds of legitimate channels and carry disputes into disruptive methods. Secondly, the more highly organized the individuals and groups, the less chance there is that they will participate in violent conflict. For example, a recent study of urban youth gangs during the summer riots in Chicago (Spergel, 1968) found that members of the better organized and established gangs tended not to participate in the riots. When the gang was destroyed or could no longer satisfy its members' needs, riotous behavior was likely to ensue.

A third variable that affects the violence of conflict is the nature of the weapons available to the parties: the more destructive the means at hand, the more violent the conflict. Finally, the social and economic status of the parties is significant, since the more they are victims of deprivations, the more they tend to express their conflicts in violent forms. The overwhelming majority of homicides and other assaultive crimes are committed by persons from the lowest stratum of society (Wolfgang & Ferracutti, 1967). However, it is not the "dregs" of society, but those newly part of and aspiring to join the middle class who form the backbone of the collective violence of riots and revolutions. Classic studies of revolutionary violence (Brinton, 1938; de Tocqueville, 1856) have emphasized relative, rather than absolute, deprivation as the cause of the violence which often accompanies an improvement in conditions; a more recent study (Davies, 1962) has substantiated the importance of a felt discrepancy between the perpetrator of violence and those around him with whom he compares himself. Investigations of the ghetto riots of the Sixties have arrived at the same conclusion: not those who were poorest, but those who were comparatively better-off, somewhat better educated, more ambitious, more inculcated with middle-class aspirations participated in and approved of the rioting (Kerner, et al., 1968).

Violence has been viewed as a means of resolving conflict, but are its varying forms all parts of the same phenomenon? Are there threads which tie together such behavior as suicide, murder, revolution, and urban rioting? The question is too complex for any simple answer, but on balance it would appear that a unifying thread does exist. Studies of varying types of violence, ranging from suicide to riot and warfare (Bienen, 1968; Iglitzin, 1966) indicate that violence occurs when the political channels are closed—or are so rigid and inaccessible to particular groups that they feel they must take matters into their own hands if they wish to bring about social change. All violent types of behavior are not only motivationally the same, but also have similar targets and results; individuals and groups which act violently are simply two sides of the same coin. Underlying all types of violence is a prevailing mood of frustration, alienation, despair, and a sense of powerlessness, as individuals as well as groups feel unable to fulfill themselves through the conventionally approved means of society. The potential suicide who feels things "closing in on him," the jealous husband who kills his wife because he has lost her affection, these are not so different in their common fear and anxiety, their shared perception of no other viable alternatives

open to them, from the violent behavior of a street-gang or a ghetto uprising.

The Target of Violence

In both individual and group violence the target can vary. It may be personalized to the degree that all the frustrations and anxieties are perceived as stemming from one source. In violence in its individual form, we can place homicide, rape, and assassination—the latter a case where not only one's personal troubles but all the political ills of the nation are attributed to the power figure marked out. Group violence can be personalized as well, as witness the lynch mob, where the collective act of violence-letting against the chosen victim assuages, at least momentarily, underlying feelings of inadequacy, inferiority, and malaise.

The target of both group and individual violence may, secondly, be turned in on itself. The individual who commits suicide is not only without hope and depressed but also is unable to let out his aggression against others, even those who may actually be oppressing him. Likewise, the long years of slavery and segregation in the South, where blacks were unable to direct their aggressions outward against the whites, resulted in large numbers of intra-group and man-wife homicides, beatings, and knifings.

Finally, the target of violence may be a substitute which is used to sublimate one's feelings when the real source of the anxiety is either not perceived or understood, or else is insulated from attack. So the individual who is forced to take verbal abuse from his boss at work and goes home and kicks the cat or his wife or uses a punching bag is attempting to work off his violent feelings. There is a very real sense in which the summer violence in the black ghetto in our urban centers has precisely this same kind of quality. Black youngsters, facing the world from a perpetual condition of frustration, the source of which is perceived in terms of inaccessible abstractions such as "the white power structure" or "the establishment," respond, not surprisingly, by kicking out at something tangible and closely involved with their own lives such as their stores, schools, ghetto buildings.

Violence and the State

No discussion of the nature of violence is complete without underlining the heavy responsibility exercised by the state, itself the prime user of violence. The idea that the state is the legitimate monopolist of physical violence was expressed by Max Weber in 1919 and has been reiterated often since then. The state, according to Weber, is the exclusive source of the "right" to use violence -all other associations or individuals may use it only to the degree permitted by the authorities. This raises some interesting moral questions, however. If one accepts the legitimacy of the state's exercise of violence, does one still accept the definition of violence as destructive harm to others? Surely, Weber's definition implied not harm, but benefit to all concerned. Thomas Hobbes recognized this problem too when he asserted in 1651 that men, anxious to be relieved of the ever-present fear of violent death, voluntarily consent to submit themselves to the rule of an all-powerful sovereign who monopolizes all power and violence. Here then is the supreme paradox: men, in order to escape from violence from each other, make a union to submit to the violence of one who is over all. The question of the legitimacy of the state's violence is crucial to both Weber's and Hobbes's arguments. The citizens must consider the state's use of violence as proper and

as carried out through recognized, accepted channels.

But still a moral dilemma intrudes. How many of the citizens must consider the violence legitimate? All? A majority? Even in the latter case there is difficulty; no doubt a majority of the citizens (white) in Selma, Alabama or Philadelphia, Mississippi thought the officials' use of violence against civil rights workers was legitimate! Discussions of "law and order," so prominent in the 1968 election campaign, are really thinly disguised calls for the authorities to use force against any disruptive social group to which lawlessness can be imputed. Thus, the violence used to defend existing power distributions is given both legal and moral justification. It should be added that although the state uses physical violence when it kills, imprisons, or otherwise punishes those who transgress its rules, it also makes effective use of the threat, rather than the actual application, of violence. One of the first to recognize the utility of the threat of violence, and of the advantages of small doses rather than indiscriminate use of violence, was Machiavelli. Writing in 1521, he argued that if violence was necessary to preserve the state, its institutions, wealth and values, it was desirable—especially if not in excessive amounts.

The Sources of Violence

Psychological Sources

The attempt to probe the roots of violence has concerned man for centuries. Is there a biological basis of violence or is it environmentally produced? Is violence a pervasive characteristic of the human condition, a "heart of darkness," which, as Joseph Conrad implied, is found not only in deepest Africa but everywhere, within the breast of every man, civilized or savage? In order to deal with these questions one must seek below the level of the violent act to the complex of hostile feelings and antagon-

isms which are its underpinning.

Violence is the extreme form of aggressive behavior, and thus one must search out the sources of aggression in order to understand violence. It is an oft debated question as to whether or not aggression is innate or a learned response to external stimuli. The behavior patterns of the animal kingdom provide valuable insights. Hostility, defensive posture in protection of territorial and property rights, antagonistic attacks on intruding strangers or sexual rivals, have all been carefully described and analyzed

by animal biologists.

The argument that aggression in animals is innate has been made most forcefully by Konrad Lorenz (1966). Lorenz takes the position that there is a "fighting instinct" in beast and man which is directed against members of the same species. Such aggression performs important self-preserving roles since it helps the animal to overcome the hostile forces he encounters in the world, while at the same time providing a kind of "natural selection" necessary in a world of limited resources. A noted animal biologist (Scott, 1958) has taken issue with the Lorenz thesis that aggression is an innate urge that must be satisfied, just like sex and hunger. On the contrary, Scott maintains, the chain of causation for aggression traces back to the external environment, and the behavior of fighting comes in response to outside stimulation. Carefully controlled studies of primates, both in their native habitat and in captivity, lend support to the thesis that aggression is a learned response. In fact, no definitive proof exists to date that aggression must be exercised regardless of what happens in the external environment (Wolfgang & Ferracutti, 1967).

Turning from animals to human beings it is apparent that the debate over the source of mankind's universally exhibited violent behavior is far from settled. Ardrey (1963) claims that aggression is an innate drive in humans as well as animals, stemming from the strong territorial imperatives which govern both worlds. Ardrey traces back man's evolution and development to his inborn aggressive instinct which motivated him to develop ever more deadly weapons, since unlike animals he possessed none of his own. Other explanations of aggression in humans range from the psychoanalytic to the physiological as well as to personality factors. It was Sigmund Freud whose famous theory of "the death instinct" implied that aggression was innate in man, as well as in animal. Men are not gentle, friendly creatures desiring love and simply defending themselves when attacked, he said, but "a powerful measure of desire for aggression has to be reckoned as part of their instinctual endowment (Freud, 1930)." Recently, support for this position has come from the English psychoanalyst, Anthony Storr (1968). Aggression, he asserts unequivocally, "is a drive as innate, as natural, and as powerful as sex. . . . In man, as in other animals, the aggressive drive is an inherited constant, of which we cannot rid ourselves, and which is absolutely necessary for survival (p. 109)." Storr thus takes issue with the theory which maintains that for aggression to take place, some kind of frustration must have previously occurred, and that the organism is responding to this outside stimulus (Berkowitz, 1962; Buss, 1961). Storr argues, in contrast, that there is an inborn, physiological mechanism which presses for fulfillment, a state of aggressive tension similar to sexual arousal, for which an outlet must be found.

If the weight of empirical evidence that aggression is innate is not conclusive, there is general agreement that aggression plays a vital role in human behavior. One can distinguish between normal aggression which is a healthy manifestation and "abnormal" aggression which tends toward violence. So, Storr maintains correctly, we all require competition, differentiation, controversy, and conflict in order to define ourselves psychologically and physically. Aggression plays a healthy role by helping the growing child break free of parental domination, and in so doing, preserve and define his own identity. It is only when some type of psychopathology prevents aggression from being normally expressed, that it turns to hatred and violence and is either repressed, turned

inward, or let out in explosive forms.

If hostility is widespread and the capacity for aggression endemic, we must still deal with the question of why, given similar external conditions, some individuals behave violently and others do not. There are several elements involved in the answer: the personality of the individual, the family patterns which mold him, the particular cultural and regional environment in which he finds himself, and, most significant, the social structure of which every individual is a member. There is the violence-prone individual and there also is the violence-prone social setting. When these intersect, then overt—as against potential—violence occurs.

Whereas it is characteristic of the infant to view the world from a solipsistic vantage point in which everything exists to satisfy his own needs and desires, when such an attitude persists into adulthood it indicates a deep-seated immaturity and insecurity. The individual who views others as objects to be exploited or manipulated for his own satisfaction, whose only way to buttress a weak ego is at the expense of other people, comes to regard

violence as the proper way to resolve conflict. Violence in such an individual thus takes on an addictive character—the more it is used to satisfy needs, the more habit-forming it becomes (Toch, 1969). It is normal for the young child to be instinctively aware of his own weaknesses and vulnerability vis-à-vis adults, and thus to respond aggressively to them. But if maturity does not bring with it a strengthening of the ego, then as an adult he will tend to react aggressively as part of his normal response pattern, even when the situation does not call for such behavior.

There are other factors which tend to give rise to violence—generative feelings of anxiety and insecurity in early childhood relationships. In particular, an uneven show of love and affection by mother to child may serve to increase his insecurity. In addition, parental rejection, imitation and identification with the aggressive behavioral patterns exhibited by either parent (especially the father), all serve to heighten the violence-prone potential of the developing individual. There is, furthermore, an abundance of literature in the field of psychology which points up the close connection between aggression in the child and the use of parental

punishment (Buss, 1961; Sears, Maccoby & Levin, 1957). It is undeniable that, particularly in Western society, the very process of familial socialization, by which a child becomes acculturated into the norms and mores of the wider society, consists of a constant series of conflicts to which he will often respond with violent aggression. In fact, as one scholar has shown (Parsons, 1951), violence generated by the social structure is particularly stimulated by the pressures inherent in the individual's relationships with his parents, his peers, and his siblings. Especially important is the role which the modern unitary family plays in an urban, industrialized society. Relatively isolated, dependent on the occupational status of the father, whose work is done in separate premises, the members of the modern family are subject to high levels of insecurity. This builds up a large "reservoir of latent aggression" in both boys and girls—in boys, as a revolt against the ever-present female role model of the mother; in girls, because of ambivalent feelings towards motherhood and femininity. Observations of child behavior at all ages confirm this, although boys tend to rate higher in the direct expression of aggression and to show less anxiety over its use (Maccoby, 1966). The wide-spread prevalence of the "machismo" syndrome shows how readily maleness is equated with overt physical aggression. Closely related to family patterns are occupational pressures for achievement and a stress on status and prestige. These serve to reinforce insecurities which may already have developed in childhood, and therefore are contributory to violence-producing tendencies.

Social Sources

Violence is not as evenly distributed within a society as one would expect if it were simply due to individual aberration. There are regional areas in which there is an excessive amount of violence. Also, there are families, tribes, and ethnic groups which are more violent than the surrounding culture. Recognition of these facts has led to the notion of a subculture of violence (Wolfgang & Ferracutti, 1967) in which there is a learning environment, handed down from generation to generation, which serves to legitimize violent behavior for the members. The values of the subgroup set it apart from and cause conflicts with the larger society. Such a group-wide acceptance of violent attitudes and behavior serves to explain the high affinity for violence (using homicide figures) among males, non-whites, and adolescents. Generally, more violence is found in urban communities and is increasing among the young.

The subcultural thesis appears equally valid in explaining rural violence in isolated central Sardinia or the "violencia" raging for the last 15 years in Colombia. The more highly integrated are the members into the subculture, the more they express attitudes, assumptions, and perceptions which view violence permissively, and thus suffer no guilt from engaging in it. Obviously, not all individuals growing up within such a setting actually engage in violence; one must conclude that those individuals most susceptible, due to their own personality inadequacies, will be the ones for whom the permissive context provides needed support. Nonetheless, empirical evidence appears most persuasive that the specific environmental milieu in which the individual develops and matures can be a potent catalytic agent in inculcat-

ing violent tendencies.

Though it is possible to explain violence in terms of personality factors and, similarly, on the basis of regional and subcultural influences, neither interpretation is adequate to explain the incidence and intensity of the society-wide violence which has always characterized mankind and which is so pervasive today. Certainly, it is not only the emotionally maladjusted or the members of a slum-based minority group who engage in violence. As already indicated, the root causes of violence lie deep within society itself. Particularly in our own century, many violent acts appear to be detached from any emotion whatsoever, motivated purely by the desire to be part of the violent action itself. This is the kind of violence occasionally found in the teen-age gang. (A notorious example was the "Egyptian King" homicide in 1957 in New York City, where a gang of boys jointly murdered a fifteenyear-old boy partially crippled by polio.) Participation in such an act appears to give the individuals a sense of their own existence and of belonging to the group, and this may be very important for those who feel that life is purposeless and futile. The sense of boredom and emptiness which may lead variously to conformism, alcoholism, experimentation with sex and drugs, emotional illness, or juvenile delinquency and crime is everywhere the same. When it occurs within the suffocating confines of the ghetto, the temptation to break the pattern with violence is enhanced.

Numerous writers and critics, such as Arthur Miller and Norman Mailer, have argued that such detached violence is to be expected from an era which deadens and suffocates man's spontaneous expression of his own nature. Those who feel bored and unfulfilled in life, particularly if they are young, seem to have a strong affinity for the violent act. This state of mind is described

poignantly by Arthur Miller (1962):

The delinquent is stuck with his boredom, stuck inside it, stuck to it, until for two or three minutes he "lives"; he goes on a raid around the corner and feels the thrill of risking his skin or his life as he smashes a bottle filled with gasoline on some other kid's head . . . it is LIFE . . . standing around with nothing coming up is as close to dying as you can get. . . . (p. 51).

Miller's observations are remarkably paralleled by these remarks of a 15 year-old Harlem youth (Clark, 1965):

Well, the gang, they look for trouble, and then if they can't find no trouble, find something they can do, find something they can play around. Go in the park, find a bum, hit him in the face, pee in his face, kick him down, then chase him, grab him and throw him over the fence. (p. 3)

As has been mentioned earlier, sociological data support the finding of a high correlation between economic and social status on the one hand, and violence on the other; those who are poor commit more violent acts. Moreover, whether one includes homicides, assault and battery, or the collective violence of riots, it is invariably true that a large number of the participants are not only economically deprived but also racially disadvantaged. A recent study of the riot-torn city of Newark (Wright, 1968) has shown the depth of disadvantage of its citizens compared to other major cities in the nation: the highest rates for crime, tuberculosis, syphilis, gonorrhea, maternal mortality, and daytime population turnover in the nation. It has become apparent to all who care to see that within our highly affluent, urbanized society there exist countless numbers of those who are both penniless and powerless, suffering from a deep-seated social malaise, from feelings of alienation from accepted norms and standards, i.e., anomie. American society is stratified and those at the bottom realize they have only limited access to the success goals of the dominant value system. At the same time, they receive messages from all sides that failure to achieve these goals is bad. It is this conflict between their aspirations and the paucity of legitimate means for realizing them that creates anomic conditions, which, in turn, provide a receptive

climate for violence. To be poor and a member of a minority group in American society means inevitable conflict between the prevailing standards of the community and the harsh realities of economic and social powerlessness. It does not inevitably mean violence, however. Those at the very bottom, who are totally dependent on organizations and institutions to meet their needs, will ordinarily go along passively accepting their plight, too much caught up in the daily battle for survival to have time or energy for protest activities. In time, they come to exist in a culture of poverty which is passed down from generation to generation, as was dramatically illustrated in a study of urban poverty in Mexico City (Lewis, 1961). But those like the rioters in the black ghettos who, due to their youth, better education, longer residence in the city, Northern upbringing, or stronger feelings of racial pride, are not overcome by the torpor of abject poverty are ripe to participate in any explosive outburst. In the last analysis, whether one refers to Mexican slum-dwellers, black residents of northern ghettos, Puerto Ricans living a substandard existence in New York City, migrant workers in California, the problems are rooted in anomic conditions: frustrated hopes, hostility and cynicism due to unresponsiveness on the part of the government, and deep resentments and grievances which are intensely volatile, awaiting only a triggering incident to erupt into violence.

Political Sources

Political factors are extremely potent as sources of violence. In particular, the state's participation in the use of violence, the specific behavior of its peace-keeping officials, as well as the more intangible philosophical and ideological views current among militants and intellectuals, all contribute to a general climate conducive to violence.

Official violence is contagious, whether it is exercised by police or by a whole nation waging war. Where such public violence is deemed legitimate and given moral sanction, it tends to create a climate where illegitimate, that is, private violence, is nourished. Organized, official participation in violence by our government in the first World War left its legacy in the form of private violence on the domestic scene. In this country, labor

strikes touched the lives of over one million workers in 1919; a revival of the Ku Klux Klan, the activities of the Industrial Workers of the World all contributed to a heightened level of violent action within the system. More recently, the militarism which has characterized this country's posture during the last decade, and about which President Eisenhower warned in his farewell speech, has played its share in contributing to a permissive attitude toward violence. The fact that our country has been at war or in a state of war-readiness for almost twenty years has surely contributed to the high incidence of juvenile delinquency today, as well as to the readiness of officials at all levels of government to call out armed forces to "repel" dissidents (Schlesinger, 1968).

History provides numerous examples of rioting directly related to police behavior. Rioting in two periods of English history, 1660-1714 and 1810-1820, has been especially well scrutinized (Rudé, 1964). In both cases, local constables were helpless before the rioters, and the army and navy, brought in to assist the local authorities, were too weakened by internal troubles. In our own country the race riots of earlier years and the more recent ghetto riots that have marked almost every major northern city in the 1960s show the same pattern: violence increases to the degree that the authorities become involved in the issues. A study of the major riots of 1919 (Waskow, 1966) has shown that the unneutral actions of the police on behalf of the white community had much to do with turning initial incidents into full-scale riots, and acted

as the final spark which incited these riots.

In the recent ghetto riots, although the underlying causes have deep economic and social roots, the actual violence was in almost every case precipitated by some police action. So intense is the depth of black resentment against the police that often even a trivial or commonplace police action is enough to set off what by now has become a familiar pattern of escalation of violence on both sides (Kerner, et al., 1968). Sources of black resentment against the police can be traced to several factors: a conviction that blacks are subject to brutality and harassment by the police; a lack of black members on urban police forces; a feeling that the police are corrupt and tend to ignore illegal practices within the ghetto; and finally, a feeling of helplessness and powerlessness with respect to getting these grievances remedied. All of these factors contribute to the climate for violence within the ghetto. Furthermore, as one study of prison riots has shown (Ohlin, 1956), if opportunities for peaceful protest are suddenly cut off, or sharp new deprivations introduced in the midst of generally the state of the state erally difficult conditions, generalized aggressions are easily transformed into violent outbreaks. The degree to which a conflict is intensified by ideological factors increases the likelihood that violent means will be used. As Georges Sorel (1908) recognized, the use of myths and symbols, both negative and positive, serves to increase the volatile nature of the conflict by appealing to men on emotional and non-rational levels. Sorel hoped that the particular myth which he described, the proletarian violence of the general strike, would serve as a rallying point for workers everywhere and would bring a kind of spiritual salvation to a world corrupted by middle-class values.

In the contemporary scene, others have developed different myths designed to cope with modern issues, many of which help to create a climate of tolerance for, if not active encouragement of, the use of violence. Frantz Fanon (1966), psychoanalyst and leading spokesman of the Algerian revolution, has had wide influence among young militant groups everywhere when he argues that the victim of colonial oppression must use violence to overthrow the hated order. The colonial regime rules by means of violence, he says, and the victim must simply lay hold of this violence and change its direction. Violence, in Fanon's words, "is thus seen as comparable to a royal pardon; the colonialized man finds his freedom in and through violence." Militant groups in the United States, such as the Black Panthers, find this analogy as appropriate to the ghetto life of the black man here as to the native under alien rule in Africa. Che Guevara, Regis Debray, and Mao Tse-Tung are heroes to countless young militants in every country, who find the actions and writings on revolution and guerrilla warfare of these leaders a source of inspiration and an example to be emulated.

Violence and Democracy

The task of evaluating the positive and negative aspects of violence within the American democratic system is immensely difficult because the verdict depends to such a large degree on subjective ranking of values and priorities. To one, the social changes wrought by years of violent labor strife in America are of such patent benefit to the society that the violence is deemed deplorable but necessary; to another, the bitter animosities and bloodshed which accompanied that labor strife far outweigh any gains made, and thus the violence is condemned. Furthermore, while the private use of violence undoubtedly conflicts with current moral standards, this has not always been true. Standards of appraisal of violence, especially towards minority groups, have varied greatly. Violent action against American Indians, excessive

force directed against Japanese on the West Coast, and brutality against the Negro have been condoned by various segments of the population. Even today, official violence is given moral sanction, especially if the targets are "deviants" from the mainstream such as hippies or war protestors. In short, though everyone condemns violence, its use has been widespread in society, both by official

and nonofficial sources.

Within American society there is a widespread affirmation of the democratic ethic, the very essence of which is the abhorrence of violence and the settlement of conflicts peaceably, rather than by coercive means. In theory, democracy flourishes when there is an absence of repressive governmental behavior, a minimal socio-economic living standard which enables the population to have the education and leisure necessary to be informed and involved in political issues, an absence of deep cleavages within the society, and finally, when there are available channels through which those who feel aggrieved can protest against the status quo.

Ideal and Reality

What happens when the day-to-day operation of the American system falls far short of the high criteria implied by the above model of democracy? There obviously exists a large gap between ideal and practice when there are large groups of people who: (1) have not adequately socialized the majority values and beliefs; (2) are subject to malaise and anomie rather than to active involvement in the system; and (3) feel that since they have no part in making the laws and rules which govern their behavior, there is no obligation to obey them. Furthermore, while the model of democracy places a high value on persuasion, it is the coercive pressure exerted by the state's use of force—and the threat of such use in the person of its armies, its police, its National Guard which plays at least a partial role in keeping order. Initially the threat by the state of its readiness to use violent force serves implicitly to coerce the minority into abiding by the majority decisions. When the threat fails, the actual application of the state's might becomes necessary, as when President Eisenhower sent federal troops to enforce the desegregation of the schools in Little Rock in 1957. Yet, as has been repeatedly asserted, every use of official violence strikes a blow against the democratic ethic since it serves to create a climate in which all types of violence flourish.

The democratic model affirms the need for respect for the individual, for self-fulfillment and dignity of each man, and for the spirit of communal responsibility. Yet the weight of modern social science literature underlies the general indifference and lack of identification of much of the population with such ideals (Mc-Closky, 1964; Prothro & Grigg, 1960; Stouffer, 1955). Statistics point to the widespread amount of non-voting and non-participation in any academic, social, or political activity, beyond that which advances self-interest. Although the ideal is a population without great extremes of wealth and poverty, our affluent society has great enclaves of economic deprivation, low educational opportunity, and lack of democratic processes for large numbers of its citizens. In the approved democratic methods one's vote, to be felt, must be added to that of others, and this collective voice in turn must be organized by effective and strong leadership. But the position of minority groups in this country, particularly that of the blacks, has been one of powerlessness and consequent lack of influence (Banfield & Wilson, 1963). In fact, this feeling of powerlessness is behind every riot. People do not want to have opportunity, freedom, or equality bestowed on them as a gift of charity but can only get these things by taking them through their own efforts. Finally, although a pluralistic society requires a wide play of conflicts which interact and clash along many lines, it is threatened when these cleavages tend to converge along one line. This is the case of the black man in American society; he faces such a combination of economic repression and racial suppression that it is only surprising that his protest against the system has thus far been so restrained.

Violence and the Resolution of Conflict

What conclusion can be drawn from this contrast of the actual with the ideal? That there are many within the system who are discontented, who wish to change the status quo, does not in itself invalidate democratic theory. In fact, that theory makes conflict and dissent an integral part of the dynamic process, but it is expected that the conflict will be institutionalized through such devices as conciliation, mediation, and arbitration. The bargaining techniques learned from labor-management relations illustrate the way in which conflict can be kept within manageable limits according to rules of fair play. Over the years, the device of collective bargaining has stabilized the area of managementlabor relations, largely because both sides have dealt from positions of strength. While it has not eliminated the causes of industrial conflict, this device has institutionalized their resolution to the degree that violence has been greatly reduced. Yet, as has been repeatedly asserted, the existence of large numbers of non-participants in the political life of the country would appear to indicate the futility of thinking of collective bargaining as the panacea for making democracy work. Millions are not even aware that regular, approved channels exist for the expression of grievances, and if they are aware, they mistrust them because they have no longrange view of a continuing dialogue and mutual interdependence

between themselves and the government.

Those who make policy must face up to the fact that conflict, and violent conflict at that, is a cardinal facet of the democratic process. While it is the hope of democracies that compromise will be maximized and violence minimized, policy-makers must realize that violence often accompanies demands upon the political system. Every society is dynamic and changing and must constantly cope with forces which exert pressure for change (sometimes for sudden and total change). Those, like the blacks, who feel themselves excluded from "the American way of life," can be expected to press for change by whatever means they can use to best advantage at the moment. The nonviolent movement has had its successes, but there are many black people who, having observed what they regard as the futility of the vote, the boycott, and the nonviolent demonstration, now glimpse an even larger arsenal of possible weapons. If violence works, they may be willing to try it.

Although most black leaders do not advocate the use of violence as a deliberate technique, an increasing number seem prepared to wield the threat of violence in the future to get present demands met. After the Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant riots in 1964, the Reverend Milton Galamison threatened the escalation

of violence at a press conference:

My answer is if one can't gain objectives through mediation around the table, if one can't gain objectives through peaceful demonstrations and picketing, then all these things may become a Sunday School picnic by comparison to what people are going to have to do in order to get their just grievances remedied. (Shapiro & Sullivan, 1964, p. 208)

Radical members of the anti-draft movement are increasingly advocating the use of violence as a conscious technique, part of a common front with black militants against the government. Calls for scientists, intellectuals, industrial workers, et al., to sabotage or demolish the research and techniques of American weaponry are more evident. According to a letter signed by people active in draft resistance in Seattle, "in a fortress under siege, the struggle does not proceed primarily by majority vote . . ." Traditional democratic theory assumes large areas of basic agreement in which the differences that do arise can be settled by compromise and negotiation. But large areas of nonagreement exist and the system is daily being forced to cope with challenges which threaten the very core of its existence. Too many persons react to such

²Letter to the editor of New Left Notes, October, 1967, 2, 36.

challenges by what Saul Alinsky calls "the zoo-keeper mentality," that is, by worrying about keeping the peace instead of facing the real issues, by calling for law and order and deploring the vio-

lence, instead of rooting out its causes.

Democratic leaders must try to ameliorate the underlying social, political, and psychological forces in the society which drive individuals to violent action. It is futile to try merely to repress the violence-for violence is just a harsh symptom of deeprooted social malaise. And there are no easy "cures" but only the need for an abiding concern with the psychological health and well-being of the citizens. There must be help towards economic security; there must be improvements in child training and family relationships so as to produce tolerant, cooperative individuals able to find constructive outlets for aggressive impulses. Voluntary associations must be strengthened so that the individual can turn to them for support in fulfillment of his needs, as well as for instruction in the methods and techniques of discussion and compromise. Finally, the policy-maker must be constantly vigilant in his attempt to bring into the orbit of political participation

those millions who now feel excluded from it.

Since the problems of the poor and the alienated center on their feelings of powerlessness and helplessness, solutions to these problems cannot be just more money or more jobs, but must help the poor to undertake social action which makes them feel more worthwhile as people. One hopeful method is the use of professional organizers, who come on a temporary basis and help a neighborhood to create a powerful, independent, democraticallyrun organization which can then negotiate with the outside. The whole concept of Black Power is a healthy effort to encourage black people to develop a sense of group solidarity, to view themselves as a power bloc and to act as one, in keeping with the importance of group action in American democratic theory. The anxiety and condemnation that has greeted this slogan would seem to imply that Americans are more frightened by a vision of a powerfully organized Negro bloc than by the riots of Watts and Detroit and Newark. In our pluralistic society, those with grievances have always come to discover that they must obtain the strength of group power in order to make their demands felt on the society as a whole. It has not been the organized groups which have threatened the system, but the disorganized and the disenfranchised.

The paradox which is implicit in this paper is that violence, the complete antithesis of the spirit and nature of the democratic ethic, is nonetheless a necessary part of the democratic process. Every act of violence, from murder to warfare, is an affront to

someone's dignity, his peace of mind, his very life. Harmful and costly in its immediate effects, in the long run it may serve as a catalyst in the operation of the necessarily imperfect democratic society. In forcing the system to a reexamination of its weaknesses and to a readjustment of its values, violence thereby performs a useful function which is therapeutic to the body politic.

REFERENCES

ARDREY, R. African genesis. New York: Atheneum, 1963.

Banfield, E., & Wilson, J. Q. City Politics. Cambridge: Harvard-M.I.T. Press,

BERELSON, B., & STEINER, G. A. Human Behavior. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964.

Berkowitz, L. Aggression. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962.

BIENEN, H. Violence and social change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968.

BOULDING, K. E. Conflict and defense. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.

BRINTON, C. Anatomy of revolution. New York: Norton, 1938. Buss, A. H. The psychology of aggression. New York: Wiley, 1961. CLARK, K. E. Dark ghetto. New York: Harper and Row, 1965. COLEMAN, J. S. Community conflict. New York: Free Press, 1967.

COSER, L. A. The functions of social conflict. New York: Free Press, 1956.

Davies, J. C. Toward a theory of revolution. American Sociological Review, 1962,

DE TOCQUEVILLE, A. On the state of society in France before the revolution of 1789.

London: John Murray, 1856. FANON, F. The wretched of the earth. New York: Grove, 1966.

FREUD, S. Civilization and its discontents. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1930.

IGLITZIN, L. The function of violence in the American democratic polity. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Bryn Mawr College, 1966.

KERNER, O., ET AL. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.

New York: Bantam, 1968.

Lewis, O. The children of Sanchez. New York: Random House, 1961.

LORENZ, K. On aggression. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966.

MACCORY F. B. The development of an difference. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford. MACCOBY, E. E. The development of sex differences. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Uni-

MACK, R., & SNYDER, R. The analysis of social conflict. J. Conflict Resolution,

McCLosky, H. Consensus and ideology in American politics. American Political

MILLER, A. The bored and the violent. Harper's, 1962, 25 (No. 1350), 50-56.

OHLIN, L. E. Sociology and the field of corrections. New York: Russell Sage, 1956.

PARSONS, T. The social system. In T. Parsons and E. A. Shils (Eds.), Toward a general theory of action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951.

PROTHRO, J. W., & GRIGG, C. M. Fundamental principles of democracy. Journal of Politics, 1960, 22, 276-294.

RUDE, G. The crowd in history. New York: Wiley, 1964. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, E. E. The semi-sovereign people. New York: Holt, Rinehart and

Schlesinger, A., Jr. Violence: America in the sixties. New York: New American

Scott, J. P. Aggression. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958.
SEARS, R. R., MACCOBY, E. E., & LEVIN, H. Patterns of child rearing. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957.

SHAPIRO, F., & SULLIVAN, J. Race riots. New York: Crowell, 1964. SIMMEL, G. Conflict. New York: Free Press, 1955.

Sorel, G. Reflections on violence. New York: Collier, 1950. (Originally published 1908)

Spergel, I. A. Youth gangs and urban riots. In L. Masotti & D. Bowen (Eds.), Riots and rebellion. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1968.

STORR, A. Human aggression. New York: Atheneum, 1968.

STOUFFER, S. A. Communism, conformity, and civil liberties. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955. Toch, H. Violent men. Chicago: Aldine, 1969.

WASKOW, A. I. From race riot to sit-in. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966.

WOLFGANG, M. E., & FERRACUTTI, F. The subculture of violence. London: Tavistock, 1967.

WRIGHT, N., JR. Ready to riot. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968.

The Effect of Civil Disorders on Small Business in the Inner City1

Howard Aldrich Cornell University

Albert J. Reiss, Jr. The University of Michigan

Almost all recent investigations of racially oriented civil disorders in the United States deal either with the precipitating causes of disorders or with the characteristics of participants in the disorders. Much less attention has been paid to the consequences of these disorders on the social and economic conditions

in areas where they take place.

This paper deals with the impact the disorders had on small business firms in the Negro ghetto. Taking the causes of civil disorders and participation in them as given, the study examines what has happened to the business organizations in Boston, Chicago, and Washington, D.C. that were most directly and immediately affected by the wave of arson, looting, and destruction that broke out in 1967 and after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King in April, 1968.

A panel study of 659 small businesses in the inner cities of Boston, Chicago, and Washington, D.C. permits us to assess not

Much of the information for this paper was drawn from two previous works by the authors (Aldrich, 1969; Aldrich & Reiss, Jr., 1969). We want to thank Nancy Suci for her assistance with data analysis for this paper.

only the extent of damages to them following disorders, but also, changes in the types of problems confronting them and changes in the attitudes of their managers or proprietors. Specifically, data are presented on the survival and damage rate for businesses in riot affected areas, on changes in the ability of small businesses to obtain insurance and their consequences, and on changes in the attitudes of businessmen toward crime and law enforcement with accompanying behavior changes.

The Sample

A survey of crime problems of small businesses was part of a larger study in 1966 of crime and law enforcement in high crime rate areas of Boston, Chicago, and Washington, D.C. conducted for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. Two police precincts were selected in Boston, two in Chicago, and four in Washington, D.C. In Boston and Chicago, one of the precincts selected had a predominantly Negro population and the other had a predominantly white population. In Washington, D.C., a majority of the population was Negro in three of the four precincts.

Within each of these precincts, a probability sample was designed and selected yielding information on 100 nonresidential establishments. The number where interviews were taken with a manager or proprietor in 1966 varied from 86 to 102. The total number of business firms interviewed was 659. In the summer of 1968, seven of the eight precincts were included in a follow-up study. Interviews were obtained for 432 owners or employees of the original 659 establishments in these seven precincts giving a completion rate of 65.5 percent. Excluding the firms no longer in

business, however, the completion rate was 80 percent.

To give the reader a brief view of the environment of the businesses, a brief description of each area follows. In Washington, D.C., the 6th precinct had a 1960 population of approximately 60,000 and was 58.5 percent white. Located in the Northwest section of the District, it experienced almost no damage in the civil disorders of 1968. The 10th precinct also had a 1960 population of about 60,000, but it differs from the 6th in that its population was 69.7 percent Negro. The 13th precinct had approximate ly 73,000 residents in 1960 of whom 68.2 percent were Negro. The 10th and 13th precincts are directly northwest of the central business district. These precincts were the scene of large scale looting and arson following Dr. King's assassination in 1968 (Gilbert, 1968).

The two precincts in Boston are Roxbury, on the near South

Side, and Dorchester, adjacent to Roxbury to the south. Roxbury includes the main Negro ghetto of Boston. Although its 1960 population of 83,000 was only 55.3 white, the proportion of whites was much smaller by 1966. Dorchester's 1960 population was 96,000, about 98.9 percent white. The area is undergoing a transition in population composition partly because of movement of Negroes from Roxbury. Both Boston precincts had a high crime

In Chicago the two selected precincts are very similar to those in Boston. Town Hall, on the North side of Chicago, was 97.4 percent white in 1960 and had a population of 204,000. A large proportion of its white population is made up of low income Southern migrants. The Filmore precinct, with a population of 140,000, while only 47.1 percent Negro in 1960 was closer to 90 percent Negro by 1966. The Filmore precinct was particularly hard hit in the civil disorders following Dr. King's assassination, especially along West Madison Street and along Roosevelt Road.

Extent of Damage Due to Civil Disorders

Of the original 659 small businesses surveyed in the seven areas in 1966 only 496 (or 75 percent) were still in business under the same owner at the same location in 1968. Approximately 4 percent had moved to another location, 5 percent were definitely out of business, and 16 percent, while not at the same location, could not be located to learn whether they were still in business.

Our interest lies less in the survival rates of businesses in high crime rate areas than in the impact the civil disorders had on such rates. Since 97 of the 111 businesses damaged or looted during civil disorders were in retail or service businesses, special attention is given to these businesses in the following discussion.

The percentage of businesses in each of the five precincts experiencing civil disorders that were damaged by arson, looting, or vandalism is given in Table 1. Of the 659 business firms in the 1966 sample, 38 were no longer at their original location because of arson or looting accompanying the disorders. Only 4 of the 38 could be identified as having continued in business at another location.

Of the establishments no longer in business, about threefourths were in retail trade, one was in commercial credit and insurance, and the remaining eight were personal service businesses. These figures do not accurately reflect the true impact of the disorders, however, since most riot-damaged businesses still were operating in 1968 (as can be seen in the bottom row of Table 1).

TABLE 1

DAMAGE AND PERCENT OF BUSINESSES AFFECTED
(RY TYPE AND PRECINCT)

The second secon	日 日 日 日 日		(BY IYPE A	(BY I YPE AND PRECINCT)				
		Severe		Busine	Business Still in Operation	ration		
City and Police	Type of	Damage:	Arson	Arson,	Looting	Looting,	Damage,	Total N of
Precinct	Business	Out of Business	and	Looting	and Damage	No	Looting	Businesses
Boston:	Retail	2	4	2	2	1	2	45
Pct. 9-Roxbury	Service	8	1	1	4	1	8	24
THE REAL PROPERTY AND ADDRESS OF THE PERSON ADDRESS OF THE PERSON AND ADDRESS OF THE PERSON ADDRESS	Other	1	1	1	1	1	4	22
Chicago:	Retail	16	2	1	16	I	7	44
Pct. 11—Filmore	Service	13	1	1	6	4	6	23
	Other	1	1	4	1	l	11	28
Washington, D.C.	Retail	24	4	1	9	İ	10	49
Pct. 10	Service	7	3	1	3	1	3	29
	Other	1	1	1	8	1	80	12
Washington, D.C.	Retail	1	2	I	9	1	4	48
Pct. 6	Service	1	1	1	3	1	9	32
	Other	1	1	1	1	1	1	22
Washington, D.C.	Retail	22	80	2	10	1	1 2 2	40
Pct. 13	Service	3	1	1	1	1	12	34
日本 日	Other	7	1	7	28	1	7	14
Total Damaged Businesses	nesses	38	10	4	28	- 1	30	

Percentages given in Table 1 are calculated on a base of the total number of retail, service, or "other" businesses within the precinct. They do not add up to 100 percent because the businesses that moved, went out of business for other reasons, or are still in business at some other location are not given. All these businesses are included in the right-hand column of the table, and are included in the base for all percents.

Retail businesses in four of the five precincts (the 9th in Boston excepted) were more likely to be driven out of business by civil disorders than others. Almost one-fourth of the retail stores in Washington, D.C.'s 10th precinct went out of business as a result of the April, 1968, disturbances. The 13th precinct in Washington, D.C. was also hit heavily, as was Chicago's 11th

precinct.

Chicago and Washington, D.C. presented quite dissimilar scenes to observers almost three months after the April disorders. By the second week in June almost all of the burned out buildings in Chicago's Filmore district had been torn down and the sites cleared of debris. Several blocks on Madison and Roosevelt were completely flattened, resembling more an open plain than the aftermath of a riot. In several instances, interviewers found only an empty space between two buildings instead of their assigned sample address. The extremely rapid clearing job done in Chicago contrasted sharply with the piles of rubble interviewers found in Washington, D.C. Entire blocks along Georgia and 14th Street were strewn with the remains of burnt-out buildings. Indeed, were one to visit Chicago's West side after touring 7th Street in Washington, he might think the cleared land in Chicago was merely in preparation for a new freeway.

Adding together all forms of damage or destruction to businesses in each precinct, we find that Boston's Roxbury district and Washington, D.C.'s 6th precinct are quite similar; twelve percent of the retail businesses in each precinct were either destroyed, damaged, or looted. At the other extreme, 44 percent of the retail businesses in the 10th precinct and 43 percent in the 13th precinct of Washington, D.C., and 41 percent in the 11th

precinct of Chicago were damaged or looted.

Only fourteen of the 111 businesses damaged or looted during the civil disorders were not retail or service businesses. Of the fourteen, nine were in Washington, D.C., an indication of the wide scope of disorders in that city. Moreover, seven of the nine were concentrated in the 13th precinct, making a total of 35 percent of all sample businesses in that precinct either damaged or looted in April.

In Boston's 9th precinct a total of 13 percent of all businesses

were affected by the disorders, a figure just slightly larger than the 9 percent affected in Washington, D.C.'s 6th precinct. Thirty-two percent of all businesses in Chicago's 11th were either damaged or looted, as were 32 percent in Washington, D.C.'s 10th precinct.

Looting. The proportion of retail businesses looted ranged from a low of 6 percent in Boston to a high of 18 percent in Chicago and in Washington, D.C.'s 13th precinct (Table 1). In 27 cases the respondent was able to give us the value of the items taken by looting. About 15 percent reported a loss of under \$500, 26 percent a loss of between \$500 and \$2499, 15 percent between \$2500 and \$4999, 22 percent a loss of from \$5000 to \$7499, and 22 percent a loss of more than \$7500. In one instance a retail business lost more than \$25,000 when looters carried away most

of the inventory.

Forty-six percent of the businesses that were looted reported that they were repaid by insurance for at least part of their loss. Another 11 percent reported that their claims were still pending. There was a major difference between retail and service businesses in the percent paid insurance claims for losses. Fifty-four percent of the retail businesses reported that they paid at least in part for losses; an additional 12 percent reported claims pending. However, only two of seven service businesses reported some payment for losses (or 29 percent) and none reported a claim pending. Retail businesses are apparently more adequately insured against losses due to looting than are service businesses, possibly because of insurance they carry against the everyday risk of theft.

Damage Other than Arson. Although 58 businesses were damaged by means other than fire, the value of the damage could be ascertained in only 27 cases because many owners had not yet paid for repairs. Of the 27, 44 percent reported damages of less than \$250, and another 29 percent reported damages from \$250 to under \$1000. Eighteen percent of the damages were in the \$1000 to \$7500 range; only two percent reported damages of

\$7500 or more.

The losses from this damage were paid by insurance for fifty-four percent of the businesses; claims were still pending for 11 percent. The only precinct that differed significantly from the others in the proportion of loss repaid was the 6th precinct in Washington, which had 80 percent of its losses due to damage paid by insurance claims. Taking all precincts together, 82 percent of the respondents reimbursed by insurance stated that the full loss was repaid.

Total Loss Due to Arson, Looting, and Damage. Unfortunately, respondents were able to tell us the total amount of their loss in only about half of the cases (38 of 73). Of those able to estimate

their total losses, 26 percent reported a loss of less than \$250. Altogether 45 percent had total losses of less than \$1000; approximately 21 percent lost between \$2500 and \$4999; and 18 percent lost \$5000 or more but less than \$7500. Again, we must emphasize that these figures do not include the 38 businesses which were forced completely out of business by the civil disorders.

Of those businesses filing insurance claims for losses sustained in the disorders, claims were pending with insurance companies for 21 percent. About 73 percent of businesses in all precincts whose claims had been settled claimed all of their loss had been repaid. Over 88 percent said that fifty percent or more of

their loss had been repaid.

Summary of Damages. In the five police precincts affected by civil disorders, 466 businesses had been selected in the 1966 sample. In 1968, 8 percent (38 businesses) were no longer operating due to severe damages incurred during the disorders. An additional 16 percent were damaged or looted during the disorders but were still in business. Thus, a total of 24 percent of all businesses in the riot-torn areas were materially affected by the disorders. All but 14 of the 111 businesses that were damaged or looted were retail or service businesses.

Of the 226 retail businesses in these areas, 31 percent were affected by the arson and looting. Eighteen percent of the service businesses were affected, as were 14 percent of all non-retail, nonservice businesses. Retail and service businesses are heavily dependent on their immediate area for customers. Unlike those in construction or manufacturing, for example, which may serve regional or national markets, retail and service businesses depend on building up a steady flow of regular customers from a local neighborhood for their success and therefore may have difficulty either retaining or re-establishing relations once this flow has been interrupted. It is very difficult to recover customers who have begun going elsewhere for their retail and service needs.

Apart from the direct financial loss suffered by business owners, there are also the costs of lost jobs and a decrease in the alternatives available to the shopping patterns of ghetto residents. The temporary closing of 31 percent of the retail businesses in these ghetto areas must have forced a large number of shoppers either to patronize unfamiliar stores or to travel outside their

neighborhood for their purchases of food and clothing.

One rather surprising finding in the aftermath of disorder in these largely Negro ghettos is the almost complete lack of racial turnover in ownership. One would have expected white business owners to have sold out to Negroes after the disorders, yet only four did so. Since one Negro owner sold his business to a white, the net gain by Negroes in ownership of existing businesses was but three businesses between 1966 and 1968.

Insurance Problems

Insurance problems of small businesses in the inner city have been studied by a number of commissions and committees over the past several years (Hearing before the Committee on Commerce, 1967; President's National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas, 1968). All these investigating groups have come to the same conclusion—that insurance coverage is denied to many small urban businesses. Our data enable us to answer two additional questions: (1) how did insurance companies react to the occurrence of civil disorders, and (2) how did businessmen

react, in turn, to actions by insurance companies?

Insurance companies generally set rates for an area in terms of its crime rate and its insured losses from all sources. Insurance companies generally do not rely on official agency statistics for information. They have more up-to-date information about their risk of insuring an area. For crimes, for example, they have the actual losses due to crime reported by the business firms they insure. Losses reported by insured businesses function as feedback for the insurance company, giving it an opportunity to compare its expected performance, i.e., expected rate of payment of losses, to its actual performance. When actual losses approach or exceed expected losses based on rates, the company may act to decrease the gap between actual and expected losses by one of several means. They may refuse to renew policies, cancel those already written, raise rates, or in some cases "red-line" high risk areas, i.e., instruct agents or brokers not to write insurance coverage for businesses in those areas.

Civil disorders add another dimension to the situation that insurance companies must take into account in setting rates or writing insurance. Crime rates generally do not affect a company's risk by a sharp change in the short run. By contrast, civil disorders raise the specter of massive losses being incurred in the span of a few days (or hours). The occurrence of civil disorders in an area should distort accordingly the "normal" reaction of in-

surance companies to insured losses.

These expectations can be tested, using 1966 information on the loss rate per 100 insured organizations and 1968 reports of rate increases and cancellations. Any loss can be regarded as negative feedback. One indicator of the volume of negative feedback is the rate of repayment for a robbery or burglary in 1965-66 per 100 insured businesses. Correlatively, the rate of cancellation of fire, theft, and property damage policies per hundred firms insured, and the rate per hundred insured firms reporting increases in insurance charges are measures of an insurance company's

response to negative feedback.

The measures of an insurance company's response to losses were computed by calculating, for each type of insurance, the proportion of insured firms in an area reporting the particular problem—rate increases or cancellations. These proportions then were added together, with each type of policy given equal weight. Each of the two insurance company response variables was plotted against the measure of feedback over the seven observation points (the areas).

From an examination of the scatterplot it was apparent that both rate increases and cancellations of insurance were positively associated with losses reported for insurance companies in each area. There is support, therefore, for the hypothesis that an insurance company's activities in an area are a response to negative

The hypothesis that the occurrence of civil disorders in an area distorts the "normal" feedback process is supported for feedback. cancellations of insurance but not for rate increases. The correlation between losses and cancellations was, in fact, nearly unity.

The effect of the riots has been to displace upwardly, by about 45 cancellations per 100 firms, the relationship between losses and cancellations. The mean cancellation rate for firms in areas heavily affected by civil disorders in 1967-68 was 60 policies per 100 firms; for non-riot areas the rate was only 25 policies per 100 firms. Note that the form of the relationship, i.e., the slope, has not changed; instead, a constant has been added to the severity with which insurance companies respond to reported losses.

As for rate increases, there was virtually no difference in the rate of increases in insurance premiums between riot and non-riot areas. The mean rate of increase for riot areas was 122 per 100 and the mean for non-riot areas was 127 per 100. Clearly the effect of civil disorders on the rates an insurance company charges those businesses fortunate enough to be insured is not the same as their effect on cancellations. This is not surprising since normally there are legal restrictions prohibiting an insurance company from setting different rates among areas in a city, but they can cancel policies. To cover unanticipated losses and bridge against future losses both actions may occur.

Businessmen's Desires to Move

Problems in obtaining insurance coverage pose other problems for small businessmen in the inner city, aside from the fact

of not being protected against unexpected losses. Lack of insurance means that a business is less likely to secure loans. Of those firms without insurance in 1966, only 8.3 percent were able to obtain a loan by 1968. This difference remains the same when

the profit status of the firm is controlled.

When losses from civil disorders, difficulties in securing loans, and insurance problems are cumulative, the small businessman is pushed toward moving from the area. Whether or not a business is making a profit at a given location, and its size also affect a businessman's desire to remain in an area. The relationship between the insurance problems reported by businessmen and their intentions to move is examined in Table 2 for each racial group, by profit status and the location of the firm in a riot or non-riot area. An index of the firm's problems with insurance companies was constructed giving equal weight to: refused insurance in 1967-68; policy cancelled in 1967-68; and insurance rates increased in 1967-68.

The impact of the riots was striking: only 18.2 percent of white businesses reporting a profit in non-riot areas have owners thinking of moving the business, whereas 46 percent of the owners of profitable white firms in riot areas have thought about moving to another area. Similarly, 45 percent of the owners of white businesses reporting no profit in non-riot areas have thought of moving, compared to 58.1 percent of the non-profitable firms in

riot areas.

All Negro-owned businesses are located in areas affected by civil disorders. The percentage of Negro owners expressing a desire to move is lower than that for comparable white businesses. This finding accords with the strong economic and social ties that Negro businessmen have to the ghetto. It also fits the assumption that there are strong forces within the white community that work to keep Negro businesses in the ghetto (Drake & Cayton, 1937). Negro businessmen are restricted on the average to locations

where Negro populations are concentrated.

Civil disorders, then, have had a number of consequences for the small business firm's ability to obtain insurance and remain in its pre-riot location. First, the occurrence of civil disorders dramatically heightens the reaction of insurance companies to area-wide losses, and small businesses located in riot-affected areas have a more difficult time obtaining insurance. Second, firms unable to obtain insurance because of being located in riot affected areas also are practically unable to obtain financial credits a need that it, a need that is never easily met for small businesses. Civil disorders in combine or the small businesses. orders, in combination with rising insurance problems and decreasing profits increase the problems are to creasing profits, increase the white small businessman's desire to TABLE 2
PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS WHOSE FIRMS THOUGHT OF MOVING

		While De	White Dusinesses	STATE OF THE PARTY		A STATE OF THE PARTY OF
Number of	Riot Areas	reas	Non-Riot Areas Profit 1968	t Areas 1968	Riot Areas Profit 1968	Areas 1968
Insurance Problems	Var	No	Yes	N _o	Yes	No
1000000000000000000000000000000000000	ICS			(1)	21 4 (14)	31 2 (16)
	42.6 (47)	57.1 (7)	3.6 (28)	0.0 (5)	16.7 (12)	37.5 (16)
	45.4 (55)	93.3 (6)	37.5 (8)	60.0 (5)	- (2)	(e)
Two	54.5 (11)	(4)	(E) -	(0) -	(0) -	_ (Z)
	100 (130)	58 1 (31)	18.2 (88)	45.0 (20)	21.4 (28)	35.3 (34)
Total 40.0 (139) 50.1 (21)	40.0 (15%)	30.1 (21)	(-)			morning of Hear

move to another area. It is apparent that the only factor preventing many businessmen from moving is the lack of a buyer. Nevertheless, some businessmen move without finding a buyer, leaving vacant and boarded-up stores behind as they head for the suburbs. This trend shows no signs of abating.

The "Law and Order" Backlash

A number of observers have commented on the importance of "law and order" in recent social and political events. Writing of the 1968 election, Converse, Miller, Rusk, and Wolfe (1969) state:

In the broad American public, then, there was a widespread sense of breakdown in authority and discipline that fed as readily on militant political dissent as on race riots and more conventional crime. . . . Thus the "law and order" phrase, ambiguous though it may be, had considerable resonance among the voters, and deserves to be cataloged along with Vietnam and the racial crisis among major issue influences on the election. (p.

Commenting on the specific effects of civil disorders on white opinion, Banfield writes that one effect of the rioting might have been to check a "growing disposition on the part of the working and lower-middle classes to accept reforms (Banfield, 1968)."

The "law and order" backlash also appears in our study of small businessmen. The fact that we used a panel survey design means that we can measure the impact of the riots by comparing attitudes of businessmen toward crime and law enforcement in 1968 with measures of the same attitudes in 1966. Since organizations and not individuals are sampled in these surveys, interviewers did not always interview the same respondent in 1968 as in 1966; in fact, only half of the respondents interviewed in 1968 are the same as those interviewed in 1966. Of the 216 respondents interviewed in both waves of the panel, 180 are white and 36 Negro. The subgroup of whites forms the basis for the following analysis.

It should be noted at the outset that most respondents who changed attitudes toward "law and order" between 1966 and 1968 moved toward a more "conservative" position. This is true

for businessmen in both riot and non-riot areas.

We will examine first the changes in three attitudes concerning crime and law enforcement in riot and non-riot areas. After this discussion we will report on two measures of change in behavior that have rather ominous implications for the level of interracial tension in the inner city ghetto.

Changes in Attitudes. Three attitudes were ascertained by

means of the same question in both waves of the panel. The three are attitudes toward: (1) the trend in the crime rate of the area, (2) the effect of civil rights demonstrations on police work, and

(3) police treatment of suspected criminal offenders.

"Crime in the streets" was an election issue in both years of our interviewing, so respondents were asked: "Thinking now about crime in this area, do you think things have been getting better, getting worse, or staying about the same here during the past year?" Their responses are presented in Table 3. The modal

TABLE 3 RESPONSES OF WHITE BUSINESSMEN TO THE QUESTION: "HAS CRIME BEEN GETTING BETTER, WORSE, OR STAYING THE SAME THIS PAST YEAR?"

Sand St. No.	- A 19		Riot Areas	A LAS DESI	
To the Course In	VALUE OF S	Better	1968 Response Same	Worse	Total Number
1966 Response	Better Same Worse		30.0 8.3	100.0 70.0 91.7	3 20 36
Total		<u></u>	9 Non-Riot Areas	50	59
		Better	1968 Response Same	Worse	Total Numbe
1966	Better Same	10.0	20.0 57.5 17.4	70.0 42.5 78.3	10 40 46
Response	Worse	4.3	33	60	96

response was "worse" in both years, but the degree of change

from 1966 to 1968 was surprising.

Businessmen in the riot-affected areas grew markedly pessimistic over the two-year study period. In 1968 none thought that the crime situation was "getting better"; all three respondents who thought things were "getting better" in 1966 saw them as "getting worse" in 1968. Of those who thought crime was "staying about the same" in 1966, 70 percent switched to the alternative that crime was as the same of the alternative that crime was worsening in 1968. In all, while 61 percent of the businessmen saw things "getting worse" in 1966, 85 percent viewed matters that way in 1968.

While businessmen in the non-riot affected areas were not optimistic in 1968, a smaller proportion of each type of 1966 respondents changed their answers to "getting worse" in 1968 than did businessmen in riot areas. Officially, the police reported that crime was increasing in all areas studied in 1966 and in 1968. Although the rates reported were higher in riot than non-riot areas, there was little difference reported in the *rate* of increase in our survey areas within each city; therefore it seems reasonable to assume that the disorders, rather than any change in crime, per se, caused the change. Nonetheless we cannot rule out alternative explanations—for example, that differences in crime patterns in the two areas are a cause.

A second attitude touches more closely on the issue of businessmen's perceptions of civil disorders. Respondents were asked: "What affect do you think the civil rights movement had on police work?" Businessmen in both areas gave mostly negative responses in 1966 and 1968. Moreover, most respondents who made favorable comments about the civil rights movement in 1966 switched in 1968 to making negative comments (19 out of 21 people switched from positive to negative). Yet, the negative shift of people who were "positive" in 1966 is almost counterbalanced by a positive shift of people who were negative in 1966 (17 people shifted from negative to positive) leaving little net change in attitudes toward the effect of the civil rights movement on police work

The strong negative attitude of businessmen toward the civil rights movement and its effect on policing may result in part from their confusing civil rights and civil disorders. Apart from any such confusion, many respondents expressed the view that the civil rights movement was putting pressure on the police and hindering their freedom of action. A significant minority believed that the riots had been caused by civil rights groups.

TABLE 4

RESPONSE OF WHITE BUSINESSMEN TO THE QUESTION:

"WHAT EFFECT DO YOU THINK THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
HAS HAD ON POLICE WORK?"

eres man garl read		Control of the Contro	t Areas Response Positive	Total Number
1966 Response	Negative Positive	82.4 85.7	17.6 14.3	34 7
Acceptance	Total	34	7 1 170	41
			Riot Areas Response Positive	Total Number
1966 Response	Negative Positive	82.3 92.9	17.7 7.1	62
	Total	64	12	76

Clearly while most small businessmen in the areas of the cities studied are hostile to civil rights groups, the data in Table 4

do not show that hostility is increasing.

The third attitude studied concerns the issue of the use of force by the police. Respondents were asked: "Do you think that the police are generally too lenient, too harsh, or about right in dealing with people who are suspected of breaking the law?" In 1966, the large majority (74 percent) of businessmen in the riot areas thought that the police were "about right." By 1968, 58.1 percent of these respondents had shifted to a belief that the police were "too lenient," making that the modal response of all businessmen. While a majority of the businessmen in non-riot areas in 1966 and in 1968 felt that the police were "about right" in dealing with suspected offenders, there was a net shift toward regarding the police as "too lenient." While only 19 percent of all businessmen in non-riot areas saw the police as "too lenient" in 1966, this became 43 percent of all businessmen in 1968.

The difference between the groups in the two areas who thought that the police were "too lenient" in 1966 is not significant (23 percent in riot compared with 19 percent in non-riot areas). By 1968, however, there was a difference (57 percent in riot compared with 43 percent in non-riot areas). Yet the major finding is the doubling of businessmen in both areas who believed the police were "too lenient" in dealing with suspected offenders.

TABLE 5 RESPONSE OF WHITE BUSINESSMEN TO THE QUESTION: "ARE THE POLICE TOO LENIENT, TOO HARSH, OR ABOUT RIGHT IN DEALING WITH PEOPLE SUSPECTED OF BREAKING THE LAW?"

23,800	ALMA NO SAF A	Too Lenient	Riot Areas 1968 Response About Right	Too Harsh	Total Number
1966 Response	Lenient Right	60.0 58.1	40.0 41.9 —(1)	=	31
	Harsh Total	24	18	-	42
10	0.90	Too Lenient	Non-Riot Areas 1968 Response About Right	Too Harsh	Total Number
1966	Lenient Right	71.4 37.3	21.4 59.3 —(1)	7.1 3.4 —	14 59 1
Response	Harsh Total	32	39	3	74

Given the generally favorable view businessmen have of the police, this is surprising.

Activity Changes

The question quite naturally arises whether changes in attitude toward "law and order" affect behavior related to this attitude. Given the fact that businessmen perceive their environment as hostile so far as crime, civil disorders, and policing are concerned, have they altered their behavior or the environment of their firms to make crime and damage more difficult, or, in general, to secure the physical boundaries of their establishment?

There are at least five specific actions that a firm can take to protect itself from crime, arson, or looting: (1) install a burglar alarm, (2) install barred windows or special locks, (3) hire guards, (4) provide special escorts for persons carrying money, (5) hire an armored car service. The above activities (plus a sixth, "miscellaneous") have been combined into an index measuring the total number of protective measures taken by a firm. A score was computed for firms in 1966 and in 1968; the range is from 0-7. Table 6 shows changes in protective measures taken by businesses between 1967 and 1968, separately for riot and non-riot areas. The index is dichotomized for ease of presentation.

In the riot areas, 31 percent of the firms that had 3 or fewer protective measures in 1966 increased the number from 4 to 7. Of the firms already using 4 or more protective measures in 1966, 80 percent retained them in 1968. Whereas only 15 percent of the businesses in the riot areas in 1966 had taken 4 or more protective

TABLE 6
PERCENT OF BUSINESSES USING DIFFERENT NUMBER OF MEASURES
TO PROTECT AGAINST CRIME

	oraci Hemmer C		
	Number of M	easures, 1968	N of Businesses
	0-3	4-7	Businesses
0-3	69.0	31.0	58
		- TANE 2015	10
	20.0	00.0	10
Total	42	26	68
	Non-R	iot Areas	
	Number of M	easures, 1968	Nof
	0-3	4-7	Businesses
0-3	86.1	13.9	101
4-7	54.5		11
Total	93	19	112
	0-3 4-7 Total 0-3 4-7	Riot Number of M 0-3 0-3 69.0 4-7 20.0 Total 42 Non-R Number of M 0-3 0-3 86.1 4-7 54.5	0-3 69.0 31.0 4-7 20.0 80.0 Total 42 26 Non-Riot Areas Number of Measures, 1968 0-3 4-7 0-3 86.1 13.9 4-7 54.5 45.4

measures against crime losses, 39 percent had done so by 1968.

Only 13.9 percent of the firms in the non-riot areas with fewer than 4 protective measures increased their number of 4 or more by the summer of 1968. Likewise, only 45.4 percent of the businesses with 4 or more protective measures in 1966 had retained that level of protection into the summer of 1968. Overall, however, there was a slight net increase from 10 percent of all businesses with 4 or more measures in 1966 to 17 percent in 1968. On balance, however, more than twice as many (39 percent) of the businesses in riot compared with businesses in non-riot areas (17 percent) had taken 4 or more protective measures by 1968. The percent increase was somewhat greater for riot than non-riot areas but not significantly so.

Purchasing a gun is perhaps the most extreme protective action a small businessman can take and still remain within the law. Table 7 gives the proportion of businessmen in each area who reported having a gun on the premises in the summer of 1968. The smallest percentage of armed businessmen is found in the non-riot areas, but a large proportion (36.1 percent) of the businessmen reported purchasing a gun in the twelve months follow-

ing the Detroit riots (July, 1967).

While a larger proportion of firms in riot areas were protected by an armed proprietor or employee, the bulk of these weapons appear to have been purchased before the major Northern urban civil disorders. Only 25 percent of those with guns stated that they had bought them within the past twelve months.

The group with the highest proportion of its members armed is Negro businessmen in the riot areas. Of this group, 30.4 percent had a gun in the establishment and 38.5 percent of these firms

TABLE 7
REPORTS OF GUN PURCHASE AND OWNERSHIP BY BUSINESSMEN
(PERCENTAGES)

	(PERCENTAL	JEG)	
Reaction	Whi	tes	Negroes
	Non-Riot	Riot	Riot
	Areas	Areas	Areas
Has a gun	17.3	28.3	30.4
Total Number	(198)	(136)	(92)
Year gun bought 1967–1968 1964–1966 Before 1964 Total Number	36.1 30.5 33.3 (36)	25.0 29.2 45.8 (24)	38.5 38.5 23.1 (26)

had bought a gun within the past twelve months. This finding certainly indicates that Negro small businessmen are as concerned about "law and order" as white businessmen.

It is difficult to determine exactly how many of the guns purchased in the past several years were bought because the businessmen anticipated the occurrence of civil disorders in the area. Clearly, some owners and managers were reacting as much to

increasing crime rates as to the threat of arson or looting.

Nevertheless, several points can be made. First, many civil disorders have been sparked by relatively minor incidents. The higher the proportion of armed businessmen in the ghetto, the higher the probability that a gun battle between a robber and a businessman will touch off a full-scale riot. A number of respondents reported wounding or killing robbers in shoot-outs in their establishments—one businessman had killed two robbers and wounded a third in three separate incidents. Under these conditions, the violence can escalate in the ghetto.

A second point concerns the likelihood of violent confrontations between businessmen and rioters once a civil disorder has begun. Several respondents mentioned that they had stood guard outside their establishment during the riots following Dr. King's assassination. A Washington, D.C. drugstore owner recruited his brother and a friend, armed them with shotguns, and kept a vigil outside his place of business for two days. No businessman reported shooting anyone during the riots, but as the more inexperienced gun-handlers buy weapons for their establishments, the

possibility of violence increases.

One action that businessmen can take to forestall violence against their business is to give favors to people in the neighborhood. The proportion of white businessmen lending or giving money away is almost the same as the proportion reporting they have a gun on the premises. (These are 1968 reports; comparison data for 1966 are unfortunately not available.) In non-riot areas, 16.3 percent report lending or giving money to neighborhood residents, whereas 27.8 of those in riot areas did so. It is striking that about equal proportions of businessmen buy guns and lend money to residents. It points up the dilemma of the white businessman in areas that are no longer populated by whites. On the one hand, the small businessman finds it necessary to prepare for numerous attempts to forestall criminal victimization. On the other hand, he must act like a businessman and attempt to attract and hold customers. Also, he may feel compelled to prove to the non-white residents of the neighborhood that he is not interested in them solely for their patronage. Thus some owners and managers make "loans" to area residents with no thought of collecting

the principal or interest.

The Negro small businessman is most affected by the ambiguous position of small businessmen in the ghetto. As a businessman, he must make a return on his investment. But, as a Negro, he finds people expect him to interact with them as a friend and neighbor. Almost 53 percent of the Negro businessmen report making loans or giving money to persons. Civil disorders have increased the pressure the Negro businessman feels, since with his lack of reserve funds, low profit margin, and inability to obtain insurance, even minor damage to his establishment can mean the loss of his business. Therefore, he must continually prove to the neighborhood that he is a Negro businessman and not just a businessman.

Conclusions

This paper has investigated a number of effects that the riots have had on small businesses in the inner city. All of the consequences discussed appear to have negative implications for the future of small businesses in these areas. The immediate consequences of the riots were disastrous for a large minority of the retail and service businesses in the ghetto, but the long-term consequences for all businesses are even less promising.

With regard to insurance coverage, the reaction of insurance companies has been to cancel policies in the affected areas and raise rates in the rest of the city. As a result many firms seek to leave the area, but because buying a small business in the ghetto is a high-risk venture at this point in time, finding a buyer is

difficult

The attitudes of all businessmen toward the issue of "law and order" have become more conservative, with businessmen in both riot and non-riot areas affected. At the same time that crime is perceived to be worsening, the police are viewed as too handicapped or hindered in their action to be able to do anything about

As for his behavioral reactions, the small businessman is increasing the number of protective measures used to protect the firm against crime. One gets an image of the businessman doing business from an armed camp, an image strikingly conveyed by the sight of grocery stores with bricked-up windows or jewelry stores where a customer must knock to gain entrance.

One positive note that emerges concerns the businessman's treatment of his customers. Evidently customers in riot-affected areas are sometimes more likely to be well-treated or catered to than customers in other areas. The extent to which such treat-

ment reduces inter-racial hostility is an open question.

Civil disorders have thus affected both the objective and the subjective situation of the small businessman in the inner city. Faced with a rising crime rate, decreasing profitability, and cancellations of insurance policies, and surrounded by persons who question his legitimacy in a neighborhood where he does not live, the small businessman's future is bleak. Although our analysis has focused mainly on white businessmen, the situation for non-whites is much the same, if not worse.

REFERENCES

ALDRICH, H. Organizations in a hostile environment: A panel study of small businesses in three cities. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1969.

ALDRICH, H., & Reiss, A. J., Jr. A 1968 followup study of crime and insurance problems of businesses surveyed in 1966 in three cities. In Crime against small business. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969.

Banfield, E. Rioting mainly for fun and profit. In J. Q. Wilson (Ed.), The

metropolitan enigma. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.

Converse, P., Miller, W., Rusk, J., & Wolfe, A. Continuity and change in American politics: Parties and issues in the 1968 election. American Political Science Review, 1969, 63, 1083-1105.

DRAKE, ST. C., & CAYTON, H. Black metropolis. New York: Doubleday, 1937.

GILBERT, B. Ten blocks from the white house. New York: Praeger, 1968.

HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE. Riot insurance. U.S. Senate,

Ninetieth Congress, August 29, 1967.

President's National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas.

Meeting the insurance crisis of our cities. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968.

Social Scientists and Social Action from within the Establishment

Robert Shellow

Department of Public Safety Washington, D.C.

Over the past four years, the processes of social change and conflict have thrust themselves into the awareness of even the most insulated people. Changes are occurring so rapidly that the most informed among us find it difficult to keep up with them, much less understand them. The man in the street has become confused and frightened and grasps for simplistic explanations, eager for bold action which will allay his anxiety and restore his sense of tranquility. Demagogues reach for power.

Surely at times such as these, those who claim a special knowledge of society and human behavior have a special responsibility. But responsibility to do what? Are teaching, consulting,

and researching the only responsible choices?

There are students of race relations among us who rush about chasing one disaster after another, who content themselves with documenting protest and riot, attitude shifts, and polarization, but confess impotence when it comes to influencing events. Some claim that the proper province of the social scientist is to do just that and no more, to be contemporary historian, systematically and accurately describing the deepening crisis. The hope is that somehow those who hold power to act will have the wisdom to

I don't believe it is enough for us to make passive offerings to decision-makers. I believe we should try to get closer to those in power and engage them actively. Unfortunately social scientists who have moved close to the seats of power—and in the process begun to assume some of that power—have in the past been regarded by many of their colleagues as having compromised the purity of their science. To participate in the formation of public policy has attracted few, and the many have shunned opportunities to do so for fear of jeopardizing their careers. But how else can the social scientist hope to have an impact unless he is close enough to the policymakers to interpret to them his theories, to explain to them his findings and translate their implications into action?

Social Scientists and the Kerner Commission

Perhaps I could best talk about the possible relationships between social scientists and policymakers by drawing on personal experiences still fresh in my memory and preoccupation. One such experience was that of principal social scientist on the staff of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission). A second experience is based on my current attempt to set up a pilot police district within the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C.

First, it is significant that I, a relatively unknown social psychologist, ended up with the responsibility for providing the major social science input into the Kerner Commission's work. A number of well-known scholars had been approached for the job but had declined, believing (I learned later) that the commission was destined to white-wash the crisis facing America, and was therefore too risky an enterprise with which to be associated.

The events of the summer of 1967 had stunned America. People were frightened and confused. The task of the commission was to provide conceptual leadership through a prestigious and powerful political body. Polarization was building rapidly and there was little leisure for careful systematic study. It was an impossible task—a social scientist's nightmare come true. To complicate matters, staff leadership was in the hands of lawyers with no social scientist on the commission itself. And it seemed many times that there was more of a preoccupation with building an argument that would hold water than with developing a reliable picture of what happened. Despite these severe constraints on the normally deliberate scientific approach, I believe that my staff and I made certain critical contributions which substan-

tially affected the course of the commission's deliberations and its

final product.

Research Strategy. At the time I joined the staff on Labor Day 1967, there were fewer than ten persons on the staff. Some 62 disturbances of varying magnitude had been identified in 56 cities by FBI Director Hoover in his testimony before the commission on August 1, 1967. Eventually, our staff compiled a list of 164 disturbances for the year, twenty of which occurred after Labor Day. The initial plan was to summarize what had happened in a brief interim report to be released by the first of the year. That was to be followed by a detailed, comprehensive and well-documented final report by mid-summer of 1968. Already the press was filled with the pronouncements of self-styled experts, the majority of whom subscribed to the nationwide conspiracy notion. If the commission was to have any impact on the formation of public attitudes and the initiation of remedial action, it had to speak quickly, with authority, and from some systematic data base.

Obviously, four months was an impossibly short period to do the job. We selected as our first task the development of a classification scheme for the data we had in hand and the selection of a workable sample for intensive study by teams sent into the field. At first, a fifty-city sample seemed a possible and respectable goal, but once the teams went into the field, twenty-six cities seemed

more realistic.

Disturbances were ordered into five levels based on their duration, estimated number of participants, extent of damage, and the level of law enforcement response. Another criterion for sample selection emerged from the construction of a geographictime chart. The chart showed that in some areas disturbances tended to cluster. In two cases, the clustering was extensive: when Detroit erupted on July 23, eight other Michigan cities were hit shortly thereafter; when the Newark riot began on July 14, fourteen other New Jersey cities followed suit. Other chains of disturbance were short, limited to usually two adjacent cities like Minneapolis-St. Paul, Tucson-Phoenix, or Cincinnati-Dayton. Still others were geographically isolated. The final sample included one extensive chain (New Jersey), two short chains, and five isolates.

Again, keeping the deadline for an interim report in mind, the number was reduced to 20 cities and 24 disturbances. This final sample seemed fairly representative of all 56 cities with respect to region, size of city, level of disturbance, and date of occurrence. The three disturbances that had occurred in university settings seemed to be in a class by themselves, distinct from the urban disorders, and arrangements were made for studying them

separately.1

Perhaps the most critical decision was to resist a shot-gun approach and to follow instead what might best be termed a casestudy method emphasizing process. Several private research groups submitted proposals, each suggesting that masses of data on conditions within the cities (i.e., economic and political organization, per capita expenditures on education, public housing units, crime rates, etc.) plus codeable characteristics of the disturbances themselves be thrown into a computer analysis with the hope that some patterns would emerge. It was judged that among other things such an approach would pose serious risks to the job of the commission. It seemed unlikely that four months was sufficient time in which to reduce the suggested masses of data to a form which computerized data processing could handle, debug the programs, and finally construct an explanatory theory. Moreover, such an approach would run the risk of obscuring insights into just how the riot process begins in the different settings and how its course is affected by various attempts at intervention.

It was felt that a more appropriate approach would be to advance on several fronts at one time: to collect data from each city by sending out teams of investigators to interview "interested parties" in three sectors (official, business, and ghetto) of each community; to compile data from existing studies of social and economic and political conditions from the professional literature, from Federal agencies, and from local sources; and at the same time to begin to develop a theoretical framework to receive these data, a framework which would itself undergo continuous modification as the information came in. To do the latter, I organized a small staff of analysts and engaged three specialists in collective

behavior to monitor our work.

The plan was to assign a principal analyst to each city, a secondary analyst to produce an independent interpretation, and finally to submit both to the other staff members and the consutants for review and criticism. The goal was to handle each of the

The report of this project entitled "Adolescent Participation in Civil Disorders" will soon be released by its authors, J. Robert Newbrough, Ralph N. Hines, Carroll Izard, and Richard H. Peterson, through the Center for Community Studies of Peabody College, Nashville, Tennessee.

²The staff consisted of David Boesel, Political Scientist of Cornell University; Dr. Louis Goldberg, Sociologist from Johns Hopkins; Dr. Gary Marx of Harvard; Drs. Elliott Liebow and Derek Roemer of NIMH; with Professors Ralph Turner from UCLA, Neil Smelser from UC-Berkeley, and Kurt Lang from New York University serving as consultants.

twenty cities separately, to produce an interpretive analysis for each, and then to draw from the analyses and data those themes which would provide the basis for a summary analysis. Concurrently, a journalist (Robert Conat) was assigned to conduct a relatively independent treatment of part of the data. He drew on much the same data as did the analytical staff and to some extent on the analytic papers produced by our division in constructing the "profiles" with which the final report began.

Unfortunately time ran out before all twenty analyses could be completed, though analytic themes were completed for all. Eight analyses were completed and detailed outlines for the remaining twelve also were developed. While at first background and interview materials came in one city at a time, by early November the multiplying teams were delivering reports on four and

five cities at once, not steadily, but in batches.

A rough draft of the summary analysis, entitled "The Harvest of American Racism: The Political Meaning of Violence in the Summer of 1967," was completed November 22, 1967, shortly before the commission made its decision to scrap its plan for an

interim report and go directly to its final statement.

The 172 page "Harvest," as it came to be called, was rough indeed. The document itself was long on attempts to cast the events of the year into a meaningful theoretical framework, but necessarily short on documentation. The exacting task of working in some 188 pages of documentation (developed from more than 12,000 pages of various source materials) had not yet begun, and the shift of commission strategy raised a question in the minds

Despite its popularity, among the younger staff especially, only brief excerpts of the document itself appear in the final report. Nevertheless, it played an important behind the scenes role in shaping the deliberations and conclusions of the commission. All division heads and special assistants to commissioners had reviewed copies of the report. It was widely read and discussed reviewed copies of the report. It was widely read and discussed for several weeks after its release on November 22, 1967. Some staff members fantasied the "Harvest" as a Sword of Damocles staff members fantasied the "Harvest" as a Sword of Damocles to depart drastically from its interpretations.

As appealing as it might have been, this fantasy of omnipotence was more a product of wishful thinking than of accurate perception. The rough first draft which was to serve as Chapter II of the final report was judged to "lack bottom" by staff leadership. To correct this deficiency staff members remaining after the December personnel cut were thrown into a frenzy of activity

rewriting and reanalyzing the material on which it was based.

The personnel cut received a great deal of attention at the time by persons both within the staff as well as outside. Statements were made and picked up by the press that the reduction in staff was directly related to the release of "The Harvest of American Racism." Recently the issue was reopened in an analysis of the functions of riot commissions (Lipsky and Olson, 1969). To my knowledge there was no connection between the two events; the personnel cut was based on two decisions, one by the president and the other by the commission itself. Due to its judgment that an early statement of riot causation was badly needed and that the conspiracy theory was gaining support, the commission elected to abandon its plan for an interim report and go directly to a final report. The majority of persons released were data-gatherers; those retained were predominately analysts and editorialists. Simultaneously the president decided not to request of Congress supplemental appropriations for any of the agencies, which therefore left the commission seriously underbudgeted and already over-committed (much of the funding already having been exacted from several somewhat reluctant operating agencies).

The final product (Chapter II, Patterns of Disorder) was dryly atheoretical; a pseudo-statistical tallying of events and characteristics of cities. At best it was a layman's conception of what a respectable social science analysis should look like—lots of variables and lots of numbers. It sometimes touched on the major analytical themes set forth in the "Harvest," especially those stressing the characteristics of riot participants, but it bent over backwards in obscuring others. We were disappointed that this section ducked the challenge of giving meaning to the riots, a meaning which we felt was implicit in the data developed by the

commission itself.

By narrowly defining events into categories and stressing the quantitative approach, significant features of social interaction were lost. A good example of this can be found in the conclusion that "no single tactic appeared to be effective in containing or reducing violence in all situations (Kerner et al., 1968, p. 125)." But who would expect a single tactic to work in all situations?

By reducing all control tactics to five simple categories and relating each to the onset and intensity of violence, the analysis obscured, I believe, one of the most important findings to come out of the investigations: namely, that there are several distinct types of disorders; that one type may (and probably will) evolve into another; and that a tactic appropriate to one kind of disorder may be entirely inappropriate to another. Negotiation with leaders of a protest crowd, for example, might hold greater promise

than treating the whole assemblage as a crowd of rioters and dispersing them; however, at the height of a riot, there may be no

one to negotiate with.

Tactics must be adapted to the changing course of a disorder. To deny the effectiveness of a given tactical approach because it is used at an inappropriate time or place is neither good social science nor common sense. Much better would it be to specify the conditions under which a given tactic is, on the one hand, inappropriate, or on the other hand, has a reasonable chance for success.

It is important to remember that the Kerner Commission report was to a large degree a political document, not a social science treatise. This was intended from the outset. If there are any doubts about this, consider the following exchange I had with one of the staff directors shortly after I joined the staff in Septem-

ber. To the best of my recollection it went like this:

My statement: "You realize that it's going to be awfully difficult to mount a study of riots using social science methodology and compress it into four

And the reply: "That's not important . . . what's important is that you've got that Ph.D."

Perhaps if I had been a purist my tenure with the commission would have ceased with this rude initiation. But in retrospect the statement was an honest one, clearly setting forth the ground rules for my participation as a social scientist in what may prove to be

one of the more significant political statements of our day.

Contributions of Social Scientists. The arrangement notwithstanding, social scientists did have an impact on the commission's deliberations and findings. Aside from the many social science consultants and witnesses utilized by the commission, there are two other contributions especially worth mentioning. In addition to initiating the studies of university disturbances mentioned above, I arranged for the inclusion of two other studies whose findings figured prominently in the final report. Both were attempts to go beyond eye-witness accounts in describing who the rioters were and how extensive their participation was in the riots. Each approached these questions from a different angle. The Caplan-Paige (1968) study, principally of Detroit and Newark, approached the problem with a survey of a probability sample; the Fogelson-Hill (1968) study was based on arrest data. The two together provide complementary bases of data describing who acts and who gets caught. Along with the UCLA study, they have

discredited the riffraff theory of riot participation, or at least have prevented that misleading notion from assuming prominence in the most authoritative statement on riots to date (Campbell and

Schuman, 1968; Sears & McConahay, 1969).

The second contribution was in the less visible realm of how the commission and its staff functioned. As in most presidential commissions, two activities go in tandem: the work of the commission as a group, and the work of the staff. In such cases, there is always the danger that if commission members lose confidence in their staff, the latter will be reduced to a disgruntled appendage. What must be kept in mind is that regardless of what the staff believes, the final responsibility and accountability for public statements is that of the commission and the commission alone. So if the commission is to subscribe to the work of its own staff, the staff must make sincere efforts to keep the commission abreast of its activities. When the subject is complicated and time pressures great, this is no small matter. The Kerner Commission held many of its own hearings while its staff was amassing independent information and began drawing their own conclusions. It must redound to the credit of the staff directors that concern over this problem of the commission's confidence in its own staff was kept foremost as the relationship developed.

Customarily the commission members held all-day hearings and then retired to a dinner meeting with various members of the staff. These meetings were designed to keep the commission current with staff activities and to discuss and set the overall direction

of the staff effort.

In late October, the commission got its first glimpse of what the staff had been doing. After some deliberation, but not very careful preparation, the staff conducted a full-scale "debriefing" of one of its city teams before the commission. It went well at first, with each of the seven team members summarizing informally the interviews and other data they had collected. But the team rapidly found themselves in trouble as commission members began pushing for an answer as to why the riot had occurred. The team had conferred only briefly prior to the presentation and nobody had as yet given much thought to putting the pieces of information into a well-thought-out interpretation. Soon team members were making statements about riot causation not at all tied to the data they had collected. Some began to draw from their own personal experiences to explain how it was to live as a Negro in an urban ghetto. Commission members began to express dismay and by the time the meeting was over several had serious questions about the reliability of the staff effort generally.

It seemed that serious damage had been done to the budding

relationship between staff and commission. Clearly, something had to be done and done quickly to restore the commission's confidence. My staff had just completed carefully worked out analyses of two disturbances; it was decided to meet the crisis head on and, whatever the risks, to present these analyses to the commission at the first opportunity. Both documents had gone through at least three rewritings and had been subjected to the scrutiny of consultants, city team interviewers, and other staff. Copies were sent to commission members before the meeting, and I was asked to make an abbreviated presentation leaving ample time for discussion. Though a number of interpretive statements were made, care was taken to stay as close to the facts as possible. When commission members asked for conclusions that were considerably beyond the data, staff analysts declined to take the leap. As a result, commission members found themselves in an active discussion advancing far more ambitious interpretations than those offered by the staff. After the meeting, several commissioners expressed the conviction that the data were being carefully sifted and competently and conservatively interpreted. They also carried away a clear image of just how different disorders could be and how easy it was to simplistically lump all into the category of "riot." In short, they left the meeting with their confidence restored

Social Scientists and Social Action: The Police Project

There is little in our training or professional experience as social scientists that prepares us for a role as administrators of programs. Yet it is here through the design and management of action programs that public policy is ultimately expressed. It is the most direct way of influencing the very social forces about which scholars write, preach, and admonish. Given the danger inherent in the design and management of programs, few of us are eager to put our ideas to the test of action. Rather, it seems safer to design programs and watch from afar how others, who perhaps do not understand what we mean, play them out, founder, and compromise—while we register dismay from the sidelines. Even compromise—while we register dismay from the sidelines. Even worse, perhaps, others criticize the functioning of social institutions but are silent when it comes to what to do about their inadequacies.

One of the repeated alarms sounded by the Kerner Commission was that there is much dissatisfaction with the quality of police service in inner city areas. Ghetto spokesmen call for absolute local citizen control, and many liberals subscribe to this, too. Moreover, criticism of the police bordering on irrational rage

is not at all uncommon among social scientists. The police are the symbol of society's resistance to change. Their bumbling efforts to cope with the powerful by-products of social movements, their seeming ignorance of what it is all about, and their presumed unanimous opposition to social change make them an easy mark for clever criticism. Social science literature on the police tends not only to be critical but borders on the derogatory (Westley, 1966). Others set out to do a careful, unbiased study of police behavior and convince wary police administrators to let them in to observe and record. Somehow, when the study is published, its findings appear to be unfairly slanted so that the police again appear in an unfavorable light. The police feel they've been suckered into a muck-raking exposé of themselves. Their suspicion of the academics deepens.

No doubt there is a need to discourage any further development of the police mystique. It is dangerous for the general public to believe that their police can do no wrong. But it is equally dangerous to lead others into prejudging police as an evil in their

midst.

If social scientists are to influence the development and reform within institutions whether they be the criminal justice apparatus, the educational system, or foreign policy, they must find better ways to develop public trust in their viewpoints and approaches. Their responsibilities go beyond those of the journalist

or publicist.

I believe that part of the problem lies in the preferred relationship between the academic world and its demands for varied and interesting publications from its members, on the one hand, and the institutions and institutional processes towards which attention is directed, on the other. The "step-in, study, pull-out, and report" format for social science research may itself undermine the confidence policymakers have in the validity of research

and may seriously dilute its impact.

It is easy enough to catalogue the incidents of abrasive contact between police and ghetto minorities, to document the bitter antagonisms and deep distrust, to deplore the lack of preparation and training that police receive for coping with one of the most sensitive and exacting tasks performed by a social institution. But what are we to do about it? As social scientists we have been terribly remiss in either offering or arranging for the training of police who must keep the peace in the rapidly deteriorating urban centers. Few of us have dared to provide badly needed counsel in managing police organizations and helping them fashion a more relevant role in the cities. We seem to hold back until the time they eagerly seek us out or come to us on our terms. We shy

away from them, responding perhaps in part to our own aversion to what we may regard as their dirty job, and in part to their reticence to involve outsiders.

My own experience has led me to conclude that it is possible to cross those barriers and achieve a measure of acceptance within police circles, albeit at some loss of freedom to criticize. Perhaps this measure of acceptance was due to my willingness to expose myself to the same risks that men in one police department faced during two civil disorders; perhaps it was due to the sanction for my work provided by an enlightened director of public safety and senior command officials of his department; and perhaps it was due to my unwillingness to prejudge all police on the basis of the behavior of some, or my unwillingness to give in to anti-police sentiments currently in vogue. In any event, I now find myself cast in the role of attempting to bridge one city's widening gap between a hostile Negro population and the police by means of an action program, an attempt to set up a Pilot Police District.

At its outset the plan may have been considered radical; at this writing eight months later it seems almost conservative. It takes one existing police district as is, with all its men and with its rules and procedures (which are those of the central police organization); it takes the existing history of conflict between the police and the citizens they serve; and it addresses itself to the basic problems about which both citizens and police complain: the breakdown in the indispensable partnership between citizens

and police in keeping the peace.

The project began with the premise that if it is intensive "professional" training for police that is lacking, we must provide it; if citizens are prevented from knowing their police as persons and vice versa, we must arrange it-by giving civilians legitimate roles in the law enforcement apparatus for which they receive compensation, by decentralizing police services to satellite centers, by providing a format for self-policing as an adjunct to existing patrols, and by experimenting with measures other than mobile patrol to maintain police presence. We must give residents more of a say in the operation of their police, creating a strongly independent and representative citizens' board which will not only keep up the pressure on police to provide quality service but will struggle with the pervasive problem, so often obscured by rhetoric, of increasing the safety of all those who are forced to live in the inner city.

Admittedly no panacea, these steps do offer a stopgap measure until police work is upgraded to professional status and until greater responsiveness to inner-city problems and residents is built into city governments. The program certainly isn't directed

at the root causes of crime or of race or class hatred. But it does hold the possibility of reducing one element of insecurity in the ghetto environment: fear of and conflict with those who should be providing some measure of protection from some of the more

dangerous and demoralizing features of a ghetto existence.

Quite expectedly, the project has not turned out to be a "safe" one. Over the past year the media have had a field day; attacks have come from all sides. The accusation from one side that we are trying to turn police officers into "social workers" has been more than matched by angry denunciations from radical spokesmen for the black community. The project, of course, doesn't go far enough for the latter; they advocate local control of police, which often encompasses discarding civil service constraints on hiring, suspending, and dismissing officers, local election of the district commander, evacuation of all white officers, returning to foot patrol, and requiring all officers to live in the area they work. Men have pounded my desk and demanded these things of the project, threatening that blood would run in the streets if we didn't comply. Public meetings on the project are inevitably characterized by lengthy diatribes on the police, how the project is a "trick-bag" conceived by honky Ph.D.'s serving colonialist masters to deceive the unsuspecting poor. Meanwhile, letters come from citizen groups each requesting that the project be located in its precinct. One area presented a petition with 2800 signatures, and a citywide citizen's group composed of archcritics and moderates alike accepted the mayor's charge to select the project site. There has been no organized police opposition to date. In fact, aside from some volunteers for the pilot unit, police response is marked by the usual skepticism but a willingness to try it out.

Both the project and its administrators are now balanced precariously on a narrow line separating two powerful antagonists, and negotiations are being carried out with both sides. The project is an experiment and may be headed in the wrong direction. But one thing can be said for it and its sponsors: it's a try. And the police, though ever chary and skeptical, seem willing to give it a chance. It is an "R & D Laboratory" within the police establishment and this is important, especially if its existence marks a trend. For, short of revolution and the questionable validity of the phoenic marks as a second control of the phoenic marks as a ity of the phoenix myth, this is the way our institutions accom-

modate themselves to changing times.

Conclusions: Social Science and Social Change

It is not only possible but desirable and perhaps essential that the social scientist become more deeply involved in trying to bring about social change in a direct manner. The risks are great, perhaps the greatest being that of failing. Once one attempts to bring about a change in a social institution, things become more complicated than our theories allow, and it is not easy to confirm the validity of those theories. But there are likely to be payoffs as well, both to the individual, to the public, and to the body of social science knowledge. The social scientist brings a perspective to his job as a program manager that may be unique due to his trained-in struggle for objectivity, but he may bring no more than any other social actionist in the form of those talents necessary to produce movement. He carries away from his experience, however, understandings of the use of power and the weight of responsibility and accountability that only a participant can gain. And in the process may make his contribution to creating a body of theory more relevant to social realities and more influential and appropriate in its application.

Recently, Alvin Gouldner (1968) took his fellow sociologist, Howard S. Becker, to task for capitalizing on an "underdog sociology." He accused Becker, as a prototype of underdog sociologists, of sidestepping the responsibility for addressing the problem of how social reform is to be achieved, and of luxuriating in safe criticism of "the caretakers that society has appointed to administer the mess it has created." For myself, I am grateful for the insights such studies of deviance afford. I feel, however, that we need more than just that, that it is time to turn our attention to other matters, to get on with the job of correcting injustices rather than simply despairing of their pervasiveness or beating our breasts on the sidelines. No doubt it is best that some of us keep our distance from the unpleasantness of the arena, stick to our research craft, and content ourselves with enriching the minds of the young. But if that is all we do, the product of our efforts will be valued only among our colleagues, our theories will remain untested or untestable, and our talented and impatient youth will look elsewhere for preparation to cope with the world as they

find it.

REFERENCES

CAMPBELL, A., & SCHUMAN, H. Racial attitudes in fifteen American cities. Report prepared for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1968.

CAPLAN, N. S., & PAIGE, J. M. In O. Kerner, et al., Report of the National Advisory

Commission on Civil Disorders. New York: Bantam, 1968.

FOGELSON, R. N., & HILL, R. B. Who riots? A study of participation in the 1967 riots. In Supplemental Studies for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968.

GOULDNER, A. W. The sociologist as partisan: Sociology and the welfare state.

American Sociologist, 1968, 3, 103-116.

KERNER, O., ET AL., Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. New York: Bantam, 1968.

LIPSKY, M., & OLSON, D. J. Riot commission politics. Trans-Action, July/August,

1969, 9-21.

SEARS, D. O., & McConahay, J. B. Participation in the Los Angeles riot. Social Problems, 1969, 17, 3-20.

WESTLEY, W. A. Escalation of violence through legitimation. Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1966, 364, 120-126.

Biographical Sketches

HOWARD ALDRICH is Assistant Professor of Organizational Behavior in the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University. He received his Ph.D. in 1969 from the Department of Sociology at the University of Michigan. His interests include organization-environment theory and research on inter-organizational relations. With Dr. Reiss he is continuing their studies of small businesses and is currently doing research on the impact of absentee ownership on the black ghetto.

VERNON L. ALLEN is Professor of Psychology at the University of Wisconsin. He received the Ph.D. in social psychology from the University of California, Berkeley, and has been a Fulbright Fellow in England. He is co-author (with T. R. Sarbin) of the chapter on Role Theory in the revised edition of the Handbook of Social Psychology, and editor of Psychological Factors in Poverty.

NATHAN CAPLAN is Program Associate at the Institute for Social Research and Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Michigan. He was previously with the Institute's Research Center for Group Dynamics which he joined after receiving his Ph.D. in 1961 from Western Reserve University. He was a consultant to the National Advisoryern Reserve University. He was a consultant to the National Advisoryern Reserve University. He was a consultant to the National Advisoryern Reserve University. He was a consultant to the Preparation of the tion under its sponsorship. He also assisted in the preparation of the Commission's report. His major interest is in social intervention and the development of change producing models.

ROBERT M. FOGELSON received the Ph.D. from Harvard University and is currently Associate Professor of History and Urban Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is the author of *The Fragmented Metropolis*, published by Harvard University Press; he served as a consultant to the President's Commission on Civil Disorders.

JOHN R. FORWARD is an Assistant Professor at the University of New Hampshire. At the time of the study reported here, he was a Study Director in the Research Center for Group Dynamics at the University of Michigan where he received a Ph.D. degree. He has authored and coauthored several articles on group achievement motivation as studied in experimental groups and in organizations. Current research interests are helping behavior in group settings and the investigation of assumptions behind the use of deception in social psychological research.

LYNNE B. IGLITZIN is a member of the Department of Political Science at the University of Washington. She received a Ph.D. degree from Bryn Mawr College. The author of two forthcoming books, Violence in American Society and The Violence Reader, she served as a research consultant for the President's Commission on Causes and Prevention of Violence.

GARY T. MARX is a lecturer in the Department of Social Relations at Harvard University and a faculty member of the M.I.T.-Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies. He received his Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley where he also taught. He is the author of Protest and Prejudice and the editor of Racial Conflict: Tension and Change in American Society. His articles have appeared in the American Sociological Review, Phylon, Transaction, The Nation, and the Encyclopedia Brittanica. He served as a consultant to the Kerner Commission and is currently engaged in research on social movements.

JOHN B. McCONAHAY is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Psychology at Yale University. He received his Ph.D. in social psychology from the University of California, Los Angeles. He has collaborated on several papers from the Los Angeles Riot Study, and currently is conducting experimental research on attribution theory.

ALBERT J. REISS, JR., is a Professor of Sociology and Chairman of the Department of Sociology at the University of Michigan. He is also the Director of the Center for Research on Social Organization and holds an appointment as a Lecturer in the Law School at the University of Michigan. He is the author of Occupations and Social Status and has edited a number of books, including Cities and Society and Schools in a Changing Society. His recent work focuses on the social organization of crime and law enforcement in major metropolitan areas.

DAVID O. SEARS is Associate Professor of Psychology and Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. He received his Ph.D. in social psychology from Yale University. He is the author of several articles on experimental studies of attitude change and selective exposure, and of the chapter on political behavior in the new Handbook of Social Psychology, and is a co-author of Public Opinion.

ROBERT SHELLOW is Professor of Urban Affairs at Carnegie-Mellon University. He received a B.A. from Reed College and the Ph.D. in psychology from the University of Michigan. He served as Assistant Deputy Director for Research for the President's Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission), and is the author of several articles on police training and application of social science to the problems of public safety. Until March, 1970, he was director of the Pilot District project for the Washington, D.C., Department of Public Safety.

T. M. TOMLINSON received his Ph.D. in clinical psychology from the University of Wisconsin, and at the time of the 1965 Los Angeles riot was teaching in the Department of Psychology at UCLA. He was a coinvestigator on the Los Angeles Riot Study conducted by the Institute of Government and Public Affairs at UCLA. In addition to several papers dealing with urban disorders, he has published in the area of psychotherapy and is co-editor of a forthcoming book, New Directions in Client-Centered Therapy. He is currently with the Office of Planning, Research and Evaluation in the Office of Economic Opportunity, Washington, D.C.

JAY R. WILLIAMS is a Study Director in the Research Center for Group Dynamics, Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. He received his degree from Duke University where he initiated research on social stratification—particularly within the Negro population in the United States. He is presently working with the National Survey of Youth: A Study of Adolescent Behavior in the U.S., and has co-authored articles on detected and undetected delinquency.

*

ACRICA I MINERAL Works and Alexander Michael March and Mandel College and photology of the College Mandel of the college of the of the Coll

The property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property o

ALBERT DESCRIPTION OF SECTION OF A PROPERTY OF SECTION
CONTROL OF THE AREA OF THE SECOND STATE OF THE

ALDRICH, HOWARD, & REISS, ALBERT J., JR. The effect of civil disorders on small business in the inner city. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1970, 26(1), 187-206.

Civil disorders have affected negatively both the objective and subjective situation of the small businessman in the inner city. He experienced considerable financial loss, and insurance companies reacted by increasing the cancellation rate in riot-affected areas. On the issue of law and order the attitudes of all businessmen have become more conservative, and an increasing number of protective measures are now being used to protect their firms against crime. On the basis of present data, predictions for the future of small business in the inner city can only be pessimistic.

ALLEN, VERNON L. Toward understanding riots: Some perspectives. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26(1), 1-18.

In this introductory paper, a brief review is presented of the nine articles comprising this issue and an attempt is made to place riots in a broader historical and scientific perspective. It is noted that the recent disturbances are a continuation of a long history of racial conflict in the United States. Various definitions given to the recent ghetto riots—senseless outbursts, criminal behavior, race riots, revolution, class conflict, social protest—contain some truth, but serve a more important function in helping simplify and provide meaning to confusing and anxiety-provoking events. It is suggested that more needs to be known about dealing constructively with chronic conflict—a condition likely to characterize racial relations in this country for the immediate future.

CAPLAN, NATHAN. The new ghetto man: A review of recent empirical studies. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26(1), 59-74.

A number of major studies on riot causation and the rise of Negro militancy in the United States have now been completed, making it possible for the first time to construct an empirically based explanation of these dramatic social events. When considered in the aggregate, the findings of these studies show that the ghetto riots and the preceding forms of civil rights protest derive from the steady changes in the Negro as he discovers himself and attempts to recreate himself socially and economically in ways that are commensurate with the image of those self-discoveries.

The transfer of the same state of the state

Configuration of their analysis and the properties and the department of the segment of the segm

All the state of t

The property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property of the property o

CAPI SECURITION THE NEW SERVICE ASSESSMENT OF THE WAS ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPER

the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of th

FOGELSON, R. M. Violence and grievances: Reflections on the 1960s riots. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26(1), 141-164.

The 1960s riots can best be understood as a manifestation of the grievances of the black ghettos. Indeed, there is an intimate relation between the rioting, looting, arson, and assault, on the one hand, and racial discrimination, economic deprivation, consumer exploitation, and involuntary residential segregation, on the other. Although the blacks obviously refuse to accept the everyday conditions of ghetto life—and apparently intend to protest them violently—their violent actions have thus far been highly selective and remarkably restrained.

FORWARD, JOHN R., & WILLIAMS, JAY R. Internal-external control and black militancy. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1970, 26(1), 75-92.

During the 1967 Detroit riot, interviews were conducted with 67 black youths who lived in the riot area. Interview data were combined with data obtained from the same respondents in an earlier study. Results showed that persons who reacted most favorably to the riot situation were those who were most confident of their own ability to shape their future but at the same time were most aware of the extent to which racial discrimination prevented black people from achieving their goals. These and other results support a blocked-opportunity rather than an alienation-powerlessness theory of recent rioting.

IGLITZIN, LYNNE B. Violence and American democracy. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26(1), 165-186.

The double standard which has been used to judge the use of violence, i.e., that by the State is legitimate, that by individuals and private groups, illegitimate, is rejected. Public and private violence are inextricably bound together, and to the degree that State violence is approved of, a climate conducive to private violence is created. The nature of violence is analyzed: definition of terms, the threat of violence, its intensity, its varying types, the State as a violent agent. Sources of violence range from individual personality and family factors, to social causes such as boredom and anomie, to the political and ideological. Finally, the philosophical and ethical implications created when violence exists within a democratic system are discussed at length.

of the half graphs the truly is understand as a maintenance of the graph of the half half half graphs of the rose to a maintenance of the substance of the rose to the rose of
PORWACID PORTY R. S. WILLIAMIS, LOV. R. Incompress control of the
Compared to the first transmitted to the compared to the compa

HOLD IN THE STATE AND AND ADDRESS OF COMMENTS OF THE STATE OF THE STAT

that he me were in legithers, he a to make the second of these without the man is regarded. Perblic and every weekers, we executively there we make to the class desires that there is also weekers, it considers that the second of the elegant of th

MARX, GARY T. Civil disorder and the agents of social control. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1970, 26(1), 19-58.

Riots have an emergent character which necessitates our focusing on the interaction between the police and the disturbance participants. From 1900 to 1953, police behavior in disturbances was frequently characterized by rioting, inactivity, and partiality; it greatly contributed to the disorders. Judged in historical perspective police recently have been relatively restrained, impartial, and quick to take action. The state's increased monopoly over the means of violence, the extension of universal citizenship, greater police resources and professionalism, and the fact that maintaining law and order now means "suppressing blacks" help account for the changes. Nevertheless, there were many instances up to the end of the summer of 1967 where police seemed to create rather than control disorder. Important factors in police behavior were: (1) inappropriate control strategies, (2) lack of coordination among and within various control units, and (3) the breakdown of police organization.

SEARS, DAVID O., & McCONAHAY, JOHN B. Racial socialization, comparison levels, and the Watts riot. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26(1), 121-140.

The basic hypothesis was that the outbreak of mass racial violence was an almost inevitable consequence of the major demographic changes American Negroes have been undergoing in recent years, most importantly the movement of blacks to the north and to the large cities, the rise in educational level, and the rise in the number of young people. Those from the "new" background (especially young northern natives) were more active in the Watts riot. Two social-psychological mediators were offered to explain this: changes in black racial socialization and differential comparison levels. The young nothern natives were found to be more disaffected politically, and to have higher economic aspirations and expectations and more serious feelings of deprivation. These latter feelings were also closely related to riot participation. It was concluded that the social-psychological effects of these continuing demographic changes are likely to magnify, rather than diminish, racial conflicts in the future.

SHELLOW, ROBERT. Social scientists and social action from within the establishment. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26(1), 207-220.

In this period of rapid social change, responsible roles of social scientists include those of interpreter and researcher, critic, and participant in the reformation of social institutions from within. Experiences as a staff director on the Kerner Commission and as director of the Pilot Police District Project (Washington, ner Commission and as director of such roles affords unique opportunities D.C.) are discussed. The existence of such roles affords unique opportunities for the social scientist to affect public policy in the current urban crisis. The assumption of power by social scientists within the political structure provides a needed corrective to the process of developing knowledge with current social utility.

to take to 12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1), 13-12(1)

Show have all any potent and the minimises outsidents from the metry of the second state of the potent and the minimises of the potent from the potent of the minimise of the restriction of the potent of the potent of the potent of the minimise of the potent of the pot

SEAR I & COO & MCCONALIAY, JOHN & Bank somittens, or
points levely and the Water and Jensey of Good Josep, 1970, 1811, 1

the continue of a stranguene of the major desegraphy charges there are a major desegraphy of the major

SHEEL LOSE & CORERT Second scientification or the local descent value within the

technical control and audit frames, required to the office of source are the model of the control of the contro

TOMLINSON, T. M. Ideological foundations for Negro action: A comparative analysis of militant and non-militant views of the Los Angeles riot. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1970, 26(1), 93-120.

Using survey data gathered in the aftermath of the 1965 Los Angeles riot, Negro respondents were divided into three groups according to their attitudes towards the Black Muslims (militant—uncommitted—conservative), and a comparative analysis was made of their attitudes toward the Los Angeles riot and related life circumstances. Racial militants made up 30 percent of the sample and were most often found among male youth. As compared with the nonmilitants, a larger percentage of the militants claimed to have participated actively in the riots and assessed the outcome of the riot much more positively. Militants also differed from nonmilitants on a number of attitudinal, demographic, and behavioral measures. These data were discussed in relation to the meaning of the Los Angeles riot and the subsequent disorders of 1967–68.

TOMILIANCE 1. M. Ideniugeall worthwarpine Vegetagetion: A com-

Negrous a series devided monther groups are children and horse proups are children as their are proposed and the proposed and the proposed and their are proposed and the propos

The Activists' Corner

Nevitt Sanford The Wright Institute, Berkeley

Scientific, educational, or charitable organizations that want to advocate policy or take action on social problems have to consider whether particular activities might endanger their taxexempt status, or even whether it might be a good idea to abandon that status. The American Psychological Association is no exception. Last fall, the Division of State Psychological Association Affairs (Division 31) requested of the Council of Representatives of APA that the association change its tax status from C-3 (which explicitly forbids participation in partisan politics) to C-6 (the status of professional organizations such as the American Medical Association). The council referred the matter to the APA Policy and Planning Board for review and recommendation. The board, of which I am now serving as chairman, discussed the issue at length, both in executive session and together with representatives of Divisions 31 and 13 (Division of Consulting Psychology) at a meeting in February. It was agreed between the board and these divisions that the issue would have to be presented to the APA membership for a vote, but that before this happened they should have a chance to avail themselves of background information, to

We very much regret that pressures of other commitments have forced David Krech to discontinue his role in editing *The Activists' Corner*. For adding this interesting and stimulating dimension to the journal, *JSI* and its readers are deeply indebted to Professor Krech and to Nevitt Sanford who will continue to edit the column. [Ed.]

become familiar with the perspectives of various concerned groups

and individuals, to take thought, to discuss.

This issue of *The Activists' Corner* is devoted to this educational undertaking. Dr. Rogers Wright, who practices clinical psychology in Long Beach, California and is President of Division 31, calls for greater APA concern with public and professional issues, and for a change in tax status as a way of expressing and promoting this concern. Dr. Jane Loevinger, who is with The Institute of Social Research, Washington University, and a member of the APA Policy and Planning Board, defends psychology as a scholarly discipline, not limiting herself to what she perceives as the threats from those who would change its tax status. She writes, of course, as an individual—not as a spokesman for the Policy and Planning Board. Neither she nor Dr. Wright has seen the other's statement.

First, Dr. Wright's Statement:

What's the Noise All About-Or, Whither APA

For over ten years, to my personal certain knowledge, increasing demands have been made that APA involve itself more creatively, actively, and productively in social and professional issues of concern both to the public we serve and to psychology. The legitimacy of such demands was (and is being) based on: (a) the fact that APA, as the only national voice of psychology, has a responsibility to make a contribution to the solution of professional and social issues; and (b) Article I of the bylaws, which states the clear intent of APA to engage in such activities on behalf of the public and the profession. Article I of the APA bylaws formerly stated that the object of the organization was to "advance psychology as a science and as a profession." As amended midway in the decade of the sixties (ostensibly to protect the C-3 tax status of APA), it now reads "to advance psychology as a science and as a means of promoting human welfare by the encouragement of psychology in all its branches. . . . "

Many of those who demand a greater involvement of APA in social and professional issues see the organization as having devoted itself primarily to the advancement of psychology as a science, usually in academia, with less emphasis on (and, at times, woefully little or no commitment to) issues of public or professional concern. This perception of a disproportionate concern with science and academia and, at times, even ineffective action in these areas has led to increasingly vociferous, bitter, and acrimonious confrontations with various parts of APA governance, to charges and counter-charges, to power struggles between parts of

the governance, and to the wasteful squandering of time and resources to achieve some end or goal viewed as important by some

segments of the membership.

The discussion, maneuvering, call-it-what-you-will, extending over most of the last decade, has still not led to any resolution of the conflict (which has in many instances been heightened instead) nor has it resulted in the evolution of clear directions and mandates for APA to follow. The various factions all purport to speak for a "constituency" of APA members, but the size of the constituency remains unknown. Typically, in my experience, when demands are made on the APA governance (especially in the social and professional areas) one sooner or later hears the statement that "x numbers of the membership will resign" if certain actions are taken; a statement frequently countered with "x numbers will resign if you don't." Of course nobody knows how many will or won't resign because no hard data exist. In this babel of claim and counter-claim, my experience is that APA governance moves only as far as is necessary to avoid "calamity" on one side, whilst not so far as to precipitate "catastrophe" on the other. The result is that nobody is satisfied, resources are squandered, actions (if taken) are frequently pedestrian mediocrities lacking in maximal effectiveness, and the "wailing and gnashing of teeth" continues incessantly—at the expense of everyone.

A case in point was the recent prodigious effort that went into the naive monstrosity called the Albee Report which, while purporting to reduce many problems, creates even more. One of the more naive postulations was that if state associations lost their direct representation in council and were constituted into a "division," the size of council could be reduced and social and professional interests (which tend to center in state associations) could then "go and do their own thing," as a division of APA. The proposition not only overlooks the fact that many (if not most) social and professional issues transcend both the limits and resources of a division but, even worse, overlooks the fact that no agency of the organization can exceed the limitations of APA's tax status with-

out jeopardizing the tax status of the whole organization.

The APA Board of Directors is unwilling to recommend changing APA's tax status from C-3 (limited to educational, scientific, and religious organizations) to a less restrictive type of tax status, such as C-6 (business and professional organizations), nor can it legally permit any agency of the organization to have a different tax status than the parent organization. Faced with this dilemma, the Policy and Planning Board, with representatives from Divisions 13 and 31, took the position that it is now past time to take the issue to the collective membership of APA for its guidance as to what APA should be and should do.

In the near future, every APA member will be asked to complete a questionnaire ballot designed to guide Policy and Planning Board and APA Council as to how the membership sees APA and what the membership feels APA's hierarchy of priorities and commitments should be. Hopefully, by majority vote, the dilemma of "too little, too late" or "too much, too soon" can be finally resolved and APA can get on with the business of "the encouragement of psychology in all its branches."

Rogers Wright

Second, Dr. Loevinger's Statement:

In Defense of Psychology as a Scholarly Discipline

Persons whose chief reason for belonging to APA is allegiance to psychology as a scholarly discipline, once virtually the entire membership, are now a beleaguered minority. We are beset on three sides, by professional psychologists who want APA to serve their business interests, by political activists who want APA to serve their social causes, and by professional managers and communications specialists who wish to govern us in the name of

"scientific" management.

Division 31 has taken the lead in urging APA to change its tax status so as to permit it to lobby for bills that will serve its members' interests. They specifically urge APA to serve professional psychologists in the same manner that the optometrists are served by the American Optometric Association. While it is true that the optometrists have got themselves written into many laws, along the way the American Optometric Association has made itself notorious as a special interest group. They would not likely be sought as consultants on social issues even if there were

some within their purview.

At present there is a move, apparently without serious opposition, to further open the rolls of APA to persons without doctoral degrees and to persons with doctoral degrees primarily professional rather than research in emphasis. Without contesting these moves, one may note that a consequence will be that research scholars will become an ever smaller minority within APA. Under these circumstances can a democratic structure work? When issues arise where the professional psychologist's interest is opposed to that of the academic psychologist, is it fair that a bare majority prevail? It does not seem fair that the academic psychologists should have control of their organization taken away from them just because there are more professional psychologists, but neither does it seem fair that professional psychologists be second class citizens or be denied their share of control simply because research scholars were there first. If our interests truly diverge (a point on which I am not convinced), perhaps the time

has come for APA to become a looser federation.

Social activists wish APA as an organization to take militant stands on issues of the day. It is not obvious that if APA does take a political stance, it will be theirs. The Policy and Planning Board contracted with American Institutes of Research to conduct a study planning the future of psychology. In applying for the contract, AIR listed 38 previous projects which, it felt, qualified it to help plan the future of psychology. These projects were divided about evenly among military, industrial-business, governmental, and educational contracting agencies. The projects included a training management study for the Army Ballistics Missile Agency, an educational study for the Agency for International Development in the Dominican Republic, and a political and economic study in Thailand for the Army Missile Command. Present and former employees of AIR and similar groups, such as the Systems Development Corporation and the Institute for Defense Analysis, are to be found in the APA Central Office, particularly its Office of Communication Management and Development, on the Board of Directors, in the Council of Representatives, in major boards and committees, among officers of divisions, and as chairmen of program committees. In an occasional single confrontation the young radicals may win, but the daily business of APA will be in the hands of the Old Reliables, some of whom are not squeamish about serving the military-industrial complex.

We all have the option of joining local and national groups that express our political purposes. Each psychologist has the obligation to reconcile the demands of the political present with his scholarly or professional commitment by his own lights. For me the obligation is a serious one. I do not wish to be limited by how others construe it, nor do I intend to dictate how they will react to it. The essence of democratic pluralism is that people unite in different groups serving their separable interests. APA members are bound by ties other than political ones. Imagine the paralysis of

APA if our meetings are given over to political harangues.

While the activists and the professionals are at least visible, the threat to psychology as a scholarly discipline from the professional managers has been almost invisible. Ever since about 1966, the systems analysts have had a strong outpost in the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Office of Education. The NSF has been encouraging the development of "information systems" in several disciplines, such as physics and mathematics, under threat that if the disciplines do not develop their own systems, an overall system will be imposed upon them.

A National Information System for Psychology (NISP) is delineated in a proposal submitted by APA to NSF on December 31, 1969. It includes the phasing out of substantive journals, the circulation of all manuscripts received, unedited, and the channelling of manuscripts to members in accord with a computerized matching of topics to their interest profiles. None of these features was widely publicized to users of APA journals prior to submission of the proposal. Complete copies of the proposal were not generally available even to members of APA Council of Representatives and to members of major boards.

NISP is defended as being "just an experiment," and "surely, as a scientist, you are not opposed to experimenting." Precisely that argument has been used in other disciplines. Sine qua non of an experiment is the establishment of a time when and a way in which the outcome is evaluated. There is no such provision for

NISP.

Major voices have urged that systems analysis in general and information systems in particular are already demonstrated to be failed experiments. I do not know to what extent the pressure for information systems, perceived as coming from the NSF, originated in the Pentagon. At any rate it originated during Robert McNamara's tenure, and McNamara was the protagonist of systems analysis. Talented as he was, he left the Pentagon in no blaze of glory. There are those who argue seriously that the great catastrophes of McNamara's tenure were largely due to his systems analysis approach, to the elevation of efficient operation to precedence over reflective choice of purpose.

Mr. Eli Goldston, president of Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates, in an address to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences on December 10, 1969, referred to systems analysis as an "expansion of the myth of mathematically precise decision making." He pointed out that "the finest market analysis ever made in the auto industry gave birth to the Edsel, [and] the most heralded scientific management control system in America recently left Litton Indus-

tries explaining away its earnings forecasts."

Writing in Nature (1969, 224, p318), Professor J. M. Ziman, British physicist and Fellow of the Royal Society, observes:

It is tragic that so many excellent and experienced scientists should have fallen into this trap, and encouraged vast expenditure on preprints and such like, instead of putting all their weight into the reform of the existing learned societies and the improvement of their journals. . . . The necessary delays occasioned by refereeing and decent printing are not really gross; a journal that gets a year behind in publication just needs a thorough his line and the state of the s ough kicking by its subscribers and contributors: to supersede it by yet another machine liable to just the same faults is sheer folly.

I write this as advocate for those devoted to the advancement of psychology as a scholarly discipline. In order to defend our interests in the face of organized groups pursuing other interests, we must unite in an organization transcending limits of subject matter or school of thought. The form of the organization is open, in particular, as to whether whole divisions may join or support it. Since the most immediate issue is defense and improvement of substantive journals, the organization will function at first as a journal interest group. A meeting to organize it will be scheduled for the Miami convention.

Jane Loevinger

Ergo, We Conclude:

The psychologists, like a lot of other people, are restless this

year.

Members of SPSSI are not unfamiliar with tax problems. Indeed some of the older hands have felt the hot breath of the Feds on their necks. SPSSI members will also see that behind the issue of APA's tax status are the larger questions of what psychology is about, how it should organize itself, and what should be the role of organized psychology in the making and carrying out of public policy. I hope these scientists-citizens will lend their wisdom and strength to the discussion that will be going on during the months ahead. Nevitt Sanford

PSYCHOLOGY

problems of: SOCIETY



"Moreover, there is nothing in the definition of psychology that dedicates our science to the solution of social problems ... Our obligations as citizens, however, are considerably broader than our obligations as scientists. When psychological issues are raised in this broader context, we cannot evade them by complaining that they are unscientific."

(Quoted from George A. Miller's Presidential Address to the American Psychological Association—Washington, D. C. Sept. 1969)

Invited addresses (22) and symposia (5) presented at the 77th (1969) Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association. The views and opinions expressed by psychologists, philosophers, sociologists, educators, economists, lawyers and government officials, concerning seven major problem areas of today:

- Psychology and the Social Change Process
- Psychology and Urban Problems
- Psychology and the Challenge of Early Learning
- Psychology and the Minority Groups
- Psychology and the Reduction of Violence
- Psychology and Campus Issues
- Psychology and Society's Future

A constructive and dynamic look at a troubled society.

Ed. by: F. F. Korten, S. W. Cook, and J. I. Lacey

Order Department

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

1200 - 17th Street, N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20036

Pages: 450 Price: \$6.00

Community Mental Health Journal

EDITORS

Sheldon R. Roen, Ph.D., Teachers College, Columbia University Lenin A. Baler, Ph.D., S.D. in Hyg., University of Michigan

EDITORIAL BOARD

Viola W. Bernard, M.D., Columbia University Saul Cooper, M.A., Washtenaw County CMH Center Erich Lindemann, M.D., Ph.D., Stanford University Lenin A. Baler, Ph.D., S.D. in Hyg. and Sheldon R. Roen, Ph.D.

CONSULTING EDITORS

Irving N. Berlin, M.D. Arthur J. Bindman, Ph.D., M.P.H. Eli M. Bower, Ed.D.
Alan J. Burnes, Ed.D.
Jerry W. Carter, Jr., Ph.D.
William W. Cooley, Ed.D.
Henry P. David, Ph.D.
Martin Deutsch, Ph.D.
Joseph J. Dowining, M.D.
Leonard J. Duhl, M.D.
Howard E. Freeman, Ph.D.
Hugh L. Freeman, B.M., D.P.M.
Sheldon Glueck, Ph.D., LL.D., S.D.
Ernest M. Gruenberg, M.D. Eli M. Bower, Ed.D.


Carl Hartman, M.A., M.S.S.W. B. R. Hutcheson, M.D. Rev. Paul E. Johnson, Ph.D. Maxwell Jones, C.B.E., M.D. David M. Kaplan, M.S.W., Ph.D. David M. Kaplan, M.S.W., Ph. James G. Kelly, Ph.D. Lewis B. Klebanoff, Ph.D. Donald C. Klein, Ph.D. Gerald L. Klerman. M.D. Leo Levy, Ph.D., S.M. in Hys. Philip M. Margolis, M.D. Edward A. Mason, M.D. Harry V. McNeill, Ph.D. John J. Noone, Ed.D.

Ralph H. Ojemann, Ph.D. Jerry Osterweil, Ph.D. Benjamin Pasamanick, M.D.
Hildegard E. Peplau, R.N., Ed.D.
Thomas F. A. Plaut, Ph.D., M.P.H.
Frederick C. Redlich, M.D.
Robert Reiff, Ph.D.
Helen Paigharz, M.S.W., Sc.D. Helen Reinherz, M.S.W., Sc.D. Gershen Rosenblum, Ph.D. Nevitt Sanford, Ph.D. Edwin S. Shneidman, Ph.D. H. Solms, M.D. Harold M. Visotsky, M.D.

The only periodical devoted specifically to the burgeoning field of community mental health. It is internationally recognized for its pioneering efforts to coordinate emergent approaches to mental health and social well being. Forty-seven outstanding consultants, representing all the pertinent disciplines and subspecialties, select articles to be published from submitted manuscripts on research, theory and practice in such areas as:

- **■** Consultation
- Primary Prevention
- **■** Crisis Intervention
- Planned Change
- Suicide Prevention
- Epidemiology
- Use of Nonprofessionals
- Family Therapy

- Delivery of Services
- **■** Evaluation Research
- Milieu Therapy
- Human Ecology
- High Risk Groups
- Social System Analysis
- Early Case Finding
- Anti-poverty Programs



COMMUNITY MENTALTH JOURNAL

Annual subscription rates: Published bimonthly

\$10 for individuals

2 years \$18.00; 3 years \$25.50; 5 years \$40.00

\$15 for institutions 2 years \$27.00; 3 years \$38.25; 5 years \$60.00

2852 Broadway New York, New York 10025 **Behavioral Publications**

PSYCHIATRY

Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN BLACK POLITICS A SPECIAL ISSUE, MAY 1970

T. M. Tomlinson, Ph.D., Issue Editor

WARREN TENHOUTEN—The Black Family: Myth and Reality

JOAN LAURENCE—White Socialization: Black Reality

JAN DIZARD—Black Identity, Social Class, and Black Power

THOMAS CRAWFORD, MURRAY NADITCH—Relative Deprivation, Powerlessness, and Militancy: The Psychology of Social Protest

HERBERT KELMAN—A Social-Psychological Model of Political Legitimacy and Its Relevance to Black and White Student Protest Movements

T. M. Tomlinson—Determinants of Black Politics: Riots and the Growth of Militancy

DAVID BOESEL-The Liberal Society, Black Youths, and the Ghetto Riots

Subscriptions: \$10.00, foreign \$10.80; payable in advance.
Single issues: \$3.00
Published in February, May, August, and November.
THIRTY-YEAR INDEX, 1938-1967: \$10.00

The William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, Inc. 1610 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009
Donald L. Burnham, M.D., Editor

THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Volume 8, Part 4, December 1969

CONTENTS

- KEITH GIBBINS Communication aspects of women's clothes and their relation to fashionability
- H. B. GIBSON AND RUTH HANSON Peer ratings as predictors of school behaviour and delinquency
- DOUGLAS W. BETHLEHEM Guilt, self-ideal discrepancy, the approval motive and recollections of socialization: some interrelationships
- HADYN D. ELLIS, CHRISTOPHER P. SPENCER AND HILARY OLDFIELDBOX Matched groups and the risky shift phenomenon: a defence of the extreme member hypothesis
- J. R. Adams-Webber Generalized expectancies concerning the locus of control of reinforcements and the perception of moral sanctions
- R. D. Francis Neuroticism and optical pupil changes in response to auditory stimuli
- D. A. Shapiro Empathy, warmth and genuineness in psychotherapy
- WILLIAM ORWIN Escape and avoidance learning in extremely neurotic and extremely stable subjects
- Neil Shapmberg, Stanley Baker and James Burns Reminiscence and pursuit rotor performance in introverts, extraverts and neurotics

BOOK REVIEWS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 32 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE

Quarterly journal of the

Psychotherapy Division-American Psychological Association EUGENE T. GENDLIN, Editor University of Chicago

PSYCHOTHERAPY also welcomes non-psychologist subscribers. The journal specializes in:

> Actual case descriptions Reports of genuine research studies Discussion among practicing therapists Theoretical formulations Reviews of the new books in the field

Rates: \$8.00 yearly

\$4.00 student rate

Write: Eugene T. Gendlin, Editor

Department of Psychology University of Chicago Chicago, Illinois 60637

The Journal of



RESOLUTION

A quarterly for research related to war and peace

DECEMBER 1969 (XIII, 4):

Trading in a Threat System: The US-Soviet Case . . Richard E. Gift Conflict Resolution in Medieval Morality Plays Dorothy Wertz Perceptions of International Conflict: The Middle . Doris Graber

Other articles; gaming section; book reviews

\$7.00 per year for individuals, \$10.00 for institutions; single issues \$3.00

Published by The Center for Research on Conflict Resolution The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104

SOCIAL SCIENCE Quarterly

APPEARING IN DECEMBER, 1969

A Double-Length Topical Issue on PLANNED SOCIAL INTERVENTION

Approximately 30 articles and 350 pages dealing with a wide spectrum of intervention topics including

- The War on Poverty
- Social Science and Social Intervention
- Social Security
- Welfare Policy

- The Military Draft
- Population Policy
- Urban Planning
- Program Evaluation

Perspectives from sociology, economics, political science, history and law with contributions by more than three dozen authors including

JOSEPH J. SPENGLER

RALPH HUITT

HAROLD SHEPPARD

ROBERT EVANS

GASTON RIMLINGER

AMITAI ETZIONI

PETER ROSSI

MAYER ZALD

DAVID GOTTLIEB

JOHN W. EVANS

Single copies may be ordered at \$3.50 or annual subscriptions (\$6.00) may be started with this number. Send check or money order to:

Social Science Quarterly
The University of Texas at Austin
Austin, Texas 78712

International Organization

the quarterly journal of the World Peace Foundation providing a lively forum for scholarship on international organizations and for analysis of current literature and research methods in the field

Spring 1970	The state of the s	Volume 24, Number 2
ARTICLES		
The Nonproliferation Treaty and the International Atomic		
Energy Agency.		George H. Quester
Integration and Disintegration in Franco-German Relations,		
1954-1965		Donald J. Puchala
Intergovernmental	Organization in the Global System	,
1815-1964: A C	Quantitative Description	David Singer and
		Michael D. Wallace
Toward the Concept of Collective Security: The Bryce Group's		
"Proposals for th	ne Avoidance of War,"	
1914-1917		. Martin David Dubin
Political Aspects of Transnational Business Collaboration		
in the Common	Market	Werner Feld
Worldwide Corporations and International Integration: The		
Case of INTELS	SAT	Jonathan F. Galloway
REVIEW ESSAYS		
Central American Integration: The Paradox of Success Gary W. Wynia		
Interstate Conflicts	s in Africa: A Review	. Robert O. Matthews
New Perspectives of	on NATO	Robert L. Rothstein
NOTES ON THE	ORY AND METHOD	
The Logistics of In	terviewing in International	
Organizations.		Edward Miles
Bilateralism and M	Iultilateralism in the	
Soviet Bloc		Richard W. Mansbach
\$2.50 a copy	\$7.50 a year	\$19.00 three years
	The state of the s	

World Peace Foundation

40 Mount Vernon Street

Boston, Massachusetts 02108

SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE

An International and Interdisciplinary Journal of Social Philosophy

Editor: K. T. Fann; Associate Editors: D. David Gruender, Donald C. Hodges; Advisory Editors: Christian Bay, Noam Chomsky, D. W. Gotshalk, Irving L. Horowitz, Oliver M. Lee, Ralph Miliband, James O'Connor, Sidney M. Peck, John Sommerville, Francis Sparshott, Donald A. Wells, Robert Paul Wolff.

Volume I. Number 1. (Spring, 1970)

"Some Contradictions of Advanced U.S. Capitalism" by James O'Connor

"The Two Faces of Civil Disobedience" by Virginia Black

"Is 'Just Violence' like 'Just War'?" by Donald A. Wells

"White Ethnics and Black Liberation" by Sidney M. Peck

"Paris and Praxis: Towards Understanding Student Revolts" by Don
Ihde

"Imperialism of the American New Left" by Howard Adelmann

"Marxism in India" by Dale Riepe

"Educational Revolution in China" by John Hawkins

"Material versus Moral Incentives" by Peter Clecak

"Maximization of Expected Utility as a Criterion of Rationality In Military Strategy and Foreign Policy" by Robert P. Wolff

"On Baroness Wootton's Larceny" by Lorenne M. G. Smith

All communications, manuscripts, subscriptions, and books for review should be sent to the Editor at the Department of Philosophy, The Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida, 32306, U.S.A. Subscriptions are \$1.50 per issue for individuals and \$3.00 per issue for institutions.

Comparative Studies in Society and History

Volume 12 Number 2 April 1970

Revolution

Jose Moreno Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare: Doctrine, Practice and Evaluation

EDWARD FRIEDMAN Neither Mao, Nor Che: The Practical Evolution of Revolutionary Theory. A Comment on J. Moreno's 'Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare'

Political Emigration

ROBERT C. WILLIAMS European Political Emigration: A Lost Subject

Bureaucracy

J. DE VERE ALLEN The Malayan Civil Service, 1874-1941: Colonial Bureaucracy/Malayan Elite

GAYLE D. NESS The Malayan Bureaucracy and its Occupational Communities. A Comment on J. de Vere Allen's 'The Malayan Civil Service, 1874–1941'

Peasantry

Shepard Forman and Joyce F. Riegelhaupt Market Place and Marketing System: Toward a Theory of Peasant Economic Integration

Review Articles

Frederick C. Turner Protestantism and Politics in Chile and Brazil JACOB M. PRICE Money and Credit in Early Industrialization: Some

Methodological Problems in Comparative Analysis

H. S. Morris Review of The Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia, and Malawi

Annual subscription \$8.50 for four issues.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 32 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022



iash soviet collection

CONTEMPORARY SOVIET EDUCATION

Edited by Fred Ablin

Introduction by George S. Counts

This comprehensive collection of articles emphasizes the latest Soviet scholarship, practice and experimentation in the field of education. The volume documents both positive and negative aspects: for example, the achievements of Soviet mathematics education on the one hand, and the damage done to Soviet genetics education during the Stalin period, on the other. All the articles have been selected from the journal Soviet Education.

\$12.00

CONTEMPORARY SOVIET ECONOMICS

Compiled by Murray Yanowitch

This two-volume collection brings together the most significant economics articles that have appeared in Soviet scholarly journals over the past several years. The volumes provide a comprehensive and detailed picture of current Soviet research and theory in the field of economics, as well as of current economic practices and institutions. The collection has been compiled from material that has appeared in translation in Problems of Economics.

\$12.50 per volume

SOCIOLOGY IN THE USSR

Edited by Stephen P. Dunn

This encyclopedic volume provides a detailed and comprehensive description of the current state of sociological study in the Soviet Union. All aspects of the discipline are covered. The book largely fills the void in Western knowledge of Soviet sociology, which is a rapidly expanding field of study in the USSR. All of the articles have been selected from the journal Soviet Sociology. \$12.50

INTERNATIONAL ARTS & SCIENCES PRESS, INC. 901 North Broadway, White Plains, New York 10603

JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH

A quarterly of scientific reports in the field of peace research
edited by Johan Galtung

Contents No. 4, 1969

Berenice A. Carroll: Introduction: History and Peace Research Berenice A. Carroll: How Wars End: An Analysis of Some Current

Hypotheses

Ronald P. Legon: The Peace of Nicias

J. Lee Schneidman: Ending the War of the Sicilian Vespers

Richard B. Morris: Ending the American Revolution: Lessons for our Time

J. A. White: Portsmouth 1905: Peace or Truce? Raymond O'Connor: Victory in Modern War

F. Hilary Conroy: The Conference on Peace Research in History:

A Memoir

Sandi E. Cooper: Recent Developments in the Teaching of Peace History and Related Areas

The first of its kind to be published in Europe, the Journal of Peace Research is edited at the international Peace Research Institute, Oslo, (P.O. Box 5052, Oslo 3, Norway), and published by Universitetsforlaget.

Subscription price including postage N.kr. 35,-- US \$6.00

SOCIAL FORCES

SOCIAL FORCES was founded in 1922 by the late Howard W. Odum. Its central focus is sociology, but it has always pioneered in exploring the areas which sociology shares with other disciplines. Each issue contains more than a dozen articles and forty or more book reviews. It is published quarterly: September, December, March, June.

Volume 48

SEPTEMBER 1969

Number 1

MCKINNEY: Typification, Typologies and Theory
RHODES & REISS: Apathy, Truancy and Delinquency
NAMENWIRTH: Graduates and Drop-Outs in New Haven
KINLOCH & PERRUCCI: Mobility Among College Students
DEAN & DUGGAN: Parole Prediction
GOULD: Property Crime in an Affluent Society

BLOOD & WOLFE: Race Differences in Blue-Collar Marriages
THEILBAR & FELDMAN: Occupational Stereotypes and Prestige

ROGERS: Environment, System and Output: A Model SABAGH ET AL: Intrametropolitan Mobility SCHWARTZ: Conflict Resolution in a Guatemalan Town

Research Note MORLAND & WILLIAMS

Book Reviews	Communica	tions	New Books Received
Subscription Rates United States Canada Foreign & Postal Union Single Copies	\$6.00 6.25 6.75 2.00	year (riptions are for the volume only. Subscriptions may be d now for Volume 48, which with the September issue.

Remittances and enquiries should be addressed to:

SOCIAL FORCES

The University of North Carolina Press Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514

BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE

AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL ANNOUNCES THE PUBLICATION OF

SYSTEMS PRINCIPLES IN BIOLOGY: A SYMPOSIUM

in the January 1970 issue Volume 15, #1

This important collection of articles examines the greatly expanded use of systems models made by biologists in recent years. The subjects range from the reactions between molecules to population genetics, and all the papers have the common theme of discovering the nature of the interaction between the numerous components that make up any biological system.

Contents

- "The Identification and Control of Metabolic States," by Britton Chance
- "Linear Systems Analysis of the Limulus Retina," by F. A. Dodge, Robert M. Shapley, and Bruce W. Knight
- "The Use of Kinetic Models to Analyze Differentiation," by Barbara E. Wright
- "Interactions Between the Endocrine System and the Developing Tissue in Ephestia Kühniella," by Heinz-Joachim Pohley
- "Endocrinology and the Systems Paradigm, by John Urquhart
- "Modeling Blood Glucose Dynamics," by Laël C. Gatewood, Eugene Ackerman, John W. Rosevear, and George D. Molnar
- "General Formulation of the Cardiovascular Control Problem— Mathematical Models," by Fred S. Grodins and John C. Buoncristiani
- "Natural Selection in Ecologically and Genetically Defined Populations," by Conrad A. Istock

AVAILABLE NOW AT A COST OF ONLY \$3.00 COMPLETE THE FORM BELOW AND MAIL TODAY

the address below. A c	Please sendcopies of "Systems Principles in Biology: A Symposium" (BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE, 15 [1], January 1970) at a cost of \$3.00 each to the address below. A check in the amount of \$ is enclosed.			
NAME	To account the second s			
ADDRESS	STARRESTAN			
Mail Order to:	BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE Mental Health Research Institute Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104			

THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, London, S.W.1

THE WORLD TODAY

The monthly journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs provides the general reader with up-to-date and authoritative information on current world problems.

Recent numbers include articles on:

COMMUNISM AND INSURRECTION IN THAI-LAND by Alessandro Casella

SOVIET ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES by Raymond Hutchings

POMPIDOU AND AFRICA: GAULLISM AFTER DE GAULLE by Kaye Whiteman

SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS: THE QUIESCENT YEARS by Peter Duminy

BRITAIN, THE DEVELOPING COMMON-WEALTH, AND THE EEC by Carol Ann Cosgrove

Annual Subscription: 45s. (U.S.A. and Canada \$6.50). 4s. per issue.

Orders may be sent to booksellers and newsagents, or to the Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London, N.W. 10. (Tel. Dollis Hill 8080).

RACE

A Journal of Race and Group Relations The Institute of Race Relations, 36 Jermyn Street, London, S.W.1.

The journal provides contributions to the study of race relations from a wide range of academic and applied disciplines. The reader will thus find material within his own field and also authoritative and intelligible statements from other fields that supplement his work. As well as articles, each number includes 'Quarterly Forum' which carries shorter items and reports on conferences and institutes, and there are also reviews of the current and relevant literature.

VOLUME XI

OCTOBER 1969

NUMBER 2

Richard P. Longaker • The Race Relations Act of 1965: An Evaluation of the Incitement Provision

Jabez Ayodele Langley • Garveyism and African Nationalism

Robert R. Bell • The Lower-class Negro Family in the United States and Great Britain: Some Comparisons

H. Lever & O. J. M. Wagner . Urbanization and the Afrikaner

C. W. Chitty . Aliens in England in the Seventeenth Century to 1660

Frederick Samuels • Colour Sensitivity among Honolulu's Haoles and Japanese

Quarterly Forum • Reviews

quarterly 50s or \$7.25 a year

15s or \$2 single copies

Oxford University Press
Press Road, Neasden Lane, London, N.W.10.

SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW MONOGRAPH NO. 16

(To appear in September 1970)

The Sociology of Sociology

Editor: Paul Halmos

'Introduction'

Robert K. MERTON, Professor of Sociology, Columbia University, New York.

'The Role of the Sociologist as a Professional: The Case of Planning

Martin C. ALBROW, Senior Lecturer, University College, Cardiff.

'The Sociological Role-Set'

J. A. BANKS, Professor of Sociology, University of Leicester.

Reflections on the Social and Political
Responsibility of Sociologists'
Leon BRAMSON, Associate Professor of Sociology, and Chairman,
Swarthmore College, Pennsylvania.

'Social Sciences and Policy'

A. B. CHERNS, Professor of Social Sciences, University of Technology, Loughborough.

'The Relevance of Social Research to Social Issues:
Promises and Pitfalls'

Herbert C. KELMAN, Richard Clarke Cabot Professor of Social Ethics, Department of Social Relations, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

'The Form and Content of Some Sociological Ideas'

Samuel Z. KLAUSNER, Department of Sociology,
University of Pennsylvania and Director,
Center for Research on the Acts of Man.

'Sociology-An Historical Phenomenon'

G. Duncan MITCHELL, Professor of Sociology, University of Exeter.


'The Spread of the Pathology of Natural Science To The Social Sciences'

John A. REX, Professor of Social Theory, University of Durham.

'The Formal Communication System of Science. A Study of the Organization of British Social Science Journals'

Richard D. WHITLEY, Research Fellow, Manchester Business School.

Price 36/- (£1.80) Plus 1/- post
U.S. \$5.50 Plus 20¢ post
Copies will be obtainable from:
The Secretary to the Monograph Editor,
Sociological Review Monographs, University of Keele, KEELE,
Staffordshire, ST5, 5BG, England.





Volume XII: 1956

No. 1 Attitudes and Adjustment in Cross-Cultural Contact: Recent Studies of Foreign Students. M. Brewster Smith, Issue Editor.

No. 2 Human Relations Research in Large Organizations: II. Robert L. Kahn, Floyd C. Mann, and Stanley Seashore, Issue Editors.

No. 3 Religious Conflict in the United States. Don J. Hager, Charles Y. Glock, and Isidor Chein, Issue Editors.

Personality Development During the College Years. Nevitt Sanford, Issue Editor.

Volume XIII: 1957

No. 1 Therapeutic Camping for Disturbed Youth. Elton B. McNeil, Issue Editor.
No. 2 Witnesses and Testimony at Trials and Hearings. Joshua A. Fishman, and Rudolph E. Morris, Issue Editors.

No. 3 Brainwashing, Raymond A. Bauer and Edgar H. Schein, Issue Editors. No. 4 Race Relations in Private Housing, Albert J. Mayer, Issue Editor.

Volume XIV: 1958

No. 1 Interpersonal Dynamics in a Desegregation Process. Marian Radke Yarrow, Issue Editor.
No. 2 Adjustment in Retirement. Gordon F. Streib and Wayne E. Thompson, Issue Editors.
No. 3 New Light on Delinquency. William McCord, Issue Editor.
No. 3 Vew Light on Delinquency. William McCord, Issue Editor.

Volume XV: 1959

No. 1 Mental Health in the Classroom. John C. Glidewell, Issue Editor.
No. 2 Consulting With Groups and Organizations. Jack R. Gibb and Ronald Lippitt, Issue Editors.
No. 3 Cross-Cultural Studies in the Arab Mid-East and United States: Studies of Young Adults.
Bradford B. Hudson, Issue Editor.

No. 4 Desegregation Research in the North and South. Thomas F. Pettigrew, Issue Editor.

Volume XVI: 1960

 June XVI: 1960
 No. 1 Training for Political Participation. Gordon L. Lippitt, Issue Editor.
 No. 2 New Pathways from the Mental Hospital. Henry Wechsler and David Landy, Issue Editors.
 A merica, Mass Society and Mass Media. Warren G. Bennis, Issue Editor.
 A teadership and Participation in a Changing Rural Community. John Harding, Edward C. Devereux, Jr. and Urie Bronfenbrenner, Issue Editors. Volume XVII: 1961

No. 1 Social Change and Psychological Patterns. Joseph Adelson, Issue Editor.
No. 2 Social Psychological Implications of Man in Space. Herbert E. Krugman and Donald N.
Michael, Issue Editors.

No. 3 Psychology and Policy in a Nuclear Age. Roger W. Russell, Issue Editor.
No. 4 Trigger for Community Conflict: The Case of Fluoridation. Benjamin D. Paul, William A. Gamson, and S. Stephen Kegeles, Issue Editors. Volume XVIII: 1962

No. 1 Impacts of Studying Abroad. George V. Coelho, Issue Editor.
No. 2 The Uses of Television. Lotte Bailyn, Issue Editor, Lewin Award, Other Papers.
No. 3 Work, Health and Satisfaction. John R. P. French, Robert L. Kahn, and Floyd C. Mann.

Issue Editors. No. 4 Man, and Satan, Isidor Chein and Henry A. Murray. Robert Chin, Issue Editor.

Volume XIX: 1963

No. 1 Psycho-Cultural Factors in Asian Economic Growth. Manning Nash and Robert Chin, Issue Editors No. 2 American Political Extremism in the 1960's. Harold M. Proshansky and Richard I. Evans,

Issue Editors. No. 3 Human Factors in Cross-Cultural Adjustment, Sven Lundstedt, Issue Editor, No. 4 Kurt Lewin Memorial Addresses 1962-63, Robert Chin and Leonard Solomon. Issue Editors.

Volume XX: 1964

No. 1 Aesthetic Probings of Contemporary Man, Warren G. Bennis, Issue Editor.
No. 2 Negro American Personality. Thomas F. Pettigrew and Daniel C. Thompson, Issue Editors.
No. 3 Kurt Lewin Memorial Address 1964, Alfred J. Marrow. Education as Social Invention.

No. 4 Youth and Social Action. Jacob R. Fishman and Frederic Solomon, Issue Editors.

Volume XXI: 1965

No. 1 Poverty Dynamics and Interventions. Berton H. Kaplan, Issue Editor.
No. 2 The Social Responsibilities of the Behavioral Scientist. Kenneth D. Benne,
No. 3 Addresses and Essays. Kenneth B. Clark, Herbert C. Kelman, Donald N. Michael, et al.
No. 4 Old Age as a Social Issue. Robert Kastenbaum, Issue Editor.
Volume XXII: 1966 Issue Editor.

No. 1 Urbanization and Social Change in the South. Leonard Reissman and Thomas Ktsanes,

Issue Editors.

No. 2 The Sexual Renaissance in America. Ira L. Reiss, Issue Editor.

No. 3 Misperception and the Vietnam War. Ralph K. White, Author.

No. 4 Man's Response to the Physical Environment. R. W. Kates and J. F. Wohlwill, Issue Editors. Presidential Address 1966, Jerome D. Frank.

Volume XXIII: 1967

No. 1 Conflict and Community in the International System. Elise Building, Issue Editor. Kurt Lewin Memorial August 1966, Daniel Katz.

No. 2 Problems of Bilingualism. John MacNamara, Issue Editor.
No. 3 Student Activism. Edward Sampson, Issue Editor.
No. 4 Family Planning in Cross-National Perspective. Lee Rainwater, Issue Editor.
Volume XXIV: 1968

No. 1 Values, Attitudes and Behaviors In Social Science and Society. Abraham J. Tannenbaum, Issue Editor.

Presidential Address, Milton Rokeach. Kurt Lewin Memorial Address, Muzafer Sherif.

No. 2 Social Psychological Research in Developing Countries. John DeLamater, Robert Hefner, Rémi Clignet,
Issue Fedica-

No. 3 Personality and Politics: Theoretical and Methodological Issues. Fred I. Greenstein, Issue Editor. Issue Editors

No. 4 Tradition and Modernity: Conflict or Congruence. Joseph Gusfield, Issue Editor.

Volume XXV: 1969 No. 1 Values in Crisis: Racism, War and the Conception of Evil. J. Diedrick Snoek, Issue Editor. Presidential Address, Thomas F. Pettigrew. Kurt Lewin Memorial Address, Morton Deutsch.
No. 2 Alienated Youth, Abraham J. Tannenbaum, Issue Editor.
No. 3 Medivation.

No. 3 Motivation and Academic Achievement of Negro Americans. Edgar G. Epps, Issue Editor.
 No. 4 Selected Papers; 1969. J. Diedrick Snoek, Issue Editor. Presidential Address, Martin Deutsch. Kurt Lewin Memorial Address, Ralph K. White.

1 1 DEC 1970 LOSS revolt violence guns protest errillas Police raid militants Slum

The Poor: Impact on Research and Theory

Marcia Guttentag Issue Editor

Vernon L. Allen Reuben M. Baron Marion Blank Courtney B. Cazden Gerald Gurin Patricia Gurin S. M. Miller Lee Rainwater

The Journal of Social Issues

THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES

Published Quarterly

Copyright 1970 by The SOCIETY FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF SOCIAL ISSUES

A Division of

THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

Annual Subscription
Institutions and Organizations
Individuals
Single Copy Price

\$9.00 7.00 2.25

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues is a group of over two thousand psychologists and allied social scientists who share a concern with research on the psychological aspects of important social issues. SPSSI is governed by Kurt Lewin's dictum that "there is nothing so practical as a good theory." In various ways, the Society seeks to bring theory and practice into focus on human problems of the group, the community, and the nation as well as the increasingly important ones that have no national boundaries. This Journal has as its goal the communication of scientific findings and interpretations in a non-technical manner but without the sacrifice of professional standards.

Bertram H. Raven, General Editor, JSI, Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024.

SPSSI Officers and Council: Robert Chin, President; Robert L. Kahn, President Elect; Martin Deutsch, Past President; Robert Hefner, Secretary-Treasurer; Council Members: George W. Albee, Kenneth B. Clark, Richard Flacks, William A. Gamson, Marcia Guttentag, Edwin P. Hollander, Irwin N. Katz, Richard A. Schmuck, David O. Sears, Philip G. Zimbardo.

Society Address: Caroline Weichlein, SPSSI Executive Secretary, P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Subscriptions to the Journal, applications for membership in the Society, changes in mailing address, and requests for information should be sent to Mrs. Weichlein.

Back Numbers: Orders for one or more copies of a particular issue or supplement should be sent to Journal of Social Issues, P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. (See inside back cover for a listing of recent Journal numbers.)

Editorial Committee: Barry E. Collins, Jonathan Freedman, Harold B. Gerard, Jacqueline D. Goodchilds, Reginald L. Jones, William McGuire, Charles Y. Nakamura, Harold Proshansky, Bertram H. Raven, Nevitt Sanford, David Sears, Paul Secord, and Gerald H. Shure.

Managing Editor: Jacqueline D. Goodchilds, Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024.

Second Class Postage paid at Ann Arbor, Michigan

Published quarterly by the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Publication Office: Edwards Brothers, Inc., 2500 South State Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104.

o spssi

The Journal of

SOCIAL ISSUES

o spssi

SPRING 1970 VOL. 26 NO. 2

THE POOR: IMPACT ON RESEARCH AND THEORY

	Issue Editor: Marcia Guttentag	1
	Introduction Marcia Guttentag	
	Implicit Assumptions Underlying Preschool Intervention Programs Marion Blank	15
b	The Situation: A Neglected Source of Social Class Differences in Language Use Courtney B. Cazden	35
	The SRS Model as a Predictor of Negro Responsiveness to Reinforcement	61
	Expectancy Theory in the Study of Poverty Gerald Gurin and Patricia Gurin	83
7	Group Cohesiveness, Ethnic Organization, and Poverty Marcia Guttentag	105
	The Problem of Lower Class Culture Lee Rainwater	133
	Theoretical Issues in Poverty Research Vernon L. Allen	149
4	Poverty Research in the Seventies S. M. Miller	169

Biographical Sketches	175
Abstracts	177
The Activists' Corner Nevitt Sanford	183
Comments and Rejoinders	191
Daniel P. Moynihan	191

Editorial Notes

ABOUT THIS ISSUE

The current issue was initiated and developed through its beginning stages by the previous general editor, Joshua A. Fishman, and editorial committee: Martin Deutsch, Irwin Katz, Bernard Kutner, Matthew B. Miles, Harold M. Proshansky, Milton Schwebel, J. Diedrick Snoek, and Abraham J. Tannenbaum.

COMMENTS AND REJOINDERS

Readers wishing to discuss or comment upon any of the articles in this or other issues of JSI may submit their reactions or criticisms to the general editor, Bertram H. Raven, Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024. Criticisms or observations of general interest will be published in a Comments and Rejoinders section of JSI.

SELECTED ARTICLES ISSUE

The Selected Articles Issue will receive approximately 25% of the yearly page total of the Journal of Social Issues and will be devoted to individual articles consistent with JSI policy. The major function of the Selected Articles Issue is to publish empirical studies relevant to contemporary social problems, extrapolations from basic research to important social problems, theories about social problems with a firm foundation in social science, and, to a smaller extent, essays concerning the role of the behavioral scientist in non-academic contemporary society. Purely philosophical essays, exhortations for action which do not deal directly with the role of the behavioral scientist, and general social commentary are not appropriate.

Authors with single papers falling within the province of the Journal of Social Issues are encouraged to submit them to the Selected Articles Editor in triplicate. The paper must be completely double-spaced, including quotations and references. JSI follows the New Revision (1967) of the Publication Manual of APA, which means that bibliographical references are indicated by their publication dates within the text and are listed alphabetically at the end of the paper. Footnotes are collected on a single page and placed at the end of the article. All figures and tables are placed on separate pages and included at the end of the article. Every article must be accompanied by a 100-120 word abstract and a brief biographical sketch for each author.

Manuscripts for the 1971 Selected Articles Issue should be sent to the JSI Editorial Office, Department of Psychology, UCLA, Los Angeles, Calif., 90024.

JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES VOLUME 26, NUMBER 2, 1970

Introduction

Poverty has been a much mined lode. Or, to use the metaphor of the blacks, social scientists have used the poor, especially the poor blacks, as their plantation. Crop after crop of words, papers, and books has been harvested. Is there anything still

worth saying about the poor?

It is best to begin with what this JSI issue on poverty does not include. It does not contain papers which describe the poor, nor explanations of the causes and concomitants of poverty. It does not offer policy solutions to the problems of poverty, nor is it a comprehensive, exhaustive review of relevant research. The focus of the issue is on the direct and indirect effects that work with the poor has had on research and theory in the social sciences, particularly in psychology.

The purpose of the issue is to gain fresh insight into the current state of some aspects of social science, rather than simply to further an understanding of the poor. Social science and psychology have, in some respects, been relevant to an understanding of the poor. Work with poor populations in both laboratory and field has brought new perspectives to the social sciences. It has exposed some of the weaknesses, inconsistencies, and lacunae in both

theory and practice.

At a time when two significant national reports (Brim, 1969, and BASS, 1969) have stressed the need for the development of theories in social science which can be applied to the study of social problems, it is useful to examine what has happened following the application of social science method and theories to the study of the poor. Work with poor populations is probably the first instance of the broad participation of behavioral scientists on many aspects of a major social problem. They have been active in research, in the application of theory, and in policy formation.

Research on the poor has provided a "context of verification (Baron, 1970)" within which to judge the generalizability of some current conceptualizations. It is a mirror which offers a view of both our theories and research strategies, and of ourselves as social scientists. Before we embark on the study of other social problems during the decade of the seventies, this image is well

worth examining.

The recurrent themes of the papers in this issue offer some generic lessons about the study of any multi-faceted and value-laden social problem. Each paper in the issue presents the modifications in research strategies and the new theoretical formulations which have evolved from work with poor populations. The papers cover both theoretical content, e.g., in social learning and in sociolinguistics, and questions which are basic to the logic of all scientific inquiry, e.g., generalizations beyond a specific context and the conditions under which causal inferences are feasible.

Descriptive Research on the Poor

A journal issue of this type is necessarily preceded by considerable descriptive and correlational work. The plight of the poor was brought forcefully to the attention of social scientists by a journalist (Harrington, 1962). Since that time, social scientists have studied the conditions of life of the poor individual in considerable detail. There are now rather full descriptions of the poor

man's experience (Liebow, 1967; Lewis, 1966).

Social science research on the poor began with a realization that few data existed on poor populations, and initially it seemed that a large-scale data-gathering effort was required. The amount of descriptive data available today is massive. The many correlational studies of poor populations show, not surprisingly, that the poor have higher rates of mental illness, do not receive the same treatments as the middle class (Hollingshead & Redlich, 1958;

Srole et al., 1962; Riessman, Cohen, & Pearl, 1964), that they pay more than others for the same goods and services (Caplovitz, 1963), that they have severely limited occupational opportunities (Duncan & Hodge, 1963), that their nutrition is faulty (Schorr, 1964a, 1964b) and their infant mortality rates high, etc. The distinctive bleakness and the physical and psychological limitations of their lives have been carefully described and documented.

The question of who should be considered poor, a basic defi-nitional problem, has also received attention. Social scientists in government have reworked initial formulas for the calculation of poverty levels (Orshansky, 1965). Among sociologists a literature has grown up around the definition of various sub-groups of the poor. The working class stable poor have been differentiated from the unstable poor; efforts have been made to disentangle the confounded relationship between poverty and race. Miller and Roby (1970) have suggested that poverty be viewed in social stratification terms rather than in terms of absolute economic deprivation. Distinctions have been made between the temporarily and the permanently poor, and between intergenerational and nonintergenerational poverty.

Sociologists have detailed, particularly in educational and work organizations, poor people's distinctive lack of mobility (Schorr, 1964a, 1964b; Gans, 1968; Mackler, 1968). The nuclear family characteristics of the poor, especially of poor blacks, have been the subject of description (Moynihan, 1965) and controversy (Rainwater & Yancey, 1967). A new field has emerged which delineates the behavioral and cognitive characteristics of poor children (Ausubel, 1967; Deutsch, M., 1967; Passow, Goldberg,

& Tannenbaum, 1967).

Analyses of government sponsored poverty programs constitute another large body of descriptive and evaluative work. These cover a broad area from overall critiques of the war on poverty (Moynihan, 1969; Ferman, 1969) to detailed studies of particular programs (Levitan, 1969). The critical spirit underlying many of these analyses is informed by implicit or explicit assumptions about causal priorities in the condition of poverty. Interpretations of the success or failure of the programs are also derived from further assumptions about what effectively changes people's lives.

Most recent legislation on poverty-related issues has been affected, directly or indirectly, by the thinking of social scientists. The "new careers" legislation (Pearl, 1968; Riessman & Popper, 1968) was influenced in part by studies of the poor person's limited access to credentialing systems and his lack of occupational opportunity. Government strategies which put money directly into the pockets of the poor through jobs or income maintenance programs reflect not only the work of economists (Tobin, 1965), but

widespread criticisms of the effects of welfare bureaucracies.

Every strategy for the solution of poverty presupposes a definition of poverty and contains theoretical assumptions about human learning and methods for successful institutional change. The raft of descriptive data which now exists and the numerous applied programs for the poor make it timely to turn a critical eye toward a reevaluation of research and theory.

Focus of the Issue

The articles in this issue contain new syntheses of research data and offer critiques of those theoretical and research problems which have not received sufficient coverage. They do not cover all fields in social science where work with the poor has led to theoretical modification. Changes in sociological and economic theory and developments in some fields of psychology have received extensive coverage elsewhere (Pettigrew, 1967; Katz, 1967; McClelland & Winter, 1969).

Each of the papers discusses work with the poor which has led to a sharpening of theoretical issues in psychology and sociology. They include work in which the use of the poor as subjects has provided new research data and has raised new (sometimes

old) conceptual questions.

Intervention programs for disadvantaged children have put a mélange of theories, hunches, and unstated assumptions about child development to the test. Blank's paper (1970) highlights some of the contradictory assumptions made by these programs. Intervention programs contrast with narrow and specific experimental studies of child development. In laboratory work, one theoretical position is not brought into direct confrontation with another, so that the difficulties which arise from conflicting viewpoints are avoided; there the experimenter can control what his subjects experience. Blank discusses cognitive and linguistic approaches to child development, contrasts them with behavioristic prescriptions, and shows how each has influenced intervention programs.

Cazden (1970) looks at the lower class child's language from a sociolinguistic point of view. In her discussion of the research in this new field, she shows that a number of easy generalizations about the language of the lower class child have not been substantiated by research findings. A large variety of language behaviors are contingent on the characteristics of the setting, especially for lower class children. One is forced to doubt the validity of research with these children in which the stimulus characteristics of the

setting have been ignored. Unfortunately, many studies fall into this category. Cazden cites both Jensen and Palmer on the rises in IQ which follow those testing sessions in which the tester has achieved rapport with the lower class child. Palmer found that, following warm-up sessions of several hours, there were no IQ differences at all between middle class and lower class children. A

Baron's (1970) paper, too, shows how complex the intercautionary note indeed. action is between the characteristics of the situation and the past reinforcement history (SRS) of the individual. In the context of the current rash of enthusiasm for behavioral control techniques, Baron's work reveals how subtle the definition of reinforcement must be. Working with non-college populations, he shows that the past history of differential reinforcements determines the individual's responses to current reinforcements in no simple manner. Interactions between the past history of reinforcement and the source and type of present reinforcements offer strong support for a contextual interpretation of reinforcement. Research with poor black subjects has led Baron to revise and elaborate his theo-

retical model of the Social Reinforcement Standard.

The Gurins' (1970) discussion of expectancies provides a needed framework within which such situation-person interactions can be conceptualized. Interactions between the past history of individuals, their expectancies, and the information and reinforcements encountered in new situations is much more complex than has been realized. The Gurins' analysis of research on expectancies reveals that the distinction between institutional and internal psychological aspects of poverty has been too sharply and simplistically drawn. As they clearly show, research on expectancies raises many questions as yet unanswered. Among the most important are those which are concerned with the relationships between level of expectancy and basis of expectancy (internalexternal), and those which relate to causal priorities in the changes in both expectancies and performance. Their analysis demonstrates how work with poor populations outside laboratory settings has opened new theoretical territory in psychology and posed critical questions which can be answered only by careful research. They outline the extensive program which is needed before answers to these critical questions can be obtained. These answers are precisely what are required if programs to alleviate

Allen's paper (1970) deals with research on the personality of the poor. His discussion of the "culture of the poor" takes a slant different from P. different from Rainwater's views. Yet in some surprising ways his conclusions agree with those of other papers. Discussing psychological research with adult subjects, he concludes that here, too, situation-person interactions are more important than previously had been emphasized in the literature. The categories and classification schemes easily applied to patient or student groups, like trait or personality typologies, do not fit well enough when applied to the poor—too much is left unexplained. Work with the poor has exposed the limits of generalization and the irrelevance of some psychological categories which have become stereotyped by use. Each classification system unduly restricts the kinds of questions asked and consequently the types of explanations offered. Allen finds much that is questionable in current explanatory systems in psychology, and justly asks whether it is a psychology of the poor that we need or a psychology of people.

Doubts are raised about the importance of harmonious intergroup relationships for the achievement of social equality in Guttentag's discussion (1970) of group cohesiveness and ethnic organization among the poor. Her analysis emphasizes the importance of ethnic cohesiveness among groups which have survived poverty in the past. Positive identification with an ethnic minority, as Lewin (1948) saw, protects the individual from the psychological consequences of his despised position and gives him a base of

organized power.

Debate also continues between the sociologists who hold that lower class culture and the culture of the poor decisively determine the poor child's socialization (Miller, 1958), and those who hold that the culture of poverty is produced anew in each generation as a response to the exigencies of the lives led by the poor (Liebow, 1967). A related argument is whether lower class groups have distinctive value systems or whether they share in the middle class values of the larger society in some "stretched" or modified form. As Rainwater's paper (1970) cogently explicates, the mix of external realities which limit and define choices, the reactions of the poor to these circumstances, and their awareness of the values of the larger society create a complicated fabric which cannot easily be cut up in terms of predetermined categories.

Why were some of these common conclusions not drawn by earlier researchers? At least a partial explanation lies in the characteristics of the experimental laboratory situation. When experimenting, an investigator may study any relationships, whether or not they frequently occur in natural surroundings. The experimenter chooses the variables to manipulate, as well as his (often quite limited) subject population. With the "situation" invariant, issues about the relevance of the chosen variables do not arise. In the field, where the behavior of the poor or the linguistic perfor-

mance of children is studied, issues of relevance and of the relative power of a number of variables in accounting for the variance are of paramount importance.

Some Common Themes

Four general points among many others may be abstracted from these papers. Although all are related to work with the poor, their conclusions have a much more general application. They are illustrative of the themes which emerge from many current

A Situational Social Psychology. Many of the papers emphasize constructs which are derived from complex interactions between individuals, their past history, and their current environment. Explanations of behavior now veer toward a "context" psychology. It is no longer regularities within subjects, nor regularities which differentiate groups of subjects, but those regularities evoked by situations which are the basis of behavioral explanation. Human nature is assumed to be more malleable, adaptive, and more capable of new learning and behavior than in the past. Every context evokes situationally specific behaviors and accentuates similarities rather than differences between individuals.

The willingness to entertain psychological theories of this complexity is surely an advance. Yet, Miller's comments (1970) contain a further challenge. He questions why psychologists are so little interested in time series studies of human behavior, why they do not study "how and why behavior changes over long periods (a decade) as a result, at least in part, of large social changes." Miller surmises that there is an "excessive concern with the non-

time (and non-cultural) bound" in psychology.

It would appear that we continue to be dominated by a faith in hypothetico-deductive systems which lead to the pursuit of those lines of research that result in findings of behavioral invariance and regularity. Findings of change in behavior over time which follows large scale social change would clearly contradict this hypothetico-deductive faith. Yet, repeatedly, though quietly, it continues to be noticed that even in laboratory studies of social behavior we are no longer able to replicate the results of ten years ago. College students, too, have changed. We become no less scientific when the belief in hypothetico-deductive systems is relinquished. It is reasonable, then, to raise the question of "relevance," a question which is inapplicable to hypothetico-deductive, omni-relevant systems. Relevance is a question about the context of research. As a number of the papers in this issue show, the generalizations of social scientists are deeply influenced by the larger social and political milieu in which they are made. Like it

or not, we are enmeshed in the historic fabric.

Miller touches the core of the difficulty when he asks whether social psychology "is best developed by thinking of itself as intrinsically connected to academic psychology rather than to sociology, economics, urban studies, etc." Before psychologists enter the applied social sciences and embark on the further study of social problems, one or the other allegiance must be chosen. The methods used and even the basic ways in which problems are con-

ceptualized and defined are determined by the choice.

Cognitive Behaviorism. Over a decade ago Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960) called for a cognitive behaviorism. The new behaviorism considers those individual differences in reinforcement history which create standards of consistency to which new reinforcements are compared (Baron, 1970). The individual's perception of himself in his relation to society, his expectancies for success, etc., create inner standards which determine the meaning and the effect of external reinforcements. A "cognitive behaviorism" does not deny the reinforcing properties of persons and events, while acknowledging that present and especially past reinforcements have cognitive representation which serve as the context within which new events are perceived. It is the internal representations, based on the real past history of the individual, which determine what is reinforcing. The individual's past and what he expects affect what the experimenter presents as a reinforcement.

Expectancies, though based on the past, include a presentment of the future; empirically, the anticipation of future events influences behavior. Although the same outcomes may be viewed within a strictly behavioristic frame of reference, this mix of cognitive constructs tied to behavioral outcomes is an efficient and meaningful way to explain research results. Explanations derived from the mix of cognitive and behavioristic concepts reflect trends

in several fields of current psychological research.

Passive Subjects and Active Investigators. The problem is not at all new. Studies of demand characteristics have shown the weakness of generalizations based on experiments performed on docile undergraduates. Research with the poor has revealed that similar problems arise even in field research. Poor subjects have increasingly forced social scientists to pay heed to their own previously inarticulated perspectives. The poor, especially the blacks, have shown that we are caught within our own definitions of the problems we investigate. Passive subjects, who accept the social scientists' definition of themselves, differ markedly from the ones who

do not accept such definitions. All definitions, descriptions, and explanations include the implicit values and perspectives of the definer. When the researcher is middle class, his definitions are

tinged by middle class values.

Gibson (1966) has forcefully shown in studies of perception that data gathered on passive perceivers in restricted experimental studies cannot be generalized to the perceptual processes which occur when subjects actively explore the environment. Passive and active subjects in perceptual studies are two separate populations whose data cannot be meaningfully pooled. The poor have retaught social scientists that there are deep constraints in research whenever they are passive objects of the researcher's attention. These constraints do not permit generalization of data to situations in which the poor can define their own roles and are able to take an active stance.

Several of the papers stress that the choices and selfdefinitions of subjects must be considered when judgments are made of the reliability and generalizability of any data. Who studies whom and how cannot be separated from the results of

research.

Systems Problems. Nearly all of the papers in the issue touch on some aspect of a systems difficulty in the level of the explanatory constructs and the implicit models of the social system which are used (Buckley, 1967). Nuclear family characteristics cannot be used as an explanatory construct for social class and racial differences which exist at higher social system levels. Social policy recommendations must realize the differences between the characteristics of social groups at different system levels and the causal

priorities which condition these differences.

Long ago, Lewin said, "It seems to be easier for society to change education than for education to change society (1948, p. 4)." The growth of the black movement has again shown the powerful influence of group ideology on group goals at system levels above that of the nuclear family. Although little systematic research has been done, the evidence seems clear that the black movement has had stronger effects on individuals, in a shorter period of time, than have the multiple ameliorative programs which were directed toward the individual or family system level. Social scientists should not have been surprised by this had they been following Karl Deutsch's (1956) simple suggestion for the determination of the importance of components of a system relative to one another: "Which part of the system gives you the maximum overall change in system performance for the least change or smallest change in the subassembly structure? [p. 279]"

Another facet of the systems problem presented in several papers concerns the researcher's choice of variables and relationships.

Modern systems theorists have long recognized that just because a number of variables are interrelated in a systemic manner does not necessarily mean that each is of equal weight in producing characteristic states of the system: any systemic variable may run the gamut from insignificance to overwhelming primacy (Buckley, 1967, p. 67).

The choice of variables may unwittingly determine a scientist's differential explanatory stress on one or another system level.

In any study of social conflict, if boundary processes are selected for study, this research strategy will naturally result in an emphasis on dysfunctional effects of conflict. When instead, the internal processes of each group in conflict are selected for study, the reported results differ markedly in emphasis (Coser, 1965). In studies of social conflict, social science research has tended to focus more on the boundary problems of immediate system maintenance than on long term system changes following conflict. Subtle differences in the choice of system level and in the selection of boundary vs. non-boundary variables have led to large differences in research results and in the policies derived from research outcomes. The papers in this issue illustrate the importance of a systems frame of reference as a way of understanding both the importance and generalizability of individual research findings.

The cumulative effect of these papers leads to some sobering and basic questions. Each author has taken a hard look at concepts and experiments in his field and has found some crucial deficiencies. The similarity in their conclusions is striking. They find that a corollary of the search for simple regularities in human behavior has been a minimization of situationally specific behaviors and of context effects. The search for regularities is derived from an implicit assumption that a human nature can be discovered and that the causal laws governing it must be as ordered and parsimonious as those for rocks and trees. Yet the search is apparently misguided. The papers in this issue stress the complexities encountered when such simplified notions of causality are applied to the experiences and behavior of the poor.

As McCall and Simons (1967) have remarked:

Man lives in a symbolic universe not unlike Plato's realm of ideals. There man is a conscious, self-conscious, reasoning being—a creature of ideas, evaluations, and volition. His actions are not the result of blind causal forces but of his own considered and willed choices. Consequently, he is a creature of responsibility, pride, and dignity, which in turn implies that he is also a creature of guilt, shame and humiliation (italics added).

Recent developments in philosophical psychology apply

newer philosophical models to the study of human action. These models treat humans as agents with agenda and start with a presumption of diversity in the meanings and purposes of behavior, a diversity related to differences in contexts (Taylor, 1966).

Studies of poor individuals—their social roles, attitudes, and relationship to organized society—touch the interface of greatest interest to psychologists and sociologists. This issue of the Journal of Social Issues should make more evident the theoretical advances in which the poor as subjects and objects of research have been catalysts.

The two JSI issues on the poor, this and the one to follow, were jointly conceived and carried through to completion with the help of Gerald and Patricia Gurin. Their knowledge and thoughtfulness have been invaluable. They would be listed as co-editors had they not modestly refused. I, however, am fully responsible for the content of the issue as it now appears.

Marcia Guttentag

REFERENCES

ALLEN, V. L. Theoretical issues in poverty research. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26 (2).

AUSUBEL, D. The psychology of meaningful verbal learning: An introduction to school learning. New York: Grune & Stratton, 1967.

BARON, R. The SRS model as a predictor of Negro responsiveness to reinforcement. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26 (2).

BASS. The behavioral and social sciences: Outlook and needs. A report by the Behavioral and Social Sciences Survey Committee of the National Academy of Sciences and the Social Science Research Council. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969.

BLANK, M. Implicit assumptions underlying preschool intervention programs.

Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26 (2).

Brim, O. Knowledge into action: Improving the nation's use of the social sciences. Report of the Special Commission on the Social Sciences of the National Science Board. Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1969.

Buckley, W. Sociology and modern systems theory. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-

Hall, 1967.

CAPLOVITZ, D. The poor pay more. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963.

CAZDEN, C. The situation: A neglected source of social class differences in language use. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26 (2).

COSER, L. The functions of social conflict. New York: Free Press, 1965.

Deutsch, K. Anatomies and boundaries according to communication theory. In R. R. Grinker (Ed.), Toward a unified theory of human behavior. New York:

Basic Books, 1956.

Deutsch, M. The disadvantaged child. New York: Basic Books, 1967.
Duncan, O. D., & Hodge, R. W. Educational and occupational mobility: A re-

gression analysis. American Journal of Sociology, 1963, 68, 629-644.

Ferman, L. A. (Ed.). Evaluating the war on poverty. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol. 385, September, 1969.

GANS, H. J. People and plans: Essays on urban problems and solutions. New York: Basic Books, 1968.

Gibson, J. J. The senses considered as perceptual systems. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1966.

Gurin, G., & Gurin, P. Expectancy theory in the study of poverty. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26 (2).

GUTTENTAG, M. Group cohesiveness, ethnic organization, and poverty. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26 (2).

HARRINGTON, M. The other America: Poverty in the United States. New York: Macmillan, 1962.

HOLLINGSHEAD, A. B., & REDLICH, F. C. Social class and mental illness: A community study. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958.

KATZ, I. The socialization of academic motivation in minority group children. In D. Levine (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation. University of Nebraska Press, 1967.

LEVITAN, S. A. Great society's poor law: A new approach to poverty. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969.

LEWIN, K. Resolving social conflicts. New York: Harper Bros., 1948.

Lewis, O. La vida: A Puerto Rican family in the culture of poverty. New York: Random House, 1966.

Liebow, E. Tally's corner: A study of Negro streetcorner men. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967.

MACKLER, B. Up from poverty: The price for "making it" in a ghetto school. Department of Urban Affairs, Hunter College of the City University of New York, 1968. McCall, & Simmons. Identities and interactions. Detroit: The Free Press, 1967.

McClelland, D. C., & Winter, D. G. Motivating economic achievement. New York: Free Press, 1969.

MILLER, G., GALANTER, E., & PRIBRAM, K. H. Plans and the structure of behavior. New York: Henry Holt, 1960.

MILLER, S. M. Poverty research in the seventies. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26 (2).

MILLER, S. M., & ROBY, P. The future of inequality. New York: Basic Books, 1970. MILLER, W. B. Lower class culture as a generating milieu of gang delinquency. Journal of Social Issues, 1958, 14 (3), 5-19.

MOYNIHAN, D. P. The Negro family: The case for national action. Washington: U.S. Department of Labor, 1965.

MOYNIHAN, D. P. Maximum feasible misunderstanding. New York: Free Press, 1969. Orshansky, M. Counting the poor: Another look at the poverty profile. Social Security Bulletin, January, 1965.

Passow, H., Goldberg, M. & Tannenbaum, A. Education of the disadvantaged. New York: Holt, Rhinehart & Winston, 1967.

Pearl, A. New careers and the manpower crises in education. In Riessman, F., & Popper, H. (Eds.), Up from poverty: New career ladders for non-professionals.

New York: Harper & Row, 1968.

Pettigrew, T. F. Convergencies and applications. In D. Levine (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation. University of Nebraska Press, 1967.

RAINWATER, L. The problem of lower class culture. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26 (2).

RAINWATER, L., & YANCEY, W. L. The Moynihan report and the politics of controversy.

Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967.

RIESSMAN, F., COHEN, J., & PEARL, A. (Eds.) Mental health of the poor. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. RIESSMAN, F., & POPPER, H. I. Up from poverty: New career ladders for non-professionals. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.

SCHORR, A. L. The nonculture of poverty. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry,

24 (5), 1964. (a)

Schorr, A. L. Policy issues in fighting poverty. Children, XI, No. 4 (July-August, 1964), U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Welfare Administration, Children's Bureau. (b)
SROLE, L., LANGER, T. S., MICHAEL, S. T., OPLER, M. K., & RENNIE, T. A. Mental

health in the metropolis: The midtown Manhattan study. New York: McGraw-

Hill, 1962.

TAYLOR, R. Action and purpose. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966.

TOBIN, J. On improving the economic status of the Negro. Daedalus, LCIV, No. 4, Fall 1965

Implicit Assumptions Underlying Preschool Intervention Programs

Marion Blank Albert Einstein College of Medicine

The question of preschool intervention, like all problems of applied research, places unusual demands on the basic sciences from which it must draw. Requisite to well-designed intervention programs is knowledge in some of the most central issues in psychology—How does learning occur? What is the role of language in thinking? What is the effect of early environment on later development? Are there critical periods in human learning?—to enumerate just a few. Yet it is just because these issues are so basic and complex that we have no well-defined answers to any of them. Nevertheless, because of the atmosphere of urgency and the attendant publicity with which the issue of intervention arose, psychology and education had to use the limited information they possessed to establish some guidelines for action.

This has meant that influences from such diverse frameworks as behaviorism, Freudian psychoanalysis, Piagetian epistemological psychology, and Chomsky's transformational grammar, have formed an eclectic or, perhaps more correctly, a mosaic backdrop for deciding how to proceed in this area. In many cases, these theories are of questionable validity and relevance with reference to the functioning of the disadvantaged child. Nonetheless, they have played a major role in the establishment of intervention

programs.

Rationale for Pre-School Intervention

The fact that preschool programs were established at all reflects the influence of several basic assumptions in our thinking. First, it mirrors our optimism about the almost endless modifiability and flexibility of human behavior (Hunt, 1964; Feuerstein, 1968). This view has been reinforced by the strong behaviorist influence in America where it is held that all aspects of learning and performance can be changed to a desired end through the proper manipulation of environmental events (Skinner, 1953). Our faith in the importance of environmental factors seems well justified by a substantial body of literature from both animals and humans (Hilgard & Marquis, 1961; Ulrich, Stachnik, & Mabry, 1966). There are, however, in almost all theories limitations to the degree of modifiability that can take place. In general, the major correlate for this limitation is age; that is, the older the organism, the less the change. The interpretations for this may vary. Thus, in a behaviorist model, slower learning in the adult may be seen as reflecting the need to unlearn previously established responses before new responses may be learned. In an ethological orientation, the change may be limited by what has been termed critical periods (Lorenz, 1937). In this view, stages exist, particularly in early development, which allow rapid learning of certain skills. These skills may be learned at other ages—but only with much greater time and effort.

Thus, the hope for any modifiability rests strongly on the idea of early intervention. The problem remains as to what behavior is to be modified; this, in turn, rests on what is deemed to be the deficit in functioning. Our views here have been strongly affected by the developmental approach to behavior. Any developmental view has built-in expectations of increasing achievement with chronological growth. These expectations are clearly reflected in the institutions with which the child has contact. Thus, in the school situation we expect the average six or seven year old to be able to read, write, and perform other symbolic operations. In this situation, disadvantaged children show poor progress (see Wilkerson, 1967). Many other deficits may well exist—personality disorders, nutritional inadequacies, poor health, etc. But the school situation, with its emphasis on scholastic achievement, has inevitably meant that learning disorders would appear most prominent.

Arguments, of course, can be and have been raised against this view. Learning in the school situation refers mainly to skills of literacy and it does not necessarily include all higher learning. Thus, it is suggested that perhaps the disadvantaged child may

not be deficient in other cognitive skills. Evidence suggests however (Feuerstein, 1968), that the deficits may not be restricted to academic work but rather "characterize an entire approach and attitude towards life" involving such features as "inefficient problem solving, a chaotic outlook about world events marked by a lack of need for logical evidence, an episodic grasp of reality (p. 16)."

There is perhaps another reason for the stress on learning. Man sees himself, in comparison with all other animals, as unique in his mental development and, in particular, in his capacity for achieving high levels of symbolic activity. Thus the learning disorders of disadvantaged children are seen as representing a weak-

ness in man's greatest strength.

Once one accepts the validity of a learning deficit, it inevitably follows that close attention be paid to all aspects of education. However, the influence of developmental theories as far apart as Piaget and Freud has meant that preschool intervention would perhaps receive the greatest attention. Despite their differing orientations, both these philosophies see early behaviors as laying the foundation for all subsequent growth. As a result, weaknesses in this initial structure leave the child not simply with a lag in development, but with an increasing disadvantage relative to his chronological age. This reasoning receives support in the finding of a "cumulative deficit" in which the discrepancy in IQ and achievement between middle class and lower class children increases with age (Deutsch & Brown, 1964).

Factors Underlying the Learning Deficit

Even with agreement as to the nature of the deficit, the problem remains of defining the course of remediation. Learning, even when limited to the academic situation, covers such a host of skills that it is essential to establish priorities of importance. In an effort to obtain a first approximation of some of the critical factors, comparisons were made of the environments of children who did well in school and those who did not. Frequently, this meant comparing the home variables of lower class and middle class families since so much early learning occurs in the home (Freeburg & Payne, 1967). Because of the myriad factors involved, attention was narrowed to those factors which armchair analysis indicated were logically related to poor school functioning. This method has been used at all levels of sophistication, from simple correlations (e.g., few books in the home associated with poor reading achievement) to much more involved analyses. For example, there have now been some studies documenting in specifics the kind of verbal

interchange that occurs between mothers and children from different socio-economic groups (Hess & Shipman, 1965; Bernstein & Henderson, 1968). For the most part, this selection of factors has been on a correlational basis and therefore no cause and effect could be demonstrated.

Programs of Overall Enrichment

The pressure for immediate action, however, meant that correlation would have to serve the role that should have been filled by causal relation. Thus the correlational approach formed the basis for what is probably the most common type of intervention program—namely, that of "overall enrichment." The general philosophy of such programs has been to select those environmental features which seem most central for cognition and offer these, in varying doses, to the disadvantaged child. The premise of these programs is that one enriches or supplements the child's background by offering trips, equipment, stories, conversation, audio

tapes, and any other presumably beneficial experience.

The value of this approach is questionable on many grounds. First, it involves major intervention in many aspects of the child's life and thus requires costly, extensive educational facilities. Second, even if gains in performance are obtained, it is not possible to determine which aspects of the program are responsible since so many areas of the child's life are affected. Third, perhaps the most serious concern is that even with this massive intervention, the cognitive gains are equivocal (Weikart, 1967; Karnes, 1968). This conclusion is, if anything, understated since negative results are rarely reported. This does not mean, however, that we were overly optimistic in our goals since some programs have achieved gains in learning rates and skills (Bereiter & Englemann, 1966a; Blank & Solomon, 1968; Weikart & Wiegerink, 1968). Rather, the limited success of overall enrichment may well rest in the inappropriateness of its philosophy which, like the materials offered, represents a melange of viewpoints. One is the developmental orientation, mentioned earlier, which stresses the continual emergence of new skills. A corollary to this approach, not previously noted, is that these skills will emerge in a uniform sequence in all children as they mature. The emphasis placed upon this uniformity has meant that the environment be viewed as a force that can only affect the rate but in no way alter the sequence. Thus the same techniques and materials can be offered to all children in the belief that they will foster the developmental sequence. As a result, aside from considering differences in the level of development reached, other individual differences are largely ignored. The

basic idea seems to be that the presentation of enriched stimulation appropriate to a given level is bound to affect the behavior

and learning.

This reasoning is reinforced by the successful experimental work of the behaviorists in manipulating learning independent of any individual differences. The Zeitgeist of this approach is so pervasive in our thinking that we are often unaware of its influence and we may even label it by some other term. Thus, a nursery school teacher may not recognize that she is not simply offering warmth and love but is also exerting control over her pupils with such verbal reinforcements as "that's a good job," "you're a big boy,""come on, try again." However, unlike the teacher, the laboratory experimenter has much greater control over his subject in terms of time, stimuli, rewards, sequencing, etc. He can even control such highly motivating physiological states as hunger and thirst. Thus, the laboratory experimenter does not simply present appropriate stimuli; he has immense power to control the organism's response to the stimuli with the result that his procedures can guarantee a high degree of success. It goes without saying that teachers of children do not have such power and would hesitate to use it if they could. As a result, well-designed and potentially useful learning material may be presented by the teacher but be ignored by the child with the result that it fails to serve as an effective stimulus.

In addition, the control that is available to the teacher is further limited by the permissive, activity-oriented nursery school tradition focused on self-expression, social behavior, and emotional adjustment. Many of these aims represent the attempt to bring psychoanalytic principles to early childhood training. These programs may be successful with the well-functioning middle-class child who has already developed strong internal controls in the cognitive sphere. However, the literature on the disadvantaged is replete with descriptions of their failure to have developed such internal skills (Mattick, 1965; Spaulding, 1966), with the result that they frequently withdraw from cognitive demands. In such a situation, the tendency of most permissive orientations would be to leave the material and wait until the child is "ready" to deal with it. As a result, the organization of traditional nursery schools may not be appropriate for the disadvantaged child since it does not afford the control necessary for "shaping" the child's learning.

The Viewpoint of Perceptual Dysfunctioning

Some investigators have taken a different approach from that of overall enrichment in that they have attempted to delineate

specific factors that may be responsible for the learning disorder. One of the most important viewpoints relies heavily on the genetic approach of Piaget (1952) in which it is hypothesized that sensorymotor schema must be fully developed before higher level concepts can be achieved. In this view, the IO and achievement deficits at school age are seen as the result of earlier and perhaps even undiagnosed sensory-motor difficulties in early childhood (Hunt, 1964; Kohlberg, 1966). Surprisingly, although this view of hierarchical deficiencies is directed towards understanding weaknesses in man's unique language and cognitive abilities, support for this view has come mainly from research on animals. This research has shown that severe perceptual and sensory-motor deprivation in very young animals results in later distorted development. Thus, the lamb who is raised without its mother will turn out to be an isolate from other sheep, will prove to be an inadequate mother to its own young, and so on. Studies on institutionalized human infants strongly reinforces this view of the damaging effects of a restricted early environment (Spitz, 1945; Goldfarb, 1945; Dennis, 1960).

Although this concept may be valid for particular groups of infants, the question nevertheless arises as to its usefulness in understanding the disadvantaged. This view is relevant to the disadvantaged child only if it can be demonstrated that he, in fact, is deprived of early basic opportunities for sensory-motor experience. Speculations have been raised as to whether different levels of stimulation exist in lower and middle class homes. The key question, however, concerns the significance of any such differences in the development of sensory-motor skills. Unfortunately there are almost no systematic data on this issue. In addition, in contrast to the studies on institutionalized children, the data that are available suggest that disadvantaged children do not achieve lower developmental scores than middle class children under two years of age (Dreger & Miller, 1968; Bayley, 1965). In many ways it is premature to raise this issue since, for the most part, we have not defined what are the essential stimuli for normal development in the human. As a result, except for extreme cases like severe isolation, we cannot even say with any certainty that a child has experienced perceptual restrictions.

In spite of the lack of evidence in support of a perceptual deficit, this approach has aroused a great interest and a variety of studies have been conducted to demonstrate perceptual dysfunctioning in older disadvantaged children. Research in our unit, however, has indicated the need for much more careful controls before one can state either that perceptual deficiencies do indeed exist in disadvantaged children or, if they do, what role, if any,

they play in later school failure. For example, research on children with learning disorders had indicated difficulties in auditory perception (Olsen, 1966; Deutsch, 1964,; Katz & Deutsch, 1967). A test widely used in this research consists of pairs of highly similar words (e.g., cat-cap) which the subject is asked to judge as the same or different (Wepman, 1960). The finding that retarded readers did poorly on this task was of obvious interest since audition is the modality by which spoken language is learned. These results are intriguing since they raise the possibility that failure to learn written language (i.e., reading) is associated with some kind of failure in discriminating spoken language. In a study replicating and extending this work (Blank, in press), I found that the correlation between the auditory discrimination task and reading performance does not appear to reflect auditory deficiencies per se but rather reflects the deficiencies retarded readers experience in the seemingly simple cognitive demands imposed by this task (i.e., the ability to listen to a sequence, retain the sequence so as to judge one stimulus against the other, and then make a judgment

as to their similarity or difference).

Another area of perceptual functioning which has aroused considerable interest is that of cross-modal integration (Birch & Belmont, 1964; Beery, 1967; Sterritt & Rudnick, 1966). One of the tasks in this area requires the child to select a visual spatial dot pattern (.) as representing a sequence of auditory signals (tap, tap, tap—long pause—tap, tap). The uniformly poor performance of retarded readers on this task has naturally attracted interest since the need to make equivalences between auditory (e.g., spoken words) and visual stimuli (e.g., written words) is vital to the reading process. Research that I had done on crossmodal transfer (Blank & Bridger, 1964, 1966), however, indicated that this task, which is seemingly of a perceptual nature, actually requires a high level of abstract (verbal) conceptualization. The auditory stimuli used in all this research were, of necessity, temporally presented. We found that temporal stimuli, whether visual or auditory, could not be utilized unless coded in a number system. Since the retarded readers had significantly more difficulty in achieving this coding, they were unable to select the dot patterns representing these sequences. What appeared to be a crossmodal deficiency was in fact a failure to code accurately the temporally presented components of the task. These conclusions were reinforced by our findings (Blank & Bridger, 1967; Blank, Weider, & Bridger, 1968) that no differences existed between retarded and normal readers when the tasks were confined to non-abstract, Perceptual components (e.g., repeating temporal rhythms without having to convert them into another modality).

These results also indicated the need to differentiate among levels of verbal skills. For example, the retarded readers were not deficient in applying verbal labels in certain situations, such as labeling spatially presented visual patterns. The difficulty they experienced was in using words to represent abstract concepts, such as temporal duration. These results suggested that a key deficiency in children with learning disorders was not simply a failure in language per se but rather in more abstract symbolic mediation. For brevity's sake, the deficiency might be called a limitation in the "abstract attitude." As indicated in the work of theorists in this area (Goldstein, 1959; Vygotsky, 1962), language is intimately linked with higher level abstract thinking, but lan-

guage itself is not to be equated with such thinking.

Even though the evidence for perceptual dysfunctioning is ambiguous, many programs, particularly those that are Montessori-based, have been established to compensate for this hypothesized deficit. As discussed by Hunt (1964), this type of program has several potential advantages. The materials are well designed and lend themselves to meeting individual differences (i.e., the children can work on their own, at their own rate, and with the material they select). The basic assumption of the program, however, remains open to question; namely, do the materials actually lead the child to develop the concepts for which they were designed? Although the research on this issue is meager, evidence suggests that disadvantaged children do not necessarily assimilate the information provided by self-didactic material (Gotkin et al., 1968). This concern receives support from the fact that contrary to the original philosophy many Montessori programs have been altered to include more language training (Kohlberg, 1966). As a result, these programs may differ little from those of overall enrichment

The Central Role of Language in Learning Deficiencies1

It should be noted that in all enrichment programs, regardless of orientation, language has emerged as a common denominator of the learning deficit. This had led many investigators to the belief that while other handicaps may exist, language is at the core of the difficulty for the disadvantaged child. The work of Bernstein (1960, 1961) on restricted and elaborated codes has been a

¹Of further reference to this section is the article following in this issue, "The Situation: A Neglected Source of Social Class Differences in Language Use," by Courtney B. Cazden. [General Editor]

major impetus to this approach. "In his definition, restricted codes are stereotyped, limited, and condensed, lacking in specificity and the exactness needed for precise conceptualization and differentiation. Sentences are short, simple, often unfinished; there is little use of subordinate clauses for elaborating the content of the sentence; it is a language of implicit meaning, easily understood and commonly shared. The basic quality of this mode is to limit the range and detail of concept and information involved (Hess &

Shipman, 1966, p. 94)."

Even if these conclusions are valid, the problem remains of determining which of the extremely broad range of language skills needs most to be fostered. Unfortunately here again we lack the necessary empirical foundation on which to build our teaching. The most logical source for such information would seem to be the psychological laboratory. However, much of the experimental research in psychology conducted in the United States has been influenced by the behaviorist tradition in which one deals only with external behaviors; internal mental processes are seen as either unknown or unknowable (Skinner, 1953). This has meant that research on language has inevitably focused on those aspects of verbalization that can readily be observed and measured in the laboratory setting. As a result emphasis has been placed on simple verbal labels as in discrimination learning (e.g., red, large, man, chair, etc.) and in paired associate learning (e.g., man-coat, window-bread, picture-happy) (Kendler, Kendler, & Wells, 1959; Spiker & Norcross, 1962).

Research, however, has suggested that disadvantaged children, while often lacking certain labels, are nevertheless not seriously deficient in this aspect of verbalization (John, 1963; Blank & Bridger, 1964, 1966, 1967). Their difficulty seems to be in the use of more complex verbal structures (as in causal thinking, conditional statements, achieving deductions, retrieving past events, etc.). The aforementioned abilities involve internal mental processes and therefore they have received scant attention from the

behavioral psychologists.

The limited view of language espoused by the behaviorists has been strongly criticized by linguists who use the transformational grammar model (Chomsky, 1957). This view emphasizes the fact that meaningful language involves not simply the learning of discrete words, but rather the rules by which these words are organized. Thus, the words "boy," "girl," "ran," "small," "the," "to," "a," tell us relatively little. These same words when organized in the state of the size of the si ized into the form "A small boy ran to the girl" tell us a definite message. In recent years, work by psycholinguists using the transformational grammar model has led to considerable advance in our knowledge of the syntax (structure) of language and the way syntactic structures are mastered by the young child (Brown &

Bellugi, 1964; Ervin & Miller, 1963).

This work has been largely responsible for one of the currently popular views about the language of the disadvantaged; namely, their language may not be the same as "standard" (middle class) dialect, but that does not mean that it is a poorer language (Baratz, 1968; Cazden, 1966; Labov, Cohen, & Robbins, 1965). This view is extremely relevant to the many attempts in public education directed at altering any dialects simply because they differ from "standard middle class." It should be noted, however, that much of the educational concern is not focused on dialect but on "the use of language for learning and communicating ideas (Cazden, 1966, p. 138)." This distinction was well illustrated in a study which found that lower class Negro children utilized the verbal descriptions of middle class white children more effectively than they utilized the verbal descriptions of their peers (Heider, Cazden, & Brown, 1968). Thus, familiarity of dialect need not

insure adequate use of language.

These results also suggest that the organizational principles governing the structure of a language may be quite distinct from the function that the language serves in thinking and problem solving. Thus, the question is not simply one of determining the similarities and differences in the structural components of various dialect systems but rather how effectively the child is using the language he already possesses. The work of Richelle and Feuerstein (1957) seems particularly relevant here since it was initially motivated by a desire to determine the differences in thinking among lower class Israeli children from different cultural backgrounds. Contrary to expectations, they found few differences among children from various lower class communities since they tended to have simple, undifferentiated concepts in which language was used in a primitive way. On the basis of these results it appeared that differences in thinking existed only when people possessed complex, well-developed mental skills. In the case of lower class children, the necessary skills have not developed, resulting in a relative paucity of such differentiation. Thus while attempts to preserve the structural language of the disadvantaged may well be valid, concentration on this aspect may cause us to overlook functional components of language. As a result attention may unfortunately be drawn away from efforts to correct possible functional limitations.

Intervention Programs Focused on Language

The critical distinction between the form and function of language has been pointed out by many noted theorists including Piaget (1952), Sapir (1921), and Vygotsky (1962). Nevertheless, the work of the psycholinguists has concentrated almost solely on the structural and phonological rules of language (e.g., does the child have the negative form, does he have a means for indicating plurals, does he use compound sentences). Almost no headway has been made towards defining the functions that language may serve (for poetry, for description, for propagandizing, for prob-

lem solving, for psycho-dynamic defenses, etc.).

Thus, psycholinguistics, like behaviorism, provides an extremely limited empirical basis from which to derive guidelines for teaching language skills to children, whether disadvantaged or otherwise. The result has been that in the teaching of verbal abilities there has been an orientation similar to that in overall enrichment; namely, try to offer every possible language skill that may be important. This ranges across such things as verbal labels, verbal descriptions of objects, rote repetition of sentences, listening to stories, facilitating dialogue, etc. Weikart and Weigerink's description (1968) of "verbal bombardment" seems the most apt term for this approach. Although questions might be raised about the expense and redundancy of such a wide range of stimulation, the most serious questions concern the child's incorporation of the material. There is rarely adequate assurance that the child will partake of the verbalization or make it a meaningful part of his experience. At most, the child might be asked to respond to a specific item such as "Say what I say," "What do you see in the picture?", and so on. Most teaching, however, is done in a group situation with the result that any overt response that is required is asked of only one child. It is assumed that in any dialogue that occurs, the other children will attend and comprehend even though they are not required to answer overtly. If the attention and comprehension are lacking, however, the children cannot follow the dialogue and the teaching, no matter how well organized, is lost.

The recognition of these difficulties has led to programs geared to requiring more active participation by the children. One of the first attempts to offer a program of more focused and directed language skills was that of Bereiter and Englemann (1966a, 1966b). Not only did they limit the type of verbalization to which the children were exposed, but they radically changed the behavior required of the child. For example, verbal responses were de-

manded of the children regardless of their interest in the material. In so doing, this program discarded the permissive orientation characteristic of nursery schools and adopted a more fully consis-

tent behaviorist position.

Consistency does not necessarily yield success. However, in the case of the Bereiter-Englemann program, the consistent behaviorist approach was ideally suited to the deficiencies of the disadvantaged child. Unlike so many other attempts at enrichment, the program demanded some level of response from the children. The material and teachers could not be ignored and thus the program refused to allow the children their well-documented mechan-

ism of avoidance (Deutsch, 1966; Mattick, 1965).

Questions nevertheless remain as to the effectiveness of the material that the child is given to inject, particularly since Bereiter and Englemann have given scant attention to several key areas. First, their approach analyzes only the material to be taught; it ignores the cognitive processes in the child that may influence the way the material is incorporated. The hope is that with sufficient exposure to the minute components of any process the child eventually is bound to learn. This philosophy is largely responsible for their almost total reliance on rote drill. Second, although they are interested in developing higher-level thinking, they feel that the most fruitful path is the development of language structures (e.g., prepositions, adverbs, full sentences). Research is needed to determine whether the rote repetition of language eventually will lead to developing the underlying cognitive structures that Bereiter and Englemann wish to foster. Third, this program, like many others, ignores individual differences in functioning. By this, I do not mean simply rate of learning, but such factors as style of learning, personality factors, motivation (Kagan, Moss, & Sigel, 1963; Witkin, Dyk, Faterson, Goodenough, & Karp, 1962).

It should be noted that almost no program in the sphere of public education grapples effectively with these issues. For example, we give lip service to the words "individual differences," but almost total reliance is placed on group teaching. At most, "individual teaching" means smaller groups or some degree of personalized attention in the group setting. This approach is then rationalized as representing egalitarian ideals since it is based on the assumption that all normal children are capable of achieving the same learning through the same techniques. As a result one-to-one teaching becomes tinged with either anti-democratic overtones or, worse still, the connotation of illness (e.g., psychotherapy) since it must be used only for children who do not fit the norm. These assumptions may be applicable to older children who already have a large body of consensually validated informa-

tion, language, and attitudes. However, even here the large number of learning disorders makes group teaching a questionable method for many children. How much more questionable this method must be for introducing the precursors of abstract thinking to the young child who is distractable, egocentric, and limited in verbal skill. Another of the biases against individual teaching rests on the implicit assumption that individual teaching would or should occupy most of the teaching day. Little consideration has been given to the possible effectiveness of short periods of daily individual instruction, even though such instruction is widely and effectively used in the initial teaching of cognition to other language deficient groups, e.g., deaf children (Blank, 1965). In addition, the limited attention spans of young children suggest that relatively brief sessions involving frequent reinforcement of new (cognitive) skills would theoretically be the most effective means of teaching.

Difficulties in teaching higher-level cognition in the group setting may not matter to the middle-class child who has numerous opportunities at home for a rich one-to-one verbal interchange. The latter may even allow the child to partake more fully of the group learning situation since he is developing the necessary fund of skills for this activity. This often is not the case with the disadvantaged child who has limited access to such individual attention. He can only rely on the group setting where adult attention is diluted and sporadic. As a result, serious questions exist as to whether the group setting can provide the necessary oppor-

tunities for higher-level learning.

A Language-Based Tutorial Program

With these considerations in mind, I developed a program of individual teaching designed to foster the precursors of abstract thinking that were needed by the pre-school age disadvantaged child (Blank & Solomon, 1968, 1969; Blank, 1968). The teaching was done daily, but occupied only a small part of the school day (about 15-20 minutes per session). As in all intervention programs the teaching reflected underlying assumptions about the nature of learning. First, it contrasted with programs that view the learning deficit as resulting from the child's not having experienced sufficiently varied and extensive stimulation. Rather, the learning difficulties were here seen as reflecting the children's failure to develop a symbolic system which would permit them to see the plentiful stimulation already available to them as existing in a coherent, logical, and predictable framework. Second, it contrasted with programs which view learning as the acquisition of

increasing numbers of facts and skills. Such information is obviously necessary if the child is to be familiar with the basic terms of the society (vocabulary). However, this view, which rests heavily on the concept of the mind as tabula rasa fails to recognize the active role played by the mind in organizing the input it receives. Recognition of the different levels of cognitive processing by the child stems in large measure from the work of Piaget wherein he documented the numerous errors made by children in seemingly "obvious" situations. These errors are comprehensible only if one recognizes that data are not simply imprinted as is but are reorganized to make them congruent with the already established mental structures. Gradually through the interplay of maturation and environment these limitations are overcome, and the child gains a more subtle and deeper understanding of reality.

Unfortunately, however, Piaget makes almost no effort to document the specific environmental opportunities that influence development. As a result, aside from trying to teach directly the particular concepts emphasized by Piaget (conservation of size, number, etc.), his theory does not delineate which factors will serve to facilitate the developmental sequence. A beginning may be made on this problem if one considers not the specific concepts in which the child makes errors, but the factors in his thinking that may have led to the error. Thus, in the classic experiment on number conservation (Piaget, 1968, where for example a child says that 6 objects spread apart are "more" than 6 identical objects spaced close together), the error is caused in part by the child's being bound by the perceptual cues before him with the result that he fails to impose delay on himself or to draw upon relevant skills which he may already have (e.g., counting).

One may attempt to overcome the difficulty by repeatedly exposing the child to this situation and explaining what he should do and/or requiring him to do it (Lenrow, 1968). Such training, however, may be self-defeating since it places the child in a situation in which his verbal and perceptual world are in conflict. He can learn to "mouth" the verbalization, but it does not represent his reality—with the possible result that illogical thinking is reinforced. An alternative course would be to train the child to use the cognitive and language skills in situations where no conflict exists. In such a case, the language may not necessarily be essential for solution but it will be congruent with reality and may even aid problem solving, e.g., as in improved Porteus maze performance with self-directed verbal commands (Palkes, Stewart, & Kahana, 1968). In essence, this approach attempts to develop the act in the child of using higher level cognitive skills even in situations where they may be redundant so that he may then be able to draw on these skills when they are essential for solution. Thus, the program I developed focused on developing a repertoire of cognitive skills which would help the child acquire strategies of thinking and information processing (selective attention, inner verbalization, ability to delay, imagery of future events, etc.) that would transfer to later more complex learning situations.

To achieve these goals a common core of the program was the representation of reality through language. This meant using the words already in the child's repertoire so as to allow him both to see their relevance to particular situations and to extend their meaning to a wider framework. It also meant having the children test out the relevance of their verbalizations by giving them the opportunity to demonstrate whether their language reflected or differed from reality (e.g., if they said a piece of metal would break when it fell, they were asked to let the object fall and see if, in fact, it broke). As indicated by this example, these goals placed little emphasis on the acquisition of information independent of the content in which it might be relevant. Thus, it was felt that if sensory dimensions such as form, texture, and color were taught as independent facts, the children could learn to recognize and label them through building up a fund of associational learning. Such information, however, may contribute relatively little to helping the child organize his world on a more systematic basis. For example, one might teach the recognition of a large number of tactual sensations (e.g., rough, sticky, wet, sandy, smooth, heavy) and feel that a grouping of "things that can be felt" unified these disparate bits of information. Such an abstract grouping exists largely in the mind of the adult, however, and may well be lost on the child. Much greater meaning can be gained if the child is asked not simply to recognize a particular stimulus, but rather is presented with a problem in which the tactual cues are necessary for solution (e.g., Which one of these could we use if we wanted to stick something on the wall—the rough sandpaper or the sticky tape? Which one of these will leave your hands wet—the milk or the flour?). Thus, the aim of the teaching was to offer common material and then pose many related questions about it which would require the child to reflect, seek information, maintain concentration, examine alternatives, and so on.

The unique opportunity afforded by the one-to-one teaching situation both helped the child to develop sustained sequential thinking and allowed the teacher continuously to diagnose difficulties and readjust the lesson to make it appropriate to the child's culties and readjust the lesson to make it appropriate where a level. This is in marked contrast to the group setting where a child's errors (either wrong answers or failure to answer) are al-

most inevitably followed by didactic teaching or by turning to another child until the correct answer is supplied. In either case, the child who did not know the correct answer may often be left in ignorance since he must take the information on faith. There is little opportunity in the group setting for the teacher to pursue the reason for his failure and then to offer him the necessary experiences to help him understand the rationale for the correct

answer.

The program of individual teaching was applied in a pilot program involving a group of 12 three to four year old children (Blank & Solomon, 1968, 1969). Thus far, promising results have been obtained and the progress has been dramatic and rapid. After three months, the mean increases in IQ in groups tutored five and three times per week were 14.5 and 7.0 points respectively. In a group of three children given individual but not cognitively oriented sessions gains in performance and IQ were not found. Comparable results were obtained in a replication of this study involving kindergarten age children who had no previous preschool experience. Clinically, however, the changes in performance were more difficult to achieve at the 5-6 year range, reinforcing the belief in the greater efficacy of earlier intervention. The program is in its initial stages of development and a great many problems must be explored. For example, a high degree of diagnostic skill coupled with ease in communicating with young children is demanded of the teacher. This makes the training of teachers quite exacting since they must develop insight rather than rely on methods such as programmed instruction. In addition, basic issues must be resolved concerning the length of time such a program must be kept up for the gains to be maintained, the relative effectiveness of different teaching techniques, the training of teachers, etc.

This program and others outlined above should be seen as preliminary attempts to establish focused programs of intervention. Even when their success is limited, such programs have the advantage of being based upon delineated, testable hypotheses which are necessary to help us go beyond the original approach of overall enrichment. In this way the nursery school can assume the vital function of serving as the natural laboratory for studying the processes of thinking in early development. Thus, properly designed intervention programs may perform the dual function of advancing basic knowledge in human behavior as well as posi-

tively affecting the children under their aegis.

REFERENCES

BARATZ, J. The assessment of language and cognitive abilities of the Negro. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, San Francisco, September 1968.

BAYLEY, N. Comparison of mental and motor test scores for ages one-15 months by sex, birth order, race, geographical location, and education of parents.

Child Development, 1965, 36, 379-411.

BEERY, J. Matching of auditory and visual stimuli by average and retarded readers. Child Development, 1967, 38, 828-833. Bereiter, C., & Englemann, S. Teaching disadvantaged children in the preschool.

Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966. (a) Bereiter, C., & Englemann, S. An academically oriented preschool for disadvantaged children: Results from the initial experimental group. Paper presented at OISE Conference on Preschool Education. In Ontario Inst. Studies in Education Monograph Series #4, 1966. (b)

Bernstein, B. Language and social class. British Journal of Sociology, 1960, 11, 271-

Bernstein, B. Social class and linguistic development: A theory of social learning. In A. H. Halsey, J. Flond, & C. A. Anderson (Eds.), Education, economy and society. New York: Free Press, 1961.

BERNSTEIN, B., & HENDERSON, D. Social class differences in the relevance of language to socialization. Report of the Sociological Research Unit, Uni-

versity of London Institute of Education, 1968.

BIRCH, H., & BELMONT, L. Auditory-visual integration in normal and retarded readers. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 1964, 34, 852-861.

Blank, M. Use of the deaf in language studies: A reply to Furth. Psychological Bulletin, 1965, 63, 412-444.

BLANK, M. A methodology for fostering abstract thinking in deprived children. Paper presented at Ontario Institute Studies in Education Conference,

BLANK, M. Cognitive processes in auditory discrimination in normal and re-

tarded readers. Child Development, 1968, 39, 1091-1101. BLANK, M., & BRIDGER, W. H. Cross-modal transfer in nursery school children. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 1964, 58, 277-282. BLANK, M., & BRIDGER, W. H. Deficiencies in verbal labeling in retarded read-

ers. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 1966, 38, 840-847. BLANK, M., & BRIDGER, W. H. Perceptual abilities and conceptual deficiencies in retarded readers. In J. Zubin (Ed.), Psychopathology of intelligence. New

BLANK, M., & SOLOMON, F. A tutorial language program to develop abstract thinking in socially disadvantaged preschool children. Child Development,

BLANK, M., & SOLOMON, F. How shall the disadvantaged child be taught? Child

BLANK, M., WEIDER, S., & BRIDGER, W. H. Verbal deficiencies in abstract thinking in early reading retardation. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 1968, Brown, R., & Bellugi, V. Three processes in the child's acquisition of syntax.

Harvard Educational Review, 1964, 34, 133-151. CAZDEN, C. B. Some implications of research on language development for preschool education. In R. D. Hess & R. M. Bear (Eds.), Early Education. Chicago: Aldine, 1966.

CHOMSKY, N. Syntactic structures. The Hague: Mouton, 1957.

DENNIS, W. Causes of retardation among institutional children. Iranian Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1960, 96, 47-60.

DEUTSCH, C. P. Auditory discrimination and learning: Social factors. Merrill-

Palmer Quarterly, 1964, 10, 277-296.

DEUTSCH, C. P. Learning in the disadvantaged. In W. Harris (Ed.), Analyses of Concept Learning. New York: Academic Press, 1966.

DEUTSCH, M. Facilitating development in the preschool child: Social and psychological perspectives. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 1964, 10, 249-263.

DEUTSCH, M., & BROWN, B. Social influences in Negro-white intelligence differences. Journal of Social Issues, 1964, 20 (2), 24-35.

DREGER, R. M., & MILLER, K. S. Comparative psychological studies of Negroes and whites in the United States 1959-1965. Psychological Bulletin Monograph Supplement, 1968, 70, No. 3, Part 2.

ERVIN, S. M., & MILLER, W. R. Language development. Yearbook National Social

Studies Education, 1963, 62, Part 1.

FEUERSTEIN, R. The learning potential assessment device: A new method for assessing modifiability of the cognitive functioning of socio-culturally disadvantaged adolescents. Paper presented to Israel Foundations Trustees, Jerusalem, January 1968.

FREEBURG, N. E., & PAYNE, D. T. Parental influence on cognitive development in

early childhood: A review. Child Development, 1967, 38, 65-87.

GOLDFARB, W. Effects of psychological deprivation in infancy and subsequent stimulation. American Journal of Psychiatry, 1945, 102, 18-33. GOLDSTEIN, K. Functional disturbances in brain damage. In S. Arieti (Ed.),

American Handbook of Psychiatry, Vol. 1. New York: Basic Books, 1959.

GOTKIN, L. S., CAUDLE, F., CANS, H., SAGGESSE, V., & SCHOENFELD, L. Effects of two types of feedback on training and posttest performance in a visual discrimination task. Unpublished manuscript from Institute for Developmental Studies, New York, 1968.

HEIDER, E. R., CAZDEN, C. B., & BROWN, R. Social class differences in the effectiveness and style of children's coding ability. Report for Project Literacy

Reports, 1968.

HESS, R. D., & SHIPMAN, V. C. Early experience and the socialization of cog-

nitive modes in children. Child Development, 1965, 36, 869-886.

HESS, R. D., & SHIPMAN, V. C. Material influences upon early learning: The cognitive environments of urban pre-school children. In R. D. Hess & R. M. Bear (Eds.), Early Education. Chicago: Aldine, 1966.

HILGARD, E. R., & MARQUIS, D. G. Conditioning and learning. New York: Appleton

Century Crofts, 1961.

HUNT, J. McV. The psychological basis for using preschool enrichment as an antidote for cultural deprivation. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 1964, 10, 309-348. JOHN, V. P. The intellectual development of slum children: Some preliminary

findings. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 1963, 33, 813-822.

KAGAN, J., Moss, H. A., & Sigel, I. E. Psychological significance of styles of conceptualization. In J. C. Wright & J. Kagan (Eds.), Basic cognitive processes in children. Monogr. Soc. Res. Child Development, 1963, 28, No. 2 (Whole No.

KARNES, M. B. The research program for the preschool disadvantaged at the University of Illinois. Paper presented at the American Educational Research Association, Chicago, February 1968.

KATZ, P. A., & DEUTSCH, M. The relationship of auditory and visual functioning to reading achievement in disadvantaged children. Paper presented at Soc. Research Child Development, New York, March 1967.

KENDLER, T. S., KENDLER, H. H., & WELLS, D. Reversal and nonreversal shifts in nursery school children. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1959, 58, 55-

60.

KOHLBERG, L. Montessori with the culturally disadvantaged: A cognitivedevelopmental interpretation and some research findings. In R. D. Hess & R. M. Bear (Eds.), Early Education. Chicago: Aldine, 1966.

LABOV, W., COHEN, P., & ROBBINS, C. A preliminary study of the structure of English used by Negro and Puerto Rican speakers in New York City. Final Report, Cooperative Research Project No. 3091, Office of Education, 1965.

LENROW, P. B. Preschool socialization and the development of competence. Project Evaluation Report, Institute of Human Development, University of California, Berkeley, March 1968.

LORENZ, K. E. Imprinting. The Auk, 1937, 54, 245-273.

MATTICK, I. Adaptation of nursery school techniques to deprived children: Some notes on the experiences of teaching children of multi-problem families in a therapeutically oriented nursery school. Journal of the American Academy of Child Psychiatry, 1965, 4, 670-700.

OLSEN, A. V. Relation of achievement test scores and specific reading abilities to the Frostig developmental test of visual perception. Perceptual and Motor

Skills, 1966, 22, 179-184.

PALKES, H., Stewart, M., & KAHANS, B. Porteus maze performance of hyperactive boys after training in self directed verbal commands. Child Development, 1968, 39, 817-826.

Plager, J. The origins of intelligence in children. New York: International University

Press, 1952.

Plager, J. Quantification, conservation and nativism. Science, 1968, 162, 976-979. RICHELLE, M., & FEUERSTEIN, R. Enfants Juife Nord Africaine: Essai psychopedagogique a l'intention des educateurs. Aliyah des Jeunes de l'Agenne Juive, Tel Aviv, 1957.

SAPIR, E. Language: An introduction to the study of speech. New York: Harcourt Brace,

1921

SKINNER, B. F. Science and human behavior. New York: Free Press, 1958.

SPAULDING, R. L. The Durham education improvement program. Paper presented at OISE Conference on Preschool Education. In Ontario Inst. Studies in Education. Monogr. Series #4, 1966. SPIKER, C., & NORCROSS, K. Effects of previously acquired stimulus names on

discrimination performance. Child Development, 1962, 33, 859-864.

SPITZ, R. A. Hospitalism: An inquiry into the genesis of psychiatric conditions in early childhood. *Psychoanalytic Study of Child*, 1945, 1, 53-74.

STERRITT, O., & RUDNICK, M. Auditory and visual perception in relation to reading ability in fourth grade boys. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 1966, 22, ULRICH, R., STACHNIK, T., & MABRY, J. Control of human behavior. Glenview, Ill.: 859-864.

Scott, Foresman, 1966.

Vygotsky, L. S. Thought and language (Trans. Eds. E. Kaufmann & C. Valtar). New York: Wiley, 1962.

Weikart, D. P. Preschool programs: Preliminary findings. Journal of Special

Education, 1967, 1, 163-181.

Weikart, D. P., & Wiegerink, R. Initial results of a comparative preschool curriculum project. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, San Francisco, September 1968. WEPMAN, J. M. Auditory discrimination, speech, and reading. Elementary School

Journal, 1960, 60, 325-333.

WILKERSON, D. A. Selected readings on the disadvantaged. In J. Hellmuth (Ed.),

Disadvantaged child, Vol. 1. Seattle Special Child Publications, 1967. WITKIN, H. A., DYK, R. B., FATERSON, H. F., GOODENOUGH, D. R., & KARP, S. A. Psychological differentiation. New York: Wiley, 1962. AND THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPER

The second secon

The second secon

Processing the second of the s

the said among the part of the continue of the 2 continue of the continue of t

The same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the sa

to the community of the contraction of the contract

and the work and the second se

The second series in particular of the boundary care and constitutions of the second s

A Company of the Comp

The state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the s

The Situation: A Neglected Source of Social Class Differences in Language Use¹

Courtney B. Cazden Harvard University

Study of the acquisition of language has been based on the assumption that what had to be described and explained was the acquisition of a repertoire of responses (in the terminology of behaviorism) or the acquisition of a finite set of rules for constructing utterances (in the terminology of developmental psycholinguistics). On this assumption, the school language problems of lower-class (LC) children can have two explanations: either they have acquired less language than middle-class (MC) children or they have acquired a different language. The "less language" explanation has been given various names—cultural deprivation, deficit hypothesis, vacuum ideology—all with the same connotation of a non-verbal child somehow emptier of language than his more socially fortunate age-mates. The "different language" explanation is forcefully argued by William Stewart and Joan Baratz (Baratz, 1969a; Baratz, 1969b; Aarons, Gordon, & Stewart, 1970). It states that all children acquire language but that many children, especially LC black children, acquire a dialect of English so different in structural (grammatical) features that com-

¹This paper, slightly changed and titled "The neglected situation in child language research and education," also appears in F. Williams (Ed.), Language and poverty: Perspectives on a theme. Chicago: Markham, 1970.

munication in school, both oral and written, is seriously impaired by that fact alone.2

The "Less Language" Explanation

Grammatical Competence. For different reasons neither of these explanations is adequate. Consider first the "less language" explanation. There is growing evidence that if we are referring to what is called "grammatical competence," the child's implicit knowledge of language structure, then social-class differences are simply not great enough to explain the language problems which teachers report from the classroom. Three pieces of evidence can be offered.

First, LaCivita, Kean, & Yamamoto (1966) report a study in which lower-middle and upper-class elementary school children from three schools in Youngstown, Ohio were asked to give the meaning of nonsense words in sentences such as the following:

Ungubily the mittler gimmled. (grammatical signal -ed only cue) A twener baikels meedily. (grammatical signal plus position cue)

They hypothesized that lower-class children would have less understanding of grammatical structure and thus be less able to give a word that was the same part of speech as the underlined nonsense word (in the above instance, a verb). This hypothesis was not confirmed. Older children were better than younger children, and position cues aided comprehension, but the lower-class children were at no disadvantage.

Second, Slobin reports beginning returns from a crosscultural study of the acquisition of language in Mexico, India, Samoa, Kenya, and the Negro ghetto in Oakland, California:

Though we have not yet analyzed the language development of the children studied in these diverse groups, it is the impression of the field workers that they all appear to acquire language at a normal rate and are clearly not "linguistically deprived." This is certainly true of the Oakland children whom we have begun to study in some detail [1968, p. 13].

Finally, when the mean length of utterance (in morphemes, see Slobin, 1967) of LC Negro children in a Boston day-care center (Cazden, 1965) is compared with the mean length of utterance of MC white children (Brown, Cazden, & Bellugi, 1969; Bloom, 1970), there is some evidence that the LC Negro children who were studied achieved grammatical development at a similar rate. Figure 1 gives this comparison. Dotted lines are for the three Cam-

²See also the article preceding in this issue, "Implicit Assumptions Underlying Preschool Intervention Programs," by Marion Blank. [General Editor]




FIGURE 1 Mean Utterance Length and Age in 18 Children.

bridge children studied by Brown et al.—two children of graduate students on the left and a lower-middle class child on the right. Broken lines are for Bloom's three New York City children, all from MC families. Solid lines are for Cazden's twelve Negro children in Boston whose development was followed for only four months.

The speech of one of the Negro children studied is particularly interesting. Gerald is the boy whose mean length of utterance is above 5 morphemes, almost off the top of the graph. His first speech sample was taken when he was 33 months old. Following are all his utterances of 7 or more morphemes in the first 200 utterances of that speech sample (unpublished speech samples from Cazden, 1965):

29. I'm looking for a cup (7)

36. I waiting for a other cup. (7)

63. You put it up on there like dis. (8)

69. I gon' put dis one in 'nere. (7)

109. Look at what I made with dis one. (8)

122. Den gon' put dis one back in here cause it fell out (12)

155. I'm gonna knock dese things in. (8)171. Soon I get finish I gon' do dat way. (9)197. Can I take it off and put it on? (9)

Whatever Gerald's communication problems may be in any particular situation, and I will suggest later that a problem could arise, they are not caused by deficiencies in grammatical com-

petence.

Admittedly, the fact that the grammatical development of these particular twelve black children is comparable in rate to children the same age from MC families does not prove that all LC children would do as well. But it does raise questions about inferences made about children's language from test scores alone or from less adequate samples of spontaneous speech (see Moore,

in press, for further arguments).

Vocabulary. So far I have been talking about the structure of the child's language, his grammar, and have argued that the characterization of "less language" does not fit LC children. Language also has a set of words—or lexicon. Do LC children have "less language" in the sense of fewer words in their mental dictionary? Here the characterization seems to fit better. All vocabulary studies report wide social-class differences. (See Lesser et al., 1965, for one study designed with exemplary care in respect to choice of test words and conditions of test administration.)

However, nagging questions remain about the interpretation

of such test results. In an article published in 1966, I wrote:

Tyler says that "lower-class children use a great many words, and a number of them use these words with a high degree of precision; but facility

with words commonly used by the lower classes is not correlated with success in school" (Eels, Davis, Havighurst, Herrick, and Tyler, 1951, p. 40). Does Tyler mean that children from different status groups know and use different words? . . . How does this relate to Nida's (1958, p. 283) suggestion that "subcultures have proportionately more extensive vocabularies in the area of their distinctiveness?" Can one speak of the vocabulary of a . . . dialect as structured?

While we have made real progress in understanding the structure of language in the intervening years, comparable progress in the conceptual or semantic area is yet to come. Our understanding of social class differences will gain from that basic research. Note that research on "applied" questions about the nature of social-class differences can itself contribute to our understanding of "basic" questions about the nature of language, as Hymes (in press) argues. An outstanding example is the work of Labov et al. (1968) on the phonology and grammar of non-standard Negro English (NNE), which both uses and extends the linguistic de-

scriptions of Chomsky's transformational grammar.

Lexical Representations. One new question about social class differences in word knowledge also derives from Chomsky's work (Chomsky & Halle, 1968). It is the relation between a person's understanding of the sound system of English and his knowledge of a particular part of the English lexicon, i.e., learn-ed or Latinate words. Briefly, if our knowledge of the sound system of English were limited to the sounds present in words as spoken, we would not understand morphemic relations such as: histor -y, histor -ical, histor -ian; anxi -ous, anxi -ety; courage, courageous; tele -graph, tele -graph -ic, tele -graph -y. The only way to account for this system of sound relationships is to postulate an underlying structure which consists of a single and highly abstract "lexical representation" of each morpheme (a unit of meaning, whether free like courage or bound like -ous). This underlying representation is related to the surface representation of the morpheme—its sound as spoken—by a complex set of phonological rules which somehow become part of the implicit linguistic knowledge of the native speaker.

Much of the evidence that determines, for the phonologist, the exact form of this underlying system is based on consideration of learned words and complex derivational patterns. This is clear from examples presented earlier. . . . It is by no means obvious that a child of six has mastered this phonological system in full. He may not yet have been presented with the evidence that determines the general structure of this system. A similar question arises in the case of an adult who is not immersed in the literary culture [Chomsky, in press].

According to Chomsky & Halle (1968) the underlying system of lexical representations conforms extremely well to standard En-

glish spelling, contrary to popular notions of chaotic irregularities. But only someone who had acquired this full system, by familiarity with Latinate words, could take full advantage of that regularity in learning to read. This is one very specific but very important aspect of language where lower-class speakers may be at a disadvantage.

The "Different Language" Explanation

The "different language" explanation is clearly true, but also inadequate. Dialects do differ in structural features which must be taken into account in planning curriculum materials and instructional techniques. Labov's research is now providing analyses of one dialect, NNE, that will make such planning possible. (See Labov et al., 1968, Vol. 1, for a full report of the research on phonology and grammar, and Labov, 1969, for a brief and less technical summary with educational implications suggested.) According to Labov, the structural differences between NNE and standard English (SE) are few in number. Furthermore, a person's grammatical competence in speaking and understanding are not necessarily identical, and there is considerable evidence that speakers of the NNE understand some, though not all, of the features of SE they do not themselves produce. Repetition tests are one source of such evidence.

In repetition tests with fourteen-year-old Negro boys, members of the peer group we have known for several years, we find that many unhesitatingly repeat ask Albert if he knows how to play baseball as axe Albert do he know how to play baseball. On the other hand, if the test sentence was ask Albert whether he knows how to play baseball, most of the subjects had far more trouble [Labov, 1969, p. 46].

Correct translation of a SE sentence into the speaker's NNE dialect presupposes correct understanding of the original. While NNE speakers ask questions in the do he know form, they understand the SE use of if but not whether.

Inadequacy of Both Explanations

The inadequacy of both the "less language" and the "different language" characterizations is two-fold. First, both refer only to patterns of structural form and ignore patterns of use in actual speech events. Second, they assume that the child learns only one way to speak which is reflected in the same fashion and to the same extent at all times. On both theoretical and practical grounds, we can no longer accept such limitations. We must attend not only to the abilities of individuals and how they de-

velop, but to qualities of the situation, or temporary environment, in which those abilities are activated. Such attention to the interaction of abilities and environments is increasing in psychology, linguistics, and education.

The Power of Environments. Barker has coined the name "eco-

logical psychology" and argues for its importance:

When environments are relatively uniform and stable, people are an obvious source of behavior variance, and the dominant scientific problem and the persistent queries from the applied fields are: What are people like? What is the nature and what are the sources of individual differences? . . . But today environments are more varied and unstable than heretofore and their contribution to the variance of behavior is enhanced. Both science and society ask with greater urgency than previously: What are environments like?

... How do environments select and shape the people who inhabit them?

... These are questions for ecological psychology [1968, p. 3].

When Kagan (1967) issued a call for "relativism" in psychology which would include the context or situation in descriptions of behavior, Psathas answered:

When Kagan uses the term "relativistic," he says that it "refers to a definition in which context and state of the individual are part of the defining statement." The "neglected situation" as Goffman (1964) has called it and the state of the individual, particularly his internal symbol manipulating state, need to be considered. They would involve Kagan in sociology and anthropology much more than he recognizes. The "context" that he refers to is one that has socially defined stimulus value. The social definitions for a situation are pregiven, i.e., exist before the psychologist or experimenter enters on the scene. He must, therefore, understand what these are and how they are perceived by the subject before he can claim to understand why the subject behaves the way he does. The "state of the individual" includes not only his biological and physiological state but his interpretive structuring of the world as he experiences it, based on his previous socialization experiences as a member of the culture [1968, p. 136].

While Barker seeks an objective description of the environment analogous to the characteristics of light or sound in the study of perception, Psathas calls for study of the environment as socially

defined and perceived by individuals.

Communicative Competence. Applied to language this means that we have to describe more than the child's grammatical competence; we have to describe what Hymes (in press) calls "communicative competence," which is how the child perceives and categorizes the social situations of his world and differentiates his ways of speaking accordingly. The important point here is not a contrast between competence or knowledge on the one hand, and performance or behavior on the other hand, though many people—including myself in an earlier paper (Cazden, 1967)—have formulated the question in this way. A child's manifest verbal behavior, or performance, has both grammatical and pragmatic aspects. And it is a reflection of implicit knowledge or competence, both of grammar and of use.

The acquisition of competence for use, indeed, can be stated in the same terms as acquisition of competence for grammar. Within the developmental matrix in which knowledge of the sentences of a language is acquired, children also acquire knowledge of a set of ways in which sentences are used. From a finite experience of speech acts and their interdependence with socio-cultural features they develop a general theory of the speaking appropriate in their community, which they employ, like other forms of tacit cultural knowledge (competence) in conducting and interpreting social life

[Hymes, in press].

Social Class Differences in the Explicit Expression of Meaning. We are a long way from understanding the range of communicative competences that different children have or how they develop. In fact, research on this enlarged question about the child's acquisition of language has only begun. Basil Bernstein (in press) has been a pioneer here. Unfortunately, although Bernstein himself has repeatedly said that he is describing patterns of use in actual speech performance, his work is frequently cited in support of "less language" assertions about grammatical competence. The unpublished research of Joan Tough at the University of Leeds replicates some of Bernstein's findings with preschool-age children who are matched on Stanford-Binet IQ but differ in social class background (see Cazden, in press). Both Bernstein and Tough find social class differences in the degree to which meaning is expressed explicitly, or independent of context. Explicitness is probably also related to what Labov calls "attention paid to the monitoring of [one's own] speech [1969, p. 32]."

The Speech Situation as an Independent Variable. Our eventual goal is to understand how a person's previous experience (of which his social class is simply a rough and composite index) interacts with factors in the momentary situation to affect his behavior. At any one moment, a child decides to speak or be silent, to adopt communicative intent a or communicative intent b, to express idea x or idea y, in form 1 or form 2. The options the child selects will be a function of characteristics of the situation as he perceives it on the basis of his past experience. We observe that a particular child in a particular situation either makes or fails to make a particular utterance. Traditionally, we have related that utterance only to characteristics of the child, such as his social class, while ignoring characteristics of the situation. As Robinson points out, the tendency in child language research has been to ignore situational or contextual variables, or to combine speech data from several contexts. Instead, Robinson suggests, "it may be wiser methodologically to accumulate the (social class) differences within contexts and to see what higher order generalizations can be made about them [1968, p. 6]."

The next section is a survey of research on child language which includes aspects of the speech situation as independent variables, regardless of the social class of the subjects. The purpose is to illustrate the idea of situational relativity and to suggest significant variables which should be explored more systematically. While the research to be reported is all about monolingual children, the notion of a diversified speech repertoire applies even more obviously to bilinguals (Herman, 1961, and McNamara, 1967, especially the chapter by Hymes).

The final section of the paper raises questions about other

necessary ingredients of a theory of oral language education.

The Effects of Situations

Relevant studies are listed in Table 1. Columns represent a very gross categorization of situational differences (the independent variables in the research): topic, task, listener(s), interaction, and situations with mixed characteristics; rows represent more easily definable characteristics of language (the dependent variables): fluency and/or spontaneity, length and/or complexity, some characteristic of speech content such as abstractness, and degree of approximation to Standard English. Unless otherwise specified, all differences to be discussed below are differences in the way the same child, or group of children, speaks in different situations; occasionally, differences between similar groups of children are reported. All but two (Moffett, 1968, and Robinson, 1965) deal with oral language.

Topic

Picture. Four studies used different kinds of pictures. Strandberg (1969) found that four- and five-year-old children above average in intelligence (with different children in each stimulus group) talked more about either a toy or a twenty-second silent film of that toy than they did about a still color photograph of it. There was no difference, however, in either average length or complexity of the responses. Strandberg and Griffith (1968) gave four- and five-year-old children in a university laboratory school Kodak Instamatic cameras loaded with color film and then elicited conversation about the remarkably successful pictures the children took. The children talked more spontaneously (i.e., required fewer adult probes) and talked in longer and more complex utterances about the pictures they took at home of personally TABLE 1
EFFECTS OF THE SITUATION ON CHILD LANGUAGE (CLASSIFICATION OF RELEVANT STUDIES)

Characteristics of the Situation	Listener(s) Interaction Mixed	Labov et al. Cooperman Cowan et al. (personal Cazden (1965) communication) Labov et al. Pasamanick & Knobloch Resnick, Weld, & Lally Kagan (1969) Jensen	Cazden (1967) Plumer Cowan et al. Smith		
Ö	Task	Heider et al. Brent & Katz	Brent & Katz Cazden (1967) Lawton Robinson (1965) Williams & Naremore (a, b)	Lawton	Labov et al.
	Торіс	Strandberg Strandberg & Griffith Williams & Naremore (a, b) Berlyne & Frommer	Strandberg & Griffith Cowan et al. Moffett Williams & Naremore (a, b) Labov et al. Mackay & Thompson	Labov et al.	AND THE POST OF TH
Language Characteristics		Fluency/ Spontaneity	Length/ Complexity	Content or Style	Approximation of Standard English

Note—Dates are cited here only where the Reference list contains more than one item by the same author(s).

significant objects (like a favorite climbing tree or a closeup of Mother's mouth) than they did about pictures taken under adult direction during the period of orientation to the camera. Since the pictures taken at home were also frequently of only one object, the authors conclude that the difference lies in the degree of personal involvement. Although topic is compounded with order since all children told stories about the preselected objects first, it seems unlikely that this accounts for all the difference. Following are examples of one five-year-old's stories, first about an assigned picture and then about one of his choices:

That's a horse. You can ride it. I don't know any more about it. It's brown, black and red. I don't know my story about the horse.

There's a picture of my tree that I climb in. There's—there's where it grows at and there's where I climb up—and sit up there—down there and that's where I look out at. First I get on this one and then I get on that other one. And then I put my foot under that big branch that are strong. And then I pull my face up and then I get ahold of a branch up at that place—and then I look around [Strandberg & Griffith, personal communication, 1969].

Cowan et al. (1967) presented elementary school children of mixed socio-economic status with ten colored pictures from magazine covers. The effect of the particular picture on the mean length of response (MLR) was strong across all age, sex, socio-economic class, and Experimenter categories. One picture of a group standing around a new car elicited significantly shorter MLR's and one picture of a birthday party elicited significantly longer MLR's, while the other eight pictures were undifferentiated between the two extremes. Although the authors cannot specify the source of the stimulus effect, they conclude that "the implicit assumption that magnitude of MLR is a property of the subject independent of his setting should be permanently discarded (Cowan et al., 1967, p. 202)."

Finally, Berlyne and Frommer (1966) studied the properties of different pictures and stories in eliciting one particular form of speech—questions. They presented children from kindergarten and grades 3, 5, and 6 at a university laboratory school with stories, pictures, and stories accompanied by pictures, and then invited the children to ask questions about them. Novel, surprising, and incongruous items elicited more questions than others, but provision of answers (an interaction characteristic) had little effect.

TV Narratives. Two studies compared narratives about TV programs with other topics. Williams and Naremore (1969, a and b) analyzed forty interviews with Negro and white fourth through sixth graders who were selected from the extremes of the

socio-economic distribution of a larger group of 200 interviewees in a Detroit dialect study (Shuy et al., 1967). All informants had responded to three topics: games ("What kinds of games do you play around here?"); television ("What are your favorite TV programs?"); and aspirations ("What do you want to be when you finish school?"). Social class differences in number of words spoken—on an elaboration index (the proportion of utterances which went beyond a simple yes-no answer or a label to a description or explanation), on a ranking of the degree of connectedness of the utterances in a response, and on verbal indices of specific grammatical features—appeared only for the topic of TV.

Although it is at best a subjective interpretation, the concentration of status differences in three of the clause indices on the TV topic seem to be a reflection of the tendency of the H.S. (high status) children to engage in story-telling or narrative while the L.S. (low status) children tended to itemize instances of what they had seen or preferred. The language used by the child in an interview is as much a reflection of his engagement within the constraints of a communication situation as it is a reflection of his linguistic capabilities [Williams & Naremore, 1969 b].

Labov has collected narratives of TV programs and personal experience from pre-adolescent boys attending vacation day camps (VDC) in Central Harlem. Following are two such narratives by two different 11-year-old boys—the first about "The Man From Uncle" and the second about a personal fight.

a This kid-Napoleon got shot

b and he had to go on a mission

c And so this kid, he went with Solo.

d So they went

e And this guy-they went through this window.

f and they caught him.

g And then he beat up them other people

h And they went i and then he said

that this old lady was his mother j and then he—and at the end he say that he was the guy's friend.

(Carl, 11, VDC, #386)

a When I was in fourth grade no it was in third grade—

b This boy he stole my glove.

c He took my glove

d and said that his father found it downtown on the ground.


(And you fight him?)

e I told him that it was impossible for him to find downtown cause all those people were walking by and just his father was the only one that found it?

- f So he got all (mad). .
- g So then I fought him.
- h I knocked him all out in the street.
- i So he say he give.
- j and I kept on hitting him.
- k Then he started crying
- l and ran home to his father
- m And the father told him
- n that he didn't find no glove.

(Norris, W., VDC, 11, #378) [Labov et al., 1968, Vol. 2, pp. 298-299.]

Labov finds that the main difference between the two sets of narratives is the absence of evaluation in the TV narratives: "the means used by the narrator to indicate the point of the narrative, its raison d'être, why it was told, and what the narrator is getting at (Labov et al., 1968, Vol. 2, p. 297)." Absence of evaluation from accounts of vicarious experience reduces structural complexity. "The syntax of the narrative clause itself is one of the simplest structures that may be found even in colloquial language (Labov et al., 1968, Vol. 2, p. 308)." But explanations, one of the devices for evaluation, may be exceedingly complex. Following is the diagram for one section of the personal experience narrative; the symbol S indicates that one sentence has been embedded in another (Labov et al., 1968, Vol. 2, p. 332):



It does not seem far-fetched to suggest a common element in these findings: the greater the degree of affect or personal involvement in the topic of conversation, the greater the likelihood of structural complexity.

Some final examples of the effect of topic on linguistic struc-

ture are, first, Moffett:

While watching some third-graders write down their observations of

candle-flames—deliberately this time, not merely in note form—I noticed that sentences beginning with if-and-when clauses were appearing frequently on their papers. Since such a construction is not common in third-grade writing, I became curious and then realized that these introductory subordinate clauses resulted directly from the children's manipulation of what they were observing. Thus: "If I place a glass over the candle, the flame turns blue." Here we have a fine example of a physical operation being reflected in a cognitive operation and hence in a linguistic structure. . . . The cognitive task entailed in the candle tests created a need for subordinate clauses, because the pupils were not asked merely to describe a static object but to describe changes in the object brought about by changing conditions (if and when), [1968, p. 180].

My last example comes from my observations of the written compositions by five-year-old children in two English Infant Schools, both in neighborhoods of mixed socio-economic status (Cazden, in press). In the first school, all the children were given their first writing books (blank with unlined pages for pictures and related stories), asked to draw a picture and then dictate a story for the teacher to write. All the resulting stories were simple sentences and all but one was of the form This is a -----. The exception was the sentence This boy is dead. In the second school, children were using experimental beginning reading materials developed by Mackay & Thomson (1968). Each child had a word folder with a preselected store of basic words plus some blanks for his personal collection. He also had a stand on which words from the folder could be set up as a text. These children composed sentences very different from each other, including the following:

My Mum takes me to school.

Is my sister at school and is my baby at home?

My cousin is skinny.

I like Siam she gave me one of David's doggies.

On Tuesday the movie camera man is coming.

I ask Helen to come to my birthday.

Whereas the presence of the pictures somehow constrained the first children to the simplest and most routine labels, absence of a picture seemed to free the second children to work with far more of their linguistic knowledge.

Task

In some studies, differences are found which seem to relate more to what the subject is asked to do with the topic than to the topic itself. For instance, Brent & Katz (1967) asked white Head-start children to tell stories about pictures from the WISC picture arrangement task, then removed the pictures and asked the children to tell the stories again. They found that the stories told without the pictures were superior. The children produced longer

stories without prompting, and ideas were related more logically and explicitly. Brent & Katz suggest that "the actual presence of the pictures, which constitute a spatially distributed series of perceptually discrete events, may in fact interfere with our younger subjects' ability to form a temporally distributed and logically continuous story, a task which required a conceptual and linguistic 'bridging-the-gap' between discrete frames (1967, pp. 4-5)." We cannot tell from this study whether first telling the stories with the pictures present contributes to the more successful attempt when they are removed.

Lawton (1968), a student and then colleague of Basil Bernstein's in London, gave a series of language tasks to boys aged 12–15 years. In an interview he elicited both descriptive and more abstract speech: e.g., describe your school and then answer "what do you think is the real purpose of education?" All the boys used more subordinate clauses and complex constructions on the ab-

straction task than on the description task.

The Structure of Directions. Four studies report differences which result from different degrees of structure or constraint in the directions. With the same boys, Lawton also conducted a discussion of capital punishment, replicating an earlier study by Bernstein (1962), and gave assignments to write on four topics such as "My life in ten years time." In the more open unstructured discussions, middle-class boys used more abstract arguments and hypothetical examples, while the working-class boys used more concrete examples and clichés or anecdotes. But in the abstract sections of the interviews, social class differences were much smaller.

The inference I would draw is that in an "open" situation the workingclass boys tend to move towards concrete, narrative/descriptive language, but in a "structured" situation where they have little or no choice about making an abstract response, they will respond to the demand made upon them. They may have found the task extremely difficult, but it was not impossible for them [Lawton, 1968, p. 138].

Comparable results were obtained by Williams and Naremore (1969 b) and Heider et al. (1968). One way in which Williams and Naremore scored the interviews on games, aspirations, and TV was by the type of questions asked by the interviewer and the corresponding type of child response. There were three types of probe constraints: (1) simple (Do you play baseball?), (2) naming (What television programs do you watch?), and (3) elaboration (How do you play kick-the-can?). Response-style was categorized as follows: (1) simple (Yeah.), (2) naming (Baseball.), (3) qualified naming (I usually watch the Avengers and lots of cartoons.), and (4) elaboration (Last night the Penguin had Bat-

man trapped on top of this tower. . . .).

Results show that in response to the first two probes, "The lower status children had more of a tendency to supply the minimally acceptable response, whereas their higher status counterparts had a greater tendency to elaborate their remarks (Williams & Naremore, 1969 a)." Following the probe for elaboration, however, these differences disappeared. "The mark of a lower-status child was that he had some tendency to provide the type of response which would minimally fulfill the fieldworker's probe, [but] not go on to assume a more active role in the speech situations including elaboration of more of his own experience (Wil-

liams & Naremore, 1969 a)."

Heider et al. (1968) report an experiment in which lowerand middle-class white 10-year-old boys were asked to describe a picture of one animal out of a large array. Criterial or essential attributes were the name of the animal and three others: number of spots, standing or lying down, and position of the head. The density of criterial attributes named by the children was almost identical for the two groups: MC children mentioned 67 attributes of which 18 were criterial, while LC children mentioned 69 attributes of which 16 were criterial. But there was a significant social class difference in the number of requests the listener had to make for more information before the picture was adequately specified: LC mean = 6.11 requests; MC mean = 3.56 requests. Thus the lower-class children's performance was far superior to what it would have been if the amount of probing or feedback had been standardized for the two groups as it usually is in both experimental situations and classrooms.

Robinson (1965), another colleague of Basil Bernstein, gave two writing assignments to 120 middle-class and working-class twelve and thirteen year old boys and girls in a comprehensive school. One assignment, to tell a good friend news of the past fortnight, presumably elicited informal or restricted codes from all subjects. The other assignment, advising a governor of the school how some money he had donated might be spent, presumably elicited a formal or elaborated code from anyone who could use one. Contrary to expectations, there were no significant differences between the middle-class and working-class formal letters, and differences only in lexical diversity (number of different nouns, adjectives, etc.) between the informal letters where the

topic was less constrained.

While the results of Lawton, Williams and Naremore, Heider et al., and Robinson have indicated that working-class children display greater abstraction, elaboration, or informational analysis when it is demanded by an adult, analyses by Anita R. Olds and

myself (Cazden, 1967) of the speech of two first-grade children in eight situations showed different results when the dependent variable is simply mean length of utterance in morphemes (utterance defined as an independent clause and any syntactically related dependent clauses). Martin, a middle-class white boy, spoke longer utterances on the average in the three structured task situations: retelling Whistle for Willie—7.09; describing an object hidden in a cloth bag—6.52; and describing five pictures about school—6.44. By contrast Rita, a lower-class Negro girl, spoke longer utterances on the average in three more informal interviews: 7.94, 7.53, and 6.20. While this study of two children must be considered only a pilot venture, it does provide an example of interaction between a child's background and the situations which elicit the longest utterances. Presumably, there are more such interactions to be discovered if we knew where and how to look for them.

Formality of the Situation. Speech situations can also be differentiated on an informal-formal continuum, according to the amount of attention paid to language itself. Labov (1968, vol. 1) has collected speech samples at several points along such a continuum from the least self-conscious and most excited speech in peer group sessions, through accounts of fights in individual interviews and other interview speech, to reading a connected sentence, and finally to reading a list of unconnected words. All speakers speak more standard English in their most formal and careful

speech.

Listener(s)

One important characteristic of the listener is age in relation to the speaker. In an early study, Smith (1935) found that children 18 to 70 months old spoke longer sentences at home with adults than at play with other children, presumably because at home they gave fewer answers to questions and fewer imperatives, and had greater opportunity for more connected discourse with less active play and less frequent interruptions. We also found (Cazden, 1967) that both Rita and Martin spoke their shortest sentences, on the average, in two experimental situations with their peers: an arithmetic game where Rita averaged 4.50 and Martin 4.78, and a telephone conversation where Rita scored 5.60 and Martin 3.58.

Two students at Harvard found that children modified their speech when speaking to younger children. Yurchak (1969) analyzed the language of her three-year-old daughter, Kathleen, as she talked to herself, her mother, and her 18-month-old baby sister. Kathleen's longest utterances were spoken to her mother, her

shortest utterances to her sister, while speech to herself was somewhere inbetween. Bernat (1969) taped the speech of three girls, 9 and 11 and 13 years old, when talking to younger boys ages 18, 30, and 29 months. The extent to which the girls adapted their speech to their young listener depended not on his age, but on evidence of his capacity to talk and understand. Their average sentence length with the first child was 4.06 morphemes, with the second 5.23 morphemes; but with the third—a very verbal child with excellent comprehension—they talked in normal, mature sentences. On replaying the tape, Bernat found to her surprise that she herself did too.

Younger listeners aren't the only restraining influence. Power relations between older and younger children can also influence

speech:

Stevie: He gon' getchyou with 'Is li's . . . he got li-' he got leg like di - like -

Stevie is ordinarily very fast and fluent with words, but he finds it very difficult to say what he means to these sixteen-year-olds—another example of how power relations can determine verbal ability available at the moment [Labov et al., 1968, Vol. 2, p. 117].

Interaction of Speakers

Here we have only one report from a pilot study and one hypothesis now being tested. But both are worth consideration by others. Oliver Cooperman, a student at Harvard Medical School on leave to work with Barbara Tizard at the University of London on the effects of various conditions of residential care on preschool age children, conducted a pilot study of various aspects of conversation. He found that "conversation is more likely to occur and include a greater number of exchanges back and forth when initiated by the child" and "a child almost never responds verbally to an adult command 'Stop doing X' except rarely, to say 'no'; on the other hand, commands to initiate action, to 'do X', frequently provoked verbal reply [personal communication, 1969]."

A student at Harvard, Davenport Plumer, is conducting his doctoral research on dialogue strategies among twelve families with children seven or eight years old, six with sons of high verbal ability (as measured on the Stanford-Binet and a combination of WISC-ITPA), and six with sons of average verbal ability. Recording equipment is given to each family in turn, and dialogue is recorded from a wireless microphone worn by the focal child. Each family records a total of seven hours during one week, including twenty-minute sessions at breakfast, supper, and bed-

time. One measure used will be the length of a dialogue-the number of verbal exchanges between the initiation and termination of a topic; one analysis undertaken will be the relation of length of dialogue to complexity of the child's utterances.

A major assumption underlying this study is that the longer the dialogue the more likely the child is to hear and use a wide range of the resources and strategies of his language. The ability to elaborate and qualify-or to follow elaboration and qualification—is most likely to be learned in an extended dialogue after an initial exchange has set up the need for clarification and elaboration [Plumer, 1969, pp. 7-8].

If either Cooperman's or Plumer's hypothesis is borne out in further research, it would have important implications for planning classrooms for maximally productive conversation. For instance, initiation of conversation probably takes place more often in a classroom where children carry major responsibility for planning their activities. But this may only be productive for language usage if involvement, and thereby conversation on a topic, is sustained over some period of time.

Mixed Aspects of Situations

Classrooms. Two kinds of situations which seem to contain a mixture of relevant aspects are the various activities in any classroom and the testing situations. Cowe (1967) has recorded the conversations of kindergarten children in nine activities. In both amount and maturity of speech, housekeeping play and group discussion held the greatest potential for language, while play with blocks, dance, and woodworking held least. She suggests that factors influencing speech are adult participation, something concrete to talk about, physical arrangements, and noise. I made similar observations when selecting play materials for the tutorial language program from which the data in Figure 1 are taken (Cazden, 1965).

Tests. Testing situations contain the effects of interpersonal formality and power relationship mixed with the cognitive demands of particular tasks. Pasamanick & Knobloch (1955) and Resnick, Weld, and Lally (1969) report evidence that the verbal expressiveness of working-class Negro two-year-olds is artificially depressed in testing situations. Even Jensen, arguing that socialclass differences in intelligence are largely inherited, reports from his own clinical experience that he regularly raised IQ scores on the Stanford-Binet (largely a test of verbal performance) eight to ten points by having children from an impoverished background come in for two to four play sessions in his office so that the child could get acquainted and feel more at ease (Jensen, 1969).

Kagan, in answer to Jensen, reports the experience of Francis Palmer in New York City:

Dr. Palmer administered mental tests to middle and lower class black children from Harlem. However, each examiner was instructed not to begin testing with any child until she felt that the child was completely relaxed, and understood what was required of him. Many children had five, six, and even seven hours of rapport sessions with the examiner before any questions were administered. Few psychological studies have ever devoted this much care to establishing rapport with the child. Dr. Palmer found few significant differences in mental ability between the lower and middle class populations. This is one of the first times such a finding has been reported and it seems due, in part, to the great care taken to insure that the child comprehended the nature of the test questions and felt at ease with the examiner [1969, p. 276].

Labov provides a dramatic example of the effect of the test situation on an older child. Attacking the conditions under which much of the data on "verbal deprivation" is collected, he quotes an entire interview with a pre-adolescent boy in a New York City school and contrasts it with his own methods and findings:

The child is alone in a school room with the investigator, a young, friendly white man, who is instructed to place a toy on the table and say "Tell me everything you can about this." The interviewer's remarks are in Parentheses.

(Tell me everything you can about this.) [Plunk]

[12 seconds of silence]

(What would you say it looks like?)
[8 seconds of silence]

A space ship. (Hmmmm.)

[13 seconds of silence]

Like a je-et.

[12 seconds of silence]

Like a plane.

[20 seconds of silence]

(What color is it?)

Orange. [seconds] An' whi-ite. [seconds] An' green.

[6 seconds of silence]
(And what could you use it for?)

[8 seconds of silence]

A jet.

[6 seconds of silence]

(If you had two of them, what would you do with them?)

[6 seconds of silence]

Give one to some-body.

(Hmmm. Who do you think would like to have it?)

[10 seconds of silence]

Clarence.

(Mm. Where do you think we could get another one of these?)

At the store.

(O-Ka-ay!)

The social situation which produces such defensive behavior is that of an adult asking a lone child questions to which he obviously knows the answers, where anything the child says may well be held against him. It is, in fact, a paradigm of the school situation which prevails as reading is being taught (but not learned).

We can obtain such results in our own research, and have done so in our work with younger brothers of the "Thunderbirds" in 1390 Fifth Avenue. But when we change the social situation by altering the height and power relations, introducing a close friend of the subject, and talking about things we know he is interested in, we obtain a level of excited and rapid speech [Labov et al., 1968, Vol. 2, pp. 340-341].

The Situation as a Source of Social Class Differences

Because all the above examples illustrate how the same children respond in different situations, it may not be clear how the situation can be considered a neglected source of social class differences. Two ways are possible. Differential responses according to aspects of the situation may be intensified for lower-class speakers (an ordinal interaction). So for example, all children may be constrained in a testing situation and lower-class children especially so. Labov found this kind of interaction between style shifting and social stratification in his study of phonological and grammatical features:

The same variables which are used in style shifting also distinguish cultural or social levels of English. This is so for stable phonological variables such as -th and -ing, for such incoming prestige forms as -r; for the grammatical variables such as pronominal opposition, double negative, or even the use of ain't [1969, p. 17].

For instance, all speakers shift from workin' to working as they shift from casual speech to reading style. But the shift is much

greater for lower-class speakers.

Alternatively, there may be interactions between language and situation in which the relationships are reversed (a disordinal interaction) rather than varying in intensity for the different social class groups. Middle-class children may be more fluent in one set of situations, while lower-class children talk more fluently in another. Such a finding was suggested for our research subjects, Martin and Rita, above. Only further research can sort these possibilities out.

Towards a Theory of Oral Language Education

Even if we had the kind of understanding of communicative competence among diverse groups of children which Hymes calls

for, we would still be far from a theory of oral language education. That requires, in addition, decisions about which goals are important, what communicative competence we seek. Sociolinguistic interference from contrasting communicative demands outside and in school are almost certainly more important than grammatical interference (Hymes, in press; Labov et al., 1968). To reduce this interference, we have to know both what capabilities the child brings and what we want him to be able to do.

Language Use Rather than Language Form is Important

Discussions of the goals of education, like analyses of child language, too often focus on language form when they should be concerned with language use. In arguing against oral language programs for teaching standard English to speakers of a nonstandard dialect, Kochman says:

My first quarrel with such a program is that it does not develop the ability of a person to use language, which I would further define as performance capability in a variety of social contexts on a variety of subject matter.

... Underlying this approach seems to be a misapplication of Basil Bernstein's terms which falsely equate restrictive code and elaborated code with, respectively, non-standard dialect and standard dialect. It ought to be noted, as Bernstein uses the term, code is not to be equated with langue, but parole, not with competence but performance. What is restrictive or elaborated is not in fact the code as sociolinguists use the term, but the message [1969, p. 2].

To reject attempts to teach a single, socially prestigious language form is not to reject all attempts at change. Cultural differences in language use can result in deficiencies when children confront the demands of particular communicative situations.

Cultural relativism, inferred from an enormous variety of existing cultures, remains a prerequisite of objective analysis. . . . But the moral corollary of cultural relativism—moral relativism—has been quietly discarded except as a form of intellectual indulgence among those who claim the privilege of non-involvement [Wolf, 1964, pp. 21-22].

Educators certainly cannot claim any privilege of non-involvement, and they must decide what goals they seek. Taking as his goal the education of a person who knows enough not to remain a victim, Olson says, "A teacher must possess extraordinary knowledge and humanity if he is to distinguish what the school demands of children simply to symbolize its capacity for authority over them from what it legitimately 'demands' or 'woos out of them' to equip them for a niche in a technological society (1967, p. 13)."

Pieces of an answer can be suggested. On the basis of his experience as a teacher in a village school for Kwakiutl Indian children on Vancouver Island, Wolcott (1969) suggests teaching

specific skills rather than trying to make over the child into one's own image. In an article in this volume, Marion Blank argues for education in the use of language for abstract thinking. Kochman (personal communication, 1969) recommends opportunity for the use of language in "low-context" situations where speaker and listener do not share a common referent and where a greater burden of communication falls on the words alone; this requires a skill that 33-month-old Gerald (Cazden, 1965) needs help in acquiring. Cazden & John (1969) argue for coordinate education for cultural pluralism in which patterns of language form and use (and beliefs and values as well) in the child's home community are maintained and valued alongside the introduction of forms of behavior required in a technological society.

In the end the goals of education are in large part matters of value, and decisions about them must be shared by educators and spokesmen for the child and his community. Such decisions, combined with knowledge of communicative competence and how it develops, will enable us to design more productive situations for

oral language education in school.

REFERENCES

AARONS, A. C., GORDON, B. Y., & STEWART, W. A. (Eds.) Linguistic-cultural differences and American education. Florida FL Reporter, 1970, 7, No. 1.

BARATZ, J. C. A bi-dialectal task for determining language proficiency in economically disadvantaged Negro children. Child Development, 1969, 889-901.

BARATZ, J. C. Language and cognitive assessment of Negro children. ASHA,

1969, 11, 87-91. (b)

BARKER, R. G. Ecological psychology. Stanford Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1968.

Berlyne, D. E., & Frommer, F. D. Some determinants of the incidence and content of children's questions. Child Development, 1966, 37, 177-189.

BERNAT, E. How speakers of different ages alter their speech when conversing with small children. Unpublished term paper, Harvard Graduate School of Education, 1969.

BERNSTEIN, B. Social class, linguistic codes and grammatical elements. Language

and Speech, 1962, 5, 221-240.

Bernstein, B. A critique of the concept "compensatory education." Introduction to Gahagan, D. M., & Gahagan, G. A. Talk reform: Explorations in language for infant school children. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, in press. Also in Cazden, C. B., Hymes, D., & John, V. (Eds.), Functions of language in the classroom. New York: Teachers College Press, in press.

BLOOM, L. M. Language development: Form and function in emerging grammars. Cam-

bridge: M.I.T. Press, 1970.

Brent, S. B., & Katz, E. W. A study of language deviations and cognitive processes. Progress Report No. 3, OEO Job Corps contract 1209, Wayne State University, 1967.

Brown, R., Cazden, C. B., & Bellugi, U. The child's grammar from I to III. In J. P. Hill (Ed.), 1967 Minnesota symposium on child psychology. Minneapolis: University of Minn. Press, 1969.

CAZDEN, C. B. Environmental assistance to the child's acquisition of grammar. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard Univ., 1965.

CAZDEN, C. B. Subcultural differences in child language. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 1966, 12, 185-219.

CAZDEN, C. B. On individual differences in language competence and perfor-

mance. Journal of Special Education, 1967, 1, 135-150. CAZDEN, C. B. Language programs for young children: Views from England. In C. B. Lavatelli (Ed.), Preschool language training. Urbana: Univer. of Illinois

Press, in press.

CAZDEN, C. B., & JOHN, V. P. Learning in American Indian children. In S. Ohannessian (Ed.), Styles of learning among American Indians: An outline for research. Washington, D.C.: Center for Applied Linguistics, 1969.

CHOMSKY, N. Phonology and reading. In H. Levin and J. Williams (Eds.), Basic

Studies on Reading. New York: Harper & Row, in press.

CHOMSKY, N., & HALLE, M. The sound patterns of English. New York: Harper &

Row, 1968.

COWAN, P. A., WEBER, J., HODDINOTT, B. A., & KLEIN, J. Mean length of spoken response as a function of stimulus, experimenter, and subject. Child Development, 1967, 38, 199-203.

Cowe, E. G. A study of kindergarten activities for language development. Un-

published doctoral dissertation, Columbia Univer., 1967.

EELS, D., DAVIS, A., HAVIGHURST, R. J., HERRICK, V. E., & TYLER, R. W. Intelligence and cultural differences. Chicago: Univer. of Chicago Press, 1951. GOFFMAN, E. The neglected situation. American Anthropologist, 1964, 66 (Part 2),

133-136. HEIDER, E. R., CAZDEN, C. B., & BROWN, R. Social class differences in the effectiveness and style of children's coding ability. Project Literacy Reports, No. 9. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univer., 1968.

HERMAN, S. R. Explorations in the social psychology of language choice. Human

Relations, 1961, 14, 149-164.

HYMES, D. On communicative competence. In R. Huxley & E. Ingram (Eds.), The mechanism of language development. London: CIBA Foundation, in press. JENSEN, A. R. How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement? Harvard

Educational Review, 1969, 39, 1-123.

KAGAN, J. On the need for relativism. American Psychologist, 1967, 22, 131-142. KAGAN, J. Inadequate evidence and illogical conclusions. Harvard Educational

Review, 1969, 39, 274-277. KOCHMAN, T. Special factors in the consideration of teaching standard English. Paper read at convention of Teachers of English to Speakers of other Languages (TESOL), Chicago, March 1969.

LABOV, W. The study of non-standard English. Washington, D.C.: Clearinghouse for Linguistics, Center for Applied Linguistics, 1969. (Available from ERIC

Document Reproduction Service.)

LABOV, W., COHEN, P., ROBINS, C., & LEWIS, J. A study of the non-standard English of Negro and Puerto Rican speakers in New York City. Final report of Cooperative Research Project No. 3288, Columbia University, 1968. 2 vols. (Available from ERIC Document Reproduction Service.)

LaCivita, A. F., Kean, J. M., & Yamamoto, K. Socio-economic status of children and acquisition of grammar. Journal of Educational Research, 1966, 60,

71 - 74.

LAWTON, D. Social class, language and education. New York: Schocken, 1968.

Lesser, G. S., Fifer, G., & Clark, D. H. Mental abilities of children in different social and cultural groups. Monographs of the society for research in child development, 1965, 30, No. 4 (Serial No. 102).

MACKAY, D., & THOMPSON, B. The initial teaching of reading and writing: Some notes toward a theory of literacy. Program in linguistics and English teaching, Paper No. 3. London: University College and Longmans Green, 1968.

McNamara, J. (Ed.) Problems of bilingualism. Journal of Social Issues, 1967, 23

MOFFETT, J. Teaching the universe of discourse. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968.

MOORE, D. R. Research on children's language as it relates to a language program for lower class preschool children. In C. B. Lavatelli (Ed.), Preschool language training. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, in press.

NIDA, E. A. Analysis of meaning and dictionary making. International Journal of

American Linguistics, 1958, 24, 279-292.

Olson, P. A. Introduction: The craft of teaching and the school of teachers. Report of the first national conference, U.S. Office of Education Tri-University

Project in Elementary Education, Denver, Sept. 1967.

PASAMANICK, B., & KNOBLOCH, H. Early language behavior in Negro children and the testing of intelligence. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1955, 50, 401-402.

PLUMER, D. Parent-child verbal interaction: A naturalistic study of dialogue strategies. Interim report, Harvard Graduate School of Education, 1969.

PSATHAS, G. Comment. American Psychologist, 1968, 23, 135-137.

RESNICK, M. B., WELD, G. L. & LALLY, J. R. Verbalizations of environmentally deprived two-year olds as a function of the presence of a tester in a standardized test situation. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Los Angeles, February 1969.

ROBINSON, W. P. The elaborated code in working-class language. Language and

Speech, 1965, 8, 243-252.

ROBINSON, W. P. Restricted codes in socio-linguistics and the sociology of education. Paper presented at Ninth International Seminar, University College,

Dar es Salaam, December 1968.

SHUY, R. W., WOLFRAM, W. A., & RILEY, W. K. Linguistic correlates of social stratification in Detroit speech. Final report of Cooperative Research Project No. 6-1347, Wayne State University, 1967. (Available from ERIC Document Reproduction Service.)

SLOBIN, D. I. (Ed.) A field manual for cross-cultural study of the acquisition of communicative competence (second draft). Berkeley, Cal.: University of California,

1967.

SLOBIN, D. I. Questions of language development in cross-cultural perspective. Paper prepared for symposium on "Language learning in cross-cultural perspective," Michigan State University, Sept. 1968.

SMITH, M. E. A study of some factors influencing the development of the sentence in preschool children. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1935, 46, 182-212.

STRANDBERG, T. E. An evaluation of three stimulus media for evoking verbalizations from preschool children. Unpublished Master's thesis, Eastern Illinois Univer., 1969.

STRANDBERG, T. E., & GRIFFITH, J. A study of the effects of training in visual literacy on verbal language behavior. Unpublished manuscript, Eastern

Illinois University, 1968.

WILLIAMS, F., & NAREMORE, R. C. On the functional analysis of social class differences in modes of speech. Speech Monographs, 1969, 36, 77-102. (a)

WILLIAMS, F., & NAREMORE, R. C. Social class differences in children's syntactic performance: A quantitative analysis of field study data. Journal of Speech and Hearing Research, 1969, 12, 777-793. (b)

WOLCOTT, H. F. The teacher as an enemy. Unpublished manuscript, Univer. of

Oregon, 1969.

Wolf, E. R. Anthropology. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964.

Yurchak, M. J. Differences in speech of a three-year-old addressing mother and sister. Unpublished term paper, Harvard Graduate School of Education, 1969.

The SRS Model as a Predictor of Negro Responsiveness to Reinforcement¹

Reuben M. Baron Wayne State University

In a recent review of comparative psychological studies of Negroes and whites, Dreger and Miller (1968) conclude that Negroes are likely to develop a more negative self-image than are whites. In this same review (Dreger & Miller, 1968, p. 19), these authors cite the observations of Gray that the poor Negro child receives a smaller gross amount of reinforcement because: (1) the mother spends more time coping with her child's behavior rather than shaping it; and (2) the mother devotes all her time to sub-

sistence activities, e.g., working at menial jobs.

The author (Baron, 1966; Baron, Robinson, & Lawrence, 1968) has recently suggested a model of the effects of differences in social reinforcement history which has relevance to the above observations. The model assumes the existence of an incongruity sensitive mechanism which is rooted in the individual's past reinforcement history and is an important determinant of his present receptivity to social reinforcement. The major assumptions of the model may be summarized as follows. (1) The individual's past reinforcement history produces an internal norm or standard against which the adequacy of present social reinforcements is judged. (2) The individual's construal or representation of such

¹The research described in this report was supported by Labor Department contract No. 81-24-66-04 to Stagner, Baron, and Bass, and by NSF Research Grant Nos. 1342 and 2372 to the author.

experiences is assumed by the model to be isomorphic with the objective properties of his actual past history of social reinforcement, i.e., evaluative reactions of other people to his behavior. (3) The social reinforcement standard (SRS) is assumed by the model to define a preferred region around which the individual seeks to secure future social reinforcement. (4) Such standards function as techniques of interpersonal uncertainty reduction, allowing the individual to coordinate smoothly his actions and interactions even with unknown others. (5) Substantial disparities from the SRS, whether in a positive or a negative direction, are assumed to produce negative affect because the validity of the person's construal of the reinforcement properties of the environment is challenged. (6) Individuals are assumed to be motivated to engage in behavior which they perceive will reduce substantial disparities between current levels of reinforcement and their SRS. Such adjustive processes may take the form of increases or decreases in level of responding and may also involve extra-task behaviors designed to bring the behavior of the reinforcing agent under the control of the respondent (e.g., they may utilize various tactics of ingratiation, such as those described by Jones, 1964). (7) If the disparity is both substantial and of a prolonged duration, the person's SRS will change in line with the discrepant inputs.

Hypotheses (6) and (7) raise the question of the relationship among different modes of resolving an SRS-input disparity. At the present time, it is assumed that short term disparities lead to behavioral resolutions, while long term disparities produce cognitive change. In terms of a hierarchy of modes of resolution it is hypothesized that the person initially seeks to manipulate the environmental source of incongruity by his task or extra-task behaviors and only changes his SRS when such attempts prove ineffectual, i.e., the disparity persists. This hypothesis derives from the prior assumption that the SRS is a relatively stable cognitive

structure of high functional significance.

As should be apparent from the above summary, the SRS model attempts to link an incongruity type model to a view of the social reinforcement process as involving a social exchange. That is, an optimal level of responsiveness is exchanged for an appropriate level of reward. Appropriateness, in turn, is defined primarily by the correspondence between past levels of attainment and present levels of achievement. Further insight into the present model may be obtained by a comparison of the SRS model and other incongruity formulations.

The SRS Approach and Related Models

Before suggesting some of the applications of the SRS model to research with the poor, a brief discussion of the relationship of the SRS model and other incongruity models such as dissonance and balance theories seems in order. Basically, the present model and all incongruity models share in common the notion that a discrepancy from some referent produces psychological discomfort. Aside from obvious differences in domain of application, there are a number of differences between such models which may help us better understand the relevance of an incongruity model to understanding reinforcer effects.

Heider's Balance Theory. There are very clear differences between Heider's (1958) balance model and the SRS. The balance model, rooted as it is in the Gestalt tradition, assumes that states of imbalance uniformly create disturbance; individual differences play no role in determining the degree of tension that will be created. As has been noted, the basic point of departure of the present model is that differences in reinforcement history induce different cognitive structures, i.e., produce different social rein-

forcement standards.

Imbalance is an all-or-none phenomenon rooted in the kind of stimulus field dynamics that derive from universal tendencies towards forming a good figure (cf. Jordan, 1968). The balance approach then is essentially ahistorical. The problems of diverse antecedents of arousal and variable patterns of resolution are

largely ignored.

In its original form, the balance model was intrapersonal in orientation although the work of such investigators as Newcomb (1953) has extended the balance formulation to interpersonal interactions. Even with its extensions, the balance model retains its all-or-none character. Typically, imbalance is assumed to set in motion irresistible tendencies toward restoring balance by changes in attitudinal or communication patterns. The SRS model, on the other hand, is avowedly interpersonal in character, replacing irresistible forces with strategies of self-presentation designed to manipulate the source of incongruity. Cognitive change in the SRS model is assumed to be a resolution mechanism of last, not first resort—initially the person is assumed to try to change the individual who controls the level of inputs (see Baron, 1966; Baron et al., 1968).

Dissonance Theory. Dissonance theory tends to be a purely quantitative formulation; qualitative factors such as the direction

of discrepancy are largely ignored as parameters of arousal and resolution.2 The SRS model in its present form (see Baron et al., 1968), puts great weight on the importance of the direction of discrepancy for predicting the mode of resolution and nature of arousal, e.g., it is predicted that negative discrepancies tend to produce increases in level of performance, while positive discrepancies may lead to decreased levels of responding. Furthermore, Baron (1966) suggests that positive discrepancies are likely to be less disturbing than negative discrepancies of equal magnitude. Unlike dissonance theory, the SRS model also suggests the possibility of a non-linear relationship between amount of discrepancy and level of discomfort. That is, it is hypothesized that while moderate positive discrepancies produce positive affect, large positive discrepancies will produce negative affect.

Dissonance theory, as was true with the balance theory, is basically concerned with homeostatic cognitive changes as the major reaction to discrepancy. SRS theory, on the other hand, postulates a more active attempt first to master the interpersonal environment. Dissonance theory also fails systematically to link past experience and present processes of arousal and resolution The referent or anchoring cognitions (e.g., the person's original attitudes) are simply treated as givens in most versions of disso-

nance theory (Brehm & Cohen, 1962).

Finally, it should be noted that while dissonance theory focuses mainly on how a person justifies poor decisions made in the past, SRS theory stresses resolutions which prepare the person for future interpersonal encounters, i.e., a predictable interpersonal environment is given greater weight than a rationalization

of past mistakes.

The Tote Model. The SRS model may also be compared to general incongruity models such as the Tote formulation of Miller Colors. Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960). In spirit, the SRS model is quite similar to this kind of cybernetic model; indeed, the SRS is viewed as analogous to a kind of thermostat of evaluation (Baron, 1966). The Tote model, however, is essentially an intrapersonal model eschewing the complex dynamics of interpersonal interactions. There is, however, a real commonality between the present stress on strategies of manipulation as resolution mechanisms

²It is recognized that there are many varieties of dissonance theory, e.g., Festinger's (1957) original version, Aronson's expectancy model (cf. Aronson, 1968), Brehm and Caban', (1969), Aronson's expectancy model (cf. Aronson), the control of 1968), Brehm and Cohen's (1962) choice-commitment model, and most recently Zimbardo's (1960) and to en-Zimbardo's (1969) existentialist version. Since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since it would be impossible to encompass more than a since compass more than a single variant in this short comparison, we are mainly focusing on Festinger's (1957) focusing on Festinger's (1957) version.

and the Miller et al. notions of cognitive functioning as being guided by plans and strategies. It might also be pointed out that the present attempt to use directional parameters to weight differentially equal magnitudes of discrepancy, as well as the suggestion that there are qualitatively different affective reactions to different degrees of positive discrepancy, departs from any simple

cybernetic model such as the Tote.

The SRS and the Operant Conditioning Approach. Since the operant conditioning approach has also been concerned with the role of the interaction of past reinforcement history and variations in present schedules, a brief comparison is of interest. Most operant oriented investigators see the effects of past reinforcement history almost solely in terms of creating differences in initial response strength upon which contemporary "shaping" procedures must be imposed (Krasner & Ullmann, 1965). Even neo-operant approaches such as those of Premack (1965) or Gewirtz (1967), which explicitly see reinforcement history as providing contextual variations, maintain the notion that stimulus control is simply a matter of prior availability of a response or stimulus class. Such approaches do not allow for the role of cognitive biasing or see reinforcement effects as involving the kind of interpersonal exchange stressed by the SRS model. Furthermore, the quest for general functional relationships typically leads operant oriented investigators to treat individual differences not as grist for a more general theory but as error variance (Gewirtz, 1967).

In summary, what we have tried to do with the SRS model is to combine the stress on reinforcement history and reinforcement schedules of the operant conditioners with the insights of social psychologists concerned with: (1) the motivating effects of attitudinal inconsistency, and (2) the view of social interaction as

involving social exchange and self-presentation.

It may also be noted that the fact that the SRS model is a theory mediating between cognitive and reinforcement approaches is nowhere more clearly evident than in the view which SRS theory takes of how input-standard disparities are resolved. SRS theory assigns highest priority as a resolution mechanism to purposeful behavioral adjustments aimed at achieving stimulus control vis-à-vis tactics of interpersonal manipulation. The result is a kind of social psychological version of the cognitive behaviorism called for by Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960).

The SRS Model and Research with "Disadvantaged" Negro Youth. The SRS model has special relevance to the problems of how to improve the motivation and performance of the poor because it suggests that we must not assume that types and levels of reinforcement which would be effective with more affluent subject

populations will be effective with the poor. For example, it follows from the SRS model that Negroes would find a low rate of approval from a white authority figure more appropriate and pre-

ferred than a high rate of approval.

Recently A. R. Bass and I carried out a series of studies of disadvantaged Negro youth (male and female) of high school age (Baron, R. M. & Bass, A. R., 1969). In these investigations we were concerned with the effects of various reinforcement parameters on task performance and self-image. Before presenting data from the individual studies these dependent variables will be briefly described. The self data were based on two different types of measures; one was designed to tap a cognitive or belief component of self-image while the other focused on the evaluative or selfesteem aspect of self-image. The cognitive aspect of self was measured by the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale (Fitts, 1965). This scale is a self-report measure using a true-false format. From the scale one can derive a total self-concept score as well as sub-scale scores involving dimensions such as physical self (e.g., I have a healthy body), moral self (e.g., I am a bad person), social self (e.g., I am a friendly person), etc. The self-esteem aspect of self was measured by a self perception questionnaire constructed by Bass and Baron especially for this research. This questionnaire (titled "Interpersonal Perception Questionnaire" or the IPQ) consisted of twelve evaluative semantic differential scales such as good-bad and dirty-clean. The subject is asked to evaluate himself in six different contexts, i.e., himself as he sees himself, and himself as parents, teachers, employers, male and female friends perceive him. The belief and esteem measures are moderately correlated (r = .34). Finally, it should be noted that each of these measures was given before and after the treatment phase in all the studies. Improvement in self-image is inferred from post score differences between treatment groups since initial differences are controlled for by the use of analysis of co-variance.

The performance data were also analyzed by the use of covariance procedure, with performance score during a non-reinforced operant phase serving as the co-variate and average score during the terminal reinforced phase serving as the dependent variable. Three general types of tasks were used in order to tap a range of skills: verbal (e.g., a word recognition task requir-

³Parallel analyses of variance using pre-post difference scores as the dependent variables were performed on both the self ratings and the performance data. The results were essentially the same as obtained with the co-variance analyses. Furthermore, it may be noted that all of the change or difference

ing subjects to delineate separate words from strings of words that were run together); visual perception (e.g., recall of tachistoscopically presented geometric designs, as well as scale reading and angle matching tasks); and manual dexterity (e.g., a pegboard assembly task). By the use of time-dependent responses the experimenters were able to pre-program the number of reinforcements desired, i.e., the time constraint made it difficult for subjects to assess the quality of their own performance. Individual studies are described below.

The Effects of Object and Frequency of Verbal Reinforcement

In this study, the first in a series, two independent variable treatments were used: frequency of verbal approval (25% vs. 75%) and object of praise, i.e., whether the person or the competence of his performance was praised ("you're good" vs. "that's a good job"). Subjects in this study were 35 Negro girls between 16 and 21 years of age who were participating in the Mayor's Youth Employment Project. Most of these girls had not completed high school. The subjects were enrolled in nurses' aide training programs and took part in the present study during the orientation

phase of the program.

One significant interaction obtained on a manual dexterity task is of particular interest since it does not appear to be derivable from either a partial reinforcement view of the learning process (e.g., low partial rates of reinforcement create optimal responding) or a straight incentive theory view which would suggest that the more positive reinforcement obtained, the more optimal would be the performance. Specifically, a significant interaction was found between rate and focus of reinforcement (F = 6.40, p < .02). As can be seen from Table 1, when the person was the focus of the reinforcement (e.g., you're good), 75% reinforcement was more effective than 25%; whereas when competence-of-performance was the focus, better performance occurred with 25% than 75% reinforcement (the dependent measure was number of seconds to complete an assembly on the pegboard).

An SRS framework may be used to interpret this interaction

scores were positive, indicating directly that there were improvements over initial level as a function of treatment conditions. The co-variance analysis, however, is the preferred procedure because, despite initial random assignment to treatment conditions, there were on occasion differences in the pre-scores between conditions on both the self measures and operant trials.

if the following assumptions are made: Dreger and Miller (1968) and Katz (1967) suggest that the type of verbal praise Negro children receive is of a relatively diffuse type, more likely to focus on the person than on the adequacy of his performance. If these observations are correct, it seems reasonable to assume that for our subjects person-oriented rather than competence- or achievement-oriented types of reinforcement are likely to have been more common. If our subject population is unaccustomed to "competence" types of reinforcement then it may be argued that they will feel more comfortable with a lower level of reinforcement when competence types of reinforcers are used, i.e., they may be made uncomfortable and suspicious when too much "achievement" or competence is stressed.

TABLE 1

Mean Number of Seconds to Complete Manual Dexterity Task
as a Function of Rate
and Object of Reinforcement

Rate of Reinforcement		Object of Re	Total	
	171 1	Person	Performance	in he manaka
25%	x	24.59	21.74	23.46
2376	n	9	6	15
750/	x	23.88	24.64	24.23
75%	n	7	6	13
Total	x	24.28	23.19	
	n	16	12	

Note.—Means are adjusted by operant (non-reinforced) trials.

These findings suggest that it may be useful to think of persons possessing different SRS's for different types of reinforcers as well as for different behavior domains.

A second finding, which was obtained for both belief and self-esteem aspects of self, was that lower frequencies of reinforcement were significantly more effective in enhancing self-image than were higher rates of social reinforcement (p's < .05). These findings may be derived from the SRS model if it is assumed that the

⁴It should be noted that these studies were not originally designed with the SRS model explicitly in mind. The choice of variables was largely dictated by our attempt to extrapolate relevant findings and theories from previous developmentally oriented research (Zigler & deLabry, 1962; Gewirtz & Baer, 1958).

lower rate of reinforcement, being more consistent with subjects' past experiences, was more credible and hence had greater impact, i.e., a 25% rate of reinforcement from a white examiner was perceived as more appropriate than a 75% rate.

In interpreting these findings it should be noted that the present data were obtained with a single small sample of black youth, who were probably at the lower end of a self-esteem con-

tinuum.

The Effects of Source and Positivity of Social Reinforcement

This study investigated the relative effectiveness of Negro peer group and white authority figure reinforcement in enhancing task performance and self-image of Negro youth. In addition, we investigated the relative effectiveness of positive and negative reinforcement. The rate of reinforcement was held constant at 67%. The subjects were 75 females and 28 males, run separately by sex. The population from which the sample was drawn was made up of Negro high school students participating in a summer vocational orientation program.

TABLE 2
MEAN SCORES FOR FEMALES ON
"HOW I SEE MYSELF" ASPECT OF SELF-ESTEEM
AS A FUNCTION OF SOURCE AND POSITIVITY
OF REINFORCEMENT

Source of Reinforceme	nt	Positive	Negative	Total
Experimenter	X	61.74 12	64.03 11	62.83
One Peer	X n	62.16 14	60.87 11	61.59
Three Peers	X n	63.69 11	61.71 12	62.66
Total	X n	62.48 37	62.19 34	Mark Work 1874 Neter School Collection

Note.—Mean scores are adjusted by pre-score for this measure.

Focusing first on the performance data, an interaction prediction can be derived from the SRS model if it is assumed that for black children the peer group is the primary source of positive reinforcement (see, for example, Ausubel & Ausubel, 1963), while white authority figures such as school teachers are the primary source of negative reinforcement. It may therefore be argued that

praise will be more effective than negative reinforcement when it comes from the peer group, while negative reinforcement will be more effective than positive reinforcement when it comes from the experimenter. The underlying assumption of such a set of predictions is that praise from a peer group and reproof from a white examiner are viewed as appropriate, and hence have greatest in-

centive value for motivating performance.

This predicted interaction was not found on the performance data with the females. Instead, there was a trend (p = < .08) for negative reinforcement to elicit superior performance on a word recognition task. Much to our surprise, however, such an interaction was found to be significant (F = 3.93, p < .05) for one of the self-esteem concepts, "self as I see myself." Positive reinforcement produced the greatest improvement in self-image when it came from one's peers, while negative reinforcement was more effective when it came from the white experimenter (see Table 2).

This finding was surprising because we had expected the appropriateness logic of the SRS model to be relevant only to the performance data, and had anticipated a straightforward superiority of positive to negative evaluation for the self-image measures. Before attempting to explain this interaction on the self-data, it should be noted that: (1) on other aspects of self-esteem and self-concept positive reinforcement was significantly more effective than negative, and (2) peer reinforcement (both one and three peers) was significantly superior to experimenter reinforcement

in creating a higher self-evaluation of performance.

Coming back to the finding that negative feedback from the experimenter produced a higher self-esteem response than a positive evaluation condition, the following might be assumed: It may be recalled that negative evaluation occurred on two-thirds of the trials. It is possible that a combination of a non-response and intermittent negative evaluation is seen by our sample as being more positive than we supposed, i.e., it may be that past white evaluation has been so consistently negative that a positive contrast effect occurs. The relative ineffectiveness of the positive evaluation treatment may be a function of the fact that for our subjects such praise is too discrepant from both past reactions of white examiners and their own negative self-image to be credible. Finally, it is possible that the self-image data in the negative condition reflects an ego-defensive, boomerang reaction; in order to maintain their sense of worth in the face of white devaluation, black youth may overemphasize their positive traits in their self reports to the same white examiner who has just criticized them.

For the males one major pattern emerged: peer reinforcement was superior to experimenter reinforcement in improving

performance and self-image. (Because of the small size of the male sample these results should be interpreted with great caution.)

The results of this study again argue for the importance of conceiving of multiple social-reinforcement standards. In particular, the findings suggest the importance of looking for different SRS's for different sources of reinforcement, and not assuming that males and females will have common SRS's for a given reinforcement source.

Studies of the Effects of Variations in Prior Availability of Social Reinforcement

Recently, my associates and I (see, for example, Heckenmueller, Schultz, & Baron, 1968) have been concerned with how short-term variations in the availability of a social reinforcer affect its subsequent efficiency (see also Gerwirtz, 1967). Baron (1968) has noted that the meaning of any short-term reinforcement operation must be seen in the context of the prior long-term reinforcement history. If this interpretation is correct, it is predicted that a low level of social reinforcement will be more likely to be seen as a thwarting experience for white rather than Negro subjects. White subjects are more likely to expect a high level of approval from a white authority figure; they are therefore more likely to be disturbed by receiving a relative lack of verbal approval, i.e., white subjects are more likely than Negro subjects to interpret a relatively neutral reinforcement condition as indicating disapproval. This greater frustration should, in turn, lead to a lessened responsiveness to the experimenter in a subsequent conditioning task.

These conditions were operationalized as follows: twelve reinforcements were given on an interval schedule during a tenminute pseudo-interview task. (During subsequent investigations, described below, a 30 reinforcement condition was also implemented.) The prior availability phase was immediately followed by a verbal discrimination task during which all subjects received 100% fixed-ratio reinforcement. The discrimination measure was the two-choice emotional labeling task described in

⁵Gewirtz suggests that the efficacy of a given reinforcer is an inverse function of its past availability. Research conducted by the present investigator, some of which is reported here, suggests that the relationship between past availability and current efficacy is a more complex one. That is, the amount of past availability is less crucial than whether the current level of availability matches or is discrepant from the past level (Baron, Robinson, & Lawrence, 1968).




FIGURE 1

Mean conditioning scores during test phase as a function of prior availability, race, and trial blocks.

Baron et al. (1968). The number of responses in the reinforced direction during this phase constituted our conditioning measure. The analysis procedure for all the studies in this series involved a repeated measures design with race of subject and/or prior availability as the between factors, and trials during the condi-

tioning phase as the within or repeated factor.

The first investigation (Heckenmueller, Schultz, & Baron, 1968) was a pilot study and involved only the low prior availability or twelve reinforcement condition (Landau and Gewirtz, 1967, refer to this as a deprivation condition). Thirty female undergraduates, 10 Negro and 20 white, were subjects; two white male graduate students played the role of reinforcing agent. It was found that the Negro subjects conditioned significantly better, i.e., showed a greater increase in the number of responses in the reinforced direction on the emotional labeling task, following this

period of relatively limited verbal approval.

In terms of the SRS model, it may then be argued that the Negro subjects find a low rate of approval from a white experimenter more appropriate and preferred than a high rate of approval. Based on this line of reasoning, it was predicted that Negro subjects would condition better following a low rather than a high level of approval from a white experimenter. The reverse pattern was predicted for white subjects. Recently analyzed and as yet unpublished data revealed the following pattern of results for 60 female subjects (two white males served as the reinforcing agents): (1) Negro college students conditioned better, i.e., produced a greater amount of responses in the reinforcement direction, following low rather than high prior availability of social reinforcement from a white authority figure; (2) there were no significant differences for high and low prior availability for white college students. This differential pattern of effects is presented graphically in Figure 1. The superiority of the Low to the High Availability condition for Negro subjects was significant only on the first block of reinforced trials (t = 3.01, p < .01). A significant race effect was also found indicating that Negroes conditioned significantly better than whites (F = 7.19, p < .01). Further insight in the significant state of the sig sight into the meaning of this data was obtained by correlating the conditioning scores with a post-experimental item asking subjects to indicate how important it was for them to get the approval of

⁶The sample consisted of 20 Negroes and 40 white undergraduates who were students at a moderately large mid-western university. The white and black students were both from middle and working class backgrounds although a higher proportion of the Negroes were from working class families. Ten percent of the students at this school are Negro.

the experimenter. For the black 12-availability group we obtained a significant positive relationship (r = .64) while for the black 30-availability group there was a non-significant negative correlation (r = -.21). This directional difference approached significance (Z = 1.86, p < .06). No significant correlations were found for the white groups. These data support the assumption that preference for a low rate of approval may be inferred from the conditioning

data at least under certain conditions.

We are presently continuing this line of investigation with Negro and white elementary school children in order to achieve a better understanding of the developmental basis of the SRS. A preliminary analysis of data, based on a single sample of 30 Negro children and using a white female examiner, revealed no significant differences in amount of conditioning as a function of variation in prior availability of reinforcement (30 vs. 12 prior reinforcements). A possible explanation for this finding is that when the incentive value of a reinforcer such as praise from a white authority figure is near asymptotic level, it is difficult to create differences which are psychologically significant. That is, it may be that for black children any and all white authority reinforcement is important and preferred. If this line of reasoning is correct, there should be greater overall conditioning for Negro children than for our college sample of Negroes. This interpretation was supported; our sample of Negro children conditioned significantly more with a white authority figure than did our sample of Negro college students.

The interpretation of the failure to find differential effects for the situational manipulation of reinforcer availability in terms of Negro children's assigning an extremely high incentive value to white approval regardless of its rate requires further clarification on a number of grounds. Such an explanation obviously takes us outside the SRS framework; in effect we are saying that under certain conditions a discrepancy model is not applicable. Baron (in press) has recently argued that the utility of the SRS model increases with age as we go from pre-school to college subjects since the model assumes active cognitive mediation. Specifically, I suggest that standards of appropriateness and therefore issues of over- and under-reward may only become relevant when the child has reached Piaget's concrete operational stage and, in addition, is able to make moral judgments based on subjective criteria (i.e., perceived intentions) rather than objective criteria (i.e., amount of damage done). Particularly with Negro children, who are generally slower than white children in cognitive development, this may not occur under the age of 9 or 10 (the age of the black children in the sample ranged from 7-1/2 to 10 years of age). Thus one possibility is that an SRS was simply not operative for the present Negro sample and that their behavior reflected the fact that their extreme past deprivation of white approval gave any white approval high incentive value, i.e., a simple drive model

may be most descriptive of the findings.

Simpler alternate explanations of the present findings should also be mentioned. First, it might be objected that finding a greater amount of conditioning for black children than black college students does not offer proof of a race-incentive interpretation, but simply reflects adult-child differences. The race interpretation of incentive differences is directly supported by some recent data obtained using white children with the same availability paradigm. When this sample is combined with the black child data, significant main effects for race are obtained—black children show a greater amount of conditioning to the verbal approval of a white female examiner than do white children. A possible confounding factor, however, is social class. It is possible that the Negro children condition better because as a group they are 'poorer," i.e., they come from a lower socio-economic class than either the white children or black college students; it may be that it is the class differences that mediate the differences in incentive value of the reinforcement. The present data do not allow us to rule out this interpretation.

The SRS and Individual Difference Variables

The findings discussed thus far make it clear that one of the problems of the SRS model is its lack of specificity. For example, how can the SRS model be used to determine a priori what an optimal level of positive discrepancy will be for different subject populations faced with different sources of reinforcement and different types of reinforcers? A possible way of deriving such predictions is to combine information about past levels of reward with information about regnant personality trends. Perhaps such data will allow us to predict, for example, that certain types of persons who have had low levels of previous reinforcement will be more likely to bias their SRS upward than will others. The study described below, while not originally designed to test such a formulation, may be seen as providing some insight into how individual difference factors such as personality variables might be woven into SRS theory.

The efficacy of material vs. verbal reinforcement. The subjects in this study, which was part of the Baron and Bass Labor Department Studies, were Negro males (16-22) who had dropped out of high school and were currently receiving training as auto mechan-

ics at a Skills Center in Detroit. The major experimental treatment was whether material or verbal reinforcement was dispensed. Reinforcement was dispensed on a 67% fixed-ratio basis for all conditions. The material reinforcement involved giving the subjects poker chips which could then be redeemed for candy or cigarettes. An example of the kind of verbal reinforcement used is the experimenter saying, "That's good," following a given trial. In addition to the material-verbal variation, a number of individual difference measures were used. The dependent variables involved indices of task performance and changes in self-concept.

The major pattern of effects, which occurred on both the performance and self-concept data, was that subjects who perceived that they had not received much positive reinforcement from their parents (as measured by Baron's Reinforcement History Scale, described in Katz, 1967) and subjects high in Need for Social Approval (as measured by the Crowne-Marlowe scale, 1964) performed better and were more positive in their selfconcept with verbal rather than material reinforcement. The reverse was true for subjects who recalled a high level of positive evaluation from their parents, who scored low on the self-measures, and who were low in Need for Social Approval; they performed better and showed more positive self changes with

material than verbal rewards.

In order to make sense out of these interactions in terms of our SRS model, it is necessary to specify further the relationship between the person's actual reinforcement history and his representation of these experiences. A recent finding in a study carried out by Baron, Robinson, and Lawrence (1968) provides some insight into this problem. In this study there was an indication of an upward biasing of the SRS for subjects who had previously encountered a relatively low rate of reinforcement. These subjects performed better when there was a moderate positive discrepancy than when the rate of reinforcement exactly matched their baseline rate of reinforcement. This finding does not support Baron's (1966) notion that optimal responsiveness occurs when the present level of reinforcement matches the past rate of occurrence. Additional findings in the Baron et al. study suggested that the matching principle may only hold for persons who have encountered a high rate of approval in the past; such persons are optimally responsive when reinforcement continues at a high level. For such subjects the SRS may be isomorphic with previous reinforcement history. With persons who have a low reinforcement history, the problem is a more complex one. The low initial rate group did best with a moderately discrepant rate of approval, better in this condition than when the actually received rate matched their baseline level of approval (i.e., 33%) or substantially exceeded it (100%).

The notion that there may be an upward biasing of the SRS for low reinforcement history persons may provide a way to explain the present findings. What emerges is the possibility that certain personality variables may moderate the relationship between the actually experienced level of reinforcement and its representation and incentive value. For example, persons who are ego-defensive may set their SRSs at an unrealistically high level. Specifically, in the present situation this may lead such persons to prefer verbal reinforcement to material reinforcement even though verbal reinforcement from white authority figures has not proved very functional or available in the past. What is being suggested is that while factors such as "hope" may generally bias the SRS to a moderate degree, for certain personality types such a biasing may extend to a preference for rates of reward which constitute large positive discrepancies from previously experienced levels of approval.

This reasoning may be applied to the material vs. verbal reinforcement study: Negroes have generally received a low level of verbal praise in the past from white authority figures—whatever reinforcements they have received have generally been material, e.g., wages. In the present study, a preference for verbal over material reinforcement was found for persons who recalled little positive evaluation from parents, showed a high need for social approval, scored high on an Introspectiveness scale, and evaluated themselves very highly on a self-concept measure. It is suggested that the combination of chronic deprivation and an ego-defensive personality orientation may lead to a person's setting his SRS substantially above the rate of reinforcement history he has received previously. Holding deprivation constant, a different personality syndrome might lead another person to set his SRS at a level which either coincides with or is moderately above the level

of reward he has previously achieved.

The present findings, as did those of the object of reward study, also remind us that we should consider the possibility that different SRSs may exist for different classes of reward, in this case, verbal and material. Another possibility suggested by the differential efficacy of different types of rewards is that we broaden our conception of the kinds of reinforcing events that have incentive value for a given subject population. For example, perhaps the most potent reinforcer for certain subject populations which have been deprived of the ability to control their own fate would be a limited opportunity to control their own outcomes. Similarly, one could argue that a graduated opportunity to manipulate

others or exercise control over other's outcomes might be the most effective way to promote learning for various populations of poor. According to SRS theory, if "other control" is a reinforcing event which has not been encountered with high frequency in the past, it should be introduced at a rate which is seen by the person as appropriate, i.e., within the region of his SRS. Once that standard has been raised through repeated exposure then the opportunity to exert more substantial control is likely to function as a successful reinforcer.

Task Self-Evaluation and Reinforcement History

We are still far from having established the exact nature of the relationship between individuals' reinforcement histories and their representations of such events. Although recent findings subgest there is far from a one-to-one relationship, some parallel research carried out in conjunction with Irwin Katz (Katz, 1967) substantiates that there is a clear relationship between selfevaluation and reinforcement history. A pilot study carried out with thirty-six 5th and 6th grade Negro elementary school children in Detroit indicated that there is a significant positive correlation (r = .38, p < .05) between a measure of perceived past reinforcement from parents (Baron's RHQ scale) and subjects' evaluation of the adequacy of their performance on both verbal and nonverbal tasks. Since this self-evaluation took place in the absence of any feedback or surveillance from the experimenter, we may assume that it represents a more generalized assessment by the individual of this reinforcement potential. Such an assessment may be assumed to represent an aspect of the individual's social reinforcement standard. This self-evaluation measure significantly differentiated between male students who were good and poor achievers in the classroom. No differences were found for females.

It is also of interest that the RHQ, in addition to giving a significant positive correlation with the self-evaluation score, yielded a significant negative correlation with Sarason's children's version of the Test Anxiety Questionnaire (r = -.36, p < .05). As might be expected, positivity of self evaluation and the Test Anxiety Scale are also negatively correlated (r = -.35, p < .05). Finally, it should be noted that the RHQ differentiated between high and low achievers in the classroom; high achievers recalled more favorable evaluations and less unfavorable evaluations from their parents than children designated as low achievers (see Table

3).

The above findings are of interest for a number of reasons: (1) they provide evidence concerning the construct validity of both the RHQ and the performance self-evaluation measure; (2) they provide us with information concerning the range of impact of variations in reinforcement history; and (3) they raise some general questions concerning how to best formulate the relationship

TABLE 3

COMPARISONS OF TOTAL NUMBER OF + AND - EVALUATIONS
ON THE RHQ FOR HIGH- AND LOW-ACHIEVING BOYS
(AFTER KATZ, 1967).

top of the state o	High Achievers (N = 15)	Low Achievers (N = 18)	
RHQ ^a	TO SERVED BEING A COLUMN TO		
Total +	15.20	11.67	3.65**
Total -	4.33	6.72	2.68*

Note.—All significance tests are two-tailed.

^aThis version of the RHQ consisted of 21 items.

*p < .02

**p < .01

between the SRS as an orienting referent and more global concepts such as self-image. It is to this problem that we address the final section.

Relationship Between the SRS and Self-Concept

The Katz-Baron findings suggest the utility of exploring the relationship between reinforcement history, self-concept, and the individual's preference for different levels or schedules of reinforcement (his SRS). At a theoretical level one could assume, for example, that a person's self-concept represents an SRS of SRSs. That is, it may be argued that a person's self-concept is derived as an integration of his reinforcement experiences in a number of different behavior domains each with its separate SRS. Alternately one could assume, as we have in our discussion of the relationship between reinforcement history and incentive value of a given class of reinforcers, that one's self-concept mediates the kind of relationships that exist between one's actual reinforcement experiences and the level of reinforcement toward which one strives. Both propositions are probably true. One's self-concept is probably determined by, and in turn is a determinant of, one's responsivity to different types and levels of reinforcement.

A Concluding Statement

An attempt has been made to demonstrate the relevance of an interpersonally oriented incongruity model to understanding Negro responsiveness to social reinforcement. Perhaps the most provocative derivation from the SRS model is the notion that Negroes would find a low rate of approval from a white authority figure, at least under certain conditions, more appropriate and preferred than a high rate of approval. The results of a series of studies carried out with disadvantaged youth suggest that this proposition has relevance to understanding Negro responsiveness to social reinforcers designed to shape both performance and self evaluation. In order to apply this basic proposition, however, it was necessary to move from a stress on a single monistic social reinforcement standard to a view which focuses on multiple social reinforcement standards which are specific to behavior, source, type of reinforcer, and situation. In order to enlarge the conceptual focus of the SRS model, an attempt was also made to relate it to more traditional notions of self referent processes. It is hoped that the present research and theorizing will occasion a rapprochement between behavioristic and cognitive interpretations of the process of social reinforcement.

In conclusion, I think the various types of research that have been described above well illustrate the proposition that research with extreme subject populations such as the poor is likely to occasion a productive re-shaping of one's theoretical model. This is particularly true if, as with the SRS model, the original theoretical notions were developed from research done with more privileged subject populations. The final result is a broadening of both

the "context of discovery" and the "context of verification."

REFERENCES

Aronson, E. Dissonance theory: Progress and problems. In R. P. Abelson, E. Aronson, W. J. McGuire, T. M. Newcomb, M. J. Rosenberg, P. H. Tan-nenbaum (Eds.), Theories of cognitive consistency; A sourcebook. Chicago: Rand

Ausubel, D. P., & Ausubel, P. Ego development among Negro children. In H. A. Passow (Ed.), Education in depressed areas. New York: Teachers College,

Columbia University, 1963.

BARON, R. M. Social reinforcement effects as a function of social reinforcement history. Psychological Review, 1966, 6, 529-539.

BARON, R. M. Social reinforcement standards and social reinforcer effects: Further extensions. Proposal for National Science Foundation Grant, 1968. BARON, R. M. Standards of appropriateness and social reinforcer efficacy. In R. H. Willis & M. S. Greenberg (Eds.), Social exchange: Theory and research.

New York: Wiley, in press.

BARON, R. M., & BASS, A. R. The role of social reinforcement parameters in improving trainee task performance and self-image. Final technical report,

U.S. Department of Labor, 1969.

BARON, R. M., ROBINSON, E. L., & LAWRENCE, S. The effectiveness of social reinforcement as a function of changes in rate of reinforcement. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1968, 4, 123-142.

Brehm, J. W., & Cohen, A. R. Explorations in cognitive dissonance. New York:

Wiley, 1962.

Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. The approval motive. New York: Wiley, 1964.

Dreger, R. M., & Miller, K. S. Comparative psychological studies of Negroes and whites in the United States: 1959-1965. Psychological Bulletin Monograph Supplement, 1968, 70, Whole No. 3, Part 2.

Festinger, L. A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957.
Fitts, W. H. The Tennessee self concept scale manual. Counselor Recordings and

Tests, Nashville, Tennessee, Box 6184, Acklen Station, 1965.

GEWIRTZ, J. L. Deprivation and satiation of social stimuli as determinants of their reinforcing efficacy. In J. P. Hill (Ed.), Minnesota symposia on child psychology. Vol. 1. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967.

GEWIRTZ, J. L., & BAER, D. M. Deprivation and satiation of social reinforcers as drive conditions. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1958, 57, 165-

172.

Heckenmueller, J., Schultz, S., & Baron, R. M. Social reinforcer deprivation effects as a function of race of subject. Proceedings, 76th Annual Convention, American Psychological Association, 1968, 391–392.

HEIDER, F. The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley, 1958.

JONES, E. E. Ingratiation: A social psychological analysis. New York: Appleton-

Century-Crafts, 1964.

JORDAN, N. Cognitive balance as an aspect of Heider's cognitive psychology. In R. P. Abelson, E. Aronson, W. J. McGuire, T. M. Newcomb, M. J. Rosenberg, P. H. Tannenbaum (Eds.), Theories of cognitive consistency: A sourcebook. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968.

KATZ, I. The socialization of academic motivation in minority group children. In D. Levine (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation. Lincoln: University of

Nebraska Press, 1967.

KRASNER, L., & ULLMANN, L. P. Research in behavior modification. New York: Holt,

1965

Landau, R., & Gewirtz, J. L. Differential satiation for a social reinforcing stimulus as a determinant of its efficacy in conditioning. *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology*, 1967, 5, 391-405.

MILLER, G. A., GALANTER, E., & PRIBRAM, K. H. Plans and the structure of behavior.

New York: Holt, 1960.

Newcomb, T. M. An approach to the study of communicative acts. Psychological Review, 1953, 60, 393-404.

PREMACK, D. Reinforcement theory. In D. Levine (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on

motivation. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965.

ZIGLER, E., & DELABRY, J. Concept-switching in middle-class, lower-class and

retarded children. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1962, 65, 267—273.

ZIMBARDO, P. G. The cognitive control of motivation: The consequence of choice and dissonance. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1969.

to be an in the party of the pa

the first services granges a constraint of the services of a first services.

The second of the case that the second of th

The second state of the second design of the second
The second secon

part resident described and a second of the
The state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the s

Collins of the second of the s

The states of the state of the

ALLE PROPERTY AND THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY

New York: Heat, 1960 St. T. S. H. J. See and the structure of pulsaring Decrees 2. M. A. a approach to the soundy of comprehensation and the control of the structure of the str

on sub-light manufactured with the state of
THE RESERVE TO SECURE AS A SECURE OF THE PARTY OF THE PAR

Mann A Market School Committee Commi

NOT WITH A THE SECRETARY (ARE), SELECTION OF SECRETARY

County to M. S. S. S. V. Few rate of entire equations are a substitute of the property of the

Expectancy Theory in the Study of Poverty

Gerald Gurin and Patricia Gurin University of Michigan

Much of the literature on poverty, historical as well as contemporary, follows one of two general interpretative approaches. One approach focuses on the institutional aspects of the problem—on the current realities that the poor must deal with. The other focuses on the problems "in" the poor—on pathologies that are

the residue of past disadvantage.

At times the distinction between these two approaches has been quite subtle and not sharply delineated. Rainwater, in earlier articles as well as in this issue (1970), has pointed out manifestations of these two approaches in sociological analyses of poverty and disadvantage—some approaches stressing the subcultural distinctiveness of the poor and others their limitations in the opportunity structure. Rainwater further notes that the distinction between these two approaches has not been adequately recognized or discussed in the theoretical sociological literature, and he indicates some of the negative consequences of this neglect on our understanding of the problems of poverty.

For psychologists who have been interested in problems of poverty this bifurcation has also had some negative consequences, although for converse reasons: the distinction between these two approaches has often been too sharply drawn. Psychological and situational approaches are sometimes considered antithetical and even mutually contradictory. Approaches that have focused on reality problems have often assumed that motivational and psy-

chological problems would disappear if basic changes in our institutions and opportunity structures were effected. In parallel fashion, those concerned with psychological and motivational issues have also often separated "psychology" and "reality." They have conceptualized the psychological problems of the poor in terms of "basic" personality dispositions that are the product of early socialization-motives, values, and behavior patterns that have become self-perpetuating and do not necessarily reflect current realities.

This excessively psychological point of view has sometimes led to a search for "deep" pathologies in motivation to interpret behavior that can be more simply explained as reaction to current situational constraints. For example, many of the motivational problems that arise in intervention programs for the poorproblems of commitment and dropout-might be explained more simply and meaningfully by relating them to the limited payoffs from these programs, rather than by analyzing the personality deficits of the poor. This psychological bias has also sometimes distorted the perspective and emphasis of programs attempting to deal with problems of poverty. For example, retraining programs for the hard-core unemployed, particularly the early programs of four or five years ago, often expended more energy and resources on "resocialization" than on meaningful skill training,

job development, and job placement.

However, not all psychological and motivational approaches to poverty depend on concepts that are divorced from current reality issues. This point of view was probably more prominent in earlier literature than it is today. For example, the shift in psychological approaches to poverty is typified by the way ideas about social class differences have changed over the past generation. Historically this approach focused on differences in basic motivational and personality dispositions between middle and lower-class populations, tracing these back to differences in parent-child relationships and early socialization patterns. In current literature the focus has shifted somewhat. Psychological analyses of class differences now place more emphasis on concepts such as "powerlessness" and "unmet expectations" which to some extent overcome the dichotomization of psychological and reality approaches by pointing to the psychological problems that spring from reality constraints. But there has been little effort to systemize these integrative approaches or to highlight the theoretical and practical issues arising from the confrontation and attempted integration of reality and psychological orientation. cality problems have often a sumed that matirational

Expectancy as an Integrating Concept

Over the past few years, we have attempted to conceptualize and analyze some of these issues in several studies of groups disadvantaged by poverty or minority status (Gurin, P. & Katz, D., 1966; Gurin, G., 1968; Gurin, G., 1970; Gurin, P., et al., 1969). We have found it helpful to focus on the concept of expectancy that has been central to motivational theorists such as Atkinson (1964) and Rotter (1954). According to these theorists, motivation of behavior depends not only on a generalized disposition to approach or avoid a given class of objects (the "motive") and the incentive value of the particular goal or object at issue, but also on the expectancy or estimate of the probability that the behavior will lead to the goal. The expectancy orientation forces one to integrate the psychological and reality aspects of the problems of poor people since it ties motivation directly to the question of situational payoffs and constraints.

The expectancy approach has obvious implications for the psychologist inclined to approach problems of poverty by focusing on internal psychological dynamics of the poor. It forces him to relate motivational analysis to realistically available rewards

and limitations.

It is less clear how such a framework also forces those who emphasize reality issues to consider individual factors. One might argue that the expectancy construct so points up the extent to which motivational problems are dependent on reality that when changes in realities and opportunity structures occur, these expectancies should change and the problems disappear. However, the issues are far more complex. Although expectancies are affected by immediate objective rewards and constraints and are thus subject to changes as the situation changes, they also are residues of the past. Expectancies are to some extent generalized dispositions that develop, like other personality dispositions, out of an individual's life history of relevant success and failure experiences; these generalized expectancies in turn influence the way an individual reacts to his current realities and to changes in these realities. Viewed in these general dispositional terms, expectancies may present problems of resocialization and relearning as serious as those of other personality dispositions; subjective expectancies do not automatically change to conform with changes in objective expectancies. Thus, some of the most interesting theoretical psychological issues begin rather than end when realities and objective expectancies change.

In this paper we will address ourselves to a discussion of some of these issues. Hopefully we are living in a period when opportunities are increasing and at least some attempts are being made to affect situational constraints, particularly for blacks and other minorities in poverty. Concern with psychological issues that are relevant during such changing conditions should be of

practical as well as theoretical interest.

To help clarify and delineate some of these issues, we will draw on the motivational literature on expectancy. Since this literature is based mainly on experimental laboratory studies of white middle class college subjects, there are obvious problems in translating it to problems of the poor. The literature has served primarily to point up and highlight problems and issues; it is to these, rather than to suggested solutions, that most of our com-

ments will be addressed.

Within an expectancy framework, two sets of psychological problems are critical for poverty groups. One is the problem of low expectancy—the feeling that one has little chance of attaining one's goal. The other, following Rotter's (1966) concept of internal-external control, is the problem of externally based expectancies—the feeling that one does not control one's own chances. Although these tend to be related-for example, the feeling of powerlessness reflects both low and externally based expectancies-they are not the same and pose different issues and problems.

In a previous paper we discussed a number of issues that arise when the concept of internal-external control is applied to problems of race and poverty (Gurin, P., et al., 1969). Therefore, we will focus here on the issue of low expectancy. We begin with two sets of questions especially relevant to our interest in affecting

the problems of poor people:

1. What are the possibilities for changing expectancies? What is the relationship between change in objective probabilities and change in subjective expectancies? What does the expectancy literature tell us about the ease or difficulty of changing expectancies and the stability and generalizability of these changes? Do poverty groups have special problems in learning

new expectancies?

2. What are the possibilities of affecting performance by changing expectancies? Since we are ultimately interested in affecting behavior that may help poor people deal with their problems, we are interested in changing expectancies only if they affect behavior. What are the relationships among change in objective probabilities, change in subjective expectancies, and change in behavior? Again, the literature will point up complexities that contradict any simplistic assumption of a linear "automatic" relationship whereby changes in objective probabilities bring about congruent changes in subjective expectancies which, in turn, bring about congruent changes in behavior.

Changing Expectancies

The Ease of Changing Expectancies

Many studies, either with children (Crandall, Good, & Crandall, 1964; Crandall, 1963; Mischel & Staub, 1965), or with adults (Feather, 1963, 1965, 1966, 1968; Rychlak & Lerner, 1965; Heath, 1961, 1962; Diggory & Morlock, 1964; Zajonc & Brickman, 1969; Brickman, 1968; Phares, 1957) demonstrate how easily personal expectancies can be altered by changing objective probabilities of success. All use the same kind of experimental setup. Subjects are asked their expectancies of success on reactiontime tasks, solving anagrams or mathematical puzzles, or other skill-based tasks. They are then asked to perform a block of trials on which they are given feedback indicating that they succeeded or failed on most of the trials. Without exception, these studies show that this success-failure feedback vitally affects subsequent expectancies of success on the same task. In fact, the realistic assessment of future chances of success and failure following a reinforcement sequence that is primarily positive or primarily negative is striking. Following success, most subjects alter their original expectancies upward; following failure, most subjects alter downward.

Dissonance Theory—An Opposing View

Still, despite this consistent, large main effect of successfailure feedback, another set of experimental studies, following the dissonance tradition of Festinger (1957) and his students, questions the ease of modifying personal expectancies. The argument, developed and tested first by Aronson and Carlsmith (1962), asserts that people, motivated by the need for self-consistency, may, as one mode for handling dissonance, reject feedback that disconfirms their initial expectancies. It is hardly surprising that people who expect to succeed may act to avoid, deny, or "undo" failure experiences, since a simple outcome or incentive model would make the same prediction. Success is clearly a more positive outcome and failure a more negative outcome in American society. More striking, therefore, is the dissonance prediction that people who hold low expectancies of success will prefer to "undo" success experiences rather than change their expectancies to correspond with the disconfirming feedback. If true, this would have serious implications for work with poor people who are likely to hold low personal expectancies.

Because of these implications, the data relevant to the dissonance prediction are of particular interest. The Aronson and Carlsmith results, which support the dissonance-avoidance hypothesis, have not always been replicated in subsequent studies that use a similar experimental approach (Lowin & Epstein, 1965; Silverman and Marcantonio, 1965; Frentzel, 1965; Cottrell, 1965, 1967; Zajonc & Brickman, 1969). The most thorough replication attempt is reported by Brock, Edelman, Edwards, and Schuck (1965) who performed several experiments to test the dissonance theory prediction and alternative explanations. The first two of these experiments were exact replications of the Aronson-Carlsmith procedure and obtained similar results. In the four subsequent experiments, Brock et al. varied how frequently the subject was given feedback about his performance. When feedback was clear and frequent, low expectancy subjects did not behave as dissonance theory would predict. Instead, they seemed more motivated by trying to do well than by trying to maintain consistency with their earlier self-conceptions.

In a recent study, Brickman (1968) argued that the inconclusiveness of some of these earlier dissonance experiments may have resulted from two common procedures: (1) inferring, rather than measuring, the state of dissonance that is presumed to follow receipt of discrepant information, and (2) failing to account for the revision of expectancies that should follow from strictly rational responses predicted from an information-processing model. Correcting for both problems, Brickman demonstrated that people, even those with low expectancies, do report more discomfort when their expectancies are disconfirmed than when they are supported by performance feedback. But his data do not show that this discomfort is handled by avoiding expectancy change. Instead, groups receiving the most discrepant feedback revise their expectancies more than a Bayesian formula suggests

is optimal, not less as dissonance theory would predict. The data that Baron presents in his paper in this issue are also relevant to this point (1970). Although Baron does not follow dissonance theory, his SRS approach at times leads to similar consistency predictions. Baron notes that his early theoretical formulation applied his consistency hypothesis to people with a low as well as a high history of reinforcements. However, some of his results have led him to feel that the consistency hypothesis holds mainly for people with a high SRS, while people who have had a history of low reinforcements tend to bias their SRS's

Although dissonance predictions, especially the critical hyupward. potheses regarding low expectancy people, are not always supported, this tradition of research does pose some significant issues for intervention strategies that depend on changing the objective probabilities of poor people.

Different Ways of Responding to Change

First, the dissonance tradition highlights the fact that low expectancy people can handle discrepant success feedback in a variety of ways. In dissonance terminology, they may choose among different, if not alternative, modes of resolving the discomfort produced by this discrepancy. They may change their behavior to undo the successful performance; they may distort feedback to avoid its dissonance implications; they may make cognitive (expectancy) changes to match their new performance. To date we know very little about what kinds of people, under what kinds of conditions, will choose behavioral rather than cognitive modes. It is clear that Aronson and Carlsmith's experimental procedure tried to rule out the possibility of easy cognitive change in order to test the behavioral modification prediction. The critical question in an expectancy-based approach to poverty intervention is what people with low expectancies will do when both cognitive and behavioral change are equally allowable in the situation. Central to dissonance theorists is the implicit assumption, made explicit by Baron in this issue, that cognitive change, involving as it must the possibility of change in not one cognition but in the whole cognitive structure, is more unlikely than behavioral change. But data to support that assumption are generally lacking. We need to know much more about multiple and alternative responses to unexpected successes.

Stability and Generalizability of Expectancy Change

Second, the questions raised by dissonance theory force us to examine the kinds of expectancies that have been so easily modified in typical psychological experiments. By and large, they deal with limited, task-specific expectancies. They may have little to do with the more basic cognitive structure and self-concept that interests both dissonance theorists and us. It is not sufficient to change an expectancy that is limited in time and does not involve the more basic sense of self. Rather, we want to develop new expectancies that will generalize beyond a specific experimental task to other types of situations and, hopefully, eventually to the person's generalized feelings about himself. In addition, we are not interested in expectancy change that maintains little stability over time or needs constant reinforcement. Instead, we hope to effect more permanent change.

What do we know about the issues of generalizability and

stability of expectancy changes from previous research? They have only rarely been examined, although what literature exists suggests that expectancy change produced in the laboratory may

be very limited indeed.

Some studies show that expectancies altered in a single experimental or training session are very unstable. Following a number of training trials in which expectancies are heightened by success and lowered by failure, even a relatively short delay of just twenty-four hours results in decided reversals to pretraining expectancies (Phares, 1966; Schwarz, 1966; Rychlak & Eacker, 1962). The fewer the training trials and the longer the delay after training, the more numerous the reversals. Schwarz's work also suggests that the pattern of success-failure experiences may be even more important than the sheer number in inducing both larger and more stable expectancy change. Controlling for number of successes, expectancies are more heightened when success experiences occur together than when they are more evenly or randomly interspersed by failures. Stability also seems to be affected by the size of the discrepancy between the original expectancy and the feedback. When successes and failures are so numerous that they appear highly discrepant with initial expectancy, change is even less enduring (Schwarz, 1966). This may well result from the incredulity effect of large discrepancies (Baron, 1970). Subjects seem very realistic about modifying expectancies to conform with objective feedback, even when it markedly contradicts what they expect; but the feedback effect may not last beyond the training situation if its credibility is dubious because it is simply too much better or worse than was originally expected.

Since these studies that examine factors affecting stability of expectancy change are few, their suggestions about timing, patterning, and size of discrepancy are by no means conclusive. Yet they do imply that intervention programs designed to alter objective probabilities of the poor must also be concerned with highly complicated techniques if objective changes in the situation are to produce stable changes in poor people's estimates of

personal chances of success.

Generalization of expectancy change is even more rarely investigated. Many factors affecting generalization of other kinds of learning may also apply to expectancy change but too few studies have explored this possibility. What little data we have suggest that certain types of people—those with initially very low expectancies (Mischel & Staub, 1965) and those who believe in internal control—and certain kinds of situations—those based on skill rather than chance (Rotter, 1966)—do show generalization beyond the training task. Still, we know very little about the conditions that will promote generalization to other kinds of tasks or, even more importantly, to the person's generalized expectancy or self-concept.

Special Problems for Poverty Groups in Learning New Expectancies

Another major question for us is whether the effects of success and failure differ depending on the person's initial expectancies. Specifically, if the expectancy problems of poor people involve both low and externally-based expectancies, is there evidence that their responsiveness to changing situations should differ from people with high and internally-based expectancies? Extrapolating from the research literature, would we expect poverty groups to have special problems in learning new expectancies as their

objective probabilities change?

Conditioner effects of low expectancies. The issue of whether people of low and high expectancies differ in their responses to success and failure has been explored in a few expectancy studies. Most support the hypothesis that sensitivity to success and failure is conditioned by initial generalized level of expectancy. One group of studies supports what might be termed a "noncongruent" hypothesis, namely, that expectancies will change most in reaction to experiences that are particularly discrepant. These studies indicate that people entering a skill situation with a low generalized expectancy will show a greater rise in their success expectations as a result of success experiences than will people with high initial expectancies. Conversely, high expectancy people will decrease their expectation of success more than low expectancy

¹This "noncongruent" hypothesis may help explain why most studies have shown that, while both failure and success feedback affect expectancies, failure has been somewhat more effective, i.e., decrements after failure are generally greater than increments after success (Crandall, 1963; Crandall, Good & Crandall, 1964; Rychlak & Eacker, 1962; Rychlak & Lerner, 1965; Feather, 1966, 1968).

In general, most studies have investigated middle class populations who have had success experience with the types of tasks presented in the experiments, and who, therefore, might be expected to approach these tasks with generally high expectancies. For such people failure would be more discordant than success. It is interesting that the one exception to this general finding appears in a study by Zajonc and Brickman (1969) that uses a reaction-time task; previous experience would have provided a more ambiguous basis for expectancy evaluations in that task. This finding on the greater efficacy of failure feedback exemplifies how our findings may be dependent on the nature of our typical subjects, and how replication of such studies on poverty groups, with lower initial expectancies, might lead to very different results.

people as the result of failure experiences (Crandall, 1963; Crandall, Good, & Crandall, 1964; Mischel & Staub, 1965;2 Feather,

If we wish to raise the low expectancies of poverty groups, 1966). these studies are encouraging, since they suggest that low expectancy people may be particularly reactive to success experiences. However, one major limitation of these studies should be noted. Since all the expectancy-change studies demonstrate the large main effect of success-failure and the strong tendency for all people to change their expectancies to conform to the objective probabilities in the feedback, the amount of change tends to become an automatic consequence of "room to move" from the original position. Not all experiments have attempted to control for initial expectancies, and those that have are of questionable adequacy. Thus, the evidence on responsiveness of low expectancy groups to success experiences remains somewhat inconclusive.

Evidence is also scarce on the important questions of whether initial expectancies affect the stability and generalization of newly learned expectancies. Some relevant data appear in an interesting study by Mischel and Staub (1965), which suggest that people with low expectancies tend to overgeneralize to dissimilar as well as similar tasks. This seems to reflect an unusual sensitivity to success and failure experiences and an over-dependence on the immediate environment. Such dependence could inhibit the development of stable, realistic expectancies. For people with low expectancies, the unusually heightened expectancies that follow

successes could easily be deflated by later failures.

Again, this is an area where research is urgently needed. If the few hints from the literature were to hold up under further investigation, expectancy-based interventions might be highly successful in changing the low expectancies of poor people. However, available data should also make us cautious against undue optimism because the very receptivity of low expectancy people to situational cues might also result in overgeneralization and quick deflation of increased expectancies if the "real" world failed to reinforce their new views of themselves.

Conditioner effects of externally-based expectancies. Although Rotter developed the concept of internal-external control a number of years ago, its great popularity is a recent phenomenon. In the recent upsurge of interest in poverty and race, internal-external control has been widely used as an operationalization of concepts

²Change in expectancy was not measured directly in the Mischel and Staub study, but was implied in changes in DEL (readiness to delay gratification).

like efficacy and powerlessness. Generally it has been forgotten that Rotter's interest in the concept developed from his theoretical involvement in the question of how new expectancies are learned. Looking at this internal-external concept both as a characteristic of a situation and as a personality orientation, Rotter hypothesized that where control of reinforcements is external—that is, based on chance forces over which the individual has no control rather than on his own internal resources of ability, skill, and effort—the person will learn less predictably from reinforcement. In simple terms, if a person feels that his success or failure in a given situation is determined by chance rather than his own actions, there is no reason for him to utilize this experience in

estimating his future chances of success.

Rotter and his associates have tested this hypothesis by comparing people in chance and skill situations and by comparing people defined as holding internal rather than external beliefs. Generally, data on acquisition and realism of learning new expectancies support Rotter's hypothesis. Subjects in skill situations, and those who believe their own actions determine the rewards they receive, show greater increases and decreases in expectancies following success and failure, and they reach a given level of expectancy with fewer successes or failures (Rotter, Liverant, & Crowne, 1961; Phares, 1957; Bennion, 1961). Moreover, they change expectancies more typically and realistically, i.e., increase expectancies after success and decrease them after failure (Phares, 1957; James, 1957; Feather, 1968). In contrast, people in chance situations, or those who believe that external forces generally determine their rewards, change their expectancies less, and less realistically, as a function of success and failure. The issue of how generalization or stability of expectancy change may be conditioned by these factors has rarely been examined. The one study directed to this issue (James, 1957) indicates that generalization is greater in skill than in chance situations and for internally- rather than externally-oriented subjects.

These results, assuming they are supported by further research on noncollege populations, suggest that the meaning of holding an externally-based expectancy may be very different from holding a low expectancy of success. Low expectancy people may be unusually responsive to success, while people who believe their expectancies are determined by forces beyond their control may be especially unresponsive to success. Therefore, the implication of this line of research for poverty programs depends greatly on the connection between level and basis of expectancy among poor people. If poor people suffer from both problems, poverty interventions may face a complex mix of expectancy orientations,

some facilitating and some minimizing the possible impact of situational changes and success experiences.

Behavioral Consequences of Expectancy Change

Those who believe that opportunity and situational changes are sufficient strategies in the war on poverty assume either that personal motivation is an unimportant element in behavior or that personal expectancies will automatically follow objective changes, and that these expectancy changes will automatically result in heightened performance. We, too, assume that performance can be enhanced through the motivational significance of increasing expectancies. However, several different theoretical models disclose complexities that contradict a simplistic assumption of a linear or automatic relationship whereby changes in objective probabilities bring about congruent changes in subjective expectancies, which, in turn, bring about congruent changes in behavior.

Does Increase in Expectancy Heighten Performance for Low Expectancy People?

One approach stresses the motivational significance of simply stating one's expectancy of success on getting commitment and involvement in the task at hand. Improvement in performance is then expected to follow because of the greater involvement. If stating an expectancy is the causally significant factor, performance should improve regardless of a high or low expectancy posture. Data from an experiment by Zajonc and Brickman

(1969) support this hypothesis.

The Atkinson model also questions simplistic assumptions about behavioral consequences from heightening expectancies. By assuming that expectancies and incentives are inversely related in an achievement situation, Atkinson predicts that both approach and avoidance achievement motivation are maximally aroused when success probabilities are intermediate, approximately 50-50. Thus, the implications of using success experiences to increase very low expectancies through this intermediate range to a much higher level depend on the person's motive characteristics. If low expectancy people also suffer from high fear of failure —a relationship supported by some studies (Feather, 1963, 1965) but not others (Rychlak & Lerner, 1965; Feather, 1966)—they may well try to avoid performance challenge as their success expectancies increase into an intermediate range. For instance, using an expectancy approach in job-training programs might result in increased dropout or absenteeism among trainees as their expectancies increase, provided: (a) they have both low expectancy and fear of failure problems, and (b) their motivation fits the model suggested by Atkinson. Of course even if there were conclusive support for this model, other sources of motivation, such as desire for money, affiliation, or power, could be used to compensate for the hypothesized avoidance of achievement as low expectancy-high fear of failure trainees experience job success. But it would require considerable sensitivity to all these motive issues to know when to arouse other kinds of motives in order to keep trainees in a skill-training situation that depends primarily on enhancing expectancies through success.

Actually, studies testing predicted performance, motive, and expectancy interactions have produced contradictory results. Most relevant is the work of Feather in which expectancy change plays an important role. Persistence at an insoluble task does seem to follow the interaction model (Feather, 1961, 1963), but performance data do not support it as well (Feather, 1966, 1968). Certainly the performance results do not warrant conclusive pessimism about what would happen if intervention programs attempt to increase the expectancies of the poor. Still this model

does raise provocative questions for such programs.

Dissonance theorists also make two assumptions that question whether success experiences will necessarily produce positive performance effects for low expectancy people. First, dissonance can be reduced by making rewards that disconfirm initial expectancies less attractive than those that support expectancies. Brickman (1968), however, finds little evidence that dissonance was handled by reducing the incentive value of outcomes that disconfirmed expectancies. Both anticipated and actual satisfaction with achievement rewards representing success were high,

regardless of personal expectancies.

Second, however, dissonance theory predicts that low expectancy subjects will not try to achieve rewards based on success even if they are attractive, because they will find the dissonance created by success too uncomfortable to tolerate. Therefore, performance will be best facilitated by feedback that contradicts initial expectancies very little, if at all. This hypothesis is examined in numerous experiments reported by Baron, with contradictory results. The burden of the dissonance experiments summarized in the preceding section of this paper also questions this hypothesis. In most of the replications of the Aronson-Carlsmith study (1962), low expectancy subjects given success feedback appeared to be motivated more by desire to do well than to avoid dissonance.

Finally, it is important to note that performance hypotheses based on dissonance theory depend largely on the interrelationships of cognitive and behavioral modes of resolving dissonance. Let us assume, for the moment, that success experiences are dissonance-producing and unsettling for low expectancy people. If cognitive change either precedes or is more likely than behavioral resolution, performance may well improve subsequent to the cognitive change, in order to match the person's new heightened sense of his potential. If behavioral resolution precedes or substitutes for cognitive change, low expectancy people should perform badly or undo successful performances in order to maintain expectancy consistency. To date we know too little about these interrelationships among modes of resolving dissonance to decide which performance prediction is most reasonable for low expectancy people.

To summarize: Some difficult problems in using expectancy change to enhance the performance of low expectancy people are suggested by following the Atkinson model and dissonance theory. Nevertheless, available data indicate we need not be as pessimistic as these approaches seem to suggest. On the other hand, we should not leap to the opposite conclusion either. Data are just too sparse to start translating research into appropriate action strategies. It is interesting, for instance, that students following Rotter's concern with expectancy as part of social learning theory have given most of their attention to the learning of expectancies. Very few experimental studies in that tradition take the next step and examine ways that newly acquired expectancies may or may not produce congruent changes in learning or performing in

achievement or job-related situations.

Problems in Expectancy-Performance Research

Another problem in translating research into action derives from the kinds of studies typical in this area. Most of the data available to us are correlational and, therefore, not very helpful in isolating whether expectancy change will actually heighten performance. Many studies have shown a positive correlation between expectancy and performance. For instance, children with high academic expectancies also achieve higher grades and perform better on IQ and standard achievement tests (Crandall, Katkovsky, & Preston, 1962; Crandall, Good, & Crandall, 1964; Battle, 1965, 1966; Coleman et al., 1966). Yet, except for some support for the hypothesis that expectancies cause greater involvement and persistence in difficult achievement tasks (Crandall, Katkovsky, & Preston, 1962; Battle, 1965), these studies tell us little about the causal connections between expectancy and performance. Similarly, studies of adults give correlational support but little else. Even Feather's studies rarely employ both the expectancy change and performance improvement scores that are so

necessary to unravel their interrelationships.

Data from Zajonc and Brickman (1969) illustrate how important this is; as in other studies, subjects who approached the task with high success expectancies performed better on the first block of trials. However, since this study also uses a measure of performance before the actual experimental performance trials and before the subjects state their initial expectancies, Zajonc and Brickman were able to show that this typical relationship between initial expectancy and first trial performance can be explained as expectancy reflecting rather than determining performance. In addition, with this pre-experimental performance measure, they were able systematically to relate changing expectancy to performance improvement. And the results do not support the simple assumption that raising expectancy leads to raising performance and lowering expectancy leads to lowering performance; rather, they show complex interaction effects. One particularly interesting result is the fact that expectancy reaction to failure has critical implications for performance improvement. Subjects who reduced their expectancies greatly after failure also showed less improvement than subjects who resisted the failure feedback and reduced their expectancies only slightly. In contrast, the study showed no improvement implications from expectancy reactions to success. Subjects who changed expectancies slightly and those who changed greatly improved equally, although Zajonc and Brickman were careful to note that subjects in the success condition may have experienced an improvement ceiling.

Summary and Implications

Major Results and Questions from the Literature

Perhaps the overall impression from the expectancy literature we have reviewed is one of complexity, contradiction, and tentativeness of our knowledge in this area. Nonetheless, two of the conclusions that can be drawn lend hope for intervention programs that are trying to affect problems of poverty through changing the environment poor people confront. First, success experiences and reality changes in opportunities probably can be used to raise the expectancies of low expectancy people. Second, studies consistently stress that this be done under conditions where a person feels that the successes come from his own skill and competence. The literature on internal and external control indicates that effects of success and failure are not very reliable

when a person feels they do not depend on his own actions.

Our review also indicates, however, that an individual's expectancies do not automatically follow changes in objective probabilities. We have suggested a number of complexities that qualify the simplistic assumption that increasing objective success and opportunity will necessarily lead to heightened subjective expectancies and more effective behavior. Programs trying to cope with these issues face several important questions:

1. Under what conditions will success experiences and opportunity changes increase personal expectancies and under what conditions will they lead to denial and avoidance responses?

2. How can success experiences in an intervention program be used to affect long-range stable expectancy changes that carry into the world

beyond the program?

3. How can the effects of a series of specific positive experiences be made to affect an individual's general self-confidence and trust in the environ-

4. Under what conditions can positive effects on psychological expectan-

cies also have positive implications for behavior?

A very general implication follows from the fact that the literature raises more questions than it answers. We have stressed the complexity of expectancy issues—especially the point that psychological problems of expectancy, though responsive to reality changes, will not disappear automatically when those changes occur—not out of an academic interest in complexity. Rather, it is important to recognize this complexity because it has implications for the underlying philosophy one adopts in attempting to

deal with problems of poverty.

In our introduction we have noted the tendency for approaches to poverty to polarize around psychological and reality positions. There is danger in basing poverty interventions on an overly psychological approach, on the assumption that the problems are in the poor. This view of the problem and tendency to blame the poor can become too easily a rationalization for our inability to deal with the tremendous reality issues in poverty. But it is also decreased as a second of the problem and tendents our inability to deal with the tremendous reality issues in poverty. it is also dangerous to assume that there are no motivational problems that are not easily solved with situational changes. When change turns out to be complicated and slow, proponents of a simplistic reality approach may swing to an equally overly simplified often projection fied, often prejudiced, psychological approach—appealing out of frustration to concepts of deep personality deficit and pathology in the poor, and even, in the case of the blacks, to the argument of genetic inferiority.

Research Implications

The questions we have raised clearly need further research if we are to use expectancy theories to guide intervention programs. In calling for more research, we might also suggest directions to take in examining generalization, stability, and perfor-

mance implications of expectancy change.

First, we feel it is important to broaden the kinds of determinants that are investigated in research on stability and generalization. For example, the significance of the social relationship between the trainer and trainee (or experimenter and subject), which Kelman (1965) and Raven (1965) link to permanency and generalization of attitude change, is completely untouched in the expectancy literature (an exception is the work of Baron). The expectancy literature, the product of either social learning or cognitive psychologists, focuses too exclusively perhaps on schedules of reinforcement, task difficulty, feedback discrepancy, or cognitive aspects of personality as determinants of the course of expectancy change.3 Important as these factors may be, poverty programs concerned with expectancy change may also need to consider characteristics of the interpersonal situation in which the low-income, low-skilled person begins to assess his chances for success. Opportunity changes generally are mediated by people-trainers in job training, employment counselors, teachers, job recruiters, political leaders, etc. Characteristics that make these people possible identification figures and credible to the poor may affect expectancy change as much as they affect permanence of other kinds of attitude change (Kelman, 1965), and as much as expectancy change follows from less interpersonal qualities of situations more typically examined in expectancy literature. This research direction connects with the conviction of many activists regarding the desirability, if not necessity, of involving community people as leaders and models in poverty intervention programs.

Second, to clarify what will happen to behavior when success experiences are used to heighten expectancies, we need the kind of experimental designs that can overcome the limitations of previous research and answer some crucial questions. We must know whether expectancy change means anything or whether performance is primarily a function of either earlier skill and ability or current success, independent of the expectancy reaction to it.

³But note Feather's emphasis on achievement motives as possibly mediating the impact of success and failure on expectancy change, and Mischel and Staub's emphasis on the importance of trust between experimenter and subject.

An obvious approach to answering these questions is to control possible effects of experience to see if expectancy has any independent effect on performance. But that is exactly what we do not want to do in work with the poor. Job retraining, employment placement, adult education, or successful collective action are all experiences that should be meaningful both for changing expectancies and for enhancing performance. We do not want to demonstrate the significance of expectancy by arguing that it affects future performance independent of these experiences. Rather, we need a research design much like the one used by Zajonc and Brickman, so we can see whether an expectancy reaction to a success experience adds anything to the contribution of the experience itself. Over and over in Feather's work we see that success in early trials is positively related to subsequent performance. What we need is a design that lets us see whether this is more true for subjects who respond to success by greatly increasing their personal expectancies than for subjects who have little, if any, expectancy reaction to success. Moreover, the design must also allow us to examine whether the person's initial expectancy conditions his reaction to success and failure and also conditions the effects of his reaction on performance improvement. Does the person with a very low expectancy respond differently to success and failure than one who already has much higher expectancy? And does his reaction to success and failure have different performance implications than it would have if he came to the situation with more self-confidence?

Most important of all is the pressing need to turn to studies of poor people who are likely to have genuinely lower expectancies of success than any group that has been called a "low expectancy group" in previous research. Like most other motivational research, the expectancy studies have relied almost exclusively on college samples, generally college males. A low expectancy person is anyone below the median in initial expectancies for that sample. We are in the peculiar position of trying to extrapolate from research on that limited and much more affluent group to poor people who have faced much harsher social realities. We, therefore, need to replicate some of the more significant studies in a genuinely low expectancy population. As a more challenging step, we should also extend previous research to issues that are not typically examined and select experimental tasks that are probably more relevant to the job skills and interests of the poor.

Some Limitations in Current Theory and Research

We have noted the need in future research to explore some of the issues that have been raised by our review of the expectancy literature and our attempts to apply it to problems of the poor. In doing so, we have stayed within the framework of the existing approaches. But this framework is narrow, covering only selected aspects of expectancy issues in poverty. The studies mainly have used tasks that reflect individual skill, providing success and failure feedback to influence the individual's expectancies about his ability to perform well. Thus, the existing theory and research are relevant to problems of poverty to the extent that the expectancies of the poor are affected by their individual skills and competences. They are most applicable to intervention programs which, like job training, promote the development of individual

competence as the way out of poverty.

Without denying the validity and place for such an approach, we nevertheless feel that it has two critical limitations. First, it assumes a benign environment, one in which success in life does follow from individual competence and achievement. This is implicit in the work on internal-external control, where the internal orientation is interpreted as realistic and "healthy" and the external orientation as a primitive belief in chance and fate. In a previous paper (Gurin, P., et al., 1969) we have suggested that, while this approach may be appropriate for the socially advantaged populations that have been the subjects of most of the expectancy research, it is more questionable when applied to poverty groups. Poor people face many external obstacles that have nothing to do with chance, and a sensitivity to the external determinants of their opportunities and expectancies may lead to more effective rather than less effective behavior.

Second, the competence approach to opportunities and expectancies is limited because it is an individual approach. It points to individual mobility as the solution to poverty and neglects the import of collective action. Focusing on individual skill determinants of expectancy, the literature is not relevant to solutions directed against the situational and institutional determinants of expectancies. Such solutions, by their nature, involve group rather than individual action. We need a whole new direction in expectancy research to make it as potentially relevant to issues like

community control as it is to job training programs.

Consideration of the external determinants of expectancies and the appropriateness of collective action to deal with them raises a host of further questions for expectancy theory and research. Clearly, the problem of learning new expectancies is no longer one of changing from an external to a more internal orientation. Rather, poor people are presented with the much more difficult problem of learning to make very complex judgments as to when internal and external interpretations are realistic, when

an internal orientation reflects intrapunitiveness rather than a sense of efficacy, when an external orientation becomes defensive rather than a realistic blaming of the social system. Moreover, these judgments must be made at a time when objective opportunities are in flux, making an accurate picture of reality all the more difficult to determine

REFERENCES

Aronson, E., & Carlsmith, J. M. Performance expectancy as a determinant of actual performance. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1962, 65, 178-

ATKINSON, J. W. An introduction to motivation. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand,

BATTLE, E. Motivational determinants of academic task persistence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 2, 209-218. BATTLE, E. Motivational determinants of academic competence. Journal of Per-

sonality and Social Psychology, 1966, 4, 634-642.

BARON, R. The SRS model as a predictor of Negro responsiveness to reinforcement. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26 (2).

BENNION, R. C. Task, trial by score variability of internal versus external control of reinforcement. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University,

BRICKMAN, P. Expectancy disconfirmation and search: Cognitive and affective components. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan,

Brock, T. C., Edelman, S. K., Edwards, D. C., & Schuck, J. R. Seven studies of performance expectancy as a determinant of actual performance. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1965, 1, 295-310.

COLEMAN, J. S. et al. Equality of educational opportunity. U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov-

COTTRELL, N. B. Performance expectancy as a determinant of actual performance mance: A replication with a new design. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-

COTTRELL, N. B. The effect of dissonance between expected and obtained performance upon task proficiency and self-estimates of task proficiency. Journal of Social Psychology, 1967, 72, 275–284.

Crandall, V. C. The reinforcement effects of adult reactions and non-reactions on children's achievement expectations. Child Development, 1963, 34, 335-

CRANDALL, V. C., GOOD, S., & CRANDALL, V. J. The reinforcement effects of adult reactions and nonreactions on children's achievement expectations: A

CRANDALL, V. J., KATKOVSKY, W., & PRESTON, A. Motivational and ability determinants of minants of young children's intellectual achievement behaviors. Child De-

Diggory, J. C., & Morlock, H. C., Jr. Level of aspiration, or probability of success? Journal of Abramal and Abram

success? Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1964, 69, 282-289.

FEATHER, N. T. The relationship of persistence at a task to expectation of success psychology, and achievement related motives. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,

FEATHER, N. T. The relationship of expectation of success to reported probability, task structure, and achieves ity, task structure, and achievement related motivation. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1963, 66, 221, 220 and Social Psychology, 1963, 66, 231-238.

FEATHER, N. T. The relationship of expectation of success to need-achievement and test anxiety. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 2, 118-126.

FEATHER, N. T. Effects of prior success and failure on expectations of success and subsequent performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1966, 3. 287-298.

FEATHER, N. T. Change in confidence following success or failure as a predictor of subsequent performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1968,

FESTINGER, L. A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957.

FRENTZEL, J. Cognitive consistency and positive self-concept. Polish Sociological

Bulletin, 1965, 1, 71-86.

GURIN, G. Inner-city Negro youth in a job training project: A study of factors related to attrition and job success. Final report to U.S. Department of Labor, Manpower Administration and U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1968.

GURIN, G. An expectancy approach to job training programs. In V. Allen (Ed.),

Psychological factors in poverty. Chicago: Markham, 1970.

GURIN, P., GURIN, G., LAO, R. C., & BEATTIE, M. Internal-external control in the motivational dynamics of Negro youth. Journal of Social Issues, 1969, 25

(3), 29-53.

GURIN, P., & KATZ, D. Motivation and aspiration in the Negro college. Final report to the Office of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1966.

HEATH, D. Instructional sets as determinants of expectancy generalization.

Journal of General Psychology, 1961, 64, 285-295.

HEATH, D. Reinforcement and drive level determinants of expectancy generaliza-

tion. Journal of General Psychology, 1962, 67, 69-82.

JAMES, W. H. Internal versus external control of reinforcements as a basic variable in learning theory. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 1957.

Kelman, H. C. Compliance, identification and internalization: Three processes of attitude change. In H. Proshansky & B. Seidenberg (Eds.), Basic studies in

social psychology. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965.

LOWIN, A., & EPSTEIN, G. F. Performance expectancy as a determinant of actual performance: Some additional variables. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1965, 1, 248-255.

MISCHEL, W., & STAUB, E. Effects of expectancy on working and waiting for larger rewards. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 2, 625-633. PHARES, E. J. Expectancy changes in skill and chance situations. Journal of Ab-

normal and Social Psychology, 1957, 34, 339-342.

PHARES, E. J. Delay, anxiety, and expectancy changes. Psychological Reports, 1966, 18, 679-682.

RAINWATER, L. The problem of lower class culture. Journal of Social Issues, 1970,

26 (2). RAVEN, B. Social influence and power. In Steiner & Fishbein (Eds.), Current studies in social psychology. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965.

ROTTER, J. B. Social learning and clinical psychology. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1954.

ROTTER, J. B. Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 1966, 80, (1, Whole No. 609).

ROTTER, J. B., LIVERANT, S., & CROWNE, D. P. The growth and extinction of expectancies in chance controlled and skilled tasks. Journal of Psychology, 1961, **52**, 161–177.

RYCHLAK, J. R., & EACKER, J. N. The effects of anxiety, delay and reinforcement on generalized expectancies. Journal of Personality, 1962, 30, 123-134.

RYCHLAK, J. R., & LERNER, J. J. An expectancy interpretation of manifest anxiety. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 2, 677-684.

SCHWARTZ, J. C. Influences upon expectancy during delay. Journal of Experimental

Research in Personality, 1966, 1, 211-220.

SILVERMAN, I., & MARCANTONIO, C. Demand characteristics vs. dissonance reduction as determinants of failure-seeking behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 2, 882-884.

Zajonc, R. B., & Brickman, P. Expectancy and feedback as independent factors in task performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1969, 2,

and the present of the transfer from the contract of the contr 148-156.

Group Cohesiveness, Ethnic Organization, and Poverty

Marcia Guttentag¹
Graduate Center
City University of New York

Much of the work in the social psychology of group cohesiveness has been conducted in the laboratory. This work has yielded some strong, though limited, empirical generalizations about the effects of cohesiveness on a wide variety of behaviors: cooperation, competition, conformity, productivity, and learning among group members. There is also a more descriptive literature from sociology and anthropology which deals with cohesion and the ethnic organization of current and historic groups. In this paper, findings from these disparate sources are examined. When combined, these diverse sources of research data offer some insights into the internal characteristics of groups which have emerged from poverty. From this perspective the literature permits the prediction of some of the antecedents and consequents of changes in group cohesiveness and ethnic organization among those who are presently poor. Recent changes in the ideology and cohesiveness of poor blacks is used as an illustrative case.

It is clear that cohesiveness at the ethnic group level produces powerful effects on individual behavior. These effects override the characteristics of nuclear family units. Reference group ideology (Siegel & Siegel, 1957; Hyman & Singer, 1968), particularly in a

¹I am indebted to Saunders Redding for his perceptive comments on this topic, and to Paul Secord for his critical reading of an earlier draft of this paper.

context where there is communal economic and social responsibility, is a better predictor of group movement than the aggregate of the concrete, external conditions confronted by group members.

There is some difficulty in extrapolating from the experiences of groups which have been poor in the past. Those poor groups that newly achieve group cohesiveness and ethnic organization face a society which differs radically, even from those in the recent past. It is a society in which social and financial responsibility for the needy has largely been coopted by government and large scale organizations. Instead of filling a social vacuum—as was once true-emergent ethnic organizations must now struggle with legitimated government bureaucracies. It is in this context that experimental studies of group cohesiveness yield some fruitful predictions about the nature and outcomes of a conflict between newly cohesive poor groups and established institutions.

The present account includes: a selective discussion of experimental findings on group cohesiveness, some experimental results of the effects of ethnic identity, examples of ethnic and religious organization among current and historic disadvantaged groups (with ethnic cohesiveness among poor blacks used as a current

illustration), and some conclusions and predictions.

The Concept of Cohesiveness

Group cohesiveness has been defined as "that group property which is inferred from the number and strength of mutual positive attitudes among members of a group (Lott & Lott, 1965)," or as "those forces which act to keep a person in the group and prevent him from leaving (Collins & Raven, 1969, p. 120)." These descriptive definitions have little surplus meaning and are based primarily on generalizations from laboratory studies of group cohesiveness. Secord & Backman's (1964) more inclusive definition of group cohesiveness, which distinguishes between three different internal sources of attraction to the group, is of particular relevance in the present discussion:

1. The basis of attraction to the group may lie in the interaction itself. In this instance the group is characterized as highly cohesive because the interaction results in high reward-cost outcomes to participants. This may occur because the needs of various members are complementary, their interests and attitudes are similar, or the organization of the group and the situation in which interaction takes place are conducive

2. Members may be attracted to the group because each individual finds the group activities inherently rewarding. . . .

3. Members may be attracted to a group because membership is a means to achieving other ends. They may perceive that only through group action can they achieve a goal, such as getting a particular piece of legislation enacted. Or perhaps membership may be a source of favorable reward-cost outcomes in terms of the status one can achieve among persons outside the group.

While it has been amply demonstrated that these various sources of attraction contribute to cohesiveness (Cartwright & Zander, 1960, pp. 69–162), little attention has been paid to two points which exchange theory would underscore. First, attraction to the group is dependent on the comparison levels of group members. Second, the total force operating on group members to remain in a group is a function not only of attraction to the group, but also of the outcomes available in alternative relations outside the group.

Some groups are highly cohesive even though their members are experiencing low reward-cost outcomes. Low-status, underprivileged groups have been shown to have high cohesiveness both in and out of the laboratory (Pope, 1942; Thibaut, 1950). This reflects a higher level of attraction than might be expected on the basis of outcomes experienced by the members of such groups. But outcome must be considered in relation to comparison level. For underprivileged, low-status groups, the low quality of outcomes available in alternative relations, the low level of outcomes previously experienced, and perceptions of what other persons like oneself are obtaining all suggest a low comparison level. Since attraction to the group is a function of the degree to which outcomes are above the comparison level, attraction to the group in this instance may well be higher than would be expected from the relatively low outcomes alone. Persons may remain in a relation even when attraction is absent and their outcomes fall below their comparison level. This occurs, however, only if their outcomes remain above their comparison level for alternatives. They are held in the group by the realization that leaving it would result in even lower outcomes [pp. 269-70].

In laboratory studies, group cohesiveness has generally been manipulated through attraction-to-group instructions, i.e., the subjects are convinced by the experimenter that they should like one another (Van Bergen & Koekebakker, 1959). Strangers who are brought together in the laboratory have no basis for cohesion other than the immediate ones established by the experimenter. Cohesiveness in the laboratory can rarely be created on the basis of the comparison levels of group members, i.e., a comparison to the "outcomes available in alternative relations outside the group [Second & Backman, 1964, p. 269]." Nevertheless, the significance of effects in experimental studies, where attraction-to-group is established simply through verbal instruction, highlights the importance of cognitive mediators in group cohesiveness (Gruen, 1965). Even in ad hoc experimental groups it is what individuals believe which establishes the group as a referent, and determines group cohesiveness. How much more powerful then are the effects of belief systems which relate an individual to reference groups that have a life over time:

reference groups can play different functions in the determination of a person's attitudes. The first of these is that of setting and enforcing standards for the person. Such standards are usually labelled group norms so we shall call this the normative function of reference groups. . . A group functions as a normative reference group for a person to the extent that its evaluations of him are based upon the degree of his conformity to certain standards of behavior or attitude and to the extent that the delivery of rewards or punishments is conditional upon these evaluations. . . The second of these functions is that of serving as or being a standard or comparison point against which the person can evaluate himself and others . . . the comparison function of reference groups. A group functions as a comparison reference group for an individual to the extent that the behavior, attitudes, circumstances, or other characteristics of its members represent standards or comparison points which he uses in making judgments and evaluations [Kelley, 1968].

Such groups provide a frame of reference for the organization of the individual's field. They create a social world, which may or may not be based on face-to-face contact (Shibutani, 1955). With the growth of mass media, the size of possible referent groups has expanded geometrically, far beyond the face-to-face groups of the past. The Woodstock phenomenon in the summer of 1969 (Roszak, 1969; Hoffman, 1969) illustrated the power of a referent group of enormous size—over 400,000 youth—which had exceptionally strong, common norms. The group was much too large to have developed its norms through face-to-face contact. Because cohesiveness develops through cognitive mediation, even without immediate behavioral reinforcers, the growth of cohesive referent groups of enormous size, in which members are physically separated, is both possible and increasingly frequent.

Experimental Studies of Group Cohesiveness

What are some of the conditions which lead to increased group cohesiveness, particularly in low status groups? Thibaut (1950) found that boys who tried to obtain better treatment from an experimenter, and failed, showed a significant increase in cohesiveness (as measured by the proportion of their own group choices), while groups of boys who were successful in increasing status as individuals, did not. Cohen (1958) found, as Kelley (1951) had, that non-mobile, low status subjects send significantly more cohesiveness-enhancing comments to their own sub-group than mobile low status subjects do. There also is evidence suggesting that the cohesiveness of a group tends to increase with an increase in the anxiety of its members (Weller, 1963).

Conditions of a lack of mobility and low status may create a growth in group cohesiveness. What is also needed is group members' awareness that their common problems stem from an external source (Lott & Lott, 1965). "Opposition to, or restriction of, the group's activities and goals by outsiders (e.g., authority figures or other groups) will increase solidarity within the group [Sherif & Sherif, 1964]." Group members must also see a possibility that cooperative behavior may reduce or eliminate threats. Among those of low status a perception that failure is not the fault of an individual but a group-wide problem, and the realization that such failure stems from external rather than inner sources, precedes a growth in group cohesiveness. A field study of motivation and aspiration in southern Negro colleges provides empirical support for the independent effects of attitudes toward "individual vs. system blame" in a low status group (Gurin & Katz, 1966).

What effects does cohesiveness have on group members' behavior? Although a number of experimental studies have examined the relationship between group cohesion and the conformity of group members their results do not lead to clear-cut conclusions. A few studies, using estimations of autokinetic movement, have found no relationship at all between conformity and degree of cohesion (Downing, 1958; Moran, 1965). An experiment which used an opinion task to study conformity (Kinoshita, 1964) found that there was an interaction between the importance of the task and cohesiveness. Conformity effects were greatest in highly cohesive groups, when the task was unimportant. Decreases in cohesion were followed by decreases in the effectiveness of group influence (Bovard, 1951). Usually, the more cohesive the group (Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950) the greater the pressure to conform—at least to group relevant norms (Schachter, 1951; Emerson, 1954). However, conformity is high in cohesive groups only when members believe it is instrumental to being liked (Walker & Heyns, 1962).

Deutsch (1949) and others (Back, 1951; Gerard, 1951; Levy, 1953) have studied cooperation, competition, and communication. Deutsch found that the more cohesive the group the greater the specialization of function and diversity of membership behavior. He concluded that members of more cohesive groups are comparatively more attentive to each other, more understanding of one another, and more influenced by and likely to change in the direction of internalized group norms. There is also greater accuracy in the estimation of feelings among people who have positive attitudes toward each other (Suchman, 1956). These findings provide a clue to some of the ambiguous results of the studies on group cohesiveness and the conformity behavior of members, particularly the finding that when conformity is not instrumental to liking, there is greater conformity in low cohesive than in highly cohesive groups (Walker & Heyns, 1962). It would appear that after group norms have been internalized, members of cohesive groups feel freer to behave in moderately diverse ways. Members of more cohesive groups also experience a comparatively greater sense of belonging and acceptance (Sagi, Olmsted, & Atelsek, 1955). This seems to permit a somewhat greater freedom of behavior (within boundaries delimited by group norms). The generalization gains support from Pepitone's work on the relationship of group cohesiveness and the expression of hostility (Pepitone & Reichling, 1955; Pepitone & Kleiner, 1957). Pepitone and others (Lippett & White, 1958) found that when subjected to insult, members of highly cohesive groups express more hostility, and express it more directly, than others do. In a field experiment on the effects of threat and frustration on cohesiveness, he also found that strong external frustrations tended to increase intra-team cooperation. A further study found such factors associated with militant collective action in ghetto riots (Forward & Williams, 1970).

Studies of the relationship between group cohesiveness and productivity in a variety of settings allow for a few unequivocal conclusions. Cohesiveness will enhance productivity or lower it, depending on the direction of the group norm (Berkowitz, 1954; Collins & Guetzkow, 1964; Hare, 1962; House, 1966; McGrath & Altman, 1966; Rice, 1958; Schachter, S., et al., 1951; Seashore, 1954). In cohesive groups, because members are so responsive to group norms, the norms can control productivity. In highly cohesive groups, with a norm of productivity, high productivity continues for some time even after the removal of external pressures (Berkowitz, 1954). When a task is valued by a group, task effectiveness is positively correlated with group cohesiveness (Collins & Guetzkow, 1964). Field studies, particularly in work organizations, have led to similar conclusions (House, 1966; Rice, 1958). As a result, social scientists have devoted considerable effort to the creation of cohesive groups in industrial and business organizations which will share the productivity goals of the larger

organization (Seashore, 1954).

A few studies have found positive relationships between group cohesiveness and the learning of individuals (Lott & Lott, 1966). The Lotts' study found that children who were high in IQ showed superiority on several learning tasks when they worked in cohesive groups. Shaw and Shaw (1962) found correlations between individual spelling scores and group cohesiveness at the beginning, but not toward the end of interactions. Individuals in cohesive groups also produce more unique ideas when working on ego-involving problems than do those in noncohesive groups (Cohen, 1960), again suggesting some heightened response freedom. A study of the relationship between the academic achievement of college freshmen and group cohesiveness (Warwich, 1964) found less scholastic improvement in members of highly cohesive natural groups than in others. As Secord and Backman (1964) point out, cohesiveness should enhance problem solving only when a maximization of communication will make an optimum solution more likely. When members of a cohesive group cannot make contributions of equal value, more poor elements will be contained in the problem solution.

Other studies have investigated the conditions under which group cohesiveness declines. When instrumental groups are continually confronted with failure (Wolman, 1960), cohesiveness suffers, but not when the cohesiveness is based on mutual acceptance rather than solely on instrumental functions. Group cohesiveness shows the sharpest decline (Lott & Lott, 1965) when individuals work toward goals which are mutually exclusive or solely individual. If individuals are able to achieve mobility from a low status group as a result of individual effort, group cohesive-

ness suffers (Cohen, 1968).

In summary, in cohesive groups: (a) members receive more individual attention and understanding from each other, communicate more with one another, and feel attracted to each other; (b) they are more likely to internalize group norms and to be influenced to change toward group standards; (c) they are freer to express a diversity of behaviors and feelings within the boundaries of group norms; (d) their productivity is influenced by group norms and goals; and (e) group cognitive problem solving is not enhanced. Group cohesiveness increases: (a) when group members perceive a common threat from an external source; (b) when group members realize that a possibility exists for cooperative behavior which may reduce or eliminate the threat; (c) when people in low status groups cannot, as individuals, achieve mobility; (d) and when there are moderately anxiety arousing conditions. Cohesiveness decreases: (a) when group members can pursue mutually exclusive or individual ends which achieve individual goals; and (b) when instrumental groups continually meet task failure (though not if such groups are based on mutual acceptance as well as instrumental functions).

In the field, reports of the positive or negative effects of group cohesiveness depend on whether it is within-group behavior which is analyzed, or the relationships between a cohesive group and other groups. Sherif's study of the creation and dissolution of cohesive groups in a natural field setting (Sherif, et al., 1961) gives an illustration of this double perspective. He stimulated group cohesiveness among boys in a summer camp by intensifying their sense of the external threat supposedly presented by another group. On a variety of measures, the groups thus created were highly cohesive. One aspect of their cohesiveness was an intensification of hostile behavior and attitudes, including stereotyping toward the out-group. A breakdown in within-group cohesiveness, which followed the cooperative action of both groups toward a common, superordinate goal, was accompanied by decreases in

hostility toward the out-group (Sherif et al., 1961). Coser (1956), following Simmel's theories, has systematically explored the multiple ways in which social conflict strengthens groups internally, by reaffirming the identity of each group and maintaining its boundaries against the social world." A growth of within-group cohesiveness, whether in laboratory or natural settings, necessarily entails a stronger definition of group boundaries. Following Secord and Backman's exchange theory interpretation of cohesiveness (1964), the ideological changes which accompany such rigidification probably have important effects on the comparison levels of group members. The ideological changes raise the comparison level for outcomes associated with the group's actions and, by cutting off associations with other groups, lower the comparison level for alternatives. This closing of ranks and hardening of group boundaries which characterize newly formed cohesive groups has led to a discussion of some of the negative effects of intensified group cohesiveness among ethnic minorities.

Pettigrew's (1969) comments on the separatist aspect of the growth in black ethnic cohesiveness illustrate the concerns of many social scientists. He views the growth in black cohesiveness and "separation" as tending to create a situation of racial isolation, with several attendant negative effects:

... Isolation prevents each group from learning of the common beliefs and values they do in fact share. It also leads, in time, to the evolution of genuine differences in beliefs and values . . . making interracial contact in the future less likely [p. 10].

Isolation between two contiguous groups generally leads to 1) diverse value development 2) reduced inter-group communication 3) uncorrected perceptual distortions of each other, and 4) the growth of vested interests within both groups for continued separation [p. 20].

In his summary of the research literature on interracial schools, Pettigrew notes that those Negro children who most fear discomfort in biracial settings have had the least experience with such situations.

Pettigrew is unwilling to extend the "immigrant analogy" to Negroes. His conclusion is that the movement toward ethnic cohesiveness, which emphasizes the boundaries between black

and non-black groups, has largely negative effects.

It is important to examine the literature on the cohesiveness of ethnic and religious groups, and the relationship between cohesiveness (or the lack of it) in such groups to a variety of behavioral and attitudinal outcomes. Ethnic cohesiveness in some current and historic populations is discussed in the next section.

Ethnic Organization and Cohesiveness

The previously prevalent "melting pot" notion is disappearing. Most evidence strongly indicates that in the lives of most people membership in ethnic and religious groups remains important, at least for those below the upper-middle class. Ethnic and religious groupings are still decisive in residential patterning (Glazer & Moynihan, 1963; Kramer & Leventman, 1961), are good predictors of voting behavior and political affiliation (Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton, & Linz, 1954), and continue to be correlated with occupational choice (Glazer & Moynihan, 1963), with social mobility (Kramer & Leventman, 1961), and with intergenerationally distinctive value systems and group ideologies (Chein, 1948).

Sociological studies indicate that, at the higher social class levels, group allegiance and identification shift from ethnic and religious ties to cohesiveness within professions and work organi-

zations.

That ethnic and religious membership can be easily evoked even in neutral surroundings has been demonstrated by a number of studies (Lambert, Libman, & Poser, 1960; Kugelmass & Lieblich, 1968; Litwak, 1960). For example, Lambert, Libman, and Poser (1960) found that the intolerable pain limits of experimental subjects could be significantly increased by verbal instructions which evoked their religious affiliation. In an experimental small group study, Lewit and Abner (1967) found that contact with racemates promoted better group performance when racemates were high in ethnocentrism and aggressiveness.

Lenski (1963) and others (Babchuk, Crockett, & Ballweg, 1967) have reported that "variables associated with religious group membership exert as much influence on the attitudes and behaviors of urban Americans as does position in the social class structure [p. 551]." Families in which there is a change to a common religious affiliation are significantly more stable than those that do not attain such affiliation (Babchuk, Crockett, & Ballweg, 1967). In the largest study of Roman Catholic education in the

United States, Greeley and Rossi (1966) found that those Catholics who had attended only Catholic schools compared favorably, educationally and in terms of the job market, with the graduates of the best schools in the country. Moreover, Roman Catholics in their ghetto schools were found to be least likely to be intolerant of other groups. Greeley and Rossi (1966) pose the question, "Is it possible that the religious community plays the role of a sort of super ethnic group which provides the emotional support a young person needs in order to develop motivation for achievement in his early years [p. 155]?" They answer the question with:

It ought to be clear that [our findings] . . . call into serious question the assumption that it is necessary, for the health of society, that the religious and religio-ethnic ghettoes be eliminated. Such subcultures do not apparenty impede achievement; on the contrary, they may even promote it. In the long run, they may even promote greater tolerance, because they give a person a relatively secure social location and a fairly clear answer to the difficult question "Who am I" [Greeley & Rossi, 1966].

Lander's (1954) study of patterns of delinquency found that it was the ethnic homogeneity of census tracts in Baltimore, rather than economic variables, which best predicted delinquency rates. Census tracts which were high in ethnic homogeneity had low delinquency rates, even when they were poor, and conversely. A replication of this study in Detroit (Bordua, 1959) found similar results. Studies in countries other than the United States have shown that when high ethnic homogeneity and cohesiveness can be consciously maintained by state planning, low delinquency rates result, even in periods of industrialization with its attendant social upheaval (Lambo, 1964; United Nations, 1963).

Religious and Ethnic Cohesion

Studies of religious and ethnic communities have been conducted by anthropologists and historians (Cohen, 1968; Finney, 1968; Gardner et al., 1968; Hackenberg, 1967; Hylson-Smith, 1968; Kaplan & Plant, 1956; Tsuchima, 1968; Vaughan, 1964). One of the generalizations made from intensive studies of communities like the Hutterites (Kaplan & Plant, 1956) and the Amish (Hostetter, 1963) is that groups which have had a long history of survival, despite conditions of poverty and active discrimination, have extensive and differentiated economic and social organizations. In these groups, communal responsibility has been assumed for individuals unable to care for themselves: the sick, the orphaned, the elderly. Another characteristic has been control over their own educational system. This has occurred both when it entailed some struggle with dominant groups (Kaplan & Plant,

1956), and when there was no struggle with a dominant group (as in the case of medieval Jewish communities [Baron, 1952]), as well as when parallel educational institutions had to be established, as is currently the case of the Japanese in Hawaii (Fuchs, 1961). Communal control over educational and social institutions was nearly always combined with *independent taxing powers*.

In every case where religious and ethnic groups survived for long periods of time despite poverty, an exceptionally powerful group ideology was prominent. Elements of the ideology contained references to the group's intrinsic superiority, and to differences between its values and those of other groups. Documentation of the special, superior characteristics of the members occurred in legends, in "group history," and in cautionary tales about non-members.

Jews in Poland During the 1930s

The history of the Jews in Poland during the first three decades of the twentieth century offers a good illustration of the effects of group cohesiveness and ethnic control over economic and educational institutions. This group is of particular interest since its history is exceptionally well documented, especially on the origins of communal, social, and economic power and responsibility (Baron, 1952). Zborowski and Herzog's (1962) reconstructed ethnography provides a detailed picture of the shtetl culture which persisted until World War I, and even longer in some cases.

This group sank from a precarious lower middle class position into conditions of extreme poverty as a result of both a severe decline in overall economic conditions and active discrimination by the state. The decline was accompanied by an awareness that any form of social mobility was impossible. When an independent Poland was established in 1918, the conditions of these Jewish communities worsened steadily, until virtual starvation was the rule. Polish independence was accompanied by waves of pogroms against Jews, particularly in Lemberg and Vilna. Political discrimination, deprivation, and economic strangulation was the policy of the state. Jews could not work in any state monopoly such as the railroad, tobacco industry, etc. They had no access to civil service on any level. Although they constituted only 10% of the population, they paid 40% of all state taxes. They did not benefit from social security² (Kligsberg, 1965). Poverty and un-

²I am indebted to the Yivo Institute for Jewish Research for access to their archival materials.

employment were rampant, particularly among young men in small towns. The stability of the nuclear family had changed as a result of the pogroms, the lack of employment opportunities, and immigration. Families that lacked a male head were not infre-

At the same time, Polish Jewry had well organized community level organizations, the Kehiles. There were developed political parties, and a variety of social, economic, and cultural organizations. These organizations attempted a program of economic self help, organized in a network of cooperative credit institutions (folksbenk) and interest free loan associations (gemiles Khasodim) (Kligsberg, 1965). Jews continued to have their own school system, orthodox and secular, in both Yiddish and Hebrew. There were also many cultural and athletic organizations. These organizations penetrated into the smallest shtetl. (As an indication of the completely isolated and self-contained nature of these communities, there were many Jews in Poland who could not speak Polish.)

What were the effects of extreme poverty and active discrimination upon this group, with its developed social and economic organizations? Of greatest interest is the effect which impoverization had on the attitude and behavior of the youth. From 1932 to 1939, the conditions of the Jewish population further deteriorated. Unemployment prevailed, and anti-semitic Polish political parties embarked on a program of total discrimination. In 1939, even the trickle of emigration to Palestine was halted. Autobiographical

material, in light of these conditions, is illuminating.

In 1932-1934, the Yivo Institute for Jewish Research in New York, sponsored an autobiographical contest among teenagers and young adults in the Jewish communities of Poland. In 1939, a second contest was conducted. As a result of these two contests, 302 full autobiographies were collected. Two hundred thirty-six were by males and sixty-six by females; the average length of documents was 59 pages (the required minimum was 25 pages). Most documents came from youths in their early 20s or younger. Nearly all the boys had attended the traditional elementary school for boys and were either mildly or extremely critical of it. All participants (as might be inferred from the autobiographies) had had at least a partial elementary education. Up to 90% of the youths came from families which were in extreme poverty. Many expressed awareness of the constant process of pauperization. Nearly all subjects head had been sent and process of pauperization. ly all subjects had had traumatic experiences. They had witnessed the murder of family members, looting by soldiers, terrorization, etc.

Survival Value of Membership in Organizations

What is of particular interest is the extent to which organizations played a dominant role in the lives of these adolescents. Nearly every individual was a member of an organization and had dominant interests in organizational activities. The organizations to which they belonged were of an ethnic, political, or religious nature, e.g., Zionist Youth, Socialist, or Orthodox. Each of the organizations had extensive, though informal, educational programs. The organizations also served collective self-help functions. These functions continued despite deplorable economic conditions.

Despite the real conditions of poverty and political danger, which were accurately perceived, organizational ties and activities appear to have provided the raison d'être in the lives of these adolescents. Despite a disruptive nuclear family life, there were low rates of anomic social behaviors like delinquency. Most responsations

dents said they were involved in attempts at self-education.

Caution is necessary. We must not place too much interpretive weight on this autobiographical material. The sample of those who participated in the contest was undoubtedly selected from the better integrated and educated groups in the population. Moreover, the amount of effort required to write an extensive autobiography indicates that the subjects were highly motivated. Nevertheless, the exceptionally frequent mention of these ethnic organizations is suggestive of their important role in the lives of these poor youths. It should be noted that a characteristic of all the organizations was that, developed according to ideological premises, they cut across the social class divisions within the Jewish community. The collective self-help offered was extended regardless of class background. The autobiographies also reveal that the authors felt an unquestioned sense of ethnic superiority despite their overt poverty. They saw themselves, even under dismal conditions, as superior to the out-group. Ideological ferver and its concomitant sense of group destiny was common. A sense of moral superiority was also evident. Based on this evidence, it would appear that the strength of the ethnic organizations contributed in no small measure to the personal and psychological survival of many individuals. In the Polish situation, the Jewish-run organizations were not outlawed by the state. More typically, ethnic organizations are subverted by the state and their destruction followed by demoralization.

Destruction of Cohesiveness

One recent, dramatic illustration of this latter process can be found in the U.S. Federal Government's treatment of the tribal rights of American Indians. In the late 19th century the federal government refused to deal with representatives of tribes, and only recognized individual Indians. In the Dawes Act of 1887, Indian reservations were divided into individual allotments of 160 acres, which each Indian was supposed to farm as an individual. Before the passage of the Dawes Act, there was:

Oklahoma. . . . the Indian method of holding land for an entire community might be superior to the idea of non-Indian society, in that this method precluded a class of people that was perennially poor. . . [Deloria, 1969b].

Following the Dawes Act, not only did the lot of the individual Indian drastically worsen, but signs of individual and community deterioration like alcoholism, delinquency, and suicide, became rampant (Deloria, 1969a).

Another Example

The European protectorate which was established in Morocco in 1912 brought tribal peace to the country by undermining the liff alliance system and its constant feuding. Yet, "feuding, an ever-present factor of social life in rural Morocco, was not fundamentally disruptive, but, rather, reinforced local social cohesion [Lewis, 1961]." The feud strengthened group identification with tribal systems that provided group solidarity and economic aid in good times and bad. The introduction of a European peace and Western marketing and monetary systems led to the breakup of communal property claims and destroyed social stability in Morocco. Social calm need not imply stability, nor social conflict instability.

Some Aspects of American Black History

I am the Smoke King.
I am black
I am darkening with song
I am hearkening to wrong;
I will be black as blackness can,
The blacker the mantle the mightier the man.
W. E. B. DuBois³

³In Clarence Major (Ed.), The new black poetry. New York: International Publishers, 1969.

Given the role of ethnic economic, religious, and social organization in group survival under conditions of poverty, let us look at certain aspects of black history in America which are not usually stressed. The Negro Freedman communities that existed in the North from Revolutionary times suffered severe discrimination. During the 18th Century, free Negroes in the North were not permitted to work at most occupations. Although they paid taxes they had no vote and no political voice (Redding, 1950; Franklin, 1967). Nevertheless, the free northern Negro from pre-Revolutionary times through the mid-19th century established increasingly high levels of social and economic organization. The Negro churches were dominant in these organizations. A denial of recognition by official church bodies in the United States had led to the formation of national bodies of black churches; these, in time, produced a large number of effective leaders. By 1850, the value of Negro churches and church property in Pennsylvania alone was well over a half-million dollars (Redding, 1950). Quaker groups established Negro schools; church schools for blacks were established throughout the North during the same period. Masonic and Fraternal Orders, such as the Black Knights of Pythias, also began at this time (Goldston, 1968). In the decades preceding the Civil War, mutual aid societies for Negroes in the North proliferated, and there were many anti-slavery groups and vigilance committees. The Sons of African Society, founded in Boston in 1798, attended the sick, arranged for burial, and took care of widows and children. In 1838 there were 80 such organizations in Philadelphia alone, and by the 1840s over half the Negro population in Philadelphia belonged to them. People paid dues. Richer Negroes belonged to several societies which assumed the responsibility of care for the sick and the poor (Quarles, 1969). Free northern Negroes held black conventions intermittently from 1817 to 1850.

Dozens of Negro newspapers were established between 1827 and 1850 (Franklin, 1967). Their dominant, unifying goal was the demand for freedom and an end to slavery. The Negro press was staunchly abolitionist. Foreign correspondents who read the Negro press in this era were "struck by the note of racial pride and distinctiveness" which characterized it (Quarles, 1969). The Negro press printed the names of black informants, and such informants were mauled, tarred, and feathered by other blacks. Independently of the white church, the Negro churches spoke out strongly against slavery. In 1852, the Zion Methodist Church in New York declared, "It is the duty of all Christian Clergy to speak out to denounce slavery at all places, in all circumstances (Quarles, 1969)." Abolitionist societies were important in all Negro communities in the North. These societies had libraries and self-

improvement programs; they invited speakers on abolitionist, scientific, and literary topics. Self-help for Negro schools was

related to abolitionist activities.

The Underground Railway and the vigilance committees, which smuggled slaves to Canada, were tightly organized and cut across class lines. Physicians, clergyman, and other upperclass Negroes were prominent in these activities. They provided board, lodging, and money, and helped former slaves establish themselves with letters of introduction. Despite the fact that they did not have the vote, black freedmen in New Bedford, Massachusetts, in 1839 publicly pledged that when they did, they would not vote for any official who was not in favor of abolition (Quarles, 1969). Under conditions of severe economic and political discrimination, black communities in the North before the Civil War nevertheless maintained strong ethnic, economic, and social organizations which had ideological unity.

It would appear that a number of conditions conducive to the formation of a cohesive group had coincided: definite out-group status, the freedom (and necessity) to establish ethnic, religious, educational, and social organizations, and, most important, a clear superordinate goal which cut across social class divisions

within the group.

After the Civil War

It is important to note that the Negro freedmen in the North were always rather small in numbers. In 1860 there were almost four million slaves in the South and West (Franklin, 1967); after the Civil War ended, the vast numbers of destitute former slaves completely dwarfed the resources of black self-help organizations. The former slaves were too many and too poor. There was a vast social class gulf between them and the northern freedmen. The Freedman's Bureau, a government bureaucracy, took over the functions of relief for the newly freed slaves. The Freedman's Bureau was completely ineffective. The repressive "Black Codes" and other southern laws enacted in the post Civil War period, kept the southern black in a helpless economic and social condition. In 1925, the Ku Klux Klan still had over four million members (Goldston, 1968). As one indication of the failure of the federal government to improve the condition of southern blacks, forty years after the Civil War 2.7 million blacks were still illiterate (Redding, 1950). By 1918, more than a million Negroes had left the South (Franklin, 1967).

With the impetus of a unifying anti-slavery movement gone, the class lines which had always characterized Negro society were even more sharply drawn. House slaves had long looked down on

the darker field slaves. Class distinctions were rigid and patterned after whites; skin color (the lighter the better) and family lineage were especially important (Frazier, 1957). Even the Negro press, writers, and theater accepted the white concept of black inferiority. Rigid class lines which at the top funnelled into white society, precluded an ethnic cohesiveness which could cut across class boundaries. Negroes in the 1920s and 1930s ". . . concentrated on acquiring yellow money, a yellow car, a yellow woman (Redding, 1950)." The cost of middle-class black society's acceptance of the dominant group's values was self-hatred and humiliation for most blacks (Lewin, 1948) within their own group, as well as open discrimination in white society.

The deleterious personal effects of such self-hatred have been amply documented for blacks (Kardiner & Ovesey, 1951; Grier & Cobbs, 1968) and other groups (Lewin, 1948). Lewin had noted that self-hatred has divisive social effects for the entire underprivi-

ledged group:

This situation is much aggravated by the following fact: a person for whom a balance is negative will move as far away from the center . . . as the outside majority permits. He will stay on this barrier and be in a constant state of frustration. Actually he will be more frustrated than those members of the minority who keep psychologically well inside the group. We know from experimental psychology and psychopathology that such frustration leads to an all around state of high tension with the generalized tendency to aggression. . . . Experiments have shown that, under these conditions, aggression is more likely to be turned against one's own group. . . . It is clear that an effective organization of a group becomes more difficult the more it contains members having a negative balance, and the stronger this balance is. This deep seated conflict of goals within an underprivileged group is not always clear to the members themselves. But it is one reason why even a large underprivileged group which would be able to obtain equal rights if it were united for action can be kept rather easily in an inferior position [Lewin, 1948, p. 195].

Lewin (1948) also realized that in minority groups with considerable self-hatred, leaders would be chosen who had gained some acceptance in the majority group and were on the periphery of the minority group. Often they were willing to accept such leadership because it gave them greater contact with and acceptance from the majority group. This was particularly damaging for the organization of the minority group, since the "leaders . . . are lukewarm toward the group. . . . under a thin cover of loyalty [they are] fundamentally eager to leave the group, or . . . try to use their power outright for acts of negative chauvinism. It is a well known fact that the task of organizing a group which is economically or otherwise underprivileged is seriously hampered by those members whose real goal it is to lead the group rather than to promote it

[p. 196]." Lewin's words rather precisely describe some black historians' view of the role of Negro leadership during this period (Redding, 1950).

Black Ideology

With apologies for the sizeable amount of black history skipped by this selective account, it is reasonable to date the beginning of the "new" black consciousness from the 1954 Supreme Court decision (Muse, 1968). Whatever the origin, black consciousness and black ideology have been explosively on the rise during the past decade. The sit-ins of 1963 and the joint work toward access to public accommodation, opportunity in employment, and unsegregated education all led to an increased ethnic identity and a growth in cohesiveness. As has been noted, cohesiveness increases when group members perceive that a possibility exists for cooperative behavior which may eliminate a common threat from an external source. Civil rights protests, and then the riots, added to within-group black cohesiveness. Black Power was first mentioned by Stokely Carmichael in 1966; "black is beautiful," interest in black history, pride in Negritude all express the

new ideology.

A full analysis of black rhetoric and black ideology is outside the scope of this paper. For the present discussion only two aspects of the new black ideology need to be highlighted. One is the stress on a common social purpose. Illustrations of the explicit social concern in the black arts movement abound. For example, in the introduction to a recently published book of black poetry, the editor says, "... all excellent art is social. . . . like most other black poets, indeed like radical revolutionary poets of the world ... black poets are involved in an attempt to trigger social change. . . . we bring the ancient brilliance of the abstracts of black cultures, aesthetics . . . the black power of our cosmological armies, the horns of our virility, the tacit foresight of our acceptance of our past. . . . [Major, 1969]." The emphasis on the distinctiveness of heritage and the special qualities of the total group, combined with a stress on the urgent, common social purposes of the group, characterizes the ideology of most cohesive ethnic and religious groups (Baron, 1952; Kaplan & Plant, 1956; Hostetter, 1963). The emphasis on a common heritage and on an urgent social program for all group members underscores within-group similarity, and the boundaries between group members and others. ers. Harold Cruse (1967) has succinctly stated this awareness of the necessity for ethnic group cohesion:

On the face of it, this dilemma rests on the fact that America, which idealizes the rights of the individual above everything else, is in reality, a nation dominated by the social power of groups, classes, in-groups and cliques-both ethnic and religious. The individual in America has few rights that are not backed up by the political, economic and social power of one group or another. Hence, the individual Negro has, proportionately, very few rights indeed because his ethnic group (whether or not he actually identifies with it) has very little political, economic or social power (beyond moral grounds) to wield. Thus it can be seen that those Negroes, and there are very many of them, who have accepted the full essence of the Great American Ideal of individualism are in serious trouble trying to function in America [Cruse, 1967, pp. 6-7].

The second aspect of the new ideology is the emphasis on blackness, and on commonly shared group characteristics and heritage. This emphasis is directly counter to the lines along which social class distinctions had been ordered among Negroes, an ordering which mirrored the values of white society (Frazier, 1957). The new emphasis on blackness, the African hairdo, etc., undermine the rationale for social differentiation among blacks themselves, which had been one of the prime determinants of social class position. Black ideology acts as a force tending toward the breaking down of within-group social class barriers; it is the only ideology which could do so, since it reverses the values of white society. The stress on common social actions and purposes and the emphasis on "blackness," both of which tend to lessen social class distinctions within Negroes, result in: (a) a great increase in within-group cohesiveness; and (b) more sharply drawn boundaries between group and non-group members.

Negative Aspects of Group Cohesiveness

Although this paper has emphasized those aspects of group cohesiveness which enable poor groups to emerge from poverty, there are negative facets of ethnic group cohesiveness which should not be completely overlooked. It is worthwhile to mention them briefly. Anecdotal evidence suggests that ethnic group cohesiveness which persists after a group has risen from poverty may have reverse effects on the further mobility of individuals. When the middle class individual makes choices which are based on ties to his ethnic neighborhood, to ethnic oocupations, etc., these may limit the individual's possibility for higher achieved status. For the individual, ethnic cohesiveness is most important when, because of poverty and prejudice, he cannot surmount institutional barriers through his individual action.

A concomitant of the growth of group cohesiveness is a

stronger differentiation between group and non-group members. The negative aspect of this growth is a tendency toward stereotyping of the out-group. Prejudices associated with and reinforced by ethnic cohesion have a long life over time. Greeley's work (Greeley & Spaeth, 1970; Greeley, 1969) has shown that significant differences in attitudes on racism and antisemitism can be found among Catholics from different ethnic groups. Even when social class is held constant, Catholics of Polish extraction score higher on racism than do those of Irish extraction. Attitudes toward antisemitism too cannot be accounted for solely by stratification variables. Irish Catholics are lower on antisemitism than Germans or Italians, and considerably lower than the Poles. Any attitude which is supported by a cohesive group is likely to persist over time. Prejudiced attitudes are no exception.

Thus the picture is not unmixed. It is rather a question of the trade-offs between various group conditions, and the effect of each condition on the poor. The lack of ethnic group cohesiveness must be weighed against both the positive and negative of strong

group cohesive forces among poor individuals.

Conclusions

This has been a selective tour of some experiments and field studies of group cohesiveness, and of the effects of ethnic and religious group cohesiveness and organization in current and his-

toric populations.

The experimental small group literature makes it clear that for the individual, especially the low-status individual, membership in a cohesive group is both subjectively and objectively advantageous. At the cost of conformity to major group norms, the individual gains a sense of rapport and of "interdependence of fate (Lewin 1948)" with fate (Lewin, 1948)" with other group members. Protected by the cohesiveness of their group, low status people feel freer to express hostility directly, and are therefore less inclined to turn inward to self-hatred. The cohesive group is a better instrument for obtaining the goals of low status individuals, not only because it has greater power vis-à-vis other groups, but also because of within-group effects on productivity which is in consonance with group norms.

As group cohesiveness grows, the comparison level of members for group-related outcomes rises compared with outcomes available in alternative relations (Secord & Backman, 1964). This change in comparison levels strengthens group boundaries which, by cutting off association with other groups, further raises withing group comparison levels and lowers comparison levels for alter-

natives. Newly cohesive ethnic groups do not show any advantage in cognitive problem solving. Strength should be more obvious than wisdom. If extrapolations from laboratory groups can be made, the cohesive group may not find better solutions to its problems, but, to achieve its goals, will rely on the solidarity and force of group members acting in concert. Exchange theory predicts a cycle of changes in the comparison levels of group members which further differentiate the group from other groups. These studies and studies of ethnic and religious cohesiveness reveal the advantages to minority individuals of membership in cohesive minority groups, groups which are at least partially defined in terms of differences from dominant and other co-existent groups. Individuals in such minority groups receive more attention and understanding from other group members and are freer to express a diversity of behaviors, including hostility toward possible threats.

There are costs for any of the group arrangements which exist in any society. The dominant ethos has been against the formation of sub-group identities in favor of an overall American one. Yet viewed from a societal perspective, members of cohesive ethnic and religious groups are less likely to become public charges and to show symptoms of personal disintegration, e.g., alcoholism and suicide. They are more likely to utilize their educational experi-

ences and to become productive adults.

Ideology matters in the formation of cohesive groups. Cohesiveness is based, to a large extent, on cognitive distinctions between the group and others. Mass media have accelerated the speed with which such cognitive distinctions can be made; badges of group identification (speech, rhetoric, dress, hairdos) are made widely and quickly available to a huge audience of potential members. Consequently, it is now possible to have reference groups of enormous size with considerable cohesiveness. Such groups serve both normative and comparison functions for their members. An awareness of common difficulties created by the out-group enhances within-group cohesiveness; it works against social class and other within-group divisions. Within-group social class differences may or may not objectively change. The ideological shift toward a value system counter to the one along which class lines in the group have been determined in the past creates a cognition of within-group solidarity among members. Cohesive ethnic and religious groups which have survived poverty have had ideologies that stressed their group superiority vis-à-vis the groups in as-cendancy. Moreover, by ideologically transcending space or time they have been able to view their group in terms other than its current minority status:

A minority-group almost by definition, has a position of low status. Actually, the proper definition of the . . . Jewish group . . . has nothing to do with America as such; it transcends the boundaries of America both in space and in time. Many Negroes have more or less intuitively recognized the validity of this principle when they seek to reestablish their continuity with the cultures of Africa or indeed to identify themselves as Negroes, with the colored peoples of the world. Similarly, Jews may find themselves in a numerical minority in the United States, and this may create special problems for them, but this minority status has nothing to do with their identity as Jews. Being Jewish is a matter of a world-wide brotherhood with a social, religious, and cultural history of some thousands of years. The difference between being a member of "an American minority-group" and being a member of "a group which, in America, is a minority" may seem linguistically trifling, but is psychologically enormous [Chein, 1952].

In the past, an important characteristic of groups which have maintained ethnic and religious cohesiveness despite poverty, has been their control over, and responsibility for, educational, social, and some economic self-help functions. Those ethnic groups in current society which newly strive toward cohesiveness are confronted by strong institutional and organizational arrangements that have taken these functions over completely. Newly cohesive poor groups, like blacks, Chicanos, and Indians, must wrest control from government over monies (since separate taxation is no longer a possibility) to be used for ethnic economic self-help, and for social and educational functions. New questions of ethnic representation within the government bureaucracy arise. Moves toward the decentralization of city schools are at least partially a result of pressure toward the greater control of the education of their children by newly cohesive black groups. In any struggle over power, money, or control, the individual, especially the poor individual, is helpless against an organization; it is organizations that interplay with, bargain with, and acquire power from organizations.

Conflict and clashes are inevitable as newly cohesive ethnic organizations struggle with established organizations to gain some control over the economic, social, and educational monies and decisions which effect them; overt hostility is more likely as ethnic cohesiveness grows. These are the social costs of a growth in ethnic cohesiveness among the poor. When will such conflict

end? As Chein has observed:

. . . we should remember that the controversies which are likely to develop about the relative merits of group survival vs. assimilation (i.e., dissolution of the group) are essentially academic in nature. There can be no large-scale assimilation as long as there are no free channels for it; in other words, as long as the group is a problem group. Negroes cannot, for example, become assimilated into the white population (even if they should all agree that this is the best solution for their problem) as long as they are rejected by the whites; . . . if, however, there are in some instances free channels for assimilation there will still be no large-scale adoption of the assimilationist solution if the assets derived from group membership outweigh the liabilities. If the channels are free and the assets are outweighed by the liabilities, there will be mass assimilation regardless of what anyone thinks about it. The problem of survival vs. assimilation arises, however, precisely where the channels of assimilation are (for intra- or extra-group reasons) not free and the assets are, in fact, outweighed by the liabilities [Chein, 1948].

The Value of Conflict

Social scientists have long been committed to those social conditions which favor intergroup contact and which minimize ideological and attitudinal differences between ethnic groups. Typically (e.g., Janis & Katz, 1959), they have discussed the adverse effects on individuals of participation in social organizations which spur overt aggression. They have stressed the compartmentalization of morality and the distrust and stereotyping of the outgroup which occurs. Their emphasis has been on ways to reduce intergroup hostility. The chapter on intergroup relations in the revised Handbook of Social Psychology (Harding, Proshansky, Kutner, & Chein, 1969) discusses ways to change behavior and attitudes in order to alleviate intergroup conflicts, and does not consider any of the positive aspects. Though the self-esteem problems of blacks from childhood on have been carefully described and studied (Proshansky & Newton, 1968), those group strategies which could markedly change the individual's self-esteem but might create group conflict have been neglected. This despite Coser's (1956) analysis of social conflict, which shows how conflict between groups strengthens the groups internally:

Conflict serves to establish and maintain the identity and boundary lines of societies and groups. . . . Conflict with other groups contributes to the establishment and reaffirmation of the identity of the group and maintains its boundaries against the surrounding social world. . . Conflict is not always dysfunctional for the relationship within which it occurs; often conflict is necessary to maintain such a relationship [Coser, 1956, p. 38, p. 47].

As Coser shows, there are both realistic and non-realistic conflicts in society. Realistic conflicts arise over "conflicting claims to scarce status, power and resources"; on the other hand, "lack of conflict in a relationship cannot be taken to indicate that the relationship is stable and secure and free from potentially disruptive strains [p. 82]."

There appear to be two reasons why in recent years social scientists do not emphasize the positive effects of group cohesiveness among ethnic minorities. Gamson (1968) has pointed out that in any discussion of power and conflict one is forced to assume either of two perspectives: that of the potential partisan who tries to influence the choices of authorities, or that of the authorities who try to achieve collective goals and maintain their legitimacy and the compliance of others with their decisions. If Gamson is right, only two perspectives are possible. In the 1940s many exiled German-Jewish social scientists like Lewin were potential partisans—and knew it. Now, it is outside the personal experience of this generation of social scientists to struggle for identity through ethnic group cohesiveness. Inadvertently then it is the perspective of authority and its stress on collective goals which is more prominent in the social science literature.

The literature on social change still is influenced by a 19th century idea of progress. It is tacitly assumed that we are moving toward an increasingly better and more just society. According to this view, eliminating group tension and conflict and the divisions between groups will help lead to a more just society. If prejudice were eliminated and groups not too strongly differentiated, this desired outcome would be hastened. The whole idea is questionable (Niebuhr, 1949). In a recent review of the contact hypothesis in ethnic relations, Amir (1969) has shown that caution must be exercised in generalizations about the necessarily positive effects of contact.

Current friction must therefore be viewed in a context which includes the social costs of the past lack of cohesiveness and organization. These costs have been high. Government strategies in which help has been given to the poor individual or nuclear family by government-run agencies have not been markedly successful. It is reasonable to suppose that the overall goals of the society will be more readily furthered through the promotion of ethnic cohesiveness among poor minorities. Cohesiveness leads to organized attempts to gain economic and social control. And this struggle in turn promotes greater cohesiveness. It is only in organized groups that the poor have some chance of wresting power from government. Control over economic and social functions in a context of cohesiveness not only reduces some of the psychological disadvantage of being poor but provides at least one avenue for achieving power and rising out of poverty.

REFERENCES

Вавсник, N., Споскетт, H. J., Jr., & Ballweg, J. A. Change in religious affiliation and family. Social Forces, 1967, 45 (4). BACK, K. The exertion of influence through social communication. Journal of

Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1951, 46, 9-23.

BARON, W. A social and religious history of the Jews. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952-1960.

BERG, K. R., & TURNER, J. L. Cultural differences in psychosocial distress: Northern-born Negroes and southern-born Negroes. Proceedings of the American Psychological Association, 1968.

BERKOWITZ, L. Group standards, cohesiveness, and productivity. Human Rela-

tions, 1954, 7, 509-519.

BORDUA, D. J. Juvenile delinquency and anomie: An attempt at replication. Social Problems, 1959, 6 (3).

BOVARD, E. W. Group structure and perception. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1951, 43, 62-69. CARTWRIGHT, D., & ZANDER, A. Group dynamics: Research and theory. (2nd ed.) New

York: Harper & Row, 1960. CHEIN, I. Group membership and group belonging. New York: American Jewish

Congress (mimeo), 1948.

CHEIN, I. Securing our children against prejudice. Paper presented at the 53rd Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Jewish Communal Service, June, 1952.

COHEN, A. R. Upward communication in experimentally created hierarchies.

Human Relations, 1958, 11, 41-54.
Cohen, D., Whitmyre, J. W., & Funk, W. H. Effect of group cohesiveness and training on creative thinking. Journal of Applied Psychology, 1960, 44, 319-322.

COHEN, P. Ethnic group differences in Israel. Race, 1968, 9 (3), 303-310.

COLLINS, B. E., & GUETZKOW, H. A social psychology of group processes for decision-

making. New York: Wiley, 1964.

COLLINS, B. E., & RAVEN, B. H. Group structure: Attraction, coalitions, communication, and power. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology. (2nd ed.) Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1969.

Coser, L. The functions of social conflict. New York: The Free Press, 1956. CRUSE, H. The crisis of the Negro intellectual. New York: William Morrow, 1967. DELORIA, V. Custer died for your sins: An Indian manifesto. New York: MacMillan,

DELORIA, V. The war between the Redskins and the Indians. New York Times,

DEUTSCH, M. An experimental study of the effects of cooperation and competition upon group processes. Human Relations, 1949, 81-95.

Downing, J. Cohesiveness, perception, and values. Human Relations, 1958, 11,

EMERSON, R. M. Deviation and rejection: An experimental replication. American

Sociological Review, 1954, 19, 688-693. FESTINGER, L., SCHACHTER, S., & BACK, K. Social pressures in informal groups: A study of human factors in housing. New York: Harper & Row, 1950.

FINNEY, J. C. Judgements of ethnic groups. Journal of Psychology, 1968, 68 (2),

FORWARD, J. R., & WILLIAMS, J. R. Internal-external control and black militancy.

Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26 (1), 000-000.

FRANKLING Americans, New York.

FRANKLIN, J. H. From slavery to freedom: A history of Negro Americans. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967.

FRAZIER, F. Black bourgeoisee. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957. Fuchs, L. H. Hawaii pono. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1961. Gamson, W. A. Power and discontent. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1968.

GARDNER, R. C., WENNACOTT, E. J., & TAYLOR, D. M. Ethnic stereotypes: A factor analytic investigation. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 1968, 22 (1), 35-44.

GERARD, H. B. The effect of different dimensions of disagreements on the communication process in small groups. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1951. GLAZER, N., & MOYNIHAN, D. P. Beyond the melting pot. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T.

Press, 1963.

GOLDSTON, R. The Negro revolution. New York: MacMillan, 1968.

Greeley, A. M. The alienation of white ethnic groups. Paper delivered at the Conference on National Unity held at Sterling Forest Gardens, New York, November, 1969.

Greeley, A. M., & Rossi, P. H. The education of Catholic Americans. New York:

Doubleday, 1966.

Greeley, A. M., & Spaeth, J. Stratification and social conflict in American white ethnic groups. Unpublished manuscript, 1970.

GRIER, W., & COBBS, P. Black rage. New York: Basic Books, 1968.

GRUEN, W. A contribution toward understanding of cohesiveness in small

groups. Psychological Reports, 1965, 17 (1), 311-322.

GURIN, P., & KATZ, D. Motivation & aspiration in the southern Negro college. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1966.

HACKENBERG, R. A. The parameters of an ethnic group: A method for studying

the total tribe. American Anthropologist, 1967, 69 (5), 578-592.

HARDING, J., PROSHANSKY, H., KUTNER, B., & CHEIN, I. Prejudice and ethnic relations. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology. (2nd ed.) Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969.

HARE, A. P. Handbook of small group research. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1962.

HOFFMAN, A. Woodstock nation. New York: Random House, 1969.

HOSTETTER, J. A. Amish society. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963.

HOUSE, W. C. Effects of group cohesiveness on organization performance. Personnel Journal, 1966, 45 (1), 28-33. Hylson-Smith, K. A study of immigrant group relations in North London. Race,

1968, 9 (4), 467-476.

HYMAN, H. H., & SINGER, E. (Eds.) Readings in reference group theory and research. New York: The Free Press, 1968.

Janis, I. L., & Katz, D. The reduction of intergroup hostility: Research problems and hypotheses. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1959, 3, No. 1.

KAPLAN, B., & PLANT, T. J. Personality in a communal society: An analysis of mental health of the Hutterities. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas, 1956.

KARDINER, A., & OVESEY, L. The mark of oppression. New York: Norton, 1951. Kelley, H. H. Communication in experimentally created hierarchies. Human

Relations, 1951, 4, 39-56.

Kelley, H. H. Two functions of reference groups, In H. Hyman & E. Singer (Eds.), Readings in reference group theory and research. New York: The Free Press, 1968.

KLIGSBERG, M. Child and adolescent behavior under stress. New York: Yivo Institute for Jewish Research, 1965.

KINOSHITA, T. The effects of group cohesiveness and importance of the tasks upon conformity behavior. Japanese Journal of Psychology, 1964, 34 (4), 181-198.

Kramer, J. R., & Leventman, S. Children of the gilded ghetto. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.

KUGELMASS, S., & LIEBLICH, I. Relation between ethnic origin and ASR reactivity

in psychophysiological detection. Journal of Applied Psychology, 1968, 52 (2), 158-162.

LAMBERT, W. E., LIBMAN, E., & POSER, E. G. The effect of increased salience of a membership group on pain tolerance. Journal of Personality, 1960, 28, 350-

LAMBO, T. A. Developing countries and industrialization. Unpublished paper presented at World Federation for Mental Health, Switzerland, 1964.

LANDER, B. Towards an understanding of juvenile delinquency. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954.

LENSKI, G. The religious factor. New York: Doubleday, 1963.

LEVY, S. Experimental study of group norms: The effects of group cohesiveness upon social conformity. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, New York University, 1953.

LEWIN, K. (Ed.) Resolving social conflicts. New York: Harper, 1948.

LEWIS, W. H. Feuding and social change in Morocco. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1961, 5, No. 1.

LEWIT, D. W., & ABNER, E. V. Racial contact, personality & group problem solving. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, September 1967.

LIPPITT, R., & WHITE, R. K. An experimental study of leadership and group life. In E. E. Maccoby, T. M. Newcomb, & E. L. Hartley (Eds.), Readings in social psychology. (3rd ed.) New York: Holt, Rhinehart, & Winston, 1958.

LIPSET, S. M., LAZARSFELD, P. F., BARTON, A. H., & LINZ, J. The psychology of voting: An analysis of political behavior. In G. Lindzey (Ed.), Handbook of social psychology. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954.

LITWAK, E. Reference group theory, bureaucratic career, and neighborhood primary group cohesion. Sociometry, 1960, 23, 72-84.

LOTT, A. J., & LOTT, B. E. Group cohesiveness as interpersonal attraction: A review of relationships with antecedent and consequent variables. Psychological Bulletin, 1965, 64, 259-309. LOTT, A. J., & LOTT, B. E. Group cohesiveness and individual learning. Journal

of Educational Psychology, 1966, 57 (2), 61-73.

MAJOR, C. The new black poetry. New York: International Publishers, 1969.
McGrath, J. E., & Altman, I. Small group research: A synthesis and critique of the field. New York: Holt, Rhinehart & Winston, 1966.

Moran, G. Group cohesion and conformity behavior. Psychological Reports, 1965,

17 (2), 465-466.

MUSE, B. The American Negro revolution: From non-violence to black power. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1968.

NIEBUHR, R. Faith and history. New York: Scribner, 1949.

PEPITONE, A., & KLEINER, R. The effects of threat and frustration on group cohesiveness. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1957, 54, 192-199. PEPITONE, A., & REICHLING, G. Group cohesiveness and the expression of hos-

tility. Human Relations, 1955, 8, 327-337. Pettigrew, T. Racially separate or together? Journal of Social Issues, 1969, 25 (1),

43-69. POPE, L. Millhands and preachers. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1942.

PROSHANSKY, H., & Newton, P. The nature and meaning of Negro self-identity. In M. Deutsch, I. Katz, & A. R. Jensen (Eds.), Social class, race, and psychological development. New York: Holt, Rhinehart & Winston, 1968.

QUARLES, B. Black abolitionists. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. REDDING, S. They came as slaves. New York: Lippencott, 1950.

RICE, A. K. Productivity & social organization. London, England: Tavistock Publications, 1958.

ROSZAK, T. The making of a counter culture. New York: Doubleday, 1969.

SAGI, P. C., OLMSTED, D. W., & ATELSEK, F. Predicting maintenance of membership in small groups. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1955, 51, 308-311.

SCHACHTER, S. Deviation, rejection, and communication. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1951, 46, 190-207.

SCHACHTER, S., ELLERSTON, N., McBride, D., & Gregory, D. An experimental study of cohesiveness and productivity. Human Relations, 1951, 4, 229-238.

SEASHORE, S. E. Group cohesiveness in the industrial work group. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan, Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, 1954.

SECORD, P. R., & BACKMAN, C. Social psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. Shaw, M. E., & Shaw, L. M. Some effects of sociometric grouping on learning in a second grade classroom. Journal of Social Psychology, 1962, 57, 453-458.

SHERIF, M., HARVEY, O. J., WHITE, B. J., HOOD, W. R., & SHERIF, C. W. Intergroup conflict and cooperation: The robbers cave experiment. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961.

SHERIF, M., & SHERIF, C. Reference groups. New York: Harper & Row, 1964.

SHIBUTANI, T. Reference groups as perspectives. American Journal of Sociology, 1955, 60, 562-570.

SIEGEL, A. E., & SIEGEL, S. Reference groups, membership groups, and attitude change. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1957, 55, 360-364.
Suchman, J. R. Social sensitivity in the task-oriented group. Journal of Abnormal

and Social Psychology, 1956, 52, 75-83.

THIBAUT, J. W. An experimental study of the cohesiveness of underprivileged groups. Human Relations, 1950, 3, 251-278.

TSUCHIMA, W. T. Responses of Irish and Italian patients of two social classes under pre-operative stress. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1968,

VAN BERGEN, A., & KOEKEBAKKER, J. Group cohesiveness in laboratory experiments. Acta Psychologica, 1959, 16, 81-98.

VAUGHAN, G. Development of ethnic awareness in Maori and Pakeha school children. Victoria University of Wellington Publications in Psychology, 1964, 16,

WALKER, E. L., & HEYNS, R. W. An anatomy for conformity. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.

Prentice-Hall, 1962.

WARWICK, C. E. Relationship of scholastic aspiration and group cohesiveness to the academic achievement of male freshmen at Cornell University. Human Relations, 1964, 17 (2), 155-168.

Weller, L. The effects of anxiety on cohesiveness and rejection. Human Relations,

1963, 16 (2), 189-197.

WOLMAN, B. B. Impact of failure on group cohesiveness. Journal of Social Psychology 1960, 53 (20) chology, 1960, 51, 409-418.

United Nations Report on the World Social Situation. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. United Nations: New York, 1963.

ZBOROWSKI, M., & HERZOG, E. Life is with people. New York: Schocken Books, 1962.

The Problem of Lower Class Culture

Lee Rainwater Harvard University

As long as there have been poor people there have been commentators on their lot. Since the Industrial Revolution such commentary has assumed an important place in political dialogue concerning the causes of poverty, the cures of poverty, and social welfare policy generally. As David Matza (1966) has shown, there has been a succession of fashions in the concepts brought to bear for understanding "the disreputable poor," and these fashions in turn have been highly consequential for the ways the larger society has dealt with poor people. Another stream of social commentary has accompanied the arrival and persistence of Africans in the New World. Because almost all Africans in the New World have until very recently been poor, the conceptions of the poor and of the black have had a natural kinship. The enterprising historian can match almost every statement made in the commentary of one period about the European-American poor with comparable statements about the Afro-Americans.

In the 1930s these two streams of social observations began to come together in the work of social scientists concerned with social stratification in the United States; out of their work has grown the most influential concept of the past two decades for trying to make sense out of the situation of the American poor in general, and the Negro American poor in particular. This is the concept of the lower class subculture. More recent work detailing black and white lower class culture patterns includes Miller (1958), Gans

(1962), Rodman (1963), Clark (1965), Lewis (1955), Hollingshead and Redlich (1958). Somewhat independently, Oscar Lewis began in the late 1950s to develop his concept of the "culture of poverty." The patterns that Lewis describes characterize, he believes, only a segment of the group that Warner and his followers have analyzed under the rubric of lower-lower class. Lewis uses the concept to apply only to the most deprived, poorest, and most disorganized segments of the lower-lower class (Lewis, 1959, 1961, 1966).

Some twenty-five years ago, when social scientists of remarkably diverse persuasions were undertaking the final burial of biological determinism of social behavior as a respectable intellectual position, Allison Davis (1946, 1948), in an analysis of the motivation of the underprivileged worker, sought to show that "just as the members of the higher skilled working class and of management act in response to their culture, to their system of social and economic rewards, so do the underprivileged workers act in accord with their culture." Davis sought to demonstrate that social, rather than biological, determinism accounted for:

. . . the habits of shiftlessness, irresponsibility, lack of ambition, absenteeism, and of quitting the job, which management usually regards as a result of the "innate" perversity of underprivileged white and Negro workers. . . [These] are in fact normal responses that the worker has learned from his physical and social environment. These habits constitute a system of behavior and attitudes which are realistic and rational in that environment in which the individual of the slums has lived and in which he has been trained [1948].

While terms like normal, realistic, and rational were perhaps overly sanguine, Davis's analysis of lower class job behavior and motivation is a classic one which still carries the ring of validity. Davis was implicitly concerned with the contending possibilities of expressive vs. instrumental role systems in the lower class as these facilitated day-to-day adaptation to the exigencies of the lower class situation. He observed that "the most powerful of all the forces that keep [the underprivileged worker] in his present way of life and work are the pleasures that he actually can attain by following his underprivileged culture." Davis saw these "pleasures" as selectively emphasized by the lower class in response to the absence of the more conventional rewards available to higher status groups.

The Poor are Different from You and Me

Although the concept of a lower class subculture has been one of the recent mainstays of professional attempts to comprehend the life, the motivations, the problems of the least well of

portion of the population, in the sociological and anthropological literature of the past 30 years two rather different views have been advanced about the distinctiveness of lower class norms and values vis-à-vis the larger "conventional" society. One of these views, fathered most directly by Allison Davis (1948) and further developed by Walter Miller (1958), holds that there is a distinctive culture which characterizes those who are brought up in the lower class world:

Now a child cannot learn his mores, social drives, and values—his basic culture—from books. He can learn a particular culture and a particular moral system only from those people who know this behavior and who exhibit it in frequent association with the learner. If a child associates intimately with no one but slum adults and children, he will learn only slum culture. Thus the pivotal meaning of social classes to the student of behavior is that they limit and pattern the learning environment; they structure the social maze in which the child learns his habits and meanings.

In the slum, as elsewhere, the human group evolves solutions to the basic problems of group life. . . . Because the slum individual usually is responding to a different physical, economic and cultural reality from that in which the middle class individual is trained, the slum individual's habits and values also must be different if they are to be realistic. The behavior which we regard as "delinquent" or "shiftless" or "unmotivated" in slum groups is usually a perfectly realistic adaptive, and—in slum life—respectable response to reality [Davis, 1948].

By the time, some ten years later, that Walter Miller (1958) applied these same views to the understanding of gang delinquency, the assertion of a distinctive lower class culture was even more sharply drawn:

There is a substantial segment of present day American society whose way of life, values, and characteristic patterns of behavior are the product of a distinctive cultural system which may be termed "lower class." Evidence indicates that this cultural system is becoming increasingly distinctive, and that the size of the group which shares this tradition is increasing. . . . the standards of lower class culture cannot be seen merely as a reverse function of middle class culture—as middle class standards "turned upside down": lower class culture is a distinctive tradition, many centuries old with an integrity of its own [Miller, 1958].

Ranged in apparent opposition to this view are the views of such more general theorists as Parsons (1954) and Merton (1957) who have seemed to maintain that American society possesses a single more or less integrated system of values, that "it" is "morally integrated" by virtue of the fact that basic moral sentiments tend to be shared by different actors "in the sense that they approve the same basic normative patterns of conduct [Parsons, 1954, p. 72]." The contrary view concerning the lack of distinc-

tiveness of lower class culture compared to the rest of society was developed by Merton (1957) in his essay on social structure and anomie:

Our egalitarian ideology denies by implication the existence of noncompeting individuals and groups in the pursuit of pecuniary success. Instead, the same body of success symbols is held to apply for them all. Goals are held to transcend class lines, not be bounded by them, yet the actual social organization is such that there exist class differentials in accessibility of the goals. . . . "poverty" is not an isolated variable which operates in precisely the same fashion wherever found: it is only one in a complex of identifiably interdependent social and cultural variables. . . . when poverty and associated disadvantages in competing for the cultural values approved for all members of the society are linked with a cultural emphasis on pecuniary success as the dominant goal, high rates of criminal behavior are the normal outcome. . . . When we consider the full configuration-poverty, limited opportunity and the assignment of cultural goals-there appears some basis for explaining the higher correlation between poverty and crime in our society than in others where rigidified class structure is coupled with differential class symbols of success [1957, pp. 146-71.

If one wishes, one can construct out of the writings of men such as Davis and Miller, on the one hand, and Parsons and Merton, on the other, a counterpart of the classic exchange between F. Scott Fitzgerald and Ernest Hemingway. For Fitzgerald, "The rich are different from you and me." Hemingway retorted, "Yes, they have more money." The advocate of a distinctive lower class culture will argue the counterpart to Fitzgerald's notion, "The poor are different from you and me." And the advocate of the universality of societal values will argue, "Yes, they have less

money.'

It is an interesting issue, yet its status in sociological writings is a curious one. Neither of the two sets of scholars whose views are presented above dwelled on the conceptual problems of maintaining that there does or does not exist a distinctive lower class culture. The relatively offhand way in which the competition between these two concepts developed—with Davis and Miller using the concept of lower class culture as preface to the presentation of field research concerning lower class behavior, and Merton using his ideas about the dominance of a common "success goal" in American society to illustrate his more general theory concerning social structure and anomie—has meant that the dialectic between these two views has never been fully explored or adequately tested against existing and developing empirical research concerning lower class behavior.

The result has been that the unthinking application of each of these paradigms by subsequent commentators on lower class

behavior has sometimes made lower class persons appear as "conceptual boobs," to use an expression coined by Harold Garfinkel (1967). In fact, both Davis and Merton were seeking to come to terms with the adaptiveness of lower class behavior but their focus for describing that adaptiveness was different. Merton sought to highlight the general stratification system and the general socialcultural situation of the lower class by using the concept of anomie, and to demonstrate that lower class behavior could be regarded as arising from an effort to adapt to a disjunction between universal American goals and the deprivation of opportunity represented by the lack of access lower class people have to the means to achieve in terms of those goals. His approach was a macrosociological one; Davis's approach on the other hand involved a more microscopic examination of the exigencies of the day-today life of lower class people. Davis sought to show how they constructed their adaptations to the lack of opportunities their environment presented them with, and also how they selectively emphasized those opportunities that were available to them, primarily opportunities for "bodily pleasures" of various kinds.

As the views of both men have permeated segments of sociological and psychological research on the lower class, the central role that creative adaptation played has tended to recede. To date perhaps the most successful self-conscious attempt to deal with these issues has been Hyman Rodman's concept of the "lower class value stretch," an adaptive mechanism by which "the lower class person, without abandoning the general values of the society, develops an alternative set of values . . . [so that lower class people] have a wider range of values than others within the society. They share the general values of the society . . . but in addition they have stretched these values or developed alternative values, which help them to adjust to their deprived circumstances [Rodman, 1963]." Rodman's formulation avoids the pitfall of making lower class persons out as conceptual boobs by not implying that: (a) they are ignorant of or indifferent to conventional norms and values, or that (b) they persist in maintaining full-fledged allegiance to conventional norms despite their inability to achieve

satisfactorily in terms of them.

Since I believe that much of the unclarity and artificial character of these two conceptions of the situation of lower class people stems from an insufficient attention to the actual exigencies of day-to-day life and to the patterned processes of growing up in the group, I want to shift now from these larger questions of overall cultural or subcultural systems to a closer examination of social and cultural factors operating in connection with one particular aspect of lower class life—the question of the regulation

of sexual and procreative activities; specifically, the questions of the normative status of marriage and having children.

The Principle of Legitimacy in the Caribbean

The most clear-cut confrontation of these two views concerning the autonomy of lower class culture has arisen not in connection with studies of the American lower class but with studies of the Caribbean lower class. In 1960 William Goode challenged what seemed to be the prevailing conception by anthropologists of the Caribbean area that common law marriage was a normative marriage institution representing a legitimate alternative to legal marriage (Goode, 1960). It was further maintained by some anthropologists of the area that the children born of non-legal unions did not suffer disadvantages from being illegitimate. Goode observed that if this was so, Malinowski's universal sociological law -"No child should be brought into the world without a manand one man at that—assuming the role of sociological father"would be called into question by the Caribean data as the anthropologists were interpreting them. Goode suggested that a careful reading of the anthropologists' reports made at least equally plausible another view: that although common law arrangements were widespread in this area, "in fact marriage is the ideal and those who violate the rule do suffer penalties.' couples live together but are not legally married, this state of affairs "creates some status ambiguity with respect to the child, the parents, and the two kin lines." From Goode's point of view the fact that a high proportion of men and women in the Caribbean area do not marry until relatively late in life is due not so much to a low evaluation of legal marriage as to the fact that the instability of the male's economic position makes him extremely reluctant to marry, and women are therefore in a very poor position to bargain for marriage since the market of marriageable men is very small. Men and women therefore establish bargains to have visiting or common law relationships and thus meet their needs as best they can, given the constraints upon them. But, in Goode's view, they do this knowing that they fall short of norms which specify only marriage as the legitimate and proper formal sexual and procreative relationship between a man and woman. Research to test Goode's hypothesis has been carried out in Jamaica by Judith Blake (1961) and by Stycos and Back (1964). These authors (and see Rodman, 1966) feel that the empirical evidence substantially sustains the correctness of Goode's views.

Within the lower class culture it seems that patterned conflict between the sexes serves to sustain non-legal unions as the

dominant form of sexual procreative relationship. Many women participate in such unions as a last resort and many men find them attractive not because of their intrinsic moral worth, but as a necessary alternative to the intimidating prospect of legal, binding marriage.

I would suggest that the following kinds of information concerning the actual ongoing life of Caribbean groups would be sufficient to confirm the essential correctness of Goode's views and

the absence of them would disconfirm his views:

 Married members of the lower class look down on non-married members and use their non-marital status to demean them in arguments or conflicts of any kind.

Partners in non-marital relationships accuse each other of being less moral because of participation in the relationship. Should the double standard operate, women would be much more vulnerable to such

accusations than men.

3. Children of non-marital relationships are treated as less valuable persons because of their illegitimate status. This is the essence of Malinowski's principle: if the accusations, "You don't know your father" or "Your father won't recognize you," exist in the group, then the non-marital relationship is deviant, not normative, no matter how common it is.

If it were to be established that these kinds of meanings are attached to non-legal unions, then it would seem to me that it is sensible to regard non-legal unions as an alternative of a particular kind present in all society—that is, behavior one may engage in until he can do what is right; something one may indeed do, but for which one pays a price in lowered esteem because one's behavior is not fully in accord with the moral system of the group. As all parties to the controversy recognize, the higher the proportion of the group that practices such unfortunate but necessary alternatives, the less effective are sanctions against those alternatives and the lower the cost of opting for them. But this does not go to the heart of Goode's point, since when something is normative there is no "moral cost" involved in adhering to the norm.

In essence what Goode has done has been to highlight certain inconsistencies in the views of some Caribbean anthropologists concerning the question of illegitimacy and consensual unions. Having strongly argued that there is no "subcultural norm" which fully legitimates consensual unions and illegitimate birth, it turns out that few Caribbean anthropologists really disagree

with him.

Studies in the ethnographic tradition make it clear that this deviance from societal norms is highly patterned. The "causes" of such patterned deviance represent an area in which consider-

ably more investigation is required before one can resolve with any confidence the contending views offered by such writers as Goode (1960), Blake (1961), Otterbein (1965), Solien (1961), and M. G. Smith (1962).

Raymond T. Smith has summarized the main direction in

which the various studies seem to point as follows:

The fact is, of course, that lower class West Indian Negroes hold contradictory views about what is desirable or possible for them. . . . The problem is to uncover the source of [the] patterned deviance from societal values.

There is a fundamental dissonance between the accepted ideals of these societies and the objective possibility of their realization by the majority of people. This is not due simply to a failure to master instrumental norms; it has to do with the mode of integration of colonial or ex-colonial societies around the acceptance of white superiority while at the same time political power was deployed for the maintenance of a fixed pattern of social and economic relations [Smith, 1963, p. 44].

It should be noted, however, that such a view of the common law customs of the Caribbean area is a far cry from the notion that these groups are simply promiscuous and irresponsible. It was probably this latter view that led some anthropologists to develop the "legitimate cultural alternative" notion as a polemic, a polemic which like many others overstates its case and then requires correction.

Let us turn now to a consideration of the implications of these data for the argument that there exists a distinctive lower

class culture.

Is There a Lower Class Subculture? What is Distinctive About It?

Evocative definitions of culture usually define the concept as referring to "a way of life" or "a design for living." Culture is social heredity, transmitted by one generation, learned by another, and shared in the particular collectivity which possesses it. More conceptually, culture is a system of symbols which orders

experience and guides behavior.

Subculture suggests that within a larger collectivity posessing an overall culture there are sufficient group-based variations in designs for living that it is worth the trouble of trying to specify several different subdesigns because of the consequences these variations are presumed to have. Since the social scientist discovers culture or subculture by abstraction from the behavior of persons in a group, the decision to define subcultures is to a certain extent an arbitrary one. Its arbitrariness is reduced only by

the possibility of demonstrating that the differences one believes exist are sufficiently consequential to be of use in understanding

behavioral variation within the larger collectivity.

Culture as social heredity, as transmitted symbol system, involves two main dimensions. It involves certain existential predictions about the world, and it involves an evaluative component specifying what is good, not so good, or bad about that which is said to exist. In other words, culture involves an "is" component and an "ought" component. These components are compounded in the inventory of elements traditionally said to comprise culture—knowledge, belief, technology, values, and norms. As Clyde Kluckhohn (1951) observed, the existential propositions in a culture always carry implicit in them certain evaluative overtones; and equally (for our purposes more) important, the evaluative elements of culture (values and norms) always carry implicit in them certain necessary existential concomitants.

If, then, we take subculture to refer to a distinctive pattern of existential and evaluative elements, a pattern distinctive to a particular group in a larger collectivity and consequential for the way its behavior differs from that of other groups in the collectivity, there is no doubt that the concept of lower class subculture is useful. All who have studied lower class people, whether under the influence of the Mertonian emphasis on general cultural norms like Cloward and Ohlin (1960) or under the influence of strong proponents of class subculture like Allison Davis (1948) and Walter Miller (1958), have produced findings concerning lower class behavior and belief that clearly suggest a distinctive patterning. The distinctive pattern is constituted by elements that are shared with the larger culture and ones that are peculiar to the group—it is the configuration of both kinds of elements that is distinctive to the lower class. The argument comes not so much in whether a lower class subculture can be said to exist but in what its content is and how it should be characterized.

About the distinctiveness of the existential perspective of lower class people there is relatively little disagreement. All investigators who have studied lower class groups seem to come up with compatible findings to the general effect that the lower class world view involves conceptions of the world as a hostile and relatively chaotic place in which one has to be always on guard, a place in which one must be careful about trusting others, in which the reward for effort expended is always problematic, in which

good intentions net very little.

The issue with respect to the evaluative aspect of lower class culture, with respect to values and norms, is a much more complex one as we have seen. As Rodman implies, the issue is in some

respects a false one which derives basically from the unrealism of separating the normative from the existential. Every norm predicates several existential conditions. These conditions are more often implied than clearly stated, but careful observation of concrete social behavior suggests that these existential conditioners of norms are central to any understanding of behavior that has reference to norms. The existential predictions come most clearly to the surface when people seek to justify their own deviance from norms. Then it becomes apparent that people take the position that they will live up to the norms of their group if they possibly can. That is, conforming to norms requires certain kinds of social logistic support. (This is apparent not only to social scientists but also to the members of the group!) Although people are most sensitive in connection with their own behavior to the necessity for certain kinds of resources for living up to norms and tend to blind themselves to this aspect of the situation when they evaluate other people's behavior, individuals who find themselves in the same boat in lacking resources generally develop some understanding tolerance for each other's deviance.

Limitations in Playing the "Normative Game"

Norms with their existential concomitants can be regarded as rules for playing a particular game. That game represents one kind of adaptation to the environmental situation in which a group finds itself. Individuals in a group negotiate with significant others to be allowed to play the normative game—to get into the game and to have the resources that will allow them to play it. If the individual is not allowed in the game (for example, Negro slaves under slavery), or if he cannot obtain the resources to play the game successfully and thus experiences constant failure at it, he is not "conceptual boob" enough to continue knocking his head against a stone wall—he withdraws from the game. Instead, he will try to find another game to play, either one that is already existing and at hand or one that he himself invents. Merton's well-known adaptations to anomie suggest several different kinds of attempts to create new games out of the wreckage of failure.

But what if a good many people cannot play the normative game, are in constant communication with each other, and there is generational continuity among them? In that case, the stage is set for the invention and diffusion of substitute games of a wide variety. In the case of New World Negroes these substitute games have been worked out long ago and subjected to some modification by each generation depending on the situation in which they find themselves (urban or rural, their labor in demand or not in

demand, etc.). Thus, though in the abstract one can analyze synchronically the situation of a deprived group vis-à-vis the larger society and its norms, in reality each generation learns the substitute games (with the family and in age-graded peer groups) at the same time that it learns the normative ones. The substitute adaptations of each generation condition the possibilities subsequent generations have of adapting in terms of the requirements

of the normative games.

Nevertheless, in the American context at least it is clear that each generation of Negroes has a strong desire to be able to perform successfully in terms of the norms of the larger society and makes efforts in this direction. The inadequacies of the opportunity structure doom most to failure to achieve in terms of their own desires, and therefore facilitate the adoption of the readily available alternatives. In this way one might say that the social ontogeny of each generation recapitulates the social phylogency of Negroes to the New World because the basic socioeconomic marginality of the group has not changed in a direction favorable to a successful achievement in terms of conventional norms.

The Poor Develop Their Own "Games"

If a group of some means becomes totally isolated from the dominant group whose games they can't play, they will establish normative games of their own. But if they continue to some extent under the influence of the dominant group, their substitute games cannot acquire full normative character. Instead, the games may become pseudo-normative—the players assert to each other that their new game has full moral justification, but careful observation of actual behavior belies that fact. It is David Matza's significant contribution (1966) that he has described the manner in which this process operates for juvenile delinquents, who develop ideologies that seem to legitimate delinquent activity as normative, but in which as a matter of fact the delinquents themselves do not really believe.

In short, those segments of the overall society who control the normative game are in a position to arrange conditions so that it is very difficult to have a competing game with a normative cachet. Though the competing games may have to be tolerated because of unwillingness or inability to provide everyone with the resources to play the normative game, as long as the keepers of the normative game have sufficient power they are able to frustrate the success of efforts to declare the competing games normative.

Given this power of conventional society, members of the lower class are likely to be socialized in such a way that they rec-

ognize the normative status of conventional games even though they eventually discover that their own best bets, given the world as it is and as they see it, lie with substitute games. As Goffman (1963) observes:

The stigmatized individual tends to hold the same beliefs about identity that we do . . . the standards he has incorporated from the wider society equip him to be intimately alive as to what others see as his failing, inevitably causing him, if only for moments, to agree that he does indeed fall short of what he really ought to be. Shame becomes a central possibility, arising from the individual's perception of one of his own attributes as being a defiling thing to possess, and one he can readily see himself as not possessing.

Though the substitute games developed in the lower class world have as perhaps their most important function the insulation of the individual from a full and sharp awareness of these facts, and of the shame that goes with this awareness, careful observation reveals that the stigmatizing standards are nevertheless internalized and have their effects.

These substitute games involve a structure of rules appropriate to them, but the rules tend to have a purely operating character. It is very difficult for their players to fully institutionalize the roles as normative except in a way that acknowledges their character as substitutes. For example, there are rules about how to make a life that retains some sense of self-esteem even though one is the mother of illegitimate children—one girl commented that her mother reacted in this way to her pregnancy: "She cried, she was hurt; as she told me because I made one mistake, don't wallow."

How Dominant Society's Norms Are Maintained in the Lower Class

If conventional society manages somehow to inculcate its norms even in those persons who are not able to achieve successfully in terms of them, and manages to prevent any successful effort to redefine norms within the lower class subculture in such a way that contrary views acquire full normative status, it is reasonable to ask by what processes it is possible to persuade lower class people to accept norms that are highly punishing to them, and to accept the label of deviant or stigmatized persons.

One of the primary reasons that it is impossible for the lower class to institutionalize its own norms is that all individuals in the group to some extent and under some circumstances will assert the validity of conventional norms and the invalidity of substitute norms. Even in Jamaica where non-legal unions are in the major-

ity, twenty percent of all first unions and a somewhat higher proportion of the first domiciliary unions involve legal marriage. There are, in short, too many "squares" around to interfere with efforts to negate the conventional norms. These individuals to some extent counter the existential challenge to the norms by demonstrating that it is possible to live up to them even with very few resources. In addition, they acquire a vested interest in derogating and demeaning those around them who do not live up to the norms. To the extent that such persons have power and prestige in the informal social networks of the lower class community, they are able to operate against an overthrow of the norms.

The sliding scale of leniency in evaluating deviation for "me," "thou," and "the other fellow" means that even individuals who are themselves involved in playing unconventional games will on occasion, particularly when angry and in a mood to degrade the status of others, assert the validity of the norm even as this behavior, by virtue of the fact that it reinforces existential beliefs about the difficulty of living up to the norm, reinforces deviance.

The aging process also assists in sustaining the validity of conventional norms. The older that people in a lower class community become, the more conventional their views tend to become and the less deviant their behavior is likely to be (at least in terms of frequency). This means that in their contest with younger persons for the right to define what is and should be, and to control the social and economic resources of the group, they acquire a vested interest in supporting conventional norms against younger persons who are more likely to challenge them. Thus, not only is there conflict between men and women, with women upholding conventional norms more readily than men, but there is also conflict between young and old. While women and older persons have to accept a great deal of behavior that is deviant from conventional norms, they do not have to like such behavior when they feel that it costs them in terms of life chances and respect.

These conflicts at the interpersonal level are given expression in certain indigenous lower class institutions which tend to be organized (at least in part) around the support of conventional norms. In the Negro community the church is particularly important since most of the verbal content of church sermons and Christian religiosity is solidly in support of conventional norms. (The conflict is, however, built into the church no less than into informal social relations by the counter-message conveyed by church

music and ecstatic behavior during church services.)

Finally, almost all of the external institutions with which lower class people come into contact are fairly solidly ranged in support of conventional norms. These institutions can sometimes

punish lower class people directly for not living up to conventional standards, and (perhaps more important) functionaries of these institutions are constantly engaged in demeaning and derogating the status of lower class people, being especially sensitive to indications that lower class people are not "respectable" in their behavior and attitudes. It seems likely that the major power sustaining the salience of conventional norms comes from this kind of day-to-day contact with conventional functionaries in schools, stores, work places, public agencies, and the like. What comes across most clearly to the lower class person in these settings is that he would be much better off if he were able to live in a conventional way because other people would not "bug" him so much.

In short the key to understanding how conventional society manages to maintain its norms lies in understanding the concerted effects of the operation of those who sustain the norms within the community (family and neighbors) and of those outside the community who sustain them by effectively punishing

(and sometimes rewarding).

Functional Autonomy and Adaptive Lower Class Culture. The end result of these various processes is the development and maintenance of a lower class subculture which is distinctive yet never free of the heavy hand of conventional culture and its norms. Lower class subculture acquires limited functional autonomy from conventional culture just as the social life of the lower class has a kind of limited functional autonomy vis-à-vis the rest of society. As Gouldner (1959) has observed, the phenomenon of functional autonomy in social systems arises in situations where the demands of full functional integration are too great for the resources available in the system. A compromise solution is for subunits of the system to pull apart, to survive more on their own since they cannot survive together in the one big happy family of a functionally integrated system.

This functional autonomy of the lower class subculture is in the interest of both the larger society and of the lower class. The lower class requires breathing room free from the oppressive eye of conventional society and, therefore, from the oppressive application of conventional norms. Conventional society is freed from the necessity to face up to the pain and suffering that it has wrought; conventional culture is relieved of the necessity to confront the fact that the norms are constantly flaunted and that the social control mechanisms that are supposed to insure observance

cannot operate effectively.

Lower class subculture, then, can be regarded as the historical creation of persons who are disinherited by their society, persons who have adapted to the twin realities of disinheritance

and limited functional autonomy for their group by developing existential perspectives on social reality (including the norms and practices of the larger society) which allow them to stay alive and not lose their minds, which allow them some modicum of hope about a reasonably gratifying life, and which preserve for many the slim hope that somehow they may be able to find admittance for themselves or their children to the larger society. In line with these existential perspectives, lower class culture has developed as the repository of a set of survival techniques for functioning in the world of the disinherited. Over time these survival techniques take on the character of substitute games with their own rules guiding behavior. But, as has been suggested above, these operating rules seldom sustain a lasting challenge to the validity of the larger society's norms governing interpersonal relations and the basic social statuses involved in heterosexual relations, marriage, and parent-child relations.

Discussions of lower class culture in isolation from the social, economic, and ecological setting to which that culture is an adaptation will generally prove to be misleading (and, with respect to policy, pernicious). The dynamic adaptational quality of any culture must be at the center of attention if social process and social change are to be understood. In the case of planned social change directed to solving problems of American poverty, this means that an appreciation of lower class culture as an element of lower class life required pari passu a systematic examination of the day-in-day-out social situation for which that culture provides the tools for folk understanding, evaluation, and adaptation.

Fighting Against Deprivation and Exclusion

The lower class world is defined by two tough facts of life as it is experienced from day to day and from birth to death. These are the facts of deprivation and of exclusion: the lower class is deprived because it is excluded from the ordinary run of average American working and middle class life, and it is excluded because it is deprived of the resources necessary to function in the institutions of the mainstream (which is after all working, and not middle, class) of American life. The most basic deprivation is of course low family income, but from this deprivation flows the sense so characteristic of lower class groups of not having the price of admission to participation in the many different kinds of rewards that ordinary society offers—some which cost money, but also a good many others (education, for example) which do not. They live in a society that is structured to make life livable for average people and they learn that people with incomes significantly below average simply cannot move around freely and confidently in such a society. The ways of living that lower class people work out represent adaptations to this disjunction between the demands society makes for average functioning and the resources they are able to command in their own day-to-day lives.

REFERENCES

BLAKE, J. Family structure in Jamaica. New York: Free Press, 1961.

CLARK, K. B. Dark ghetto: Dilemmas of social power. New York: Harper, 1965.

CLOWARD, R. A., & OHLIN, L. E. Delinquency and opportunity: A theory of delinquent gangs. New York: Free Press, 1960.

Davis, A. The motivation of the underprivileged worker. In W. F. Whyte (Ed.),

Industry and society. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946.

Davis, A. Social class influences upon learning. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948.

GANS, H. The urban villagers. New York: MacMillan, 1962.

GARFINKEL, H. Studies in ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967.

GOFFMAN, E. Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963.

GOODE, W. J. Illegitimacy in the Caribbean social structure. American Sociological Review, 1960, 25, 21-30.

GOULDNER, A. W. Reciprocity and autonomy in functional theory. In L. Gross (Ed.), Symposium on sociological theory. Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson, 1959.

HOLLINGSHEAD, A. B., & REDLICH, F. Social class and mental illness. New York:

John Wiley, 1958.

KLUCKHOHN, C. Values and value orientations in the theory of action. In T. Parsons & E. A. Shils (Eds.), Toward a general theory of action. Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1951.

LEWIS, O. Peasant culture in India and Mexico: A comparative analysis. In Mck. Marriott (Ed.), Village India: Studies in the little community. American Anthropological Association, Memoir 83, 1955.

LEWIS, O. Five families. New York: Basic Books, 1959.

Lewis, O. The children of Sanchez. New York: Random House, 1961.

Lewis, O. La vida: A Puerto Rican family in the culture of poverty. San Juan and New York: Random House, 1966.

MATZA, D. The disreputable poor. In B. Reinhard & S. Lipset (Eds.), Class, status and power. New York: Free Press, 1966.

MERTON, R. K. Social theory and social structure. Glencoe: Free Press, 1957.

MILLER, W. B. Lower class culture as a generating milieu of gang delinquency. Journal of Social Issues, 1958, 14 (3), 5-19.

OTTERBEIN, K. F. Caribbean family organization: A comparative analysis.

American Anthropologist, 1965, 67, No. 1.

Parsons, T. (Ed.) Essays in sociological theory. New York: Free Press, 1954.

RODMAN, H. The lower class value stretch. Social Forces, 1963, 42, No. 2. RODMAN, H. Illegitimacy in the Caribbean social structure: A reconsideration. American Sociological Review, 1966, 31, 673-683.

Solien de Gonzalez, N. Family organization in five types of migratory wage labor. American Anthropologist, 1961, 63, No. 6.

SMITH, M. G. West Indian family structure. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962.

SMITH, R. T. Culture and social structure in the Caribbean. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1963, 6, 24-26.

Stycos, J. M., & Back, K. The control of human fertility in Jamaica. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1964.

Theoretical Issues in Poverty Research

Vernon L. Allen University of Wisconsin

Elsewhere in this issue specific psychological theories are discussed with reference to their utility in research on poverty. Here, adopting a fairly broad perspective, some critical comments will be offered concerning more general conceptual topics in psychological research in poverty. In passing, observations also will be made on empirical research in the field.

Psychological Theory and Poverty

In very general terms, the psychology of poverty can be seen as concerned with the relationship between environment and behavior. To put it another way, the psychology of poverty deals with the "interface" between the economic system and the individual: the relationship between a particular array of physical and interpersonal stimuli and psychological structure or overt behavior. Unfortunately, our theoretical and conceptual tools for analyzing such inter-level problems still are unsophisticated and unsystematic.

Most extant psychological theories are woefully inadequate for dealing with the type of problems presented by poverty. A theoretical system bridging the psychological level and the level of the social (and economic) system within a single conceptual framework would seem to be most congruent with the nature of the problems encountered in research in poverty. That is to say,

the theory should be social-psychological: one that specifies the relationship—the interdependence—between the individual and the social and economic system in which he is enmeshed. Most psychological theories make little attempt to discuss the role of objective environmental conditions; at best, environmental and situational factors are sometimes "psychologized." Most of the psychological theories available can be characterized by Bruns-

wik's (1938) term, "encapsulated centralism."

One framework, role theory, does coordinate the conceptual level of the individual and the level of the social system and would appear promising for poverty research, though as yet relatively ignored. Theoretical implications for social identity of the poor stemming from the poor's disproportionate enactment of ascribed (nonchosen) relative to achieved (chosen) roles were discussed in a recent article by Sarbin (1970). Rotter's social learning theory, too, provides a conceptual mechanism for linking psychological level variables with the objective factors in the real world via the concept of expectancy, as described by Gurin (1970; see also Gurin & Gurin, 1970).

It might be useful to attempt an integration of psychological theory with theories from the social structure level, such as theories of social change. Whether explicitly acknowledged or not, the aim of much psychological research in poverty is to produce social change: to increase the ability of an individual to act within and upon the social system in a more satisfying and successful way. It might prove possible to integrate elements of the real-world social system (economic, class, race, and political) with psychological variables, thereby placing psychological theory in closer contact with external objective factors. Attempts to deal with problems of poverty from the point of view solely of "encapsulated" psychological theory will often result in findings that are incomplete at best, and naive and inconsequential at worst.

Studying Psychological Factors in Poverty

Psychological problems in poverty can, in general, be viewed from one of two perspectives: as independent or dependent variables. Viewed as dependent variables, psychological characteristics found among the poor may be studied as consequences of a set of adverse environmental conditions to which the individual has been subjected over a long period of time. As independent variables, the same psychological factors may be viewed as having contributed to the individual's present condition.

When viewing psychological factors as independent vari-

ables, we are on somewhat insecure conceptual and empirical ground. To assume that psychological factors have contributed to an individual's plight may be appealing in its simplicity; it is then an easy-but unwarranted- step to conclude that intervention programs should be directed towards altering the psychological characteristics presumed detrimental to the individual. Regardless of the degree of truth in such an analysis (and there may be some), a more general problem is at issue here. It is often implicitly assumed that internal psychological characteristics are causally related to important patterns of behavior. Are internal psychological states and behavior in fact closely related in a causal manner? Does a change in the internal psychological state produce a concomitant change in behavior-for the poor or the nonpoor? Answers to these questions are equivocal. For example, on the basis of the known association between achievement and school grades, a program to increase achievement motivation should improve school grades. One attempt to accomplish this end showed that achievement training increased grades for middle-class high school students but not for lower-class students (Kolb, 1965). For most dispositional traits, little or no attempt has been made to observe their relation to some specifiable behavior. Even less is known about the relation between individual psychological change and subsequent social change. Without such knowledge we are unable to affirm that changing a particular psychological disposition would have utility for the poor, regardless of how attractive such an analysis may be for persons inclined toward a psychological interpretation of poverty.

Much psychological research in poverty has been concerned with the processes by which the psychological and social environment produce a particular set of behaviors. Given the existence of a particular set of psychological characteristics-regardless of genesis—their consequences upon other aspects of the individual's life (e.g., success in school) can also be examined. An example of the first approach is the recent theoretical and empirical work on the processes of cognitive socialization in early childhood and the

preschool period.

It should be noted here that the major share of psychological research in many areas of poverty has been directed toward studying children. This emphasis is understandable. Most psychological theories, though starting from different initial assumptions, agree that experience and early personality development, i.e., early socialization, are crucial for later behavior. Hence, earlier intervention and training hold greater possibility of producing successful change than similar attempts made later. Enthusiasm for such early intervention programs should be tempered by the recent discussion that pointed out the limitations of such

approaches (Kohlberg, 1968).

We should not overlook, in our emphasis on childhood socialization, the contribution of post-childhood experiences to personality and behavior. In Langner's Midtown Manhattan study (Langner & Michael, 1963), stress factors in adulthood were more strongly related to an individual's current mental health risk than were childhood stress factors. And Norma Haan (1964) has reported that early childhood social status had only a minor effect on adult ego functioning, while ego functioning was significantly associated with adult social status and achieved mobility. These data suggest that social learning may not be as pervasive and permanent over time as frequently assumed.

One unfortunate consequence of the unquestioned acceptance of the primacy of early childhood influences on later personality and behavior is the belief that personality structure and motivational patterns are resistant to change. McClelland (1965) has demonstrated that achievement motivation of adults can be increased, and there is no reason to believe that other aspects of adult personality cannot similarly be changed if appropriate training and subsequent environmental support are provided.

If we are serious about producing change in an individual's skills and psychological traits, perhaps emphasis should be directed toward elements of the social and environmental systems other than the individual himself. The most pervasive, probably most affectively intense, and thus most powerful, components of environmental influences on the individual are likely to be informal or noninstitutional: the family, social groups, peers, neighbors, community, etc. These social factors exert strong influence upon an individual's behavior. Producing desired behavior in one's "relevant others" is probably as important in producing and maintaining individual change as efforts directed solely toward the individual himself. Rosenthal's demonstration of the effects of changing teacher's expectancy on children's school performance is a case in point (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). The Synanon organization's method of treating drug addiction might be taken as an impressive real-life example of the crucial importance of group support, status in the group, role expectations, and community structure in producing extensive changes in overt behavior and self-concept. In sum, psychological factors should not be conceptualized as if they existed in social isolation. We must remember that behavior patterns are most efficiently acquired and effectively maintained when surrounding social forces provide support and reinforcement.

Poverty as a Psychological Concept

We sometimes tend to forget that poverty generally is defined economically rather than psychologically. Using cost-of-living indices and other esoteric measures, economists are able to devise a precise cut-off point that separates the poor from the nonpoor, the sheep from the goats as it were. However sensible this sharp and quantitative measure may be for economic analysis and for political policy-making, the economist's concept of poverty is

of questionable help to the psychologist.

The first point that should be made is that the gross category of "poverty" is probably much too broad, even as an economic index. It is a commonly held view that behavior of the most abjectly poor—the most extremely under-privileged—differs from that of others who, though poor, nevertheless seem to share values and behavioral attributes with the middle-class above them, rather than with the abjectly poor below them. The erstwhile distinction between the poor and the pauper indicates an awareness of this difference, the pauper often being thought of as apathetic and fatalistic. In sum, many recognize within the poverty group a smaller group, "the disreputable poor [Matza, 1966]," who are subject to severe denigration by the nonpoor as well as by others who may differ but little from them economically. It is clear that quite often discussions of poverty refer to this smaller subgroup rather than to the entire one-fifth of the population alleged to fall below the poverty line.

If one believes that a relation exists between behavior and economic condition, then psychological differences should also be expected if the poverty group were more finely differentiated according to income. Interesting data from the Srole et al. (1962) study of social class and mental illness support the view that significant psychological differences may exist among groups experiencing different relative degrees of poverty. Differentiating socioeconomic class into finer strata than used in most analyses, Srole found that a relationship between mental illness and socioeconomic level existed even within this lower-class group. Implications are clear: for psychological purposes the dichotomy of poor-nonpoor is probably too gross to detect many important psychological differences that exist within the broad poverty cate-

gory.

A second and even more basic and complex difficulty can be raised concerning the use of a unitary category of poverty. A category of people homogeneous on the economic index of poverty consists of an extremely heterogeneous lot indeed. Having one characteristic in common—lack of financial resources—does not necessarily imply the common possession of other characteristics (such as psychological traits). The poor consists of, among others, the child and the aged, the unemployed and the unemployable, the vagrant and the migrant, and the physically sick as well as the mentally sick. Given the history of discrimination against the Negro in the United States, race is certainly an important factor deserving separate consideration, as no one needs reminding at this point in time. It is likely, for example, that the psychological meaning of being poor differs for blacks, who have lacked objective opportunities, as compared with whites. For whites, poverty may be more frequently related to personal problems of disturbed personality, intellectual inferiority, or motivational deficits.

Most of the psychological studies relevant to poverty are usually conducted with samples designated as "lower-class" according to various indices of socio-economic status. Because such a global specification of the lower-class sample is frequently used, it is often impossible to determine whether much past research has any relevance at all to groups designated as "poor" by the economic criterion in use today. Sometimes the lower-lower class was used in past research and sometimes apparently the upperlower. Since we are not dealing with a simple nor homogeneous population psychologically, care must always be taken to specify which of several poverty subgroups one is referring to. Comparability among studies may well be seriously compromised when such differences exist among samples. Lack of agreement among investigations of the poor may sometimes be more apparent than real because different types of groups were used for the poverty samples.

Availability of some sort of taxonomy classifying into reasonable subgroups the varied groups of people lumped together under a common economic index of poverty would be extremely useful. Taxonomic schemes, to be most helpful to the psychologist, should utilize dimensions that possess behavioral significance and implications. One classification, suggested by Miller (1964), consists of two dimensions—stability of family and level of income. Combining two levels of family stability (stable-unstable) and two levels of income (adequate-inadequate) produces four groups called the stable poor, the strained poor, the coperskidders and the

skidders, and the unstable poor.

Miller's taxonomy retains the use of the economic index and adds to it a second, noneconomic factor, family stability, that is given equal importance. By holding constant low economic position, classifications can be formed entirely on noneconomic dimensions. Examples of such taxonomies are provided by the

work of Deutsch (1967) and Bernstein and Henderson (1969). Deutsch constructed a "deprivation index" comprised of scores on several variables (e.g., parents' aspiration for children, crowdedness of the house, mother's presence at breakfast, absence of father). A low positive correlation existed between the deprivation index and socioeconomic class. Utility of this measure is shown in research demonstrating the independence of the deprivation index from socioeconomic class. Within a group homogeneous on socioeconomic class, there was a significant correlation between scores on the deprivation index and scores on reading level for elementary school children from the slums. Bernstein and Henderson's classification, again differentiating children in the lower socioeconomic class group, is based on the nature of communication patterns in the home: the degree of emphasis on language in the transmission of nonpersonal skills to the child (high or low), and degree of emphasis on language in teaching personal relationships (high or low).

It seems clear from present research trends that efforts will continue towards creating more differentiated and more psychologically meaningful taxonomies for studying poverty. In the past, research typically has simply compared the poor with the middle-class; future research will probably make comparisons

more frequently among several categories of the poor.

Specification of Intervening Processes

To find a relationship between environment (e.g., level of income or socioeconomic status) and behavior is not difficult and has been demonstrated with a diversity of behaviors ranging from sexual activity to religious belief. The discovery of a relationship between background (i.e., poverty) and behavior is no longer very satisfactory as an end in itself. Much more worthwhile is an understanding of the specific variables and detailed means by which environmental conditions produce the psychological dispositions, which in turn are responsible for a particular behavior. From merely demonstrating the existence of a relationship, investigators have progressed toward attempting to specify in detail the intervening processes that mediate the demonstrated relationship between poverty and behavior. Considerable amount of progress is being made in this direction, and it is safe to predict that more and more psychological research on poverty will deal with specific psychological processes and variables that intervene between poverty and behavior. Only two examples need be mentioned here.

One significant attempt to pursue the specific psychological

processes mediating between poverty and behavior was made by Languer and Michael (1963) in their analysis of social class and mental illness. Most research has shown that the poor contribute disproportionately to the incidence of serious mental disorders such as psychoses. For purposes of analyzing the relationship between social class and mental illness Langner and Michael developed a model that explored the concept of stress (experienced at the individual level as "strain") as an intervening variable between environment and behavior. Environmental stress factors, determined empirically, were shown to be positively related to mental illness independently of social class level. Moreover, and most interestingly, these uncorrelated stress factors operated in a simple additive way in relation to mental illness. For example, persons experiencing five stress factors in childhood had a higher probability of being judged mentally ill as adults than persons experiencing three stress factors, who in turn had a greater likelihood of mental illness than persons exposed to only one stress factor. Though a high number of stressful incidents does occur in the lives of the poor, the higher incidence of psychosis could not be explained simply by this fact. Holding constant amount of stress experienced, the poor still showed greater mental illness than the nonpoor, which is apparently accounted for by the selective use of adaptive techniques for dealing with stress by social class levels. The poor seem to employ adaptive techniques that lead to behavior problems defined as "psychosis" whereas the nonpoor tend to use adaptive techniques that lead to "neurosis."

In a series of studies, Deutsch (1967) and associates have attempted to determine the specific psychological mediators of the relationship between social class and behavior in a different area, school achievement in children. Deutsch's research aimed at specifying in a detailed manner the psychological processes affected by poverty—motivational, linguistic, perceptual, etc.—and also attempted to specify which skills and abilities were required to succeed in particular tasks in school. It was found that children from poverty backgrounds were very retarded in language development, upon which a great deal of school work depends. Less obviously, it was discovered that slum children were deficient in elementary sensorimotor skills, which are basic for the development of more complex cognitive processes. Thus, lower-class children were poorer in auditory discrimination, a skill essential for reading. Moreover, the school experience was very incongruent with the home experience for the lower-class child; types of be havior expected in school differ from the behavior expected by lower-class parents at home. Failure experiences are likely to result, with a corresponding decrease in motivation and interest in school work.

The advantage of analyses at the specific and detailed level is clear. When the nature of the psychological processes that mediate between poverty and inadequate school performance are known, then compensatory programs can be designed to accomplish specifiable goals. Thus, pre-school enrichment programs for lower-class children need to stress language development, need to provide opportunity for improving elementary sensorimotor skills, and need to provide success experiences so that school is not a source of frustration.

Intrapersonal and Situational Determinants of Behavior

The relative contribution of psychological (intrapersonal) as opposed to situational factors in determining behavior is a recurrent issue in the psychological study of poverty. The problem is often posed in terms of whether behavior patterns observed among the poor are due to personality of the poor (internal characteristics) or to "reality" factors, i.e., the inevitable pressures of objective life conditions. The issue is frequently phrased in an all-ornone fashion, which is obviously not only an oversimplification but also simply wrong. Most psychologists would affirm that behavior is always a joint function of the external situation and of personal dispositions, the determination of the relative weight

being admittedly difficult in specific instances.

The trend within psychology certainly seems to be moving toward greater recognition of the important role played by situational factors. Thus, for example, difference in behavior of a single person across situations is often greater than difference in a given behavior across people. Generality and consistency of behavior across situations is often not high, and much of the observed difference in a person's behavior can be accounted for by changes in the situation or stimulus context (Hunt, 1965). In a cross-cultural study of child rearing, situational constraints seemed to be more important determinants of the mother's behavior toward her children than were psychodynamic factors or beliefs (Minturn & Lambert, 1964). For instance, the mother exhibited less affect and warmth toward the child when the number of persons per living unit was high. Situational variables such as living arrangements, family size, household composition, and sex of child were critical factors associated with variation in maternal behavior.

The problem of internal dispositions versus situational stimuli manifests itself in several forms in the psychology of poverty. One form is in the all-or-none sort of interpretation or re-interpretation of a given set of findings. A set of behaviors that has been observed to occur among the poor is interpreted, on the one hand, as being due entirely to internal psychological dispositions possessed by the poor. And, on the other hand, other persons totally deny that any role is played by internal psychological characteristics, claiming instead that environmental conditions constitute

the single causal factor.

The presumed inability to delay gratification (impulsefollowing) by the poor can be taken as a good case in point. Several clusters of behavior patterns attributed to the poor have been interpreted as reflecting a personality trait or preference for immediate gratification: greater premarital sexual experience among the poor (Kinsey, Pomeroy, & Martin, 1948); lower educational attainment (Straus, 1962); lack of financial savings and the pattern of consumption (Schneider and Lysgaard, 1953). Let us assume for purpose of discussion that agreement can be reached on the assertion that the poor and the middle-class do differ on the set of behaviors listed above. Even so, the meaning of the behavior, that is, the alleged causal basis of the behavior, often takes one of two extremes. In one instance, a personality trait may be posited as the causal force; the poor are seen as "impulsive" because of a trait of character. In the second instance, behavior may be attributed to the inevitable pressures of environmental forces, pressures that presumably would produce the same effect on most people living under similar conditions.

Miller, Riessman, and Seagull (1965) take the latter tack, pointing out many alternative explanations for the alleged impulsiveness of the poor. Most of their explanations are in terms of situational pressures. For example, although statistics show that lower-class adolescents leave school earlier, this may not indicate inability to defer gratification. The school, with its middle-class structure, probably is less enjoyable for the lower-class student and of less relevance to his future employment prospects. More over, economic problems make it more likely that the lower-class youngster will be forced to leave school. Furthermore, experimental attacks of the school of the sch mental studies of ability to delay gratification have not found social class differences, though both social classes respond to situational variables such as trustworthiness of the experimenter. Miller et al. conclude that the poor are not "psychodynamically constrained" to prefer immediate gratification; instead, other realistic factors can parsimoniously account for the same be

havior.

As the example demonstrates, even if objective differences in behavior can be shown to exist between the poor and the nonpoor, positing an internal psychological state to explain the behavior may be unnecessary. Among alternative explanations for the behavior are situational factors that impinge in a similar manner upon all people living under conditions of poverty. A person's behavior may represent, then, the most rational and realistic (and perhaps the only) response that could be made under conditions

of pressure from his environment.

Another form taken by the situational versus intra-individual problem is methodological. In this version of the issue, alleged psychological differences between the poor and the nonpoor are minimized or discounted as being invalid because situational variables contribute differentially to the observed performance of the two groups. Intelligence testing can be used as an ideal case in point. Results of intelligence tests tend to show quite consistently that children from poverty backgrounds score lower than children from the middle-class. These data, in themselves, have not been in dispute; but whether these data really do indicate true differences in intelligence (leaving aside for the moment what intelligence means)—that is, whether the tests are valid for the poor -certainly has been in dispute. Allison Davis (1948) many years ago pointed out that intelligence tests, like the institution of the school itself, have a heavily middle-class bias. Thus, intelligence tests tend to be composed of items whose language and content are more common and familiar in the experience of the middleclass child, who tends often to have taken tests similar in content and similar in emphasis on speed. Middle-class children are apt to have had more practice at test-taking and to have greater knowledge of the optimal strategy to follow for obtaining high scores in test-taking. Instructions employing middle-class terminology may not be understood by lower-class children, who are likely to be poor readers. Also, the test-giver is usually a middle-class person with whom the lower-class test-taker is likely to have less rapport and whom he will be less motivated to please, which is to say that test-taking is a social situation. All these factors and others have been shown to affect performance on intelligence tests and other types of tests as well.

These comments are meant to imply that situational influences may differ in the case of the poor and the nonpoor, and that these situational influences may be contributing to the test results in addition to the real level of the individual's hypothetical

capacity or "intelligence."

In a very impressive series of experiments, Haggard (1954) demonstrated the influence of simple situational variables in quite a rigorous way. In three one-hour training periods, several hundred eleven-year-old lower-class boys received practice in taking tests. In addition, positive motivation was enhanced by creating rapport with the examiner and by giving rewards for doing well. Providing the children with only this very limited amount of instruction and practice produced significant and quite dramatic in-

creases in scores on intelligence tests.

The example given with intelligence testing can be generalized to any instance in which, due to differences in rapport with the examiner, understanding of instructions, level of motivation, familiarity with the measuring devices and procedure, and other similar factors, the resultant data on performance may not indicate true differences in underlying psychological structure between the poor and the nonpoor, but reflect instead artifactual differences due to the unequal weight of known and unknown situational factors.

The psychic versus situational alternatives are often discussed in terms of "psychological" versus "reality" factors, which only confuses the issue by assuming that there is an objective reality uninfluenced by cognitive and perceptual processes. The truth no doubt lies somewhere between the polar extremes of intra-individual and situational; the problem of research in poverty is to determine the relative importance of individual and situational factors in accounting for a particular behavior. Internal psychological dispositions may be of paramount importance in determining some behaviors; situational and stimulus factors are doubtless of predominant influence in other behaviors.

Research stressing situational factors holds the advantage of being particularly appropriate for understanding poverty; environmental conditions of deprivation are certainly of great centrality in the life of the poor. The situational approach also has the advantage of suggesting that changes ought to be made in the environment or social structure in order effectively to change behavior. Changing long-enduring psycho-dynamic structures of individuals is likely to appear more difficult to accomplish than changing environmental conditions, and thus less likely to lead to

programs of action by society.

The Culture of Poverty-An Equivocal Concept

The concept of "culture of poverty" has gained prominence within recent years, being particularly emphasized in the writings of social anthropologists conducting research among the poor (Gladwin, 1961; Lewis, 1966). The culture of poverty, or more precisely, the subculture of poverty, refers to a way of life or a de-

sign for living that is handed down across generations. Oscar Lewis (1966) states that slum children have acquired the basic values and attitudes of their subculture by the age of six or seven. The culture of poverty concept accounts for the behavior of the poor by positing a system of values different from the middle-class in many (but not all) respects—a normative system that is selfperpetuating. The culture of poverty supposedly transcends social, racial, regional, and even national differences: the poor are

expected to be much the same the world over.

Oscar Lewis identifies 70 traits comprising the culture of poverty; the most important ones for our purpose are the values and character structure of the individual. The most frequently mentioned psychological themes referred to by the culture of poverty concept are: strong feelings of fatalism and belief in chance, strong present time orientation and short time perspective, impulsiveness or inability to delay present gratification or plan for the future, concrete rather than abstract thinking processes and concrete verbal behavior, feelings of inferiority, acceptance of aggression and illegitimacy, and authoritarianism.

Several criticisms can be raised against the concept of culture of poverty. For one thing, behavior cannot be equated with values. In other words, simply because a person behaves a certain way does not mean he desires to do so or does so because of his beliefs or values. Another problem is that the concept is tautological; values inferred from behavior are used to explain the same behavior. To be useful for explaining behavior, values should be measured independently of the behavior to be explained, otherwise no advantage can be claimed for the gratuitous labeling of behavior. Another difficulty is that the concept of culture implies a certain degree of homogeneity and consensus, certainly a matter

for empirical investigation.

At this point, let us examine available data to determine whether consistent differences do in fact exist between the poor and nonpoor in areas of personality and values covered by the concept of culture of poverty. Elsewhere, I have reviewed available empirical data on several personality concomitants of poverty (Allen, 1970). It was concluded that for many widely quoted personality correlates of poverty, data are ambiguous at best and overwhelmingly nonsupportive at worst. For example, a review of relevant research leads to the conclusion that: the hypothesis of shorter time perspective among the poor has not been demonstrated; the poor are not less inclined to delay immediate, lessvalued goals for the sake of greater future gains; the poor are not more responsive to concrete (material) incentives than the nonpoor; systematic data are inadequate concerning differences in self-concept between lower- and middle-class groups.

From a review of available data, then, one must conclude that many presumed relationships between personality characteristics and poverty simply are not supported by results of reliable research. This statement should not be taken so strongly as to suggest a firm and final conclusion. Many available studies suffer from methodological shortcomings and often do not investigate the group of extremely poor who might be most likely to manifest differences with the middle-class. On the other side of the coin, evidence alleging the existence of differences between the poor and nonpoor has often been based on data obtained from a single family by self-report or through participant observation. For reasons too obvious to enumerate, broad conclusions about the culture of poverty based on such evidence should be viewed with extreme caution bordering on skepticism.

It must not be overlooked that in areas of personality that do show an association between personality and poverty the relationship is often quite weak. When data are reported in percent of respondents agreeing or disagreeing with an item, a difference of about ten percent is frequently found between poverty and middle-class groups. Correlations between personality scales and socio-economic class are also typically low, Sewell and Haller's (1956) correlation of .25 between socio-economic class and the California Personality Test being typical for well-controlled studies. Neither should we lose sight of the fact that even when statistical significance is obtained, overlap between groups is

usually fairly large.

On the more specific question of whether the poor share common values with the rest of society, there has also been empirical dispute. Some investigators point to evidence of the acceptance of a common value system in some areas by the middle-class and by the poor: Goode (1960) on illegitimacy; and Taft (1950) on juvenile delinquency. Other investigators have concluded that value differences are not shared between classes: Hyman (1953) on attitudes and aspirations; Henriques (1953) on illegitimacy; and Miller (1958) on delinquency. Rodman (1963) proposed a way of resolving these contradictory conclusions by the concept of the lower-class "value-stretch." He suggests that while the poor do not abandon the general values of society, at the same time an additional or alternate set of values is developed. In other words, the general values of society are stretched to afford an adjustment to the situation of the poor, resulting in the existence of a wider range of values than found in the middle-class. The value-stretch concept is useful in preventing an oversimplified either-or conceptualization, and again points to a limitation of the concept of culture of poverty.

Psychology of People or Psychology of the Poor?

Under this final and rather odd heading I should like to make some comments on empirical research in poverty, and raise a question concerning alternative strategies for psychological re-

search relevant to poverty.

First, it must be stated that the quality of much psychological research in the area of poverty is deficient even when examined with charity. Many studies in the field are anecdotal and observational, and do not warrant consideration in assessing the current state of scientific knowledge in the area—except perhaps for their value in suggesting hypotheses. Among the more systematic studies, failure to provide controls for obvious confounding effects (such as for intelligence and for social class of the examiner), small and nonrepresentative samples, and measuring instruments of dubious validity within the middle class-not to mention validity across classes—are not at all uncommon. Many studies have made sweeping generalizations on the basis of unsystematic observation and unwarranted inferences concerning psychological determinants of observed behavior. To wound a metaphor, my intentions in these assertions are not to throw out the few clean babies with the flood of dirty bath water, but to call attention to the paucity and quality of systematic knowledge about an important subject.

Apparently a process of leveling and sharpening occurs with respect to research data. Many findings continue to be accepted as valid in the face of data that are ambiguous at best and overwhelmingly contradictory at worst, as noted in the section on "culture of poverty." There seems to be a psychological tendency—perhaps not unique to social scientists nor to data in this area—to sharpen the findings supporting one's preconceptions and to ignore or forget findings that are discrepant. The tendency to simplify and bring order from chaotic conditions is understandable. But when considering possible courses of policy or action, it is particularly incumbent upon us to take a long and objective look at available data with as great a degree of freedom

from the influence of preconceptions as possible.

It is curious too that upon finding a slight difference between poverty and nonpoverty groups we often emphasize the difference instead of stressing the even larger degree of similarity. Kluck-hohn, Murray, and Schneider (1953) have said that every man in certain respects is like all other men, like some other men, and like no other man. When reading the psychological literature in this area with a critical eye, one begins to believe that the psychological similarity of the poor man to other men may be greater than we have tended to think, and that differences when found are less striking than often supposed. Perhaps a question that should be cause for perplexity is why psychological characteristics of the poor are not even more distinctive than they apparently are. In this regard, an attempt to categorize the proportion of common cultural experiences among the poor and nonpoor might be illuminating; more commonality might be manifest than one would at first expect.

Some Implications from Basic Psychological Theory

Concerning strategies for psychological research in poverty, it seems unnecessary to affirm that we can learn about the poor by studying the poor themselves. Yet it may also be true that in the long run our understanding of poverty can be most enhanced by development of basic psychological theory and data. The poor, after all, are not a species apart. Many examples could be given to support the contention that advances in general psychology might in the long run make more important contributions to the understanding of a social problem than direct research on the problem itself. (It should also be said that research in poverty can

and has enriched basic psychological theories.)

Since the necessity of direct research on the poor presumably needs no defense, I shall therefore emphasize the importance of general psychological theory and research for furthering our understanding of poverty. Take as an example one very significant trend that has occurred with psychology during the past decade; the greater emphasis now given to cognitive processes. Previously cognitive processes received little attention relative to motivational processes, both in general psychological research and in social class research. Thus, in the past, studies typically have attempted to find differences between lower-and middle-class children on aggression, dependency, conscience development, and the like Much of the earlier emphasis stemmed from the pervasive in fluence of psychoanalysis, a motivational theory. The pendulum clearly is swinging away from preoccupation with motivational processes toward an increased interest in cognition; manifestations of this trend are also evident in research on poverty.

The increased interest within general psychology in language, the nature of intelligence, and cognitive factors in learning has been reflected in research in poverty. That language, thought,

and learning are very closely interrelated is becoming quite clear, and holds important implications for understanding the effect of

poverty on one's behavior.

Basic psychological research has demonstrated too that the human organism is highly malleable and strongly affected by transactions with its environment, especially in the early years of childhood. Hence, early experience is of extraordinary importance in determining the course of a child's cognitive development. Awareness of the importance of early sensorimotor stimulation on cognitive and intellectual growth has led to a great deal of research in poverty, and has inspired the creation of programs designed to provide compensating experiences for the inadequate perceptual and cognitive stimulation found in homes of the poor. A variety of pre-school enrichment programs of the "head start" variety has been one practical outgrowth of research interest in cognition and cognitive development.

The example above could be supplemented by many others to document the contention that basic findings in psychology have important implications for understanding behavior of the poor. While research with the poor should continue vigorously, we should stay alert to opportunities for applying basic findings and theory from all areas of psychology to the problems of poverty. Using basic psychological theory in research on poverty entails much more than a rigid and literal transfer of existing ideas to the field of poverty research. Obtaining optimal usefulness from basic psychological theory is not a simple or straightforward task. For the purpose of rendering a theory useable for research in poverty, considerable skill and imagination are required in operationalizing and translating theoretical constructs and in determining the configuration and relative weight of variables when utilized in a different empirical context.

In terms of the knowledge required to guide programs of social change more effectively, available psychological theory and data at this point must obviously be declared to be incomplete. Further understanding of the complex problem of poverty may be dependent upon increased understanding of behavior in general, and in particular upon empirical and theoretical advances in understanding the problems of the relation between environment—

in the broadest sense of the term—and behavior.

REFERENCES

ALLEN, V. L. Personality correlates of poverty. In V. L. Allen (Ed.), Psychological factors in poverty. Chicago: Markham, 1970.

Bernstein, B., & Henderson, D. Social class difference in the relevance of lan-

guage to socialization. Sociology, 1969, 3, 1-20.

Brunswik, E. The conceptual framework of psychology. In O. Neurath, R. Carnap, & C. Morris (Eds.), International encyclopedia of unified science, Vol. 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938.

DAVIS, A. Social-class influences upon learning. Cambridge: Harvard University

Press, 1948.

DEUTSCH, M. The disadvantaged child. New York: Basic Books, 1967.

GLADWIN, T. The anthropologist's view of poverty. In, The social work forum. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961.

GOODE, W. J. Illegitimacy in the Carribbean social structure. American Sociological Review, 1960, 25, 21-30.

GURIN, G. An expectancy approach to job-training programs. In V. L. Allen (Ed.), Psychological factors in poverty. Chicago: Markham, 1970. GURIN, G., & GURIN, P. Expectancy theory in the study of poverty. Journal of

Social Issues, 1970, 26 (2).

HAAN, NORMA. The relationship of ego functioning and intelligence to social status and social mobility. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1964, 69, 594-605.

HAGGARD, E. A. Social status and intelligence: An experimental study of certain cultural determinants of measured intelligence. Genetic Psychology Mono-

graphs, 1954, 49, 141–186.

Henriques, F. Family and colour in Jamaica. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1953. HUNT, J. McV. Traditional personality-theory in the light of recent evidence.

American Scientist, 1965, 53, 80-96.

HYMAN, H. H. The value systems of different classes: A social psychological contribution to the analysis of stratification. In R. Bendix & S. M. Lipset (Eds.), Class, status and power. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953.

KINSEY, A. C., POMEROY, W. B., & MARTIN, C. E. Sexual behavior in the human

male. Philadelphia: Saunders, 1948.

KLUCKHOHN, C., MURRAY, H. A., & SCHNEIDER, D. M. Personality in nature, society and culture. New York: Knopf, 1953. KOHLBERG, L. Early education: A cognitive-developmental view. Child Develop-

ment, 1968, 39, 1013-1062. KOLB, D. A. Achievement motivation training for underachieving high school boys. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 2, 783-792.

LANGNER, T. M., & MICHAEL, S. T. Life stress and mental health. Glencoe, Ill.

Free Press, 1963.

Lewis, O. The culture of poverty. Scientific American, 1966, 215, 19-25.

MATZA, D. Poverty and disrepute. In R. K. Merton & R. A. Nisbet (Eds.), Contemporary social problems. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966. McClelland, D. C. Toward a theory of motive acquisition. American Psychologist,

1965, **20**, 321–333.

MILLER, S. M. The American lower classes: A typological approach. In A. Shostak & W. Gombarg (F. 1) Property of the company of tak & W. Gomberg (Eds.), Blue collar world: Studies of the American worker. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964.

MILLER, S. M., RIESSMAN, F., & SEAGULL, A. A. Poverty and self-indulgence: A critique of the non-deferred gratification pattern. In L. A. Ferman, J. L. Kornbluh, & A. Haber (Eds.), Poverty in America. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965.

MILLER, W. B. Lower class culture as a generating milieu of gang delinquency.

Journal of Social Issues, 1958, 14 (3), 5-19.

MINTURN, L., & LAMBERT, W. W. Mothers of six cultures. New York: Wiley, 1964. RODMAN, H. The lower class value stretch. Social Forces, 1963, 13, 205-215.

ROSENTHAL, R., & JACOBSON, L. F. Teacher expectations for the disadvantaged. Scientific American, 1968, 218, 19-23.

SARBIN, T. R. The culture of poverty, social identity, and cognitive outcomes. In V. L. Allen (Ed.), Psychological factors in poverty. Chicago: Markham, 1970. SEWELL, W. H., & HALLER, A. O. Social status and the personality adjustment

of the child. Sociometry, 1956, 19, 114-125.
Schneider, L. S., & Lysgaard, S. The deferred gratification pattern: A preliminary study. American Sociological Review, 1953, 18, 142-149.

SROLE, L., LANGNER, T. S., MICHAEL, S. T., OPLER, S. T., & RENNIE, T. A. C. Mental health in the metropolis. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962.

STRAUS, M. A. Deferred gratification, social class, and the achievement syndrome. American Sociological Review, 1962, 27, 326-335.

TAFT, D. R. Criminology. (Rev. ed.) New York: Macmillan, 1950.

Septem F. (4) The conference of spreaming administration of a girle on gardeness of the 18 of th

The second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of th

drome American American Research colors and a majoria correction of the colors of the

AND THE PARTY OF T

the transition of the second state of the second se

collected. As the basis states age; angillatened that a payment of the states of the s

for addity, the for the second of the property of the party of the party of the second
Three M. In The value system of Milescent Access, A reader Malagraph of attraction to the engine of attraction and to the discussion of M. International Conference of the Section of the

NAME A. C. POSSINGS, W. S. & All a service B. State of the Advantage of the Advantage of the State of

SHIPSONARY, S. Rimowo, M. A. & Assemble of D. M. Pro- 19, a matter of the state of

contracts that execution a countrie development of the falls

Such the Art terrors must be some impleinty for Local translation of the such and the such and the such and the such and the such as a s

CARLE OF A MERCANICE TO AN APPENDING TORREST ON LABORETT

A track the process of the part of the process of the process of the process of the part o

The state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the s

A let I of the selection to be a let be

The National State of the Control of

der Photo II. 22 Tream 25 W. M. Mercerous de Victor, best made biblio.

Colo M. Der Lander data prosport selle de la finanza 12 de la colo de l

Poverty Research in the Seventies

S. M. Miller New York University

The sixties have been a terrifying decade for this nation. Consensus, pluralism, affluence, and good-will—all have proven slogans rather than descriptions; panaceas, not strategies; blinding, not mind-opening. Instead of consensus, we have deep conflict; pluralism decomposes to reveal profound differences in power; affluence turns out to be maldistributed and inadequate for our needs, unless we constrict wants; the attempts to overcome racial and class discriminations encounter deep antagonisms rather than a reservoir of good will.

The Sixties—A Decade of Scorching Revelations

Social scientists have not escaped similarly scorching revelations. As the nation learned about poverty, social scientists learned about themselves. First, was the wry dismay that it took nonacademics to introduce this nation to the facts and the scandal of poverty amid affluence. Second, was the much more disturbing discovery that our data were skimpy, our theory inadequate, and our perspectives not sharpened by the North light of pure objectivity but molded by our convictions.

As this volume demonstrates, the data upon which generalizations are wrought are indeed very scanty. Not only do they often collide with each other, but they are based on studies of restricted, constricted situations—which should impede extending their

sovereignty to life as it is lived rather than experimented upon in the laboratory. The experience of the sixties should have chastened us to realize how little we know about the root facts of human existence—whether economic, political, social, or psychological. Ignorance, not codified knowledge, is our state—

hopefully, not our destiny.

The inadequacy of theory has been the recurring theme of this volume in its reassertion of the significance of the situation, rather than only the psyche, in behavior. Fashions in social science and in politics one-sidedly emphasize one or the other of these elements of the human condition. The theme of the culture of poverty became the theoretical support for a political program of motivation for jobs without the assurance of jobs for trainees. Despite the awareness that academic disciplines are conveniences rather than universalities or moral imperatives, we continue to generalize in terms of limited sets of variables which have been packaged within a particular discipline. (In this volume some

healthy departures from this practice are visible.)

Perhaps most striking in the sixties was the attack upon the presumed objectivity and neutrality of social scientists and other academicians and professionals. Universities and their faculties were charged with serving as the guardians of the (liberal) establishment. Expertness was seen as mainly at the service of power elites; advocacy planning, where experts openly and consciously commit themselves to working in the interests of disadvantaged groups, emerged as a repudiation of neutrality. Where one stood in terms of political attitudes affected where one could make studies—low-income communities were dubious about researchers researching them unless they had some confidence in the outlook of the researchers. Social scientists are not impermeable and insulated; their genius as well as their failure comes from their permeability with the world around them. Acting as though this were not the case distorts us.

The questioning of the goal of integration—no longer regarded as the high ground on which one could move, both black and white, as both researcher and citizen—made us aware that our perceptions, feelings, and desires affected our "scientific outlook." The heady moment before Vietnam and before Black Power when our scientific and citizen roles coincided, when we could believe that we could improve the society as we performed our flourishing scientific work, was short indeed. Divisions in political aims unfolded, the ease of change proved illusory, money became tight, and our social concerns as intellectual issues were poorly absorbed through the toughened hides of the academic disciplines. (Even in this issue, social psychologists seem to have

to prove themselves worthy of that title by writing articles in the systematic vein of their discipline, though they are highly critical of the work and perspectives that they review.)

Looking Toward the Seventies

I write this harsh postmortem only partly because of my feelings of despair and rage at the sixties. (I do not share the fashionable view of the sixties as having no positive importance; no indeed.) I feel that we social scientists can/should do better in the seventies. I will not attempt what is needed—a full-scale analysis of what the seventies are likely to be and the issues that are raised for social scientists who recognize their aim is to change the society as well as to understand it. (At the end of the sixties, I have come back to Marx's formulation; during the hopeful mid-sixties, I used to say that now that we are changing society, we also had better learn to understand it. Some of that understanding became more painful than I thought it would.) Rather, I will pick up several issues of perspectives which should affect research in the seventies.

The Issue—Not Poverty but Inequality

First, I would repeat what I and many others have tirelessly (but with little effectiveness) said through the sixties. The issue is inequality, not poverty. To say poverty implies a fairly fixed line, defined by some pretentiously scientific standards, to which all families should be brought. Inequality asserts that the issue is the relative position of individuals. Therefore, it forces attention to the relationships and relativities of different groups in society. We can discuss poverty by discussing the poor alone; we cannot discuss inequality without discussing the better-off. I cannot pinpoint the consequences of the shift in terms, but I have the very strong feeling that if one is concerned with inequality rather than poverty, different issues and different ways of studying old issues emerge.

It should not be necessary to say to social psychologists that inequality is not an economic issue. But there does seem to be little research on the interaction of high and low groups in real life situations. Are they changing? For some reason, psychologists seem to believe that historical change is of no importance in their work. In a devotion to the universals of psyche and behavior, academic psychologists have been uninterested in how and why behavior changes over relatively long time-periods (a decade) as a

¹Pamela Roby and I have tried to develop an analysis of the dimensions and facts of inequality in our *The Future of Inequality*, New York: Basic Books, 1970.

result, at least in part, of large social changes. Psychologists are little interested in time series of human behavior because of an excessive concern with the non-time (and non-cultural?) bound.

That is at least how one non-psychologist sees the field.

I hope that a concern with inequality would lead to efforts to study changes in social interactions over time and to discern the factors involved in making for changes. There is some little ground between Erik Erikson and Robert Lifton, on one hand, and "history is bunk," on the other; academic psychologists should search for a place to plunk their flag.

A Mobility Model Downgrades the Poor

Second, the goals of national efforts are in conflict and this conflict extends to social scientists. Is the goal "changing opportunity" or "changing conditions"? Much of the anti-poverty elfort of the sixties was aimed at increasing opportunity, especially for the young, particularly through education. The promotion of individual social mobility was the objective. A much higher rate of movement out of poverty ranks would be acceptable even if those left behind were as poorly off as before. Opening doors is the objective, not lifting floors so that no one is in dire circumstances.

Many of us have accepted the mobility motif without evaluating it. This perspective accepts the society fundamentally and seeks to get the disprivileged into the higher economic levels of it at a more rapid rate. A counter perspective accentuates the importance of improving the conditions of those at the bottom, those left behind in the social mobility race, and even sometimes argues for the importance of changing the values of society rather than trying to give more people a better start in the race to affluence.

My strong suspicion is that many of us have absorbed the mobility model and that it affects the kind of research that we do and the way we go about it. My guess is that the mobility model encouraged social scientists to downgrade the strengths and flexibility of the bility of the poor. I may be wrong about this, but I am convinced in any case that social scientists have to become more aware of what their own perspectives are and how they are being used by

others.

Recognizing Limits of Remediation Policies

Third, we have to be willing to recognize the limits of the remediation policies of this country. The so-called "welfare state" policies and education, as the major vehicle of social mobility and as the mid-wife of a meritocracy where merit achieves its just reward, may not be as effective in producing redistribution and lessened inequality as was commonly thought to be the situation in the sixties. Since the kinds of policy implications that the researcher thinks about effect the nature of his research (choice of problems, angle of analysis), it is important to be open to a wider range of action implications than we have been.

Reallocating Academic Disciplines

Fourth, should we not begin to think seriously about the recutting of academic disciplines? Is social psychology best developed by thinking of it as intrinsically connected to academic psychology rather than to sociology or economics? Or, as part of a new discipline that is struggling to emerge—which is about urban studies and political economy? Or as part of action fields, like education, in which the core is a concern with a set of social problems or issues rather than with a methodology? My suspicion is that deep changes are taking place in the field of social psychology but that these changes in practice have not permeated the training and location of social psychologists.

In the sixties, social scientists apparently jumped from the laboratory and the clipboard to the corridors of power. The whiff of the top was intoxicating—at least until we learned how long those corridors were and how difficult to influence those at the end of the passageway. We should also have learned the limits of what we had to offer and how in turn we were often manipulated.

In the seventies, we should refrain from providing a rationale for, nor a beautifying of, programs that cannot work. We should help uncover and refine the important values for society. We should assess the possibilities and the limits of governmental policies and actions. We should alert ourselves and the nation to the things that government cannot do and which we as a nation yet must do for ourselves.

Examining Ourselves

The seventies will require more complicated perspectives from social scientists than they exhibited in the sixties. For it is now clear that the issues are not only those of integrating the poor and the discriminated into society but changing that society at the same time. Our unclarity about our own perspectives aggravates the faulty data and limited generalizations which plague social science. But better data and generalizations will not alone solve our problems. We have also to examine ourselves.

entre de la companya del companya de la companya de la companya del companya de la companya del la companya del la companya de la companya del la companya de la companya del la

and a partial of the company of the

A CONTROL OF THE PROPERTY OF T

Proposition of the control of the co

The device we have an extra production of the second of th

Biographical Sketches

VERNON L. ALLEN is Professor of Psychology at the University of Wisconsin. He received the PhD in social psychology from the University of California in Berkeley, and has been a Fulbright Fellow in England. He is co-author of the chapter on role theory in the revised Handbook of Social Psychology, and editor of Psychological Factors in Poverty.

REUBEN M. BARON is Associate Professor of Psychology at Wayne State University in Detroit and Chairman of the Social Psychology Area. He received his PhD, specializing in social psychology, from New York University. He spent two post-doctoral years at the University of Michigan. His publications include articles on attitude change and social motivation. His current research into the determinants of social reinforcer efficacy represents an attempt to merge the insights of social and developmental psychology. He is joint author of a soon to be published book, Varieties of Discrepant Action: Toward a Functional Theory.

MARION BLANK is Assistant Professor of Psychology in the Department of Psychiatry at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine of Yeshiva University. She received her PhD in child development from Cambridge University and since then has devoted herself to studies concerned with the development of language and thinking in young children. This work has been concerned with issues in both the basic research on cognition as well as its applicability to the treatment of learning disorders.

COURTNEY B. CAZDEN is an Associate Professor of Education at Harvard University, interested in the development of children's verbal abilities in and out of school. She is currently analyzing preschool language intervention programs and has two books in preparation: Child Language and Education and The Functions of Language in the Classroom (jointly edited with Dell Hymes and Vera John).

GERALD GURIN is a Program Director at the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. He received his PhD in social psychology from the University of Michigan. Among his publications is Americans View Their Mental Health, of which he is co-author. Recently he has been engaged in studying psychological and motivational factors in trainees in manpower training programs.

PATRICIA GURIN is Associate Professor of Psychology and Research Associate at the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. She received her PhD in social psychology from the University of Michigan. She is co-editor of Race Relations and the Social Sciences and co-author of a monograph, Motivation and Aspiration in the Negro College.

MARCIA GUTTENTAG is Associate Professor of Psychology at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York and Director of the Harlem Research Center. She was previously a Visiting Fellow at Yale University. A social psychologist, her current research is concerned with the effects of school social organization on cognitive and motivational variables in children. She is co-editor of the forthcoming Handbook of Evaluation Research.

S. M. MILLER is Professor of Education and Sociology at New York University, formerly at Syracuse University and Brooklyn College. A socio-economist, he is co-author of the Future of Inequality (with Pamela Roby) and Social Class and Social Policy (with Frank Riessman). He was co-editor (with Alvin Gouldner) of Applied Sociology. Earlier he was editor of Max Weber: Selected Readings, co-author of The Dynamics of the American Economy, author of Comparative Social Mobility, and co-author of a series of studies of school dropouts. He is president of the Eastern Sociological Society. He organized the first joint meeting of SPSSI and SSP.

LEE RAINWATER is Professor of Sociology at Harvard University and a Faculty Associate of the Joint Center for Urban Studies of MIT and Harvard. His research work over the past six years has been concerned with problems of poverty and racial oppression, and with social policy initiative to deal with these problems. His books include And the Poor Gel Children, Family Design, and (with William Yancey) The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy, and Behind Ghetto Walls: Black Families in a Federal Slum.

ALLEN, VERNON L. Theoretical issues in poverty research. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26 (2), 149-167.

Psychological research in poverty deals with the relation between behavior and broad environmental factors; for such problems current theory is, unfortunately, less satisfactory than one would wish. Limitations of both the purely economic definition of poverty and of the concept of culture of poverty are pointed out. Among the recurrent conceptual issues in poverty research is the relative weight that should be attributed to intrapersonal versus situational factors in interpreting the behavior of the poor. Although the usefulness of research dealing directly with poverty is not disputed, further understanding of psychological factors in poverty may be facilitated by advances in general psychological theory and research.

BARON, REUBEN M. The SRS model as a predictor of Negro responsiveness to reinforcement. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26 (2), 61-81.

An attempt was made to demonstrate the relevance of an interpersonally oriented incongruity model—Baron's SRS theory—to understanding Negro responsiveness to social reinforcement. Based on the SRS model it was hypothesized that Negroes would find a low rate of approval from a white authority figure, at least under certain conditions, more appropriate and preferred than a high rate of approval. The results of a series of studies carried out with disadvantaged Negro youth suggest that this proposition is relevant to understanding how Negro self-evaluation and task performance is affected by social reinforcement parameters such as type, source, and frequency of reinforcement. The role of such research in broadening the focus of the SRS model from a monistic to a multidimensional conception is also discussed.

BLANK, MARION. Implicit assumptions underlying preschool intervention programs. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26 (2), 15-33.

This paper considers the assumptions underlying many of the efforts that have been put forth in the area of preschool education for the disadvantaged child. In particular, attention is directed to programs based on concepts of overall enrichment, perceptual training, and language based intervention. Within the framework of the latter classification, a one to one tutorial program developed by the present author is described. Emphasis was placed on the need to establish limited focused programs based upon delineated testable hypotheses before effective methods of intervention can be implemented.

ALLEN, VES VON L. Theoretical issues in powerty represent from at home to have 1970, 30 (25), 1939 William represent growth and the control of the control o

The property of the control of the c

Arrent Compared AC in Associate Professor of Professor at the Chapter State and Director of the Chapter State and Director of the Chapter State and Director of the Chapter State and Chapter St

The control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the control of the co

To the Action of Should like the members of the Eastern Artists.

As not not to the ment the last have necessary at \$9851 and \$20.

LEE I WE I COME ALL CONTROL OF SECTION OF STATEMENT OF THE LANGE OF TH

the paint accounting the analogophore attack paint principal of the disease the paint of the disease to an excise of an excised advantage and excess of an excised advantage and the paint of the excess of an excess of a suppose the paint of the excess of

CAZDEN, COURTNEY B. The situation: A neglected source of social class differences in language use. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26 (2), 35-60.

Lower class children have been described as having less language or a different language than their middle class peers. Both descriptions are discussed and found inadequate. The alternative proposed is that at any moment a child selects certain linguistic options as a function of the situation as he perceives it on the basis of his past experience. A review is presented of research on child language which includes aspects of the speech situation as independent variables—topic, task, listener(s), or characteristics of the interaction. Finally, implications for education are raised.

GURIN, GERALD, & GURIN, PATRICIA. Expectancy theory in the study of poverty. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26 (2), 83-104.

The experimental literature on expectancy change and performance effects of expectancy is examined for its relevance for poverty interventions. By supporting the view that success experiences and reality changes can be used to heighten personal expectancies and motivation, these experimental studies conflict with psychological theories that emphasize "deep pathologies" of the poor; they are more consistent with theories that stress reality constraints and the need to alter the life conditions of the poor. Nonetheless, complexities in these studies highlight psychological problems that must be confronted even by advocates of structural-institutional attacks on poverty. They suggest, for instance, that personal expectancies do not always change when objective probabilities increase. Moreover, expectancy changes noted in typical experimental studies are not necessarily stable nor indicative of shifts in the person's basic sense of self-confidence; neither do they automatically lead to behavioral changes. Finally, the relevance of the expectancy literature is limited by an individualistic bias which points to individual mobility and neglects the import of collective action.

GUTTENTAG, MARCIA. Group cohesiveness, ethnic organization, and poverty. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26 (2), 105-132.

Experimental and field studies of groups show that in cohesive groups, members are more productive, receive more individual attention and understanding from each other, and seem to be freer to express diverse behavior. Cohesiveness increases when group members perceive both a common threat and the possibility of cooperative action to reduce it; cohesiveness declines when individuals can achieve goals through independent actions. Growth in group individuals can achieve goals through independent actions. Growth in group cohesiveness entails stronger definitions of group boundaries and clearer distinctions between group and non-group members. The religious and ethnic groups which have survived poverty without debilitation have ideologies which stress the differences between group and non-group values, are characterized by communal control over educational and social institutions, and by independent taxing power. The growth of ethnic ideology undermines social class distinctions between poor and non-poor members of the group. The positive effects of cohesiveness among the poor, organized along ethnic lines, are balanced against the negatives of sharpened group boundaries.

AND RECOUNTING The standard A orginary round of the first standard for the second standard for the sec

towers for this entrance have resent discribed as baying less little and or continued and the continued and the second and the continued a

GREN, GIRALD, & GURIN, PATRICIA, Expectatory fector at the an

The extension of the elevation of the process change and performances of the elevation of t

TENT of MARCIA Croup rehamment, ether degeniment, bearth person of seeds hims (970, 2642), 105-122.

The state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the s

MILLER, S. M. Poverty research in the seventies. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26 (2), 169-173.

The sixties have been a terrifying decade for this nation. Consensus, pluralism, affluence, and good-will—all have proven slogans rather than descriptions; panaceas, not strategies; blinding, not mind-opening. Instead of consensus, we have deep conflict; pluralism decomposes to reveal profound differences in power; affluence turns out to be mal-distributed and inadequate for our needs, unless we constrict wants; the attempts to overcome racial and class discriminations encounter deep antagonisms rather than a reservoir of good will. Social scientists have not escaped similarly scorching revelations. As the nation learned about poverty, social scientists learned about themselves. First, was the wry dismay that it took non-academics to introduce this nation to the facts and the scandal of poverty amid affluence. Second, was the much more disturbing discovery that our data are skimpy, our theory inadequate, and our perspectives not sharpened by the north light of pure objectivity but molded by convictions.

RAINWATER, LEE. The problem of lower class culture. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26 (2), 133-148.

Lower class behavior has been analyzed from the perspective of a distinctive sub-culture (Allison Davis, Walter Miller, Oscar Lewis) or as a manifestation of blocked opportunities for achievement in terms of goals and aspirations which are essentially conventional and shared with the larger society (Parsons, Merton, Cloward and Ohlin). Data from a long term participant observation study of an all-Negro public housing project suggest a synthesis of these two views of the emphasizes on the one hand the conventionality of the aspirations of lower class people and on the other hand, the development of subcultural techniques for coping with and living in a world which makes achievement of those aspirations impossible.

In a second control of the second control of

RADIVANTED SEED TO medica entrace characteristic section of 1233 SET AWARA

substable of the local Colors, Walter & why Colors result of as a manifestation of backed operating the Market for the second of as a manifestation of backed operating the second of the second operation of the second of the second operation of the second operation of the second operation of the second operation of the second of the seco

The Activists' Corner

Nevitt Sanford The Wright Institute, Berkeley

This column has been interested in undergraduate education all along, particularly in the developmental kind—the kind that expands the personality and gives self-understanding—but the following is the

first paper on this subject to come in.

Dr. Lenore Borzak, who tells us here about a course designed to promote development in the area of ego identity, is Director of Freshman Composition at Kendall College, Evanston, Illinois. She had the help of Dr. Jean B. Carlson, a University of Illinois PhD, who teaches psychology at Kendall.

Freeing Women to Become People Lenore Borzak

It has barely begun, the search of women for themselves. But the time is at hand when the voices of the feminine mystique can no longer drown out the inner voice that is driving women on to become complete.

These are the closing remarks of Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique, prophetically published in 1963. Now, seven years later, the impact of those words and many others which have followed is just beginning to be felt and understood. We are, in the United States, experiencing what may be our first bloodless revolution the revolution of women to assert themselves, to define themselves as human beings, to understand the roles they have undertaken in the past and the goals they will be selecting in the future. It is no coincidence that nearly every major magazine in the country in the past four months has had either a cover story or a feature article on the new emergence of the American woman. It was no coincidence either that we, as two American women, decided to examine, in a one month Interim course, the issues which have lately been raised by this "revolution." We weren't nearly so prophetic as Friedan, however, since when we planned the course in the spring of 1969 we had no idea that six months later when we met to prepare a syllabus, we would not only be overwhelmed by the amount of newly published material on the subject but also staggered by how these stirrings we had only vaguely sensed were reverberating throughout the country. One of the class projects during the one-month course (January 5-30, 1970, 4 credit hours) involved each student's keeping a journal of clippings from newspapers and magazines that pertained to women. We expected a thin spiral notebook with several articles; instead nearly every one of our 20 students presented us with huge scrapbooks, accompanied by apologies for what they'd missed. And that was just one month!

The foregoing has certainly indicated what we feel is current about the topic of women in the United States. But the big word in colleges these days is relevancy, and it is to this that we really want to address ourselves. It is of course handy if a course deals with current topics; but this is not synonymous with its being relevant. We feel that our one-month seminar (entitled "Women, the Second Sex?") was both current and relevant. This is because we confronted our students with materials, ideas, issues, and questions that forced them (and us) to examine their own attitudes in relation to how they feel about themselves as women of men (there were 18 women and two men enrolled), how they view themselves in relation to the opposite sex, how they have lived and are living, and what sort of future they envision for themselves This kind of questioning goes beyond the currency of the topic of what's happening "out there" in the country, for our concern (and we have evidence for saying their concern) was with what's there"—inside of each person that shared with us this educational experience. This self-examination is really what the course was all about, and, in a larger sense, what all education involves Changing attitudes toward oneself, increasing awareness, expanding the ing the possibilities of what it means to be a woman, discarding what is irrelevant-all of this was going on.

¹During the "Interim" at Kendall College, students take and faculty members teach only one course. [N.S.]

The Interim Course

We began by deciding how we could bring together two different perspectives for a truly interdisciplinary course. My colleague, Dr. Jean Carlson, is a psychologist, trained in the social sciences and concerned with human behavior as it is reflected in one's self image and in the view of the individual in relation to others; while I am an English instructor, accustomed to viewing human behavior as it is portrayed in literature. The readings we selected therefore reflected both perspectives: these were arranged according to five topics which we discussed intensively for three weeks, meeting four and sometimes five times per week in two-to-three hour sessions. The first concern was examining the biological nature of women, raising such questions as "Is anatomy destiny?" and "Are there innate differences between men and women and/or inherent qualities that can be called masculine and feminine?" Here, as in each of the five topics, we read the studies of social scientists and physicians (in such books as Friedan's The Feminine Mystique; The Woman in America, a syrrigiosium of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, edited by Robert J. Lifton; Margaret Mead's Male and Female; Caroline Bird's Born Female; and The Potential of Women, edited by Seymour Farber and Roger Wilson). Related to this area was a lecture by a visiting biologist on abortion. For a literary treatment we read Penelope Mortimer's The Pumpkin Eater (and also viewed the film version of the novel) and Henrik Ibsen's "A Doll's House."

We next were concerned with the historical evolution of the American woman, involving a chronological survey of her politiical, economic, legal, and social status. Here we had guest lecturers: an historian whose PhD thesis had centered on the feminist movement in the second decade of the twentieth century, and a lawyer, presently one of two women aldermen in the city of Evantton. Their visits, like those of our other speakers, were really discussions with the students (each session was held around a table in a small seminar room), with a good deal of time devoted to

questions and answers.

From there we moved to a look at the present economic status of women, enhanced by a visit from the president of the Chicago chapter of the National Organization for Women (NOW). At this point many ideas were generated about the possibilities of radically changing the economic set-up that now involves a kind of "male mystique"-that is, the notion that men are the "natural" breadwinners who, in many families, singlehandedly support the family. The idea of day-care centers, providing child care so that women could more equally share the family's economic burden, was put forth. Following that, we considered the psychological implications of how the foregoing patterns had helped to determine women's self-images and the roles which they felt were either imposed upon them by "society" or by their own choices. Molly Bloom's soliloquy from James Joyce's *Ulysses* and Virginia Woolf's *Mrs. Dalloway* were two literary sources in this area.

The final week of the course was devoted to individual student research reports given orally and in writing that had been selected by the students according to their special interests. When more than one student selected the same or a similar topic, they presented their reports as a panel. The most popular topic was "The Pill," though each student who dealt with this offered a different perspective. Other topics ranged from the treatment of women in four twentieth century American novels to a comparison of the views of women as expressed by Sigmund Freud and

Karen Horney.

One other major area of student participation involved individual magazine reports, in which each student reported on a different popular magazine in terms of the kinds of articles and advertising relating to women which it contained. Here the students expressed amazement at the image of woman that was being purveyed, not only in such magazines as Playboy and Esquire, but also in the so-called "women's magazines" written for (though as one student pointed out, with few exceptions not by) women. We discovered that in surveying 20 magazines (running the gamut from children's to teen-ager's to bride's to homemaker's) there was one (count 'em, one) article on the American Indian, the only article not concerned with such topics as bagging a boy, seducing your boss, enticing your husband, enlightening your children, beautifying your home, etc. Many students said that they had been reading these magazines for years and had never really noticed the contents before.

Discoveries and Awakenings

This brings us to the real importance of a course such as this While the magazine assignment evoked dramatic response in terms of seeing old familiar things in new ways, we feel that throughout the course this is what was happening. The students were beginning to look at their old familiar selves in new ways, for they were starting to ask why they saw themselves as "destined" to marry, have children and perhaps a career. Early in the course, when asked about their respective life plans, they had indicated that certain careers, such as elementary teaching, were appealing, because you could always "go back" to them when the children

were grown. Now they were beginning to think about whether they really wanted to marry and have children, whether the goals they'd been implicitly and explicitly setting for themselves might not be simply (and complexly!) a reflection of what American society says women should be and do (and markets these prescriptions in its magazines and television programs and commercials). They were beginning to wonder if being born female meant being the second sex, or if indeed there was a first and

second sex at all.

On the first day of class we had asked the students to write on separate index cards the following lists: Who are you? What are the special strengths of women? What are the special strengths of men? Who are the women you most admire? Who are the men you most admire? They kept these, and we didn't ask to see them until the next to last day of class. Then we tallied them up and discovered that only a few girls had listed "woman," "girl," or "female" in their list of Who-am-I. Instead they spoke of themselves as daughters, sisters, girlfriends. Most frequently cited among the special strengths of women were: (1) the ability to have children, and (2) understanding of others; while for men the most common strengths cited were: (1) courage, (2) aggressiveness, and (3) ability to reason. The women most admired were Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mrs. Rose Kennedy. When our tally was complete one student spontaneously exclaimed, "My God, we were the feminine mystique!" With this kind of wrap-up no summary was necessary for us as instructors.

We'd like to mention one other student remark made by a young woman who was engaged to be married and was planning to leave school and work full-time so that her husband-to-be could continue his education. She said that in being confronted with many possibilities for changing old patterns and old roles that women had pursued, she had been thinking more of her potential rather than of some prescribed "destiny" she'd always believed

in. As she expressed it, "Now I feel I can do anything."

This is an exciting prospect for a girl of eighteen. However, she may discover that the men in her life aren't ready for this kind of assertiveness (and this seems to be what much of the present "women's liberation movement" is about), even though her realizing her potential may enable the man she loves to better fulfill his. There is still much to be explored in this area and many more questions to be raised and resolved, but we feel we've made a beginning. We as women significantly altered some long-standing views of ourselves and our relations to our husbands and children. We also expanded our educational identities by looking at issues from cross-disciplinary perspectives, and this was immensely

satisfying and rewarding. But best of all we felt that our students left the course somewhat different from the way they entered. And who knows where this will lead? (As Betty Friedan asks:

Who knows what women can be when they are finally free to become themselves? Who knows what women's intelligence will contribute when it can be nourished without denying love? Who knows of the possibilities of love when men and women share not only children, home, and garden, not only the fulfillment of their biological roles, but the responsibilities and passions of the work that creates the human future and the full human knowledge of who they are?

Comment from the Corner

The course Mrs. Borzak has described was given for academic credit, as she told me by telephone, and this seems entirely proper. It was not simply group psychotherapy, sensitivity training, or "encounter," nor was it primarily a means for political ends. Rather, the right setting having been created, it used intellectual material and academic procedures-reading, studying, writing, discussion of ideas—as means for promoting individual development. It seems to have achieved some integration of ideas and feelings, of "sense and sensibility." The students learned the content because it was meaningful to them; it excited them by challenging some of their old ideas about themselves and other people and by revealing some of the sources of their beliefs. The best hope now is that having learned some content because of their personality needs, they will go on to use academic learning as a means for expanding their personalities. If they are now freed of inadequate and restricting self-conceptions, they may go on to develop personalities that embrace affective investments in intellectual matters, identifications with intellectually demanding work, and modes of functioning that involve the use of culture for expressing emotional needs and resolving inner conflicts.

Much the same sort of thing that Borzak and Carlson did could be done by seizing the occasion of a campus crisis in governance to give a course on authority, authority relations, and authority relations, and authority relations, thoritarianism, or the occasion of the opening of a new "living and learning" dormitory to give a course, for those who live there,

on leadership or freedom and responsibility.

It is a little sad, though, to think that we have to use such occasions, such current and salient events, in order to offer students something the dents something that is relevant to their situation and development To fulfill the ment. To fulfill the human and cultural needs of students has always been the first students have always been the first students have always been the first students and cultural needs of students have always been the first students have always been the first students and cultural needs of students have always been the first students have always been the first students and cultural needs of students have always been the first students and cultural needs of students have always been the first students and cultural needs of students have always been the first students and cultural needs of students have always been the first students and cultural needs of students have always been the first students and cultural needs of students have always been the first students and cultural needs of students have always been the first students and cultural needs of students have always been the first students and cultural needs of students always always been the first students and the first students are always ways been the function of the humanities, which can be and sometimes are taught in such a way as to contribute directly to

identity formation. That they are rarely so taught today has less to do with the shortened attention span and diminished faith of students than with the fact that specialized scholarship and the insistence of professors on teaching their careers has so desiccated these great subjects as to leave them no longer viable for students. If those professors cannot or will not make their subjects relevant, then it is up to educators such as Mrs. Borzak to find such means

as they can for reaching students where they are.

But "relevance" today usually means "social relevance." When I noted Borzak's title and the quotation from Betty Friedan, I assumed that the study of women's roles was going to be put into the service of the Women's Liberation Movement. But what Mrs. Borzak says suggests that before—and after—they liberate themselves from men, women must liberate themselves from themselves, from their unexamined preconceptions about them-selves and others and from other internal restraints on their development. It might well be that unless this kind of liberation is achieved, women may free themselves from men only to find themselves dominated by other women.

This may be rushing in where only angels dare to tread. What I am going to do is ask some women who have been doing research on sex roles and sex differences, engaging in adult education, helping women with their decision-making at choice points in their lives, or taking part in the Movement, to comment on Borzak's paper—and this for the next issue of this Journal. This could, in turn, stimulate further comment. As I understand

statement (staltoyether ütkrus: (Weitress of the Sign of the

it, men are welcome to take part in these discussions.

Nevitt Sanford

is entity throat and T but the control entry an invested of a conbido with the confronced secretion with a releviriment as a connotions that whip the (Altikhai hydrodored as bothering and the inistential used as an acceptant their acceptant has an definated (best areas subject as as a sixtual from no forger value for exactly of it bothers are subject as as a sixtual por estate chair subjects a calculation of the control of the notion as bother bothers and the subject and a source of the control of the con

When I noted the state study of women's roles was going to be put somen that the study of women's roles was going to be put the the service of these enterprises that before and distribution for women's parties and the service of these enterprises and the service of the women's parties and the women's parties and the service of the women's transfer of the service o

The first and the first and the state of the first and the

The second of the many control statement of the second of

The second secon

The first the come saw of their that Berrak and Califol, of condition that the come can be seen to be a considered a configuration of a configuration of the considered at the configuration of the configuration

to the a large said, though, to think that we provide the second such customs and said in course, as paid to the second such as a contract of the second such as a
Comments and Rejoinders

Comment: Jensen not "Must Reading" in the Nixon Cabinet.

Daniel P. Movnihan **Executive Office** The White House

I have been catching up with journals during a week in the country, and have with much profit just got through your Autumn

issue of last year.

I notice in Miss Alfert's comments (1969) on Jensen a quotation from a New York Times article stating that I had distributed Jensen's HER article (1969a) to the Nixon Cabinet as "must reading." Miss Alfert would have no way of knowing this, but the statement is altogether untrue. Nothing of the kind happened. The subject did once come up in a Cabinet meeting—a perfectly casual enquiry by someone in quite a different field as to whether people in the field accepted this view. (Much as you might ask a geophysicist whether he and his colleagues agreed that the seas are rising owing to carbon dioxide in the upper atmosphere.) No one, least of all the President, had any position. He turned to me. I said that Dr. Jensen was a respectable scientist who had set forth a hypothesis to explain a real enough phenomenon, but that it was surely no more than that. The basic fact, I ventured on with increasing unease, was that geneticists could not yet say what is the biological basis of intelligence. Thanks be to God, Lee DuBridge was on hand and confirmed what for me was basically a guess. (Contrary to views in some quarters, it is thought poor form to lecture the Cabinet on things one knows nothing about.) I spoke to the editor of the New York Times, calling attention to

the error, and I do so to you, as I think it important that the readers of the Journal of Social Issues be clear that the government is capable of handling such matters with reasonable sophistication. I fear the tone of Miss Alfert's comments suggests that in her view for me to distribute Jensen is yet further evidence of his guilt. Curiously, I am one of the extreme environmentalists whom he cites in rejoinder (Jensen, 1969b, p. 213—"Department of Labor, 1965"), pointing out how unscientific we can be.

I know what Jensen is going through. I got the same treat-

ment for almost exactly the opposite hypothesis!

REFERENCES

ALFERT, E. Comment on: The promotion of prejudice. Journal of Social Issues, 1969, 25 (4), 206-211.

JENSEN, A. R. How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement? Harvard

Educational Review, 1969, 39, 1-123. (a)

JENSEN, A. R. Rejoinder: The promotion of dogmatism. Journal of Social Issues, 1969, 25 (4), 212-217. (b)

AND THE RESIDENCE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPE

April . Commercial The product of the

policy of the policy of the first of the policy of the pol

Volume XII: 1956

No. 1 Attitudes and Adjustment in Cross-Cultural Contact: Recent Studies of Foreign Students. M.
Brewster Smith, Issue Editor.
No. 2 Human Relations Research in Large Organizations: II. Robert L. Kahn, Floyd C. Mann, and
Stanley Seashore, Issue Editors.

No. 3 Religious Conflict in the United States. Don J. Hager, Charles Y. Glock, and Isidor Chein,

No. 4 Personality Development During the College Years. Nevitt Sanford, Issue Editor.

Volume XIII: 1957

No. 1 Therapeutic Camping for Disturbed Youth. Elton B. McNeil, Issue Editor.
No. 2 Witnesses and Testimony at Trials and Hearings. Joshua A. Fishman, and Rudolph E.

Morris, Issue Editors. No. 3 Brainwashing. Raymond A. Bauer and Edgar H. Schein, Issue Editors. No. 4 Race Relations in Private Housing. Albert J. Mayer, Issue Editor.

me AIV: 1958

No. 1 Interpersonal Dynamics in a Desegregation Process. Marian Radke Yarrow, Issue Editor.

No. 2 Adjustment in Retirement. Gordon F. Streib and Wayne E. Thompson, Issue Editors.

No. 3 New Light on Delinquency. William McCord, Issue Editor.

No. 4 Culture Change and the Small Community. Robert J. Smith, Issue Editor. Volume XIV: 1958

Volume XV:

No. 1 Mental Health in the Classroom. John C. Glidewell, Issue Editor.
No. 2 Consulting With Groups and Organizations. Jack R. Gibb and Ronald Lippitt, Issue Editors.
No. 3 Cross-Cultural Studies in the Arab Mid-East and United States: Studies of Young Adults.
No. 4 December 1997.

Desegregation Research in the North and South. Thomas F. Pettigrew, Issue Editor.

Volume XVI: 1960

No. 1 Training for Political Participation. Gordon L. Lippitt, Issue Editor.
No. 2 New Pathways from the Mental Hospital. Henry Wechsler and David Landy, Issue Editors.
No. 3 America, Mass Society and Mass Media. Warren G. Bennis, Issue Editor.
No. 4 Leadership and Participation in a Changing Rural Community. John Harding, Edward C.
Devereux, Jr. and Urie Bronfenbrenner, Issue Editors.

Volume XVII: 1961

No. 1 Social Change and Psychological Patterns. Joseph Adelson, Issue Editor.
No. 2 Social Psychological Implications of Man in Space. Herbert E. Krugman and Donald N.
Michael, Issue Editors.
No. 3 Parallel Issue Editors.

Michael, Issue Editors.

No. 3 Psychology and Policy in a Nuclear Age. Roger W. Russell, Issue Editor.

No. 4 Trigger for Community Conflict: The Case of Fluoridation. Benjamin D. Paul, William A. Gamson, and S. Stephen Kegeles, Issue Editors.

Volume XVIII: 1962

No. 1 Impacts of Studying Abroad. George V. Coelho, Issue Editor.
No. 2 The Uses of Television. Lotte Bailyn, Issue Editor, Lewin Award, Other Papers.
No. 3 Work, Health and Satisfaction. John R. P. French, Robert L. Kahn, and Floyd C. Mann,

Man, and Satan, Isidor Chein and Henry A. Murray. Robert Chin, Issue Editor.

No. 1 Psycho-Cultural Factors in Asian Economic Growth. Manning Nash and Robert Chin, Volume XIX: 1963

No. 2 American Political Extremism in the 1960's. Harold M. Proshansky and Richard I. Evans,

No. 3 Human Factors in Cross-Cultural Adjustment, Sven Lundstedt, Issue Editor.
No. 4 Kurt Lewin Memorial Addresses 1962-63. Robert Chin and Leonard Solomon. Issue Editors. Volume XX: 1964

No. 1 Aesthetic Probings of Contemporary Man. Warren G. Bennis, Issue Editor.
No. 2 Negro American Personality. Thomas F. Pettigrew and Daniel C. Thompson, Issue Editors.
No. 3 Kurt Lewin Memorial Address 1964, Alfred J. Marrow. Education as Social Invention,

Jerome S. Bruner. No. 4 Youth and Social Action. Jacob R. Fishman and Frederic Solomon, Issue Editors.

No. 1 Poverty Dynamics and Interventions. Berton H. Kaplan, Issue Editor.
No. 2 The Social Responsibilities of the Behavioral Scientist. Kenneth D. Benne, Issue Editor.
No. 3 Addresses and Essays. Kenneth B. Clark, Herbert C. Kelman, Donald N. Michael, et al.
No. 4 Old Age as a Social Issue. Robert Kastenbaum, Issue Editor.
Volume XXII: 1966
No. 1 Urbanization and Scient Change in the South Leonard Reissman and Thomas Ktsanes,

No. 1 Urbanization and Social Change in the South. Leonard Reissman and Thomas Ktsanes,

No. 2 The Sexual Renaissance in America. Ira L. Reiss, Issue Editor.
No. 3 Misperception and the Vietnam War. Ralph K. White, Author.
No. 4 Man's Response to the Physical Environment. R. W. Kates and J. F. Wohlwill, Issue Editors. Presidential Address 1966, Jerome D. Frank.

ume XXIII: 1967

No. 1 Conflict and Community in the International System. Elise Building, Issue Editor. Kurt Lewin Memorial Award 1966, Daniel Katz.

No. 2 Problems of Bilingualism. John MacNamara, Issue Editor.

No. 3 Student Activism. Edward Sampson, Issue Editor.

No. 4 Family Planning in Cross-National Perspective. Lee Rainwater, Issue Editor.

ume XXIV: 1968 Volume XXIII: 1967

ume XXIV: 1968

No. 1 Values, Attitudes and Behaviors In Social Science and Society. Abraham J. Tannenbaum, Issue Editor,
Presidential Address, Milton Rokeach. Kurt Lewin Memorial Address, Muzafer Sherif.
No. 2 Social Psychological Research in Developing Countries. John DeLamater, Robert Hefner, Rémi Clignet,
Issue Falione. Volume XXIV: 1968

No. 3 Personality and Politics: Theoretical and Methodological Issues. Fred I. Greenstein, Issue Editor.
No. 4 Tradition and Modernity: Conflict or Congruence. Joseph Gusfield, Issue Editor.


METALY: 1949


Volume XXV: 1969

ume XXV: 1969
No. 1 Values in Crisis: Racism, War and the Conception of Evil. J. Diedrick Snoek, Issue Editor. Presidential Address, Thomas F. Pettigrew. Kurt Lewin Memorial Address, Morton Deutsch.
No. 2 Alienated Youth. Abraham J. Tannenbaum, Issue Editor.
No. 3 Motivation and Academic Achievement of Negro Americans. Edgar G. Epps, Issue Editor.
No. 4 Selected Papers: 1969. J. Diedrick Snoek, Issue Editor. Presidential Address, Martin Deutsch. Kurt Lewin Memorial Address, Ralph K. White.

Volume 26: 1970

No. 1 Ghetto Riots. Vernon L. Allen, Issue Editor.





THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES

Published Quarterly

Copyright 1970 by The SOCIETY FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF SOCIAL ISSUES

A Division of

THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

Annual Subscription
Institutions and Organizations
Individuals
Single Copy Price

\$9.00 7.00 2.25

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues is a group of over two thousand psychologists and allied social scientists who share a concern with research on the psychological aspects of important social issues. SPSSI is governed by Kurt Lewin's dictum that "there is nothing so practical as a good theory." In various ways, the Society seeks to bring theory and practice into focus on human problems of the group, the community, and the nation as well as the increasingly important ones that have no national boundaries. This Journal has as its goal the communication of scientific findings and interpretations in a non-technical manner but without the sacrifice of professional standards.

Bertram H. Raven, General Editor, JSI, Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024.

SPSSI Officers and Council: Robert Chin, President; Robert L. Kahn, President Elect; Martin Deutsch, Past President; Robert Hefner, Secretary-Treasurer; Council Members: George W. Albee, Kenneth B. Clark, Richard Flacks, William A. Gamson, Marcia Guttentag, Edwin P. Hollander, Irwin N. Katz, Richard A. Schmuck, David O. Sears, Philip G. Zimbardo.

Society Address: Caroline Weichlein, SPSSI Executive Secretary, P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Subscriptions to the Journal, applications for membership in the Society, changes in mailing address, and requests for information should be sent to Mrs. Weichlein.

Back Numbers: Orders for one or more copies of a particular issue or supplement should be sent to Journal of Social Issues, P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. (See inside back cover for a listing of recent Journal numbers.)

Editorial Committee: Barry E. Collins, Jonathan Freedman, Harold B. Gerard, Jacqueline D. Goodchilds, Reginald L. Jones, William McGuire, Charles Y. Nakamura, Harold Proshansky, Bertram H. Raven, Nevitt Sanford, David Sears, Paul Secord, and Gerald H. Shure.

Managing Editor: Jacqueline D. Goodchilds, Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024.

Second Class Postage paid at Ann Arbor, Michigan

Published quarterly by the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. Send Post Office Department Form 3579 to Publication Office, Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106.

Printed by Edwards Brothers, Inc.

O spssi

The Journal of

SOCIAL ISSUES


o o o o o o

SUMMER 1970 VOL. 26 NO. 3

PROFESSIONALS AND THE POOR

Issue Editor: Marcia Guttentag

Preface: Government Policy and the Poor: Past, Present, Wilbur J. Cohen and Future	1
The Insolence of Office Marcia Guttentag	11
The More Things Change: A Case History of Child Guid- ance Clinics Murray Levine and Adeline Levine	19
Poor People and the Distribution of Job Opportunities Marcia Freedman	35
Legal Problems Peculiar to the Poor	47
The Law and the Poor John Marian	59
Urban School Politics: Professionalism vs. Marilyn Gittell	69
The Poverty Board: Some Consequences of "Maximum Feasible Participation" Louis A. Zurcher, Jr.	85
Social Stereotypes and Social Research Elizabeth Herzog	109



Social Science	Andrew Billingsley	127
Biographical Sketches		143
Abstracts		147
The Activists' Corner	Nevitt Sanford	153

Editorial Notes ABOUT THIS ISSUE

The current issue was initiated and developed through its beginning stages by the previous general editor, J. A. Fishman, and editorial committee: Martin Deutsch, Irwin Katz, Bernard Kutner, Matthew B. Miles, Harold M. Proshansky, Milton Schwebel, J. Diedrick Snoek, and Abraham J. Tannenbaum. Cover by Etta Proshansky.

COMMENTS AND REJOINDERS

Readers wishing to discuss or comment upon any of the articles in this or other issues of JSI may submit their reactions or criticisms to the editor, Bertram H. Raven, Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024. Criticisms or observations of general interest will be published in a Comments and Rejoinders section of JSI.

SELECTED ARTICLES ISSUE

The Selected Articles Issue will receive approximately 25% of the yearly page total of the Journal of Social Issues and will be devoted to individual articles consistent with JSI policy. The major function of the Selected Articles Issue is to publish empirical studies relevant to contemporary social problems, extrapolations from basic research to important social problems, theories about social problems with a firm foundation in social science, and, to a smaller extent, essays concerning the role of the behavioral scientist in non-academic contemporary society. Purely philosophical essays, exhortations for action which do not deal directly with the role of the behavioral scientist, and general social commentary are not appropriate.

Authors with single papers falling within the province of the Journal of Social Issues are encouraged to submit them to the Selected Articles Editor in triplicate. The paper must be completely double-spaced, including quotations and references. JSI follows the New Revision (1967) of the Publication Manual of APA, which means that bibliographical references are indicated by their publication dates within the text and are listed alphabetically at the end of the paper. Footnotes are collected on a single page and placed at the end of the article. All figures and tables are placed on separate pages and included at the end of the article. Every article must be accompanied by a 100–120 word abstract and a brief biographical sketch for each author.

Manuscripts for the 1971 Selected Articles Issue should be submitted to the Editorial Office, JSI, Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Calif. 90024.

PREFACE

Government Policy and the Poor: Past, Present, and Future

Wilbur J. Cohen University of Michigan

The federal government's role in assisting the poor has evolved gradually during the history of the nation. Federal policies have been shaped by both long-standing traditions and changing economic and social conditions. New circumstances and rising expectations of the people have led to demands that the federal government assume greater responsibility for the well-being of all citizens. citizens.

The Past

The United States in its early history was an expanding country with a vast frontier and a predominantly agricultural economy. The early American made his living from the soil and was self-reliant in providing for his immediate and future needs. In times of great adversity he helped his relatives or friends, or was helped his relatives or friends, or was helped by them. But the Constitution empowered Congress to collect taxes to provide for the common defense and general welfare, and part of the taxes provided for pensions for disabled veterans of the Revolutionary War and for maritime hospitals to care for merchant seamen.

With the beginning of the industrial revolution and the accompanying shift from a rural to urban society, unemployment replaced famine as a nightmare of the workingman. Disability and death caused economic problems not previously so serious on farms. The magnitude of the problems swelled as millions

poured through America's ports.

The nation's social consciousness was also advancing. In the second half of the nineteenth century, some states established homes for the mentally ill and later for dependent children, the blind, the deaf, and the aged. Meanwhile the working man was demanding a reasonable degree of security for himself and his family. His demands crystallized with the phenomenal rise in the labor movement in the 1880s.

Legislative activity increased in some of the states early in the twentieth century and cash assistance was provided to certain categories among the poor. Laws making it possible for orphans and other children without paternal support to live at home with their mothers rather than in institutions were adopted in a number of states before World War I. In the mid-twenties, a few states began to experiment with old-age assistance and aid to the blind.

At the same time, the states and the federal government had come to recognize that certain risks in an increasingly industrialized economy could best be met through the principle of social insurance rather than relief of those already made dependent. Social insurance began with workmen's compensation, which all but four states had adopted by 1929. Retirement programs for certain groups of government employees such as teachers, policemen, and firemen, and for federal civil servants also appeared before 1935.

Shifting Responsibility from State to Federal Government

In general, though, the development of government programs lagged behind needs and behind those of other industrialized nations. Prior to 1935, the federal government's role was severely limited because of the widely held view, political and constitutional there will be a second to the widely held view, political and constitutional the second to the widely held view, political and constitutional the second to the widely held view, political and constitutional the second to the widely held view, political and constitutional the second to the widely held view, political and constitutional the second to the widely held view, political and constitutional the second to the widely held view, political and constitutional the second to the widely held view, political and constitutional the second to the widely held view, political and constitutional the second to the widely held view, political and constitutional the second to the widely held view, political and constitutional the second to the tional, that responsibility for the poor and the unfortunate was the primary—if not exclusive—responsibility of the states. For example, in 1854 President Pierce vetoed legislation advocated by Miss Dorothea Dix which provided for federal aid to the states in the form of land for the construction of facilities for the care and treatment of the insane. President Pierce argued that this was a local, not a federal responsibility, and that approval of this measure might lead to federal participation in the care of the pool, thus transferring this obligation from the states to the federal government. This interpretation of the role of the federal government continued in the states to the ment continued until the severe depression of the 1930s ushered in a new era. With in a new era. With at least one-third of the nation ill-housed, ill-fed, and ill nowish at least one-third of the nation ill-housed, fed, and ill-nourished, it became apparent that federal action was

3 PREFACE

a necessity as neither the states, local communities, or private charities had the financial resources to cope with the growing

needs of the people.

Beginning in 1932, the federal government first made loans, then grants to the states to pay for direct relief and work relief. The special federal emergency relief and public works programs were started. Then in 1935, President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed pioneer social legislation, embodying the recommendations of a specially created Committee on Economic Security. On August 14, 1935, the Social Security Act was signed into law.

When President Roosevelt signed the act he said: "We can never insure 100 percent of the population against 100 percent of the hazards and necessitudes of life, but we have tried to frame a law which will give some measure of protection to the average citizen and to his family against the loss of a job and against

poverty-ridden old-age."

The act was the first expression of a public policy asserting protection for people against the loss of their economic security

due to old age or unemployment.

The law established two social insurance programs on a national scale to help meet the risks of old age and unemployment: a federal system of old-age benefits for retired workers who had been employed in industry and commerce, and a federalstate system of unemployment insurance. The choice of old age and unemployment as risks to be covered by social insurance was a natural development, since the depression had wiped out much of the lifetime savings of the aged and had reduced the opportunities for gainful employment.

The law also established a public assistance program providing federal grants-in-aid to the states to help them give financial assistance to the needy aged, blind, and dependent children. It also expanded the grants-in-aid mechanism to enable states to extend and strengthen maternal and child welfare services, ser-

vices for crippled children, and child welfare services.

The Popularity of Social Security

The social security program has become exceedingly popular and proven to be one of the most effective antipoverty programs the country has. Social security benefits are keeping about ten million people out of poverty. On the other hand, the public assistance program is the target of widespread criticism. Only about two-fifths of the poor receive public assistance and it is estimated that about another one-third meet federal requirements for public assistance but are ineligible because of state standards and With the enactment of the Social Security Act, federal funds regulations.

for general relief were discontinued, although work relief projects were continued for a number of years.

Poverty Legislation in an Age of Prosperity

During the 1940s and 1950s relatively little attention was focused on the poor. Although some improvements were made in the social security, unemployment insurance, and public assistance programs, it was not until the 1960s that the conscience of the American people, under the leadership of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, was awakened to the needs of the disadvantaged. The paradox of poverty amidst a nation of plenty became a major social and political issue. While the vast majority of Americans was sharing in the gains of a prospering economy, about 22 percent of the population was poor in 1959. President Kennedy took up the cause of the forgotten poor and planned an intensified

attack on poverty which President Johnson put into effect.

Congress expressed the nation's commitment in 1964: "It is the policy of the United States to eliminate the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty in this nation." To carry out this commitment, far-reaching, wide-ranging social legislation was enacted over the next four years. The Economic Opportunity Act, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Medicare and Medicaid, Social Security Amendments, the Civil Rights Act, and the Rent Supplement Program are a few of the many laws that were enacted to attack poverty on many fronts. Federal funds assisting the poor increased from \$9.9 billion in 1960 to \$24.6 billion in 1968. The combination of innovative and imaginative programs backed by federal resources and enlightened economic, fiscal, and monetary policies which stimulated economic growth, providing record levels of employment, reduced the number of persons living in poverty from 39 million in 1959 to 24 million in 1969

As a result of substantial social security benefit increases in 1965 and 1967, the incomes of about one and a half million persons were raised above the poverty line. Job training, rehabilitation, health and educational programs made it possible for millions of others to participate in a sustained, prospering economy.

The experience of the past eight years makes it reasonable to assume that poverty can be eliminated if that is set as a national goal which is steadfastly pursued with enlightened public policies.

It would cost about \$11 billion—less than what the American people spend on tobacco and alcoholic beverages a year—to raise the incomes of the nation's 25 million poor people above poverty. The problems of poverty, of course, cannot be solved by money alone. Besides a regular income, the poor need more and better

5 PREFACE

education, health services, job training, housing and other services, services that promote self-help and independence and which in the long run prevent rather than ameliorate poverty.

Who are the Poor?

Of the 25.9 million persons living in poverty in 1967, about 7.5 million or 30 percent of the poor lived in households headed by aged or disabled persons; about 18.4 million persons lived in households that were headed by a non-disabled person under sixty-five. Some 8.2 million of this latter group (including 4.2 million children), or 45 percent of those under sixty-five, lived in households in which the head worked the full year. About 6.5 million (35 percent) lived in households where the head worked part-time, and 3.7 million (20 percent) lived in households where the head did not work at all. The myth that the poor are lazy and don't want to work persists despite the fact that 80 percent of working-age men who are poor have jobs.

The complexity of the poverty problem is illustrated by the differences in ages, work experience and capability, and family composition—all of which call for a variety of public and private

approaches to eliminate poverty.

The Future

The Economy. Continued prosperity and economic growth are essential to the attack on poverty. An expanding economy creates jobs, raises incomes, and provides the tax base needed to finance vitally needed social programs. Continued economic growth, fostered by flexible, sound fiscal and monetary policy, can produce increased funds to devote to the elimination of poverty. Even without increasing the present federal tax rate, the closing of major tax loopholes would provide substantial additional revenues to devote to social purposes. There really is no reason why, with the urgency of the problems that we face today, the nation could not devote a larger share of its economic growth to public human-investment programs. Today about one-fifth of the increase in that growth is used for federal programs, one-tenth for state and local spending, and the remaining seven-tenths for private purposes. By adopting more equitable income taxes, closing loopholes, eliminating outmoded inequitable property taxes, the federal, state, and local governments would be better able to meet the growing human needs of their citizens.

Jobs. The additional funds produced by this growing economy can be invested in a number of programs which will help eliminate poverty and, in turn, will create additional revenue and in the long run reduce social costs. The creation of five million useful public service jobs-jobs in hospitals, parks, recreation centers, jobs to serve the home-bound and the handicappedwould give many unskilled, inexperienced people the opportunity to work and improve their ability to compete in the labor market. Other imaginative job training programs and programs designed for disadvantaged young workers would expand the earning capacity of many other able-bodied persons. Better training and better jobs must become available for the one-third of the poor who belong to families whose heads hold full-time year-round jobs. An effective solution to this problem would significantly reduce the overall problem of poverty and make it more easily resolved.

Discrimination. Justice and opportunity must become a reality to every American-regardless of race, creed, color, sex, or national origin. Every effort must be made to carry out diligently the constitutional obligations and statutory requirements of the Civil Rights Act so that equality of educational opportunity is a right for every boy and girl and every family in the nation. The goal of enhancing opportunity must be built upon assuring good health and education to everyone. Freedom of choice in the decisions about where people shall live or work or spend their leisure time must be insured. The elimination of discrimination would increase the gross national product by about 20 to 30 billion dollars annually.

Central Cities. An urban development program must be undertaken that encompasses the efforts of both government-from model cities to rat control—and private enterprise, through the creation of community development enterprises. If we are to get rid of our slums and ghettos, government and business—and the residents of the areas affected—must pool their resources, their

desires, and their ingenuity.

We have the foundation for this effort—the framework to help build six million new housing units for lower-income families over the next ten years, ten times as many as we built in the last decade.

Family Planning. Family planning services must become available able, on a voluntary basis, to those with lower incomes and less than college educations, just as they are to the higher-income and the college-educated person in the suburb. This is not now the case

It has been estimated that in the period from 1960 to 1965, low-income women of child-bearing age had an annual fertility rate of 153 births per 1000 women. The rate for the rest of the female population was 98 births per 1000. This rate of 98 per 1000 is consistent with a rate of 98 per 1000. is consistent with an ultimate family size of about three children considered to be the size that most Americans, regardless of race or economic status, desire.

7 PREFACE

Thus it is considered likely that the fertility rate for the poor would approach that of the non-poor if they had access to the same family planning services. And on that basis, it is estimated that in 1966, among 8.2 million low-income women of childbearing age, there were 450,000 births of what might be called unwanted children.

Greatly increased federal funds should be provided to bring family planning services to five million low-income women over

the next eight years.

Education. The expansion of educational opportunities would rescue many of our children from the fate of poverty and insure the vitality and continued economic growth of our society. The cost of education is an investment in our future. Every child has a basic right to as much high quality education and training as he desires and can absorb—from preschool to graduate school. Today too many of our children and youth are denied that opportunity because of inadequate finances. Only a third of the nation's two million children from low-income familes are enrolled in preschool classes. Millions of children are attending crowded elementary and secondary schools in which the teaching is poor and the resources for high quality education are lacking. Every year an estimated one million potential college students from low-income families are denied a college education because they lack the finances.

Today the nation is devoting about 6 percent of its gross national product to education. This investment must be greatly increased if the United States expects to remain a first class nation. The federal investment in education of about \$6 billion should be at least doubled in the next few years with concurrent increases in state and private expenditures for education. The needs of our schools are so great and their potential for breaking the vicious cycle of poverty so vast, that we can no longer afford

to neglect them.

Health. Ill health and disability are prevalent causes of poverty. Many would not be poverty stricken if they had had adequate medical care which would have prevented or provided prompt treatment of disabling conditions. Many still could be rehabilitated and restored to productive, satisfying lives. A greater proportion of the nation's growing wealth could be allocated to providing, through public and private health insurance programs, medical care for all, including preventive, diagnostic, and treatment services. Medicare should be expanded to include coverage of the disabled and payment for prescription drugs. Adequate health care would help bring into the mainstream of our economy many who are now being bypassed.

Social Security. Some of the additional resources that will be-

come available as a result of a prospering economy can be channeled into the social security program and other income maintenance programs. The aged, the disabled, children—those who cannot be expected to work—do have a right to share in the growing affluence. The general level of social security benefits should be increased gradually by at least 50 percent and the minimum monthly benefit increased to \$100. About 4.4 million persons would eventually be taken out of poverty with these increases. The first immediate step to be taken is a 10 percent across-the-board increase and an increase in the minimum monthly benefit to \$80. This improvement would in one step take 1.4 million per-

sons out of poverty.

Public Assistance. In addition, the present welfare system must be radically overhauled. No one is happy with the present system—not the welfare recipients, the taxpayer, the administrators, nor the Congress. Today, only about two-fifths of the poor are getting any assistance under federally-aided welfare programs and in many states those who receive public assistance are still well below the poverty line. We must be willing to take a few risks and experiment with bold new approaches. We can begin by converting the present hodge-podge of state welfare programs into a federally-financed system of income payments for the aged, the blind, the disabled, and dependent children with eligibility—the amount of payments, financing, and appeals determined on a national basis. If we ever expect to eliminate poverty, we must support an assistance program that applies to all in need and that pays adequate amounts.

We must work to replace the welfare system with some form of income maintenance or other program which would assure a reasonable income. However, much more work has to be done on devising a viable, acceptable program. In the meantime, we must continue to improve and build on the programs we do have.

Social Services. Family planning services, visiting nurse services, day-care services for the children of working mothers, community action programs, and consumer and legal aid must be available where needed. City Hall—and Washington—must be closer to the people they govern. There must be an adequate program of consumer and legal protection for the poor. To avoid further discontent and rioting in our urban slums and to help eliminate poverty, there must be an end to practices that short-change the poor in the grocery store, in the welfare office, at the landlords, at the neighborhood department store, and in the courts—in short, at all the way-stations that add up to life in the ghetto. It is important, too, that credit union facilities be available

to the poor and that credit unions take even greater responsibility for the consumer education of their members.

Conclusion

The problem of eliminating poverty cannot be solved by as simple a method as handing every poor person a check that would take him out of poverty. In the first place, it probably would not be acceptable indefinitely to many taxpayers. In the second place, a simple payment would not prevent poverty in the future. But the United States does have the material and intellectual resources to devise and afford a comprehensive, far-reaching, imaginative program which would be politically acceptable and would in the long run prevent people from becoming poor. We need the national will to do so. I believe that we can and we must develop this will.

and the second s

The Insolence of Office . . . 1

Marcia Guttentag² Graduate Center, CUNY

Social scientists are not fond of social history. They are more comfortable with the model of the physical sciences whose subject matter seems immune to historic incident and clearly transcends the social past. Social scientists view social history as tangential to their own pursuit of truth through empirical study and theory construction.

The first article in this issue illustrates the consequences of an inattention to social history for social scientists and for professional practitioners. Social science is deeply entwined in the social fabric of its time, and thus it is difficult to gain an objective perspective on its practices and assumptions. The Levines' study of child guidance clinics over a number of decades documents the point. For example, during periods of prosperity an ideology that success is based on individual effort is apt to prevail, while in depression periods reforming society may appear dominant. Such prevailing views can have a profound influence on how social problems are handled by professionals. Another problem arises through the professionalization of reform practices. Professional groups develop their own ideologies, strongly dominated by class

¹Hamlet, act 3, scene 1, line 73. ²Mrs. Violet Levine and Mrs. Rhoda Spielvogel contributed considerable patience, resourcefulness, and accuracy to their editorial work on both JSI poverty issues. The issues reflect their thoughtful efforts. The counsel of Dr. Jacqueline Goodchilds, Managing Editor of the JSI, was unfailingly wise and humorous.

interests which they strive to protect. Moreover, particular ideologies may especially dominate reform practices of professionals. A case in point is the application by social workers of psycho-

analytic principles to child guidance procedures.

Today the number of professionals in institutions which carry out social reforms has multiplied enormously. The poor must now contend with armies of institutionalized professionals. They are subject, too, to the unseen professional elites (social scientists many of them) who make and influence the policies which affect their lives.

How do social reforms become institutionalized? What determines their eventual outcome? Repeated encounters between the poor and institutions, some of them summarized in this issue, make it clear that theories of institutional change which do not include the social psychology and sociology of the professional vis-à-vis his client omit what may be most essential about the fate of social reform.

The extensive literature which describes and analyzes poverty programs includes occasional institutional critiques interspersed with accounts of the experiences of the poor. The papers in this issue focus more directly on institutional analysis, as it is illuminated by the experiences of the poor. These experiences are prototypic, not idiosyncratic. Each of the papers in this issue examines a different facet of public institutions as revealed in interaction with the poor. The papers permit some conclusions about the social psychology of professionals in those public organizations which touch the poor. Though each paper was written independently, there are many parallels among them.

General organizational theories of bureaucracy (Weber, 1946; Merton, 1957; Etzioni, 1961) require supplementation by middle-level generalizations based on the characteristics of current interaction between professionals in public institutions and

their distinctive clients-the powerless poor.

Organizational "Ins" and "Outs"

Freedman examines from a socio-economic position the farreaching effects of being an organizational "have" or "have-not" in the work organizations of the private sector. Organizationally, being "in" or "out" creates a sharp dichotomy; there is no continuum between the two positions. Peripheral members of organizations, like the poor and relatively unskilled, are "out" even though they may be employed, for they are not protected by organizational umbrellas. The economic realities of their lives are determined by their relationship, or lack of it, to a work organization. If they are eventually expendable, then employment is peripheral or temporary. By the time an individual reaches his midthirties, occupational and organizational ties usually have been established for life. Poor people, nonwhites, women, and other discriminated groups face multiple obstacles which effectively prevent them from ever obtaining organizational protection. Freedman shows that aggregate economic solutions, which ignore these organizational realities, do not bring about the necessary redistribution of income. As long as relative shares remain the same and the formidable gap between organizational "ins" and "outs" continues, overall economic advances do not solve the problem of poverty and inequality (Miller & Roby, 1969).

The gulf between organizational "ins" and "outs" also is a critical factor in a different arena—the urban schools. Gittell, a political scientist, discusses current theories of urban political participation. Accepted pluralist explanations of urban participation, she shows, overlook the issue of the participation of the poor and of racial minorities in political decisions. Such explanations largely ignore class and racial divisions, slighting the difference between the political participation of multiple elites and the sepa-

rate issue of the participation of non-elites.

Gittell's vivid case study of the processes of decentralization in the New York City schools documents her contention that there are monolithic consequences for those who are outside a public organizational wall. Professionals within several organizations can efficiently align themselves against scattered, poor, organizational "outs"—a circumstance which dramatically occurred during the recent decentralization struggle. Faced with a bureaucracy, potential participants are unable to seize power. Bureaucracies are notoriously immune to the few political forces accessible to the poor; they can protect themselves from changes initiated by most groups of organization "outs." Public bureaucracies and the professionals in them, if they are large enough, are also resistant to changes initiated from above.

The Bureaucracy of Law

Law is singularly germane to the interests of applied social sciences. As an institution, it governs the widest variety of interactions between individuals and society. Much of what has been written about the law and the poor has simply argued that each poor man should have his neighborhood lawyer, ignoring institutional processes.

The law in operation is a series of bureaucratic institutions and an institutional hierarchy. Weiss demonstrates that in their relations with the bureaucracy of the law, the poor are critically disadvantaged. They do not have durability—they cannot, for

example, wait the two years required to challenge an unconstitutional administrative rule on welfare. They usually do not have initial power of confrontation as do public organizations and businesses. Apparently simple, procedural matters of access to and durability with the legal bureaucracy, when not readily available, have profound negative consequences. Hazard shows that most public sector activity favors the middle class; his original analysis of the formal content of the law reveals how deeply it is tied to the maintenance of economic institutions. The law gives consistent economic preference to the middle class through institutional structures which discriminate against the poor because of their lesser education and their different values and mores.

These analyses by Hazard and Weiss of the formal, substantive, and procedural aspects of the law disclose how thoroughly the law in operation reinforces existing social inequalities, how it sanctions the misused power of government bureaucracies, and how it upholds and maintains strong organizational walls against

the economically and politically disadvantaged.

The Effects of Maximum Feasible Participation

Little is known of what happens when the poor become organization "ins"—in the middle-class sense of having power and a voice in organizational decision making. In a recent book on the urban crisis, Banfield (1970) reiterated a common stereotype of lower-class individuals which holds that they are locked into a culture from which they cannot escape. They are "unable or unwilling to plan for the future, to sacrifice immediate gratifications in favor of future ones, or to accept the disciplines that are required in order to get and to spend (p. 126)." This description echoes a view shared by many organizational professionals. "Maximum feasible participation," which expresses an opposing view, was born as a political slogan and has since been quietly buried by politicians. When the concept was in vogue, community action boards around the country had at least some members who were deliberately chosen from the poor to represent the poor. The participation of the poor permitted a test of whether the experience of power, even limited, would change their outlook. Yet little research has been done on the consequences of "maximum feasible participation." The Zurcher study is an exception. It presents data on the behavioral and attitudinal effects of "maximum feasible participation" on poor participants. Zurcher found (as proponents of the concept predicted) that the attitudes of the poor became less anomic when they participated on community boards, and the quality of their participation determined the intensity of the change. When the poor exercise active power and responsibility in organizations, their attitudes and aspirations grow to be similar to those of the middle class. The evidence which Zurcher presents should give pause to those who claim that lower-class culture is little influenced by new social contexts, particular-

ly contexts in which the poor can exercise some power.

Herzog scrutinizes many common but unquestioned assumptions in the intellectual baggage of social scientists. She demonstrates how the dubious dichotomies, deceptive models, and spurious symmetries that seem appealingly rational to social scientists often are wildly incorrect. Yet these intellectual notions frequently guide the ways in which research is conducted and, more important, how whole bodies of research data may be interpreted. Herzog vividly exposes those styles of thinking which systematically cloud the social scientist's objectivity. She illustrates the intellectual constraints which can be imposed by "immaculate testing of a few theory determined variables" or the "highly focused design incapable of showing that a relevant factor is missing."

Billingsley's paper offers ample documentation of the implicit class- and caste-related values of social scientists. He found that research on black families has been largely omitted from current texts on the family. Much of the work of black scholars has been ignored. Billingsley shows that government policies formed from

such incomplete data must be quite limited or biased.

Ideology and Values: Organizations and Institutions

The articles in this issue lead to one central question: why have we been blind to the way in which our professional institutional roles and broader social values profoundly influence our

approach to social problems?

Our social services and reforms are shaped by social ideologies and values, sometimes with little regard to the nature of the social problem which requires attention. In particular, the very special ideologies developed among professionals may be uniquely inappropriate to solving the problem at hand. It is the poor who suffer most from these influences, since they are apt to have ideologies and values most deviant from those of the professionals. They are least able to benefit from the institutionalized services supposedly offered them. Yet, typically, professionals in organizations subjectively experience their own sense of benevolence. Bureaucratic benevolence, as the poor know, bears little relationship to the outcomes of bureaucratic actions.

We have seen in these papers also how the structure of social organizations can adversely affect services to the poor. A central element in this process is the elaborated structure of administra-

tive rules and procedures that develops as a basis for providing services. The jungle of administrative rules creates an impenetrable wall keeping public institutions powerful and inaccessible. Absolutism is frequent when rules are applied by people who did

not formulate them.

The public organizations with which the poor have contact operate with delegated authority. Professionals in these organizations can enforce, but not change, the rules. They are gate-keepers. A poor person on the outside is confronted by the gate-keeper's determination to do a good job and enforce the rules. In entrepreneurial enterprises there are awards for flexibility; not in public institutions. There is no redress against the gatekeepers who keep the gates closed.

It is the thicket of administrative rules in schools, in legal institutions, in clinics, and in work organizations which confronts the poor and keeps them powerless. Social reforms are eroded by subtle changes in administrative rules. Administrative rules are the vehicles through which the status needs of professionals are expressed; against them the poor have no redress. Rules, particularly in public organizations, are worthy of serious study and of

the self-conscious attention of practicing professionals.

Summary

The themes which emerge from all of the papers here converge to several clear points about professionals and institutions. (a) The social history of professionals and institutions supplies a perspective needed to evaluate the current influence of economic and social conditions on the aims of professional practice. (b) Despite the professional's sense of independent identity, he usually is firmly entrenched as an organizational "in" with powers and viewpoints that are consistent with this position. (c) The sharp disparities between organizational "ins" and "outs" which pervade economic, legal, and public institutions work to the continuous disadvantage of "outs" whether they are clients and/or poor people. (d) Even the scholarly activities of social scientists reveal a host of intellectual snares and class and caste prejudices that insidiously bias research and policy.

The poor, in their encounter with public institutions, have provided insights into our professional and scholarly roles that

we dare not ignore.

REFERENCES

Banfield, E. C. The unheavenly city: The nature and future of our urban crisis. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970.

ETZIONI, A. A comparative analysis of complex organizations. New York: The Free Press, 1961.

MERTON, R. Social theory and social structure. New York: The Free Press, 1957.

MILLER, S. M., & ROBY, P. The future of inequality. New York: Basic Books, 1969.

WEBER, M. (Collected writings) In H. H. Gerth & C. W. Mills (Eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in sociology. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.

The More Things Change: A Case History of Child Guidance Clinics

Murray Levine and Adeline Levine¹ State University of New York at Buffalo

As social scientists and as practitioners in the mental health field we pride ourselves on our objectivity and upon the empirical base of our theories, our generalizations, and our practices. Let us suggest, on the contrary, that our theories of practice in the mental health field are incomplete, for the set of variables included in the theories has been too narrow. We will argue in this paper that potent social forces determine not only the organization and delivery of services, but also the forms of service which are delivered and even conceptions of the nature of the mental health problem.

The development of the community-supported child guidance clinic will provide a case study in which we can examine an agency that has been vitally important in the field and one which is currently under pressure to change. Some of the current pressures toward change in the mental health field generally, and some of the solutions which have been proposed, may be better

¹The material in this paper is based upon our recent book, "A Social History of Helping Services: Clinic, Court, School, and Community." We are indebted to Seymour B. Sarason and our colleagues at the Yale University Psycho-educational Clinic, where these ideas were developed.

understood in the light of factors which influenced the development of the child guidance clinic.

Unanticipated By-Products of the Industrial Revolution

The contemporary child guidance clinic developed in its modern form in the mid-1920s, but to understand that development it is necessary to look at American history, from the Civil War to the First World War. The period of rapid industrial expansion following the Civil War was accompanied by massive immigration and burgeoning urbanization. After 1890, the new immigrants were packed into the cities and a set of social problems arose, reminiscent of those of the present day. In that day, just as in our own, every social institution was under pressure to change to meet urgent problems. The schools were in gross difficulty. In the early 1900s twenty to fifty percent of the school children in our major cities were two or more years behind age in grade placement. That percentage had failed and had been left back (Cornman, 1906). Overcrowded slums, poverty, poor working conditions, broken families, and the loss of family and faceto-face community ties created a breeding ground for social problems. Delinquency, crime, and prostitution festered, even among the Jews, who generally show low rates of these problems (Goren, 1966). Urban recreational facilities were largely absent. The American Protestant church found that its gospel of heavenly salvation was irrelevant to the working man's problems. That church began losing influence in the cities when the older residents moved to the suburbs, for the newer immigrants were Catholics and Jews (Abell, 1943; Hopkins, 1940).

The political and economic systems were also under drastic pressure to change. From its birth in the 1870s, the developing labor movement's course was marked by widespread unrest. There were strikes accompanied by violence and riots, controlled finally by the federal and state militia (Beard & Beard, 1927). The muckrakers called public attention to the variety of abuses people suffered under unbridled free enterprise, when governmental forms promoted industrial development at the expense of human needs. After the 1890s the corrupt municipal political machines came under attack, and efforts were made to obtain real reforms in housing, sanitation, and food inspection; in health, recreational, and educational facilities; and in the inadequate system of individual, private philanthropy under which much of welfare was conducted (Riis, 1902, 1917; Steffens, 1904, 1909). Most of the major professional facilities focusing upon child de-

velopment and child welfare originated between 1890 and 1912 (Cohen, 1958).

Social Darwinism: Justification for Inaction

In the period of economic growth following the Civil War, the dominant social ideology which justified reality was conservative social Darwinism. The extreme position, best exemplified in the writings of Herbert Spencer and later of William Graham Sumner, held that the rule of the survival of the fittest applied to social forms and to the human animal as well as to other biological forms. The social order of the day had evolved because it was the best of all possible forms. Those in superior positions were there because they were better equipped innately to be there; those in unfortunate circumstances were innately inferior. It was folly to do anything to help the unfortunate, for by encouraging the survival of weak forms of life, the viability of society itself could be threatened. The poor, or the insane, or the criminal were unalterably less fit (Spencer, 1873). Scientific charity was designed in part to distinguish the few worthy poor from the mass of the unworthy. It is little wonder that under such a social philosophy, helping agencies were sometimes more punitive than they were helpful.

In the late 1880s and following, as the human problems became more disturbing to the social order, a different social philosophy became dominant. This viewpoint held that all people were innately good, that all had the potential for development; if people had troubles, it was the consequence of conditions around them. One helping form of this period consisted of providing new opportunities for people (Goldman, 1956). It is not our purpose here to detail the variety of social changes, nor the course of the fight for change, but let us say that the field of social work and particularly that aspect which developed through the settlement house movement was at the forefront of the fight (Davis, 1967).

A Period of Social Reform

The twenty-year period of reform preceding the First World War saw the development of the two immediate predecessors of the child guidance clinic. Both were responses to urban problems and both developed as attempts to modify existing social institutions. We refer here to Lightner Witmer's psychological clinic, established in the Department of Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania in 1896, and William Healy's clinic, established as part of the first juvenile court, in Chicago in 1909. Witmer

viewed his clinic as a means of changing the public school system, by helping it to provide more adequately for individual differences. Witmer pioneered changes both in teacher education, and in the development of special classes. Special classes were designed not to isolate the deviant, but to serve as educational devices to broaden the range of individual differences the public schools could accommodate. Witmer's emphasis was not on psychopathology but upon devising methods to permit the fullest intellectual and emotional development of those who were not being served educationally. In Witmer's view, it was the school and the educational institution which needed to develop new methods for dealing with the problems presented by people having different educational needs (Witmer, 1915).

The juvenile court was established in Chicago in 1899 on the premise that the prevalent treatment of juveniles as criminals contributed to their later development as adult criminals. The juvenile court was designed to change the legal treatment of children from one of punishment for crime to one in which the child that broke the law was to be dealt with by the state "as a wise parent would deal with a wayward child." The very function of a criminal court was changed in the juvenile court concept. The juvenile court relied heavily on a system of probation, on giving the individual another chance. The probation workers also saw it as their duty to act preventively by dealing with the social con-

ditions fostering delinquency (Addams, 1925).

Healy's clinic, established in 1909 as a result of citizen action and the efforts of probation workers, was first attached to the juvenile court. It was a logical place to be if one accepted the premise that the court had changed from an institution dealing with criminals to a child welfare agency. Healy pioneered in the psychological study of the individual delinquent and he began to develop psychotherapeutic methods of treatment. However, in his clinic, the bulk of treatment was what was then called social treatment (Healy, 1915). Social treatment was designed to help the individual to deal with aspects of his environment, by encouraging him to reach out and by helping him in concrete ways to take advantage of existing educational, recreational, and vocational opportunities. Social workers of that day literally went out to people and did not require that people who were having troubles come to them. The very going out implies that the workers of that time believed the major focus of a difficulty was not in something the patient carried around in his head, but in the conditions under which he lived.

The End of the Reform Era

Nineteen twelve saw the beginning of the end of the era of

reform. The Progressive party was beaten and fell apart by 1914. With the coming of the First World War many reformers participated in the pacifist movement and thereby suffered damaged reputations. The war effort and patriotism dominated public opinion and concern. Problems of the poor, of the workingman, woman, and child, of the immigrant, of the slum, of political, industrial, and social reform were forgotten. In the post-war period, from 1920 until the depression of the 1930s, liberals and reformers were without power or influence (Chambers, 1967). The Bolshevik revolution sparked a "red scare." In the early 1920s the Palmer raids, KKK activities, and patriotic societies, warning of the menaces to America, both encouraged and reflected oppressive pressure toward the elimination of anything that

was not "100 percent American."

The 1920s was also the businessman's decade. "The chief business of the American people is business," said Calvin Coolidge. With the support of the courts, the regulatory agencies, and the legislature, there was an almost unprecedented period of sustained economic growth and prosperity. The businessman, the millionaire, a Lindberg, a Babe Ruth, or even an Al Capone could capture public attention and admiration in an era when success was admired, and success was viewed as a matter of individual effort. If a man failed in the prosperous 1920s, it was not that best of all possible worlds which was at fault, but clearly the man lacked something in himself. Emil Coué could sweep the nation with his catch phrase, "Every day in every way I am getting better and better." The problem in the 1920s was to make the self better. In the pre-World War I era, the problem had been to make the world better.

Industrial development and the war also led to a change in the relationship between the sexes. Women's labor force participation steadily increased, and in 1920 the 19th Amendment assuring women the right to vote was ratified. Changes in sexual behavior occurred. Short skirts, jazz, sexy dances, public drinking and smoking, and open discussion of sex and free love influenced youth particularly. Automobiles gave youth freedom from parental surveillance, and some said cars became travelling bedrooms. The virtues of pre-marital chastity and marital fidelity were challenged. While most people did not participate openly in adulterous affairs, as a matter of living out modern values, such affairs were the object of curiosity and discussion as exemplified in the popular literature of the time.

The mass media purveyed the sexual theme and the theme of scientific human relations. It was in this period that psychoanalysis emphasizing individual psychodynamics took hold in the United States, thus providing an intellectual, scientific rationale for the

changes which were taking place. Popular psychoanalysis with its emphasis on free expression of sexual impulse filled magazines and books, was a principal topic of conversation, and guided or confused the thinking of parents concerned with raising their children in a world whose standards were markedly different from the world of their own youth. We mention psychoanalysis because that area of study and practice came to be highly influential in the developing child guidance clinics. However, popular Watson, popular Gesell, habit training, and traditional concepts of child rearing also reached the American parent through the developing mass media (Allen, 1959). It is little wonder that the child guidance clinic, with its emphasis on scientific expertise in an area of grave concern, took hold and flourished.

Child Guidance and the Professionals

In the following pages we will focus on the privately supported, community child guidance clinic, with its now traditional team of psychiatrist, psychologist, and social worker. Much of the discussion is based on the clinics which developed out of the pattern pioneered by the Commonwealth Fund Demonstration Clinics. For purposes of discussion, let us assert that these clinics, as pioneers in practice and as centers of training and research, were highly influential in setting the pattern of development of the entire field.

The Commonwealth Fund was established in 1918 in the pattern of philanthropy developed by those who made great fortunes in the industrial and economic growth following the Civil War. Its first venture in the field of health and welfare was a program for the prevention of juvenile delinquency. While the program had several aspects, its name, its intent to focus on delinquency, and its support of clinics designed to prevent delinquency reveal that the original program was planned on premises reflecting the climate of social reform of the pre-World War I era. In January of 1921, an advisory committee convened in Lakewood, New Jersey to draw up guidelines for the new program. Among those who attended the conference were William Healy, his psychologist colleague Augusta Bronner, and Charles W. Hoffman, one of the early juvenile court judges.

The report of this conference clearly and explicitly states that unresponsive and poorly trained teachers and school authorities, inadequate child welfare agencies, institutions for the feebleminded, detention homes and reform schools, insufficient recreational facilities, child labor, and inadequately trained probation officers in the juvenile court all contributed to causing delinquency by

failing to serve youth adequately. The conference report included a statement that existing social agencies needed to be carefully evaluated, and needed to change, if delinquency was to be

prevented.

It was also obvious at this time that the model of treating the sick who came to the clinic for help was totally inadequate to the task of truly serving a community. In 1921 a survey was conducted by the National Committee for Mental Hygiene, the major agency cooperating with the Commonwealth Fund in the development of the delinquency prevention program. The survey revealed that two out of three who came before the juvenile court were mentally abnormal, that 13 percent of the public school population deviated from normal mental health (i.e., could use services), and that six percent of the public school population showed conduct disorders sufficiently severe to bring themselves to the attention

of authorities time and time again.

In 1922, before the Commonwealth program was really instituted, the National Committee sponsored a mental hygiene clinic in Monmouth County, New Jersey, an area with a population of 100,000. The clinic was immediately swamped. In its second year, the clinic limited its scope to diagnostic work only, and limited its intake to three communities within the county. "Nevertheless, within three months a waiting list of 200 existed. This emphasized the immensity of the task of child guidance and the impossibility of securing coverage by direct service in any community. It showed the necessity of adapting clinical processes for indirect service." That was the opinion of Dr. George S. Stevenson, then director of one of the major divisions of the National Committee on Mental Hygiene and a man close to the de-

velopment of the child guidance clinic (Stevenson, 1948).

In other words, the planning conference, the survey, and the early experience suggested that a treatment oriented clinical facility could not begin to cope with the problem of preventing delinquency. The original goal of the clinics was to use mental hygiene personnel as consultants to workers in community agencies to help those workers deal more effectively with the children in their care. There was clear recognition of the need to develop indirect methods of treatment and ways of influencing aspects of the social environment if the full need was to be met. Within a decade, indeed almost from the establishment of the very first of the Demonstration Program clinics, the goal of developing indirect methods was lost. The clinics chose to work with the individual rather than to work with the broader social structure. Given the knowledge of the immensity of the demand for service and the impossibility of meeting the service demand by techniques of

individual treatment, why did the clinics embrace the methods and doctrines of psychoanalysis which focus on the individual? Why did they not seek to develop an applied sociology instead?

A Period of Conservatism

We have pointed to one line of explanation by suggesting that the conservative feeling tone of the 1920s favored an emphasis on individual responsibility instead of institutional responsibility. Indeed, reformers were looked upon with suspicion and treated with outright hostility in the culture at large. In the very beginning, when clinic attempts at interagency cooperation ran into difficulties, the difficulties were not viewed as technical problems in the relationship between people representing different social systems, but rather the difficulties were accepted as a convenient excuse for retreating from interagency contacts. Those who were training psychiatrists and social workers in the mid-1920s complained that it was difficult to interest the young workers in the technical problems of consultation, community relations, and organization. They were interested in concepts of individual psychodynamics, not in social reform or institutional change (Lowrey & Smith, 1933). Perhaps the older symbols were now stale.

But to pin the change to a vague concept like the feeling tone of an era is too weak. Much more was happening which influenced the development of practice in the field. To understand, it is necessary to focus on the development of professional social work, for the story of child guidance is much more the story of social work than it is of psychiatry or of psychology. Originally the clinics included the three professions. The social worker was to relate to the social agencies. The psychologist was to relate to the schools and to give the intelligence tests which were popularized during the First World War. The psychiatrist was to diagnose the distur-

bance and make recommendations for treatment.

The Professionalization of Social Work

However, social workers clearly came to dominate the clinics, if not in status then certainly in numbers and in influence on practice. For example, the Bureau for Children's Guidance established as part of the Commonwealth Program was a training agency for the New York School of Social Work, and it had little part in the training of psychiatrists and psychologists. The Bureau's successor, the Institute for Child Guidance, was in existence from 1927 to 1933. In that time 15 psychologists and 32 psychiatrists completed at least one full year of training as compared with 174 social workers. The numbers reflect the ratios of

social workers to the other professionals in the clinics. In those years the ratios were anywhere from three to one to six to one, and sometimes more, numbers which still hold in most clinic settings

today (Lowrey & Smith, 1933).

Professional social work originated out of two major movements. One was the settlement house, a source of cultural enrichment and community organization, which used social research, political action, and governmental power to achieve constructive social change. The second was the Charity Organization Society whose parent was the institution of private alms doled out to individuals. Their investigative methods, designed to determine eligibility for charity, evolved into methods of casework designed to diagnose an individual and to help a family. Charitable work had originally been carried out by volunteers, but the need for training programs both for volunteers and for the increasing number of full-time paid workers led to the development of full-time schools of social work. By 1919, there were 17 such schools in the country (Cohen, 1958).

The very earliest social workers were largely volunteers, predominantly upper class women who engaged in charitable, humanitarian activity. When social work became an occupation, the typical pioneers were upper class, college-educated women seeking new meaning for their lives by finding a place in a changing society. They were of the first generation of women for whom higher education had become a reality. Marginal people and minority group members frequently tend to flow into new occupations and new professions rather than into established ones because the barriers of tradition are less formidable (Klein, 1946). Given the accelerating changes in the social, occupational, and educational status of women, many flowed into the new field of social work, with the conscious aim of attaining professional standing (Davis, 1959). While there was pressure for professional standing from the early group of Smith, Vassar, Wellesley, and Radcliffe educated women, the pressure was perhaps even greater from later generations. The later generations came from a broader spectrum of social class backgrounds and sought social and economic advancement through their profession. The shift in the People entering the social work field requires close attention in

In 1915, in the context of a strong impetus toward achieving professional standing, Abraham Flexner, the man who was the prime mover in the reform of medical education, addressed the National Conference of Charities and Corrections on the question of whether or not social work was a profession. He concluded that social work lacked major criteria to be accepted as a profession.

The most glaring omissions were an educationally communicable body of knowledge and a professional method (Flexner, 1961). Shortly after Flexner's address, in 1917, Mary Richmond published Social Diagnosis, a comprehensive text on social casework methodology (Richmond, 1965). It is probably no accident that caseworkers produced the first detailed treatise on method, for the settlement house workers insisted that no methodology was possible. Rather, they emphasized the need for flexibility of approach, preferring to tailor the method to the problem. With Social Diagnosis the social work profession had its first approach to an educationally communicable method.

World War I produced another strong impetus toward the development of casework with the individual. Psychiatric social work began with the need to train workers to help treat the large number of neuropsychiatric casualties, the "shell-shocked cases" produced by the First World War (Neilson, 1919). The clear focus of their attention and of their training was upon the individual

case.

Psychoanalytic thinking was introduced into schools of psychiatric social work at the very beginning. Psychoanalysis was not well accepted in the medical schools of the day and the medical psychiatric establishment was not terribly pleased with the developing social work field. The medical establishment more or less looked down on social workers, but the younger and then more obscure medical psychoanalysts found their niche in social work schools where they were held in high esteem. Social workers gained in prestige from being taught by medical men. Of equal importance, they gained both a body of knowledge, with its own technical jargon, and a teachable technique, the therapeutic interview.

The professionalization of the social work field had profound consequences for child guidance practice. The child guidance clinics were intended to serve a delinquent or a low income population. For example, one of the first of the Demonstration Clinics in St. Louis received 74 percent of its caseload from the juvenile court. Then, as now, children from low income families reached the juvenile court. The other Demonstration Clinics also had only 25 to 33 percent of their cases referred from sources likely to tap a middle or upper income group (Stevenson & Smith, 1934). By 1948 about 60 percent of referrals to privately supported clinics came from upper income populations (Healy & Bronner, 1948). That trend continues, if it has not accelerated since (Furman, Sweat, & Crocetti, 1965). The change in population requires explanation especially since self-referred middle class cases, those now considered most desirable, were originally seen as expensive

to handle and as diverting effort from an important goal, that of helping workers in various community agencies do a better job with the children the agencies treated (Stevenson & Smith, 1934).

As social workers began dealing with self-referred parents and as they were influenced by psychoanalytic thinking, they focused more finely on the parent-child relationship, discovering that many parents wanted help for themselves. In a short time a requirement was imposed that parents participate in the work of the clinic if their children were to be accepted for service. By 1930, the service in many child guidance clinics became therapy for mothers by social workers, and the social work literature increasingly focused on issues of psychotherapy (H. Witmer, 1940). The change in the nature of the service took place despite clear evidence that the earlier methods of social treatment (environmental manipulation) had been effective, and the change persisted despite evidence that the new form of treatment was no better, if not actually inferior, to the old, in terms of the rate at which patients seemed to be helped. For example, the older methods of social treatment claimed improved and greatly improved rates ranging as high as 92 percent (Johnson, 1916; Lee & Kenworthy, 1929). The newer methods claimed rates which were never higher than 72 percent (Lowrey & Smith, 1933), and, as one looks at figures reported by others than the innovators of psychotherapeutic methods, the rates of improvement frequently fall far below 72 percent (Levitt, 1957). The change to a form of service, which was certainly no better than social treatment requires explanation.

An Emphasis on Method

In the 1920s social workers needed a professional method to achieve professional status. The method they were taught and the method they relied upon was casework based upon psychoanalytic concepts. In the 1920s the literate population was being inundated with popular Freud. It cannot be documented, but it is a reasonable assumption that the parent who brought his child to the clinic was more likely to speak the social worker's language, more likely to be from a background similar to the social worker, and more likely to share the social worker's life style, values, and assumptions. In light of present day thinking, it is reasonable to assume further that such a client would not only have been seen as more desirable, but may in fact have responded better to the interview technique used by the social worker. Over time, the social worker's approach would have favored one group, effectively screening out lower income individuals who do not, as a rule, respond well to "talking treatment."

It is also reasonable in view of the fact that the profession and

the upwardly mobile social worker had strong needs to achieve greater status, that the worker would have found gratification in serving a more prestigious social class. In fact, in the late 1920s clinic board members frequently had their own children treated and examined in the clinics in an effort to erase the stigma associated with psychiatry and mental hygiene. Such attention by upper class members of society must have left a distinct concept of "a desirable patient" in the minds of clinic workers. While the pioneer social workers would not have needed to derive status from contacts with prestigeful clients, such considerations would undoubtedly have been important in an upwardly mobile group seeking professional status and might well have influenced who

was seen in the clinics (Walsh & Elling, 1968).

Over a period of years the population of children and the types of problems seen in the clinics also changed. Clinics showed a rough sequence of referrals. At first they received gross mental defectives, those with a variety of neurological disabilities, and severe delinquents who had been untouched by any other mode of help. Later, the schools sent aggressive and disruptive children. Finally, often in response to the clinics' educational program, children who were shy and withdrawn, who had habit disorders or other relatively circumscribed psychological problems were referred. In fact the ticket of admission to clinics became a com-plaint of "nervousness." The clinics tended to concentrate on children whose difficulties were less severe or of recent origin (Stevenson & Smith, 1934; Witmer, 1940). What is most paradoxical about this situation is that the mental health professional, who started out by intending to help the community with its mental health problem, ended with the "easiest" cases and left community agencies, presumably staffed with less well trained people, with the more difficult problems. And, over time, the clinics also reduced their consultative contacts with other agencies.

It is not too difficult to trace the origin of the change in population. The earliest clinics were training centers, and cases were selected for teaching and training potential. Since students were being trained in psychotherapeutic methods, it seems reasonable to suppose that there was a bias in the direction of accepting cases amenable to treatment by the methods being taught. Trained in settings which selected cases good for teaching and training purposes, it is likely that the students developed a similar conception of what constituted a "good case." Note that there was no indication of attempts to evolve methods suitable to the cases which came to the clinic. Just the opposite seems true. Rather than study the nature of the problem and evolve different methods for treating different problems, the methods were considered good and the cases unsuited to the

"good" method. Supervisory practices of referring questions and objections about treatment to the student's personal, emotional problems could only have intensified the trend. Moreover, more sophisticated supervision, case conferences, and consultation, all emphasizing deep psychodynamic formulations, would have had the effect of removing attention from actual patient contact and outcomes. Parenthetically, we wonder whether hours of patient contact decreased as hours of supervision, conferences, and similar hallmarks of an emphasis on method increased over the years. We can only conclude that the maintenance of method was more important than any attempt to develop modes of treatment for the variety and number of mental health problems which came to the fore. The maintenance of a method can only be seen as serving the needs of the professional and not the needs of the broader society. We do not mean to be critical of a particular profession in this discussion. Rather, we are trying to demonstrate that pervasive social forces shaping the nature of practice must be included in the set of variables considered in thinking about practice in the mental health fields.

Form and Reform

To recapitulate, the thesis we have developed states that the conception of the mental health problem and the form of help developed at any given point in time are shaped by and will reflect general social conditions. During periods of time characterized as reform, the dominant philosophy will be one which emphasizes the "spark of the divine" in man. Each person will be viewed as having a potential for development which is inhibited by social conditions, and the form of help will be that of providing opportunity for the individual to develop through changing the social setting in some way. During periods which are essentially conservative, the social world will be viewed as the best of all possible worlds, and individuals who have difficulty in living in the good social world will be viewed as "sick." The form of help will be that of removing the individual from the social setting, attempting to change him in some way, and then reintroducing him into the same setting.

We have also suggested that the developing helping forms will employ people who are themselves drawn into professions partially as the consequence of social forces which make entrance into one profession more feasible for members of a particular social group. The social and economic characteristics of that group will then help to shape the helping forms in ways which will promote the class interests of the helping group and of the profes-

sion generally.

As we began looking into the early history of clinical services for children, it became apparent that those services had great pertinence for the contemporary community mental health movement. Embedded in the community, growing out of social need, and concerned with prevention, the pioneer models of clinical service demand close examination precisely because our predecessors began with approaches the community mental health movement is just now rediscovering (Sarason et al., 1966; Rosenblum & Ottenstein, 1965). Just as the earlier services were shaped by the nature of the social problems at the time, so are contemporary services developing from a certain social context.

We have stated the thesis elsewhere (Levine & Levine, 1970) that helping forms in periods of social change will emphasize the environmental determinants of problems in living. In periods of relative conservatism or of consolidation of change, personal determinants will be the focus of attention. The changes in emphasis from the pre-World War I period to the 1920s, with its

consequences for child guidance practice, is a case in point.

Elsewhere (Levine & Levine, 1970) we have also developed the theoretical position that new forms of mental health services and certain institutional changes are in order because of ongoing social change. Based on the assumptions that social institutions develop and support a way of life based on economic and occupational considerations and that social institutions have built-in resistances to their own change, we have argued that when institutions are out of phase with social change, they can contribute to problems in living. Based on theoretical derivations from Freud's Civilization and its Discontents (1930), we have argued that economic and occupational changes have resulted in a greater quantity of free libidinal and aggressive energy for which society does not as yet have adequate channels of expression. Basic institutions attuned to the expression of an earlier, lower level of impulse are inadequate to their contemporary tasks.

Given these assumptions, we view the contemporary community mental health movement as a necessary response to social change. The community mental health approach operates with a "competency model" which emphasizes the provision of opportunity for social and economic advancement. The workers attempt to create or to support the development of new forms of social organization or they work for change in ongoing social institutions. In other words, the focus of effort is on the social institution, since the competency model assumes people can learn to live better if given the opportunity. We also predict that the most effective helping forms will be those which promote new, acceptable modes of libidinal and aggressive expression. The development of new recreational and

work forms emphasizing emotional expression, in pleasurable and aggressive contexts, is a necessity. The older mental health facilities stressing adaptation to existing social conditions and emphasizing individual failures in adaptation are less immediately relevant. It is their lack of relevance in the present context of acute social change which is in large part a source of pressure on these institutions to change. It is incorrect, we believe, to view the contemporary situation in the mental health field in isolation from the rest of the society and to view the problems of the helping agencies as exclusively those of a shortage of personnel and facilities. Much more is involved, for helping agencies are a part of the changing society; they are influenced by the changes; and they should help to direct change. A true recognition of their own role can but increase the effectiveness with which today's helpers approach today's problems.

REFERENCES

ABELL, A. I. The urban impact on American Protestantism, 1865-1890. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943.

ADDAMS, J. et al. The child, the clinic and the court. New York: New Republic, 1925.

ALLEN, F. L. Only yesterday. New York: Bantam Books, 1959.

BEARD, C. A., & BEARD, M. R. The rise of American civilization. Vol. II. The industrial

era. New York: Macmillan, 1927.

Chambers, C. A. Seedtime of reform: American social service and social action 1918-1933.

Ann Arbor, Michigan: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, Univer. Michigan Press, 1967.

Cohen, N. E. Social work in the American tradition. New York: Holt, Rinehart,

Winston, 1958.

CORNMAN, O. P. The retardation of the pupils of five city school systems. Psychological Clinic, 1906-1907, 1, 245-257.

Davis, A. F. Spearheads for reform: The social settlements and the progressive movement,

1890-1914. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.

FLEXNER, A. Is social work a profession? In R. E. Pumphrey & M. W. Pumphrey (Eds.), The heritage of American social work. New York: Columbia Univer. Press, 1961.

FREUD, S. Civilization and its discontents. London: Hogarth Press, 1930.

Furman, S. S., Sweat, L. G., & Crocetti, G. M. Social class factors in the flow of children to out-patient psychiatric facilities. American Journal of Public Health, 1965, 55, 385-392.

GOLDMAN, E. F. Rendezvous with destiny. New York: Vintage Books, 1956.

GOREN, A. A. The New York Kehillah, 1908–1922. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 1966.

Healy, W. The individual delinquent. Boston: Little, Brown, 1915.

Healy, W., & Bronner, A. F. The child guidance clinic: Birth and growth of an idea. In L. G. Lowrey & V. Sloane (Eds.), Orthopsychiatry 1923-1948:

Retrospect and prospect. New York: American Orthopsychiatric Association, 1948.

HOPKINS, C. H. The rise of the social gospel in American Protestantism. New Haven:

Yale Univer. Press, 1940.

JOHNSON, H. M. The visiting teacher in New York City. New York: Public Education Association of the City of New York, 1916.

KLEIN, V. The Jeminine character. New York: International Univer. Press, 1946. LEE, P. R., & KENWORTHY, M. E. Mental hygiene and social work. New York: Com-

monwealth Fund, Division of Publications, 1929. Levine, M., & Levine, A. Social change and psychopathology: Some derivations from "Civilization and its Discontents." In G. D. Goldman and D. N. Milman (Eds.), The contributions of psychoanalysis to community psychology. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1970.

LEVITT, E. E. The results of psychotherapy with children: An evaluation. Journal of Connecting Psychology, 1957, 21, 189-196.

LOWREY, L. G., & SMITH, G. The institute for child guidance, 1927-1933. New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1933.

NERLSON, W. A. The Smith College experiment in training for psychiatric social

work. Mental Hygiene, 1919, 3, 59-64.

RECEISIONED, M. E. Social diagnosis. New York: The Free Press, 1965. Rus, J. The battle with the slums. New York: Macmillan, 1902.

Rus, J. How the other half lives. New York: Charles Scribner, 1917.

ROSENSLEM, G., & OTTENSTEIN, D. From child guidance to community mental health. Community Mental Health Journal, 1965, 1, 276-283.

SARASON, S. B., LEVINE, M., GOLDENBERG, I. I., CHERLIN, D. L., & BENNETT, E. M. Psychology in community settings. New York: Wiley, 1966.

STREET, H. The study of sociology, New York: D. Appleton, 1873.
STREETING, L. The shame of the cities. New York: McLure Phillips, 1904.

STEVENS, L. Upbuilders. New York: Doubleday, Page, 1909.

STEVENSON, G. S. Child guidance and the National Committee for Mental Hygiense. In L. G. Lowrey & V. Sloane (Eds.), Orthopsychiatry 1923–1948:

Retriopert and prospect. New York: American Orthopsychiatric Association, 1948

STEVENSON, G. S., & SMITH, G. Child guidance clinics: A quarter century of development. New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1934.

WALSES, J. L., & ELLING, R. H. Professionalism and the poor: Structural effects and professional behavior. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 1968, 9, 16-28

Werness, H. L. Psychiatric clinics for children. New York: The Commonwealth

Fund, 1940.

Witness, L. The exceptional child: At home and in school. In U. of Pennsylvania (Ed.), University Lectures delivered by members of the faculty in the free public lecture course, 1913-1914. Philadelphia: Univer. of Pennsylvania Press, 1915.

Poor People and the Distribution of Job Opportunities

Marcia Freedman Columbia University

If there is a single-minded drive in American society that cuts across the most widely diverse groups, it is probably the urge to consume. And consumers, as every marketing specialist knows, thrive on obsolescence and innovation. It is this easy acceptance of novelty that makes American society seem more open and flexible than it actually is and that encourages the search for new and, hopefully, better methods in such diverse endeavors as bottling soft drinks or alleviating poverty. As those who have engaged in such efforts can attest, creating new containers and even introducing them into general use is comparatively easy; social change is a more elusive goal.

Since Franklin D. Roosevelt's pronouncement of the poverty of one-third of the nation in the thirties, we have managed to limit relatively severe economic disadvantage to one-fifth of the population. Most of this improvement came in the early part of the period; since World War II, the distribution of income has remained such that the top 5 percent of families receive 20 percent and the

bottom 20 percent receive 5 percent (Moss, 1968).

In economic terms, the society is, above all, stable. "The political and economic balance among forces in society seems sufficiently resistant to change to prevent any marked redistribution of the fruits of growth [Mason, 1959, p. 3]." The optimists among us may maintain that, even so, everyone is better off and

that deprivation is only relative, but the persistence of such relativities, especially in the face of well-publicized efforts for amelioration, deserves more searching scrutiny.

Evolutionary Theories Argue Against "Tampering"

While there has never been a shortage of proponents of conflict as the necessary fuel for change, American social science has always been dominated by evolutionary theories of progress. Pluralism is conventionally viewed as a model for bargaining rather than as a source of conflict; and efficiency is considered best achieved by a degree of competition that stops short of destructiveness. It is not surprising, therefore, that the leading notions of functionalism in American sociology and of welfare economics should stem from Pareto's concepts of equilibrium. A chemist steeped in the traditions of Newtonian physical science, Pareto sought to apply mechanistic principles to economic and social problems. In a famous definition, he explained equilibrium as a state such "that if it is artificially subjected to some modification different from the modification it undergoes normally, a reaction at once takes place tending to restore it to its real, its normal state [Pareto, 1935, IV, p. 1436]." To tamper with the mechanism is to foster instability and threaten continuity, to undermine that equilibrium which alone can insure greater social utility.

In welfare economics, Pareto's view of social change became translated into a theoretical statement of allocation: "... a Pareto optimum, defined as a (economic) position from which it is not possible, by any reallocation of factors, to make anyone better off without making at least one person worse off [Mishan, 1966, p. 163]." If at least one person is better off, no one being worse off, the community as a whole is better off. In the real world, however, changes in allocation, and particularly many designed to promote efficiency, may not result in improvement for everyone. Furthermore, "a Pareto Optimum, or an ideal output, is but one of a large number of conceivable summit positions, each distinguishable from the others by a different pattern of welfare distribution [p. 169]." The revisionists among welfare economists, like Mishan and Little, recognize that "to choose as between such positions we must therefore be prepared to make ethical judgments [Mishan, 1966, p. 163]," and they are disposed to make these judgments in favor of a general reduction of inequality.

Attacking Poverty-By Subsidizing the Poor

Policy-makers, however, seldom seem to heed such theoretical caveats. In day-to-day decisions, allocative efficiencies, production optima, economic growth, and anti-inflation measures

are pursued without regard to reducing inequality and often in the apparent expectation of the oppositie. Even schemes that are specifically designed to improve the lot of the poor do not really disturb the underlying equilibrium. The most recent proposals for reform of the welfare system promulgated by the Nixon administration as near-future policy, are an example of plus ca change ... Hailed by many as a revolutionary beginning of income maintenance, they represent the culmination of a very simple idea -since the poor lack money, the solution to their problems is to provide them with some. The proposals, in fact, would bring welfare standards in "poor" states up to the most generous existing levels in "rich" states and would represent in this respect a real improvement for a large group of eligibles. But apart from the meanness of even the highest existing standards, the general inclusion of the working poor in the distribution system would have the effect of subsidizing low-wage jobs on a permanent basis, and the programs as a whole would most likely act to perpetuate the existence of a substantial underclass, albeit removed from dire deprivation and extreme risk. It is, by the way, no accident that these proposals are coupled with a sizeable tax break for the middle class, a benefit likely to be realized sooner than a liberalized welfare program.

Attacking Poverty—By Rehabilitating the Poor

In the recent past, we have concentrated on a somewhat different, although equally peripheral set of interventions, designed to rehabilitate, retrain, and redirect the poor. The activities of the federal government (through the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Office of Education, and the Department of Labor), the various state and local programs, and the voluntary activities of such groups as the National Alliance of Businessmen and the Workers' Defense League are all informed by the notion of guided mobility. Individuals who can be improved through education (viz., Head Start) or training (viz., the Manpower Development and Training Act) or exposure to work (viz., the Neighborhood Youth Corps) or some combination of these elements should be able to move into the productive mainstream.

Neither of these styles of intervention—income maintenance or retraining programs—constitute a frontal attack on poverty, because neither is designed to alter the rules that govern who pays and who gets paid, the processes by which the prices are set, or the relative rewards for different activities. There exists, in fact, an opportunity structure based largely on the distribution of occupational roles, and the patterns of movement in this structure are highly institutionalized. We are all aware of individual success

stories—the triumph of the talented but uneducated man, the sudden leap forward of the "late bloomer," the acquisition of credentials after long struggle—but flexibility at the margin tells us little about intractability at the core. The dynamics of the system operate to maintain equilibrium, even though individuals change places and the places themselves are radically altered from time to time.

The Establishment at Work

The chief assumption underlying pragmatic efforts to enhance upward mobility is that unfilled opportunities for good jobs exist in the labor market and that they exist in sufficient quantity to provide all willing hands with the means to become established members of the work force. While local and individual successes have been well publicized, there has been little effect on the aggregate flows. What seems to happen is that however strong the urge for upward mobility, men will at some point settle for stable employment at a living wage that provides minimum protection from risk. Those who achieve at least this limited goal may be said to be established at work (Freedman, 1969). By the time a man is thirty, he falls into one of three groups, and the likelihood of his remaining in the same group thereafter is very high.

Those with college degrees who have made their way into the professions or the upper stratum of managers are the most advantaged. Their work lives are likely to resemble orderly careers; they are attached either to an occupation, an organization, or both; their incomes are high, and their provisions against risk,

elaborate.

The most disadvantaged are those least likely to be attached to an occupation or an organization. Their incomes are not sufficient to bring them above the poverty level, and their supplementary benefits are confined to the minimum public social secu-

rity provisions.

Between these two extremes are the overwhelming majority of American workers who form a continuum beginning from the top group at one end and slipping off into poverty at the other. Their most important occupational attribute, however, is that they are attached to some stable form of organization. Traditionally, we have thought about attachment to occupations, a limiting view reflected in the emphasis on education and pre-employment training that has characterized recent program efforts. The influences and effects of organizational attachment on the prospects of workers have not always received similar attention.

Organizational Protection

By definition, attachment implies membership in a collectivity. Attachment defines role, whether it is expressed in professional, institutional, or company terms. A man may refer to himself as a doctor, a government employee, or simply as working for "the company." Such statements are clues to his social status and his probable income level; they also imply the form of insulation he enjoys from the competition of others and from his own

shortcomings.

William Goode has called this phenomenon "the protection of the inept." He begins with the fact that in modern industrial society, "a wide range of talent can acquire the skill necessary to carry out most jobs," and advances to the thesis that "industrial society is highly effective at production not so much because it allows the most able to assume positions of high leadership, but because it has developed two great techniques (bureaucracy and machinery) for both using the inept and limiting the range of their potential destructiveness." The bureaucracy Goode has in mind actually represents a departure from the rational model developed by Weber because its strict logic has been diluted by the introduction of traditional elements and particularly by notions of mutual obligation. This system protects both the apt and inept, and the mechanism by which it is implemented is the work group -whose "social arrangements do not permit much overt discrimination between the less able and the rest [Goode, 1967, pp. 6-8]."

Protection in Large Industrial Units

Although professional, trade union, and other occupationally based organizations provide important mechanisms for protection, the most significant form in an advanced society is the large industrial unit. Gardiner Means has made the point that adequate economic theory must take into account the existence of two major divisions—a large bureaucratized corporate sector and a sector made up of small firms and individuals who more nearly meet the classical model of the entrepreneur subject to the rigorous competition of the market (Means, 1965). Partial insulation from the market gives the corporate sector scope for decisions, not only on pricing but also on wage levels and on the interaction of wages and prices. It can and does, for example, pass on wage increases to consumers in the form of higher prices, the source of so-called cost-push inflation. With considerable market power, large firms make higher profits and pay higher wages for comparable skill levels. And workers attached to such firms, especially with the aid

of the countervailing influence of their unions, are at least the

short-term beneficiaries.

The situation is illustrated in a recent news item on one effect of Chrysler's postponement of a new plant opening in New Stanton, Pennsylvania:

"When we heard of the delay we thought we got a small reprieve," says T. E. Wible, president of the L. E. Smith Glass Co. . . . which makes handcrafted glass products. "We don't pay Detroit wages," he adds. An unskilled beginner in Mr. Wible's shop earns \$2.20 an hour, well below the \$3.36 such a worker would earn on a Chrysler assembly line [Wall Street Journal, Aug. 25, 1969].

And even though the rise in industrial wages has not kept pace with inflation in recent years, the differentials between small and large firms have, if anything, grown greater.

Exclusion of Negroes from Collective Protection

There is ample evidence of the protection afforded by strong collectivities and, by inference, the consequences of the lack of such protection. It has often been noted—with varying degrees of distaste and alarm—that Negroes have not followed the immigrant tradition of the highly organized ghetto with its myriad of self-help institutions. What they lack is not only the type of ethnocentric political machine destroyed by reformist politics, but also a viable economic base. Small units of production and independent marketing outlets no longer make an important contribution to opportunity. As self-employment has declined, so has the scope for small-scale entrepreneurship. The route to secure employment at decent wages is through attachment to an organization—ceteris paribus, the larger the better—the arguments of "black capitalism" theorists notwithstanding.

The systematic exclusion of Negroes from such collectivities during past years has finally given way to a limited number of openings for those who are "qualified," but gains in civil rights have not yet obviated the discrimination that, for example, maintains income inequalities between Negroes and whites with the same educational achievements (Hamel, 1967). This outcome is closely related to the failure of a majority of Negroes to achieve organizational attachment to the same degree and at the same level as whites and to that extent, to benefit from the protection

afforded by organizational umbrellas.

Protection for Some Implies Exclusion for Others

Goode recognizes the contribution of non-performance characteristics to discrimination before the fact—that is, in determining who shall be admitted to the group in the first place—but he

does not dwell on the dysfunctional effects for the excluded. In fact, however, the "ins" and the "outs" are accorded differential treatment on a larger scale than we are accustomed to recognize. There is no implication in this statement that the "ins" are idle rentiers. In spite of the apocalyptic vision of the prophets of cybernation, most workers still earn their livings by the sweat of their brow, if only in a metaphorical sense. But exertion does not guarantee competence, and however sincere the effort, many members of internal labor markets ride along on less than maximum performance by virtue of their membership alone. Competition in the workplace is suppressed in favor of group effort, and while this may have the functional consequences described by Goode, the arena of conflict is transferred to the streets and the noisy desperation of the "outs."

Once inside a large organization, workers within a wide middle range of talent are capable of meeting minimum standards of performance. Recent developments in public programming recognize this state of affairs, at least obliquely, through a renewed emphasis on the private sector (more specifically, the large corporations) as a source of employment opportunity for the disadvantaged. Nevertheless, the efforts of the National Alliance of Businessmen, which enlisted the cooperation of the highest levels of management and by December 1968 had received pledges of over 172,000 jobs from 12,000 companies, still fell short of the demand for stable jobs at decent wages in most communities

(Wright, 1969).

Robert Averitt (1968) calls this large corporate sector the "center" economy, comprising large firms that tend to be integrated in ownership, dispersed in location, diversified in production, and decentralized in management. In contrast, the "periphery" firm is small, unintegrated, local, limited in production type, and centrally managed. The distinction implies two types of employment. Averitt, in fact, maintains that the complex pay and benefit structure of the "center" constitutes a "private welfare state" that is "eroding the employability of the transient group [Averitt, 1968, p. 152]." In other words, the protections accruing to one group of workers may create barriers to entry which make the position of the excluded group relatively worse. The case would seem to be similar to the gap in wages and security that exists between "permanent" and transient workers in Japan.

Dean Morse, focusing on types of worker rather than on sites of employment, has singled out part-time and part-year workers as a relatively disadvantaged group. He hypothesizes that they bear a large part of the cost of maintaining flexibility in the labor market and comments on the historical parallel with the position

of the immigrant worker to whom these costs were transferred earlier in our history (Morse, 1969).

The Under-Employment of Women

The existence of two distinct sectors, broadly differentiated by the extent of their employment advantage, can be illustrated by the position of women in the labor market. Under current conditions, economic expansion brings a large number of women into the labor force (Mincer, 1967). A few figures will suffice to illustrate the point that they are concentrated in low-wage employment. First of all, 30 percent of all women workers were employed part-time in 1967, compared to 12 percent of all men. Of those employed full-time, 42 percent worked all year, compared to 70 percent of the men (Bogan, 1969). In 1965, the median earnings of year-round full-time women workers were \$3838 compared to \$6388 for men (Perella, 1968).

Part of this differential results from discrimination (that is, cases where women are paid less for the same work), but the major factor is a distinct occupational distribution for women. They are concentrated in the lower-paid occupational groups, and, just as important, tend to work in non-competing groups that have few hierarchical ties within organizations. In order to get a better job, they usually have to change employers, since promotional opportunities are rare. Even then, the nature of the

work varies little from one site to another.

The largest increase in female labor force participation in recent years has been among married women. Their median contribution to family income in 1967 was 22 percent (Waldman, 1968). If their husbands are employed, they are "secondary" workers, and it is the pooling of family earnings that has obscured the basically undesirable nature of many individual jobs. The problem becomes clear when we consider the 5.2 million families headed by women. As Waldman points out, "Families which women head are usually low income familes." Of these, the half who were in the labor force had a median family income in 1966 of \$4750 (Waldman, 1968, p. 21), enough to support a single person but hardly adequate for additional dependents.

Frequent Job Changes Reduce Collective Protection

The pattern of work for women provides employers with enormous flexibility. Large central offices of insurance companies can count on turnover among young single women to obviate the necessity for wage increases or measures to combat dissatisfaction. Factories can draw on a reservoir of housewives for light

assembly work when the demand for labor is high and lay them off without causing serious problems when demand slackens. Large department stores count on part-time female help to meet the biggest portion of their manning requirements. In such organizations, work schedules can be arranged for as little as one day a

week, on a flexible basis, up to full-time.

As long as there are year-round stable jobs for men, women may be viewed as filling the interstices, or, alternatively, providing needed workers in less attractive situations without too much sacrifice on the part of anyone. Unfortunately, however, there are many jobs available for men that are no better than the typical female job, and in some cases even worse. They are, by and large, unsuitable for becoming established in the sense of attaining decent living standards during the period of family formation. We have heard a great deal in recent years about the disappearance of unskilled jobs. The problem, however, needs restatement. It is true that expansion has occurred at the top levels of the occupational structure where educational and training requirements are high, but the pool of eligibles for these opportunities has also grown. The problem is that at the lower levels, we have had no increase in those stable well-paying positions for relatively unskilled men that characterized the historical shift from agriculture to manufacturing.

Instead, there has been an increase both in higher-paid professional occupations and in lower-paid service occupations. In commenting on wage differentials, some economists have given explicit recognition to the partitioning of the labor market: "In fact, of course, the trade and service sectors have raised wages. Differentials for occupations in which women cannot readily be substituted for men have narrowed, and the trade and service sectors have avoided further wage increases by using older women, teenagers, moonlighters and so on [Duesenberry, 1959, p. 83, italics added]."

Our Failure to Change Opportunities for the Poor

As an imaginative reader might surmise, other complicating factors might well be brought to bear on an analysis of who pays and who gets paid. The discussion presented here is meant only to illustrate the way opportunity is presently structured and to indicate why the anti-poverty effort has necessarily fallen so short of the mark. It is likely that the greatest beneficiaries have been social scientists, professionals in the human services, and welfare administrators. Considering their limited number, the opening of new job opportunities in program development has meant a sizeable increase in demand for their services and a concomitant in-

crease in their rewards, both monetary and honorary. But with few exceptions, no attempt was either made or contemplated to change the opportunities or rewards of the objects of the program —the poor. Individuals have been rescued and prepared to fit into better jobs, but the increase in better jobs has been almost alto-

gether at the level of the college graduate.

Meanwhile, people have been encouraged to feel that higher levels of consumption are their right in a rich society. If father himself is not able to provide what is necessary, mother may also go to work; two incomes often suffice. But if mother cannot be spared at home (and especially in the face of expensive or nonexistent child-care arrangements), two incomes of another sort are available through father's peripheral employment and mother's welfare payments. In addition, where so much wealth exists in the form of goods, it becomes impractical to protect every single portable item of potential consumption, with the result that a second economy of unknown size exists for the purpose of stealing and exchanging whatever ingenuity can profitably pick up.

Legitimate Efforts are Frustrated

Meanwhile, legitimate efforts are also being made to redistribute wealth. In some cities, hospital workers have been organized, and their improved bargaining position has resulted in higher wages. Welfare rights groups have fought with some success to realize the benefits to which the law entitles them. Less focused militancy has also worked to deprive the labor market of underpaid applicants for menial, insecure jobs. But tax loopholes continue to benefit the rich; medicaid cutbacks threaten the elderly and the poor; and the blessings of economic growth remain unevenly distributed-when they are not absolutely cancelled by external dis-economies of pollution, crowding, and missiles in the

backvard.

One has to approach the major problems of any society with a good deal of humility. Most particularly, it is important to recognize that change entails costs as well as benefits and that relative well-being is hard to measure. Nor should the difficulties of thorough-going changes in the distribution of the national income be underestimated. Any proposal, for example, to raise the wages of low-paid workers, either through minimum-wage legislation or in some other way, immediately evokes the threat of inflation in the minds of most economists and businessmen, because, once again, they assume that relative income shares must remain the same. It is heartening to note that respectable opinion is just now turning to consideration of this assumption, as evidenced by the January, 1969, report of the staff of the Cabinet Committee on

Price Stability (U.S. Gov't., 1969, Study Paper No. 4), which rejected the inevitable trade-off between unemployment and inflation. The report suggested that a fall in the rate of profit among manufacturing firms (those in the concentrated, relatively uncompetitive, "center" economy described above) would break the circle of high prices (in the face of unused capacity), high profits, and union demands for higher wages. Note, however, that this unprecedented critique was applied to the problem of unemployment and inflation, and not to the issue of raising wages for workers on the "periphery." To take seriously the latter problem would presumably produce not only "unacceptable" inflation, but would also adversely affect business "confidence," with the consequence of withdrawal of effort on the part of those who are being asked to share the affluence (Berg, 1963).

Major Social Problems are Political—Not Economic

Given this enormously complex set of interrelationships and the predictable reluctance of any group to give up its own advantages, one or another program or package of programs in the manner of the war against poverty cannot be expected to produce utopian results. Major social problems turn out to be political, and it is in the conflict of competing interests characteristic of the political process that change is ultimately defined. Those who seek to engage in that process will do well to understand as clearly as possible the inter-locking aspects of the system when they choose priorities for intervention. Otherwise, the delusion persists that what may otherwise be perfectly acceptable attempts to change things at the margin, or to ameliorate the lot of particular groups, are harbingers of social revolution.

REFERENCES

AVERITT, R. T. The dual economy. New York: W. W. Norton, 1968.

Berg, I. The confidence game. Columbia University Forum. Winter 1963, 6, 34-40. BOGAN, F. A. Work experience of the population in 1967. Special Labor Force Report No. 107. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, 1969.

Duesenberry, J. S. Underlying factors in the post-war inflation. In American Assembly, Wages, prices, profits and productivity, 1959.
FREEDMAN, M. The process of work establishment. New York: Columbia Univer.

Press, 1969. GOODE, W. J. The protection of the inept. American Sociological Review, 1967, 32, 5-19.

HAMEL, H. R. Educational attainment of workers. Monthly Labor Review, June 1967, 90, 39-47.
Mason, E. S. Introduction. In E. S. Mason (Ed.), The corporation in modern society.

Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer. Press, 1959.

Means, G. C. Collective capitalism and economic theory. In A. Hacker (Ed.), The corporation take-over. New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1965.

MINCER, J. Recent influences on the supply of labor. *Monthy Labor Review*, Feb. 1967, 90, 30-31.

Mishan, E. J. A survey of welfare economics. In Surveys of economic theory. London: Macmillan, 1966.

MORSE, D. W. The peripheral worker. New York: Columbia Univer. Press, 1969.

Moss, M. Consumption: A report on contemporary issues. In E. B. Sheldon & W. D. Moore (Eds.), *Indicators of social change*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968.

PARETO, V. The mind and society. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1935.

Perella, V. C. Women and the labor force. Monthly Labor Review, February 1968, 91, 1-12.

U.S. GOVERNMENT, Studies by the staff of the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969.

WALDMAN, E. Marital and family status of workers. Special Labor Force Report No. 94. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, 1968.

WALL STREET JOURNAL, August 25, 1969.

WRIGHT, R. A. From overalls to the attaché case. New York Times, January 6, 1969.

Legal Problems Peculiar to the Poor

Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. University of Chicago

The programs for alleviating poverty include two components that are distinctively legal. One is the furnishing of legal assistance to the poor—expanded Legal Aid, neighborhood legal services, etc. The other is reforming the law itself, on the assumption that various provisions of the law work unevenly or unjustly on the poor (Dunham, 1965; Carlin, Howard, & Messinger, 1967; Wald, 1965). The two components are closely related, in the following respects:

The law affects people somewhat differently when they have legal assistance than when they do not, so that furnishing legal assistance modifies the working of the law even without effectuat-

ing changes in its formal content.

Lawyers acting for the poor are instruments through which the formal content of the law can be reformed. Lawyers can carry litigation into appellate courts with the aim of securing new definitions of the law, they can advocate and agitate in the legislature and in administrative agencies for law reform objectives, and in the private sector they can engage in such efforts as negotiation of change in the provisions of private arrangements, e.g., leases.

Providing legal assistance to the poor is in effect the providing of a subsidy in kind. It is thus comparable to publicly subsidized housing, medical care provided at less than cost, and public education. Whether legal services should be provided to low income people and, if so, how much and to which ones is a problem with its own complexities. Furthermore, while a legal assistance pro-

gram is related to the matter of changing the formal content of the law-in the ways indicated above-such a program is not the same thing as law reform: A legal assistance program can operate without seeking or bringing about much change in the law's formal content, and change in the law can be brought about without a legal assistance program. It is perhaps laboring the obvious to underline this distinction but it is often difficult to determine, when someone is referring to "the law," whether reference is being made to the work of the practicing bar, or to the legal profession as a calling, or to the government, or to legal institutions as they actually work, or to the law's formal content.

Is the Law Disadvantageous to the Poor?

The objective of this paper is to consider, in an analytical way, the formal content of the law as it relates to the poor. More specifically the question is whether there are components of the law, considered in its formal content, that are disadvantageous

to the poor. The thesis advanced is threefold:

First, with some exceptions American law has abrogated limitations on legal capacity of persons related to wealth or characteristics associated with wealth. Assertions that the law is unequal as regards the poor refer mostly to legal sanctioning of activities that result in acquisition of unequal amounts of property. This inequality could be effaced only by radically altering freedom of private socio-economic initiative and introducing a broad policy of income redistribution.

Second, there appear to be many social programs expressed in law that have the ostensible objective of equalizing opportunity or situation, but which appear in fact mostly to benefit other than the poor. The rules comprising these programs could be changed to the advantage of the poor, in ways which would also benefit others. Change in these rules would do no violence to our legal and political traditions, but is obstructed by groups having vested

interests in the rules as they stand.

Third, there are some provisions of the law that create conditions directly adverse to certain subgroups of the poor. These subgroups include certain cultural "deviants" whose life ideals and styles diverge from those of the community majority. Since the content of the law reflects majority mores, it creates legal conflicts for these minorities. Change in the law could substantially reduce these conflicts.

Free Legal Capacity and its Consequences

The relatively free scope afforded private initiative under the law of western countries, specifically the United States, is the

product of a long development. Viewed from the perspective of the medieval age in which the development began, the trend of the law has been to eliminate birth, inheritance, place of residence, and station in life as determinants of legal capacity. The legal way-stations include the elimination of villenage (obligations of service by serfs and peasants) and other customary service obligations, burgage (legal status tied to city or borough of residence), and guildship privilege, limitations on "settlement" (residence for purposes, inter alia, of poor law benefits), trading restrictions and exclusions (the underside of monopolies), employment servitude, and correlatively the relaxation of restrictions on property transfer and acquisition, commercial exchange, political capacity of religious minorities, and association in entrepreneurial and labor combinations. Related more modern developments, involving state subsidy and direction, include public common school education as under the Northwest Ordinance, encouragement of relocation as under the Homestead Act and the FHA, and promotion of advantageous markets in commodities, finance, and

These legal developments formally express a complex cultural transformation of western society. Where medieval society in self-conception was relatively static, inherited, corporate, backward looking, and other-worldly, with corresponding legal relationships, modern society is relatively dynamic, individualistic, and materialist, with corresponding definitions of legal capacity and process. On one hand, modern legal institutions give emphasis to the conditions and procedures under which change in social, political, and economic relationships may be effectuated, manifested in constitutions and procedural and administrative codes, in the manifolds of contract law, and the burgeoning of Due Process. On the other hand, modern definitions of legal capacity have secured participation in the processes of selfassertive change to all citizens on a principle approaching complete formal equality. The formal equalization of participating opportunity is manifested in the repeal of property ownership qualifications for exercise of political rights (Williamson, 1960), the repeal of slavery and its residual legal incidents (Franklin, 1968), and the emancipation of women (Flexner, 1959; Kanowitz, 1967, 1968). The most recent question concerns the participatory

opportunity of younger people (Friedenberg, 1969).

The logic of a self-assertive and widely participatory social system tends progressively to regard matters of individual belief, opinion, and deportment as outside the proper scope of public regulation, except to the minimal extent required to protect comparable interests of others. Accordingly, the law of a participatory self-assertive system is chiefly concerned with relationships con-

cerning material resources—the creation, exchange, and use of property (Hohfeld, 1917). The legal system formalizes these relationships, regularizes and coordinates the processes by which they are changed, and secures the results to their intended beneficiaries. In this connection, property includes not only "private" property but "public" property as well (Reich, 1964; Demsetz, 1966)—where the highways shall run and who may use them, who may use Boston Common for parades (The N.Y. Times, 1968), and who gets into the Naval Academy and C.C.N.Y. Since poverty is relative and property is its measure, poverty is the consequence of a legal system which makes such differentials possible. The law in this sense sanctions inequality in enjoyment

of property.

The complaint that the law sanctions poverty is thus both obviously true and not so obviously a complaint about the social predicates of which the law is simply an expression. Implicit in the grievance concerning poverty is the proposition that a system which encourages and secures equality of participatory opportunity somehow is unjust, even hypocritical, if it contenances the inequality in power over property that eventuates from the exercise of participatory opportunity. Yet a social order cannot completely have it both ways, making possible that people do their thing and then complaining when some of them do it better than others. The point can be lost in the shuffle of taxes, subsidies, and regulatory interventions which characterize modern economies, and it can be obscured in political rhetoric (everyone is equal but some are more equal than others). If the point is not lost or obscured, then the problem, an old one, is how far to intervene in autonomous exchange operations of an open society to make redistribution in favor of those who come out on the short end. That is not simply a legal question.

Reforming the Legal Patterns of Income Redistribution

To the extent that income distribution has not yielded perfect income equality the law can be changed in the direction of equalization. There is a wide range of possibilities short of equalization which might well help the poor a good deal. Identifying them is not too difficult; establishing the political consensus to bring about their change is something else.

The most straightforward form of income equalization is the payment of subsidies in money. This involves taxing the relatively affluent and giving the proceeds to the relatively indigent, in the form of payments such as AFDC, a family allowance, or a negative income tax (Okner, 1966). There remains the question, however, whether in a predominantly middle-class society there is a

sufficient number of people with very high incomes to yield the tax revenue required to remedy poverty, except perhaps at rates so steep as to be politically repugnant and economically destructive. Consider the fact that 69.4% of the federal personal income taxes paid by individuals in 1966 was paid by persons earning less than \$20,000. More complicated forms of redistribution include subsidies in kind—food, medical care, housing, education, legal services, etc. (Freedman, 1970). Still more subtle forms of redistribution are involved in such programs as price supports for farmers, special tax exemptions for the aged, and incentive programs for private sector enterprises that are thought to be of special benefit to the poor, e.g., subsidized loans to businesses located in the ghetto.

A similar way in which the law could be changed to the advantage of the poor is to revise existing income redistribution and subsidy schemes. American public sector activity in its present form, as someone has observed, is preponderantly "socialism in the middle class." The benefits of socialism could be more abundantly sprinkled on lower income groups. By way of

illustration:

The financial support for primary and secondary education could be more nearly equalized as between the affluent suburbs and other communities (MacInnis v. Shapiro, 1968; Daly, 1968).

The parks budget could be shifted in part from Yellowstone and other middle class playgrounds to basketball courts and other lower class playgrounds.

The funds now spent for research (particularly in such exotic areas as outer space) and for higher education (particularly in graduate schools where cost per pupil is high) could be diverted to improvement of the schools in the inner city and the outer country. Consider the December 1968 Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, which calls for a \$10 billion increase in annual federal spending for higher education, as well as the creation of 550 new colleges (Time, 1968).

Reforms in the law such as these often are quickly put aside by the denizens of suburbia and academia, for reasons that are not far to seek. There is a tendency also to ignore the possibility of reform in certain other public services which are not conceived as welfare programs nor always perceived as working disadvantageously to the poor, but which in fact are of special significance to low income people. Services of this sort include the courts of minor jurisdiction, administrative agencies such as the housing bureau and the consumer fraud bureau, and—above all—the police. These agencies are of special importance to the poor because a disproportionate share of their "customers" are low income people. In most communities, urban and rural, these agen-

cies are severely hampered by poor facilities, inadequate salary schedules, manpower shortages, awkward administrative arrangements, and obsolete or combersome procedures—deficiencies that legal change can remedy or ameliorate (Comment, 1965; President's Commission on Law Enforcement, 1967). Why this line of law reform has been ignored is not so clear, though it may have to do with the fact that it requires action elsewhere than in Washington: The pulse of law reform at the state and local level is a faint echo of the throb that beats in the think tanks. At any rate, the prospects of law reform other than income redistribution are nurtured in part by the hope that something may be done for

the poor that does not involve drain on the fisc.

On reflection, it is evident that there are ways of redistributing income which do not involve the government's budget. These opportunities are suggested when it is recognized that all legal regulations have the effect of a levy imposed on someone in favor of someone else. Water pollution controls burden manufacturers and their customers in favor of other water users (Coase, 1960; Hoak, 1967); a minimum wage in the laundry industry burdens laundresses in favor of manufacturers of commercial washing machines and their employees (Lester, 1960; Peterson, 1959, 1960). Indeed, the law contains an awesome array of rules that modify market exchange processes in such a way as to give economic preference to particular groups whose interests conflict with those of the poor. Illustrations of these rules include:

(1) Rules that prohibit free entry into the labor market, for example legally sanctioned restrictive apprenticeship programs. Sovern (1966) reports a case study of a sheet metal worker's apprenticeship program wherein 80% of those admitted as apprentices were relatives of union members.

(2) Assignment rules that favor entrenched skilled labor groups (National

Woodwork Manufacturer's Association v. N.L.R.B., 1966).

(3) Minimum wage laws in certain situations. Everyone concerned agrees that who is helped and who is hurt by minimum wage laws is the most important single issue in the field of minimum wage regulation. To those workers whose take-home pay is increased by such a law, it is a blessing, but to those who lose their jobs, the law may be a disaster.

(4) Rules that inhibit adaptation of services to the needs of the poor, for example public utility regulations that prohibit or restrict "irregular" bus and taxi operations, regulations that prohibit vendors from operating at night or other "off hours," and regulations that restrict entry into markets of special

concern to the poor, such as the consumer credit market.

(5) Rules that require goods or services to be purveyed according to quality specifications that price them out of reach of the poor, building codes being the most conspicuous example.

These rules and their infinite variations reduce in some degree the marginal buying or selling power of everyone who is not

their beneficiary. The poor have the lowest marginal buying and selling power, therefore the lowest marginal ability to adjust to the burden of this kind of levy. The problem is essentially the same as that posed by a non-progressive tax, for example a flat rate sales tax. The beneficiaries of these regulations, notably many elements of organized labor and of small business, do not see it this way of course. That should occasion little surprise, but it does pose obstacles to reducing the disabilities these regulations impose on the poor.

Insofar as change in the formal content of the law can improve or ameliorate the condition of the poor, change along the lines indicated above appears to be the most productive way to do it. (This does not exhaust the possibilities for reform of "the law," of course, for broad sectors of the administration of the law leave much to be desired.) Implicit in this conclusion is the proposition that most of the poor are not much different from other members of the community, except that their material living standard is

lower or more precarious.

It is important to keep this in mind, because the view is often expressed that low income people as a class are distinct from everyone else, and therefore have distinctive problems, including distinctive legal problems. Yet this seems plainly untrue of most low income people. This includes:

The "temporary poor"—students who lack adequate financial support and people who are retired on insufficient pensions. Their problems have always been amenable to money—the G.I. Bill,

subsidized Social Security, etc.

The "voluntary poor"—people who could earn more money but for one reason or another choose not to. This includes ministers and priests, artists, some teachers and military personnel, many social workers, and a large but mixed group whose "menfolk" have vendable skills but who prefer relaxation in poverty to frenzy on the job. No manageable legal reform could compen-

sate for these exercises of preference.

The "vocationally poor"—people who work hard and live carefully, but whose wages are low due to a combination of intense labor competition in the work they do and their own low vocational mobility. Workers in the needle trades and textile industry, for example, have chronically low wages because their production is subject to competition from countries whose whole labor force has a low living standard. The same is true of farm workers, pottery workers, and others. A similar type of near-poverty attends workers whose skills are easily displaced by machines—dishwashers, ditch diggers, and others. These problems are essentially economic and their solutions are essentially economic:

Measures to redistribute income in favor of these people and measures to improve their ability to change to jobs that pay more, i.e.,

vocational training.

The temporarily poor, the voluntarily poor, and the vocationally poor all have problems other than strictly income problems, and most of them have legal problems of one sort or another. But the available evidence suggests that their legal problems are pretty much the same as those encountered by most families: Domestic relations conflicts, credit problems, and involvements with the criminal law, particularly male juvenile delinquency (American Bar Foundation, 1968; Stolz, 1968). The substance of the law does not hold special grief for them.

There are, however, subgroups of the poor of whom this can't be said. These include the culturally "deviant" poor and

those who can't cope.

Legal Disadvantages of the Deviant Poor

Our heterogeneous society includes many whose ideas of the good do not correspond with professed majority sentiment. Some forms of deviance are regarded as merely eccentric, others as immoral. Some forms are made illegal. For deviants who have enough money, legal proscription of their deviance usually is only a bother. They can go to Mexico to smoke marijuana, to Las Vegas to gamble, to Johannesburg to connive with kindred spirits, to Japan to get an abortion, and to Canada to escape the draft. Similar adaptations are possible for less dramatic forms of deviance:

Education in private schools for the unusually devout (Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 1925) or for those interested in being educated in the cultural tradition of their forefathers.

Imbibing in private clubs for those whose thirst lasts longer than the Blue Laws contemplate (U.S. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder, 1968; Ford, 1952).

Motor racing on tracks, sand dunes, and snow drifts for those with tastes for speed which exceeds the law's limit.

A summer (or winter) camping ground for those to whom change of season signifies change of abode.

For cultural deviants who don't have much money, these adaptations are difficult and often impossible. As a result, the choice for them comes down to conforming to majority mores as expressed in the law or living crosswise to the law and suffering the consequences. The severity of the consequences depends on the form and strength in which majority sentiment is expressed in the law. It may include criminal punishment (e.g., for gambling), illegitimacy of private transactions (e.g., of "common

law" remarriages), and ineligibility for public benefit programs (e.g., residency requirements for welfare or for public schooling). The point can be summed up by saying that much of the criminal law, some of the law governing private relationships, and most of the rules concerning eligibility for public benefits contemplate a life style that is steady in location, consistent in purpose, and

conventionally moral in character.

This is not new, for the law has never fit gypsies well. Nor is it surprising. Explicitly and implicitly the law reflects the concern that if people don't conform to conventional mores, they run the risk of getting themselves or their families into trouble. Conventional wisdom apprehends that cigarettes and whiskey can be debilitating and impoverishing. Furthermore, the law-makers know to whom the victims will look when these predictable misfortunes arise: Who provides milk for the hippie's baby, tutelage for the abandoned child? In the judgment of conventional wisdom, therefore, deviance is often irresponsibility and irresponsibility is usually expensive. The only people who can afford it are those endowed with wealth or talent.

As a general proposition this instinct of conventional wisdom does not seem demonstrably wrong. The problems with conventional wisdom as expressed in the law derive from two related tendencies: moral overkill and adherence to a simplistic approach to the problem of nurturing prudence. Moral overkill manifests itself in the desire to stamp out forms of deviance whose real threat to the community is marginal or remote (Kadish, 1968). Why should Amish children have to go to public school (Garber v. Kansas, 1968); why shouldn't welfare families have a TV (Benich, 1966; Briar, 1966); why can't the hillbillies head back home in the off-season without losing their compensation benefits? The simplistic approach to nurturing prudence is a manifestation of the belief that passing a law will straightforwardly result in people obeying it. Hence welfare mothers are adjured to a continence that priests now find burdensome, inner city residents are obliged to attend schools whose programs have been declared educationally bankrupt, and the rural unemployed are importuned not to come to the city unless they have skills they have never heard of. It seems not too much to say that the subjects of these regulations have enough troubles without trying to heed legal admonitions invented by those of us who live in tract houses. If less exacting standards of conduct were prescribed for the poor, it is possible that they would observe no worse standards of conduct than they do and, in time, perhaps better ones.

In this connection attention must be directed to the laden issue concerning whether poor Negroes constitute a culturally

deviant group. Daniel Moynihan suggested they did (1965) and has been attacked not only for propounding an affirmative answer but for even putting the question. There is evidence to be cited both ways (Rainwater & Yancey, 1967), but in one perspective it seems irrelevant. If the average Negro (the average Negro is a low-income person) is thought by the majority community to be different, then he will be so treated and may well come so to regard himself. The only way to forfend a self-fulfilling prophecy is to treat it as false, and this the majority is not now ready to do in the case of the black man. The problem can also be resolved by converting prophecy into certain fact, as is the aim of the Afro-American cultural identity movement. The legal questions thereupon arising are whether as a culturally deviant group, the Afro-Americans must conform to generally applicable rules concerning such matters as access to public education, religious devotions in prison, and haircuts. These questions are not without legal precedent.

Those Who Can't Cope

Among the approximately ten million impoverished American families are many-no one knows quite how many-for whom the contemporary environment is simply baffling. The job skill problem is now well recognized: Many poor have such weak reading and computational skills that they can neither hold many jobs otherwise open to them (e.g., driving a taxi or running a floor waxer) nor read the advertisements about education in reading and computational skills. Aspects of the consumer skill problem have also been recognized—ignorance of tenancy rights, obliviousness of the fine print in contracts, timidity in seeking alternative places to shop (Chapman & Shay, 1967). Yet there are still more deeply rooted problems, especially on the consumer side, that are

neither obvious nor obviously remediable.

The essence of the matter is that in a milieu of uninhibited freedom of speech for vendors and freedom of choice for purchasers, maintaining one's solvency requires more sophistication and more self-restraint than many people have. Lavish inducement on the one hand and strong impulse on the other conduce to more or less chronic financial distress. This condition exists not only for "the poor" but for millions of lower-middle income people who spend much of their lives under indenture. Aside from the immediate material consequences of this distress are the worries of keeping up the payments, the harassment resulting when they are not, and the abrasions and concussions which the family unit suffers in the struggle. Moderating garnishment will obviate that sudden and sometimes devastating symptom of financial distress, but cannot reach the cause.

One way of reaching the cause is to reduce the scope of contractual competency under the law to something nearer the effective contractual capacity of the low-income consumer. Invidious discrimination can be avoided by legal reforms cast in general terms, even though there is little expectation of benefit to upper income people. Such measures include:

Specification of the terms of common types of contracts, for example, various forms of insurance, consumer credit agreement (Surran, 1968), and residential rental agreements (American Bar Foundation, 1969).

Specification of provisions that are to be deemed part of common types of contracts, notably those covered by the Uniform Commercial Code.

Mandatory "second thoughts" intervals before certain types of contracts become effective.

Building third parties into the agreement who can be expected to stimulate caution or at least awareness on the part of the buyer, for example, guarantor government agencies.

Another approach is to encourage the activity of agencies which moderate the intensity of marketing stimulation and response. These include government fraud investigation bureaus, Better Business Bureaus and Chambers of Commerce in some communities, and debt counseling through such groups as churches and unions. And the old-fashioned idea of the consumer or producer cooperative still has protean applications. The effectiveness of such instrumentalities is limited because they seem more clearly visible to the middle class than to the poor, but it has to be kept in mind that the alternative to these imperfect solutions is wardship.

REFERENCES

AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION. Research Study to Assess the Need for Utilization of Legal Services by the Poor. Office of Economic Opportunity Research, Contract No. OEO-4047, 1968.

AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION. Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code. Tentative draft, 1969.

Benich. Privacy, poverty and the constitution. California Law Review, 1966, 54, 425-434.

BRIAR. Welfare from below: Recipients' views of the public welfare system. California Law Review, 1966, 54, 370-377.

CARLIN, J. E., HOWARD, & MESSINGER. Civil justice and the poor. Issues for Sociological Research. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1967.

CHAPMAN, J., & SHAY, R. (Eds.) The consumer finance industry: Its costs and regulation.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1967.

COASE. The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economy, 1960, 1. COMMENT. Enforcement of municipal housing codes. Harvard Law Review, 1965, 78,804-805.

Daly, C. U. (Ed.) The quality of inequality: Urban and suburban public schools. Chicago: University of Chicago Center for Policy Study, 1968.

Demsetz. Some aspects of property rights. Journal of Law & Economy, 1966, 61. DUNHAM. Consumer credit problems of the poor: Legal assistance as an aid in law reform. Proceedings of the National Conference on Law and Poverty,

U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity, 1965.

FLEXNER, E. Century of struggle: The woman's rights movement in the United States. Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1959.

FORD. The Texas Liquor Control Act. 1A Vernon's Texas Penal Code Annot., 1952,

Franklin, J. H. From slavery to freedom. (3rd ed.) New York: Knopf, 1968.

Freedman, M. Poor people and the distribution of job opportunities. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26(3).

FRIEDENBERG, E. Z. The generation gap. The Annals, 1969, 32, 382.

GARBER V. KANSAS, 197 Kan. 567, 419 P. 2d 896, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 51., 1968. HOAK. Who pays the clean water bill? In G. Nikolaieff (Ed.), The water crisis. New York: Wilson, 1967.

HOHFELD. Fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning. Yale

Law Journal, 1917, 26, 710-746.

KADISH, S. The crisis of overcriminalization. Amer. Crim. L. Q., 1968, 7, 17.

KANOWITZ. Sex based discrimination in American law. 11 St. L. U. J. 292, 12 St. L. U. L. J., 1967.

KANOWITZ. Legal status of American women. Family Law Quarterly, 1968, 2, 121. LESTER, R. Employment effects of minimum wages. Comment, 13, Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 1960, 254.

MacInnis v. Shapiro. 37 U. S. L. W. 2298 N. D. Ill., Nov. 15, 1968.

MOYNIHAN, D. P. The Negro family: The case for national action. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Office of Policy Planning and Research: U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1965.

OKNER, B. A. Income distribution and the federal income tax. Ann Arbor: Inst. of Public

Adm., University of Michigan, 1966.

NATIONAL WOODWORK MANUFACTURERS ASS'N. V. N. L. R. B., 386 U.S. 612, 1966. Peterson, J. M. Employment effects of state minimum wages for women: Three historical cases re-examined. Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 1959, 12, 406.

Peterson, J. M. Employment effects of minimum wages: Reply 13, Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 1960, 264.

PIERCE V. SOCIETY OF SISTERS, 268 U.S. 510, 1925.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. The challenge of crime in a free society, 1967.

REICH, C. The new property. Yale Law Journal, 1964, 73, 733.
RAINWATER, L., & YANCEY. The Mognitude report and the politics of controversy. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T., 1967.

Sovern. Legal restraints on racial discrimination in employment. 1966, 177-85. STOLZ. The legal needs of the public: A survey analysis. American Bar Foundation Contribution Series, 1968, 4.

Surran. Legislative controls as a response to consumer credit problems. American Bar Foundation Research Contribution Series, 1968, 1.

THE NEW YORK TIMES. Mayor orders Boston Common and Public Gardens cleared of "hippies." June 29, 1968. TIME MAGAZINE. December 20, 1968.

U.S. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. 1968, 47, 68-69.

WALD, P. M. Law and poverty. Working paper for the National Conference on Law and Poverty, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,

WILLIAMSON, C. American suffrage from property to democracy. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960.

The Law and the Poor

Jonathan Weiss

Columbia University Center for Social Welfare Policy and the Law

The poor confront the law as others do and also differently. Dependent on where they are, their access to lawyers, their aggressiveness or natural shrewdness, sometimes the poor may achieve results from the law and its agents similar to what others who are better situated achieve. Such successes are hardly the rule, however. The poor have almost always had uniquely bitter experiences with the legal process.

Law as an Institution

The law is an institution and deals with other institutions. All people confront it as a source of sanctions and hence, to some degree, of fears. Crimes are not committed in front of policemen. Illegal acts are taken with a conscious and unconscious calculation of risks. Sanctions are not only criminal—i.e., arrest, detention, fine, incarceration, or execution—they are also "civil." "Civil" sanctions in practice may be criminal, as when juveniles are incarcerated for being incorrigible, or aberational activity results in being incarcerated as insane, or old age leads to forced seclusion as a "senior citizen." More broadly, rules which are violated, often without will to violate, lead to real sanctions—loss of license, loss of money, loss of entry to a union or a job or even a seat on the stock exchange. Citizens universally confront the institution of the law as an area of forbidden acts whose violation sanctions deprivations.

The law also is a functioning institution with a series of commands and demands. Forms must be filled out; taxes paid. Voting or driving requires registration. Most importantly the law commands direct recourse to it as an institutional process. To collect money counsel must be retained, threats made to sue, suits executed, etc. Disputes are channelled away from all processes but the court (including the informal effects of perceptions and predictions of what the courts will do if the question is put to them). To obtain what is wanted in a dispute about money, obligation, freedom, or property, the law commands that people come to it. They must follow its commands of how to present their side of a question. The legal machinery operates both to sanction and to command certain procedures and behaviors in order for individuals to continue in society and to profit from it.

What does the institution of law offer in return? In the main it offers a type of societal support. It provides a common referent for disputes. It provides rules for the conduct of business behavior and money manipulation, and rules about acts which are considered to the conduct of the cond

sidered harmful to others or society.

Confronting a Bureaucratic Hierarchy . . .

To offer this support the institution of the law operates as a series of bureaucratic institutions. First, what is called "administrative law" is purely bureaucratic. When the government must dispense favors, collect money, or regulate conduct, officials are established who have chains of power, ability to refer to internal rules, and the power to "pass the buck." Police departments also operate as bureaucratic machines (Goldstein, 1958); juvenile courts are a separate little bureaucratic world (Allen, 1964). As the poor sadly know, "welfare" programs are a mysterious world governed by a petty officialdom which marches to a distant and certainly very erratic drummer (Sparer, 1965). In short, the law is confronted by individuals as a series of domains of authority. Each domain is defined through the operation of an institutional hierarchy. It is in the context of a category of rules, rewards, and denials, effectuated by an organization of those charged by law to execute power, that the commands and sanctions of the law have reality. For all men this is true. Yet the concrete reality of the law has added dimensions for the poor. These extra dimensions make the social and psychological meaning of the law radically different for poor people.

For the Poor, the "System" is an Enemy

The poor are mysterious to those not so classified. Commentators on poverty agree that the poor are characterized in general by passive rather than active reactions to everyday situations, and by dependence (Duhl, 1963; Riessman, Cohen & Pearl, 1964). The institutions with which they deal are not like the Securities Exchange Commission or the Federal Communication Commission. The SEC or FCC are institutions which, if granting a favor, permit progress toward money or prestige; these are institutions whose interest is sought and whose favor is curried. The poor, on the other hand, face only negative outcomes in their institutional dealings. They fear arrests by the police, humiliation by the schools, and starvation at the hands of those institutions supposed to alleviate poverty. For the poor, "the system" is an enemy. The law has often been the instrument of, rather than a bulwark against, the oppressors (Alinsky, 1964; Silberman, 1964; Smith, 1919). Lawyers for the poor call the "Fair Hearings" of the Welfare system "Unfair Hearings," the "landlord-tenant court," a "landlord court." All too often, in welfare hearings the results are predetermined. In the special "landlord-tenant" courts, the judges expect tenants to pay, eviction can be accomplished almost overnight, yet tenants cannot complain about slum conditions. These tribunals often operate to oppress the poor rather than dispassionately to settle disputes. When dishonest salesmen or slumlords seek to fulfill their goals they use the courts and their lawyers. The poor do not usually use this alternative. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has reminded us of the relevance in our own time of the words of Anatole France, "The law in its majestic equality forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread."1

In short, the societal relations of the poor in many parts of this country are reminiscent of a feudal kingdom in which survival is obtained by paying fealty to various lords: the rent man, the grocery man, the policeman, the furniture store man—against whom the poor have no rights they can know or exercise, but merely some standard expectations of what to give and what they may expect to receive in return. The everyday lives of such citizens reveal that they have not yet graduated from "status" to "contract." Those who represent or can invoke the law by suit against them treat the poor as dependent creatures. They live at sufferance of the landlord as well as that of a welfare worker. They fear the suit by the company which defrauded them (now hiding behind legal technicalities as to who is responsible for what), as well as arrest by police whose pay is partially the pleasure of the prowl of power. There are real inequalities, political and social, which causally or essentially are promulgated by the legal rules.

¹In Griffin v. Illinois 351 US 12, 23 (1956) concurring.

Special Rules of Access and Durability

The position of the poor in relation to the law and its institutions is governed by a body of distinctive substantive and procedural rules. It is not simply that the institutions which deal with the poor treat them as creatures of dependent status. The system of courts has fashioned special rules and special problems for the

poor.

The special rules are of two kinds. First are those procedural rules which govern availability of and survival in forums. Second are the specific substantive rules which discriminate against or stigmatize the poor. The rules of access and durability are special rules of the courts and their agents. Administrative agencies often are steeped with rules which have unconstitutional and illegal provisions. Even a non-scholar can describe a long list of defects in these rules which are clearly visible even in a superficial survey (Sparer, 1965). The rules endure because the poor have never had advocates or forums.

For example, for over thirty years the vast majority of the states refused to place a mother and children on a state welfare budget if they had traveled to the state within the preceding year. The constitutional defects in these rules are obvious—state welfare budgets primarily use federal money. This is one unified country where people have a right to travel. They cannot be starved because they exercised this right, especially when children starve because their mother has moved. People have a right to pick the best place to settle under their Freedom of Association (1st Amendment to the Constitution). They then must not be treated differently. Yet this administrative rule survived over thirty years. It took two years of consecutive argument in the United States Supreme Court to destroy it. The final Supreme Court decision came down close to three years after the first case was filed to invalidate that one rule. Even after the decision, New York State promulgated almost the same rule, and lawyers had to file suit over again. As a result, the same issue is once again in the Supreme Court. The rule is one of many rules that effect millions. It is estimated that \$36 million more will go to people on welfare as a result of that Supreme Court decision.

To Sue a Bureaucracy . . .

It is a long and cumbersome route to sue against a rule. In practical terms the only rules that the poor may sue against are those that are clearly unconstitutional, not those that are blatantly unreasonable—because the latter fall in the range of administrative "expertise."

Litigating unconstitutional rules is arduous; there is a

myriad of them. Litigation is a courtroom procedure. In fighting with a bureaucracy, there are more ways than one to skin a cat. General Motors and General Electric do not just simply go to court. They know legislators; they have access to the press; and they have many means of bringing pressure. They also, more importantly, have the initial power of confrontation. When a welfare mother comes in to ask for her monthly pittance, she is just one of many who seek aid for their children. When GM or GE seeks an exemption from restrictions on foreign investments from the Commerce Department, they confront not only the government but individual lawyers, clerks, and decision-makers as institutions, and all are somewhat impressed by their implicit power and their actual size and strength. The monoliths of capitalism use many routes of persuasion to confront the institutions which regulate and offer benefits. They have the image of conquerors, while a poor person seems to be looking for an individual "handout."

In this context, the importance of durability cannot be overrated. Just as the poor have very few forums and access to even those has been rare and difficult, the staying power of the poor is often weak. GM and GE have the endurance and strength to use all forums. If they fail, they can try again. If they can not pressure an administrative agency, they can go to court. If that fails, they can try to change the law. If that fails, they can put new pressure on the administrative agency or hope to influence whoever in the future will be in power. During all this time they will merely be lacking more power and profits, not facing destruction. A poor person can only attack rules by access to the courts. Access is difficult, and the individual may literally starve before the case is finished. If a welfare mother does not win a temporary victory and does not have private charity to support her while waiting for judgment, her attack on the one year residency requirement vanishes with her disappearance into death or another place where she could receive support. The same is true when the rules governing eviction from public housing are at fault, or when trials which test the criminal or juvenile courts are fought. Individual clients may not survive the process; often a whole case is about the client's continued viable existence.

In Forma Pauperis

The poor face a different series of rules when dealing with the "law" directly in courts. First, there are financial barriers. Almost everything costs money—jury trials, docketing fees, publication for divorces, transcripts, transcripts of pre-trial stuff, preparing records for appeal, docketing appeals, and losing appeals.

For example, in New York State to appeal unemployment insurance cases, the domain of the poor, 19 briefs and 19 records have to be submitted to Albany. The duplication costs in a recent case of this author's were \$100 exclusive of postage and typing.

The procedure seems designed to eliminate appeals.

A poor person may escape some of these fees by labeling, i.e., stigmatizing, himself as different. There is an ancient rule, in forma pauperis, now codified in most states by statute, which allows the suspension of some fees. The way in which in forma pauperis is obtained shows how the poor are treated and labeled differently. A special motion to proceed as a poor person must be made, generally with copies served on the city or state. In support of the motion, the lawyer must disclose the essence of his case. He must state that he thinks it is a good case. His poor client has to list all sources of income, all items of property real and personal, he must state that no one else is interested in the case, that he believes he has a good case, and that his lawyer serves without fee. The court then considers the papers and in its discretion grants that permission.

Surrendering Privacy . . .

A poor person, if successful, thus enters the case with a clear label and stigma attached to him. The papers themselves which have been entered in forma pauperis are now public documents that tell the world all his sources of income. (So if an ex-husband pays some support to a woman on welfare, all his acquaintances can find out how much if she files in forma pauperis.) The poor person's revelation must be complete. This author has had a client denied his in forma pauperis request because, after coming off welfare to work at a menial job, his affidavit did not specify all his personal property-presumably accumulated at the minimal wage he earned. A judge who sits on a case is alerted by this rule to the fact that a person is not paying his counsel; if he has a bias against free legal services, this may prejudge the case. In short, the poor person must surrender privacy, accept the label of "poor," and anticipate the possibility of judicial prejudice simply to avoid the payment of fees.

The consequences of proceeding forma pauperis are interesting. Such a judicial grant of grace does not pay for all the necessities. A corporation or a rich man of course has access to witnesses and expert testimony, which a poverty victim does not have. The corporation and rich man can pay to bring and pay to testify; the poor person cannot. Cases are theoretically built on evidence. Yet the poor lose their children in family court regularly on the basis of uncontradicted psychological testimony, while the rich have a

battle of experts about visiting hours.

Further Discrimination . . .

The discrimination cuts deeper. The poor have no way of getting pre-trial discovery in which the whole trial is really played out. In most states, for example, witnesses can be brought and examined at great length to have a transcript ready for the trial. But this must be paid for. To appeal a case the court has to have the record. What this means is that someone has to type a copy of every paper filed and every word said, often volumes long. Someone has to pay for it all. All extra-judicial activities come dear and the poor have no money.

There is some judicial relief for extra-judicial expense. The poor may not have to bring their briefs on appeal; they may file xeroxed or mimeographed copies. This does save money, but, as those who publish know, manuscripts do not read as well as printed pages and may even indicate a lack of care to a judge. Once again the scarlet letter P is imprinted on the case and the court decides arguments posed between printed bound briefs and the inferior-looking duplicate typed manuscripts of the poor.

Further, it may be almost impossible to proceed in forma pauperis in courts where the poor are prevalent. In New York, for example, before the time when the motion to proceed to in forma pauperis is granted, the time in which a landlord-tenant case must be answered and a jury demanded runs out. This means that the jury demand is either forfeited or paid for. Having this in forma pauperis status granted is the result of considerable paper work, an additional burden on the poor and on the lawyer who serves without pay. Time sometimes makes it impossible, as in a case where an eviction notice will be executed overnight, or a repossession effected right away, or a person immediately incarcerated. It should be noted that in spite of all the reforms suggested for bail (and fines), which are areas well known to have pure economic discrimination, no one has ever figured out how to use in forma pauperis for those matters.

Substantive Legal Differences for the Poor

The rules governing the relationships of the poor among themselves and between them and society are often substantively different than those for the rich. There is a dual system of family law (Tenbroeck, 1964). Welfare in New York insists, for example, that if a mother goes into the hospital or out of town, that she turn her child over to them and sign a release. When she returns to get the child, she is told that she must prove to the welfare department that she is a fit mother. Often it refuses to return the child. In the case of any other parent, the bureau of child welfare would have to go to family court and file a neglect petition. Another instance of

this discrimination is the release of juveniles. Their release is predicated not on what they have done, supposedly, but on how they will perform in the environment to which they are returned. A boy who steals a 10¢ Kool-Aid may be incarcerated because of his robbery, though a rich car-thief will probably be returned to his mansion. All of us know that policemen and judges treat the poor quite differently (Goldstein, 1958). Such harsh treatment may have been one of the causes of the American riots (President's

Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968).

No one in this country can be forced to let people into his home unless there is a warrant or a crime being committed. Yet people on welfare are told that they will not receive welfare unless they permit a number of forced home visits a year. The state maintains the reason is that the purpose of welfare is to help children. The reasoning continues that once a person goes on welfare, the primary responsibility for child rearing is the state's, and the parent may not be a barrier. Welfare recipients must sign over future earnings and recovery for injuries, sign consent forms for invasions of privacy, etc., etc. (Stein, 1967). This list can be expanded to great length and extended into additional subject areas, as others have done elsewhere. It is very clear that many special rules exist which create substantive differences for the poor before the law.

Advocates for the Poor

Recently in the United States some inroads, some slight inroads have been made into this thicket. Under the federal government, about 2000 lawyers are paid in various cities to work in neighborhoods to represent slum dwellers. In the neighborhoods, lawyers have discovered that many groups of cases are quite different from those of the middle class (some matters, like divorces without estates, are easier). One group of cases is related to the terrible administrative treatment of those dependent on government largesse for reason of age, blindness, or infancy. Another group of cases concerns children. These cover delinquency and the fight against the filing of neglect petitions on mothers because they live in apartments that are too small (since welfare pays too little), etc. The lawyers who have started suits or sought for political pressure to alleviate these violations are having some impact. As a result of their work, constitutional law and the equal protection doctrine will have many new concrete examples.

The most important benefit from neighborhood law is derived from advocacy, and the new notion of justice and pride which emerges for the poor. As an advocate, the lawyer is no Prometheus who brings the fire of middle class truths to the dull

hovels of the poor. He is not a social worker who tries to orient his client to society's precepts and values. He must treat his clients as equals and conceive of himself as an agent to effectuate their, the principals', desires in the legal framework and the practical world. The poor man has someone to stand up for him. "Mouthpiece" can be an honorable word. The activity of advocacy can bring the clichés of equal access to the law and the best interests of the child, welfare of the family, etc., closer to the facts. Most important, there is someone who speaks out. The poor man sees advocacy work. By a form of osmosis, this doctrine of rights, this realization of the value of aggressive assertion of those rights, effects his conduct and those to whom he communicates.

Summary

The poor confront the legal system with a different set of problems and obstacles than do others. Two areas of rules are different for them: (1) rules governing access and endurance in the forums of persuasion, and (2) the substantive rules governing the poor as a specially treated group, e.g., dual family law. The first set appear to be permanently institutionalized. They are an area of rules more dependent on society than on the law. The second set are now undergoing constitutional attack. The poor generally are relegated to a status of dependence in relation to institutions. In contrast, others can utilize institutional contacts as an occasion for achieving major personal gain. Providing counsel may remedy some of this disparity. Lawyers working with the poor have exposed the range of specially oppressive rules for the poor. Agencies of government are concerned with administration per se rather than constitutional rights. This has been instructive in the field of jurisprudence. In the absence of legal scrutiny and attack, unconstitutional rules will be promulgated against the weak

REFERENCES

ALINSKY, S. Reveille for radicals. Chicago, Ill.: Univer. of Chicago Press, 1964. ALLEN, F. A. The borderland of criminal justice. Chicago, Ill.: Univer. of Chicago Press, 1964.

Duhl, L. The urban condition. Chicago, Ill.: Univer. of Chicago Press, 1963. GOLDSTEIN, J. Police discretion. Yale Law Journal, 1958, 69, 543.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. New York: Bantam Books, 1968.

RIESSMAN, F., COHEN, J., & PEARL, A. Mental health of the poor. New York: The Free Press, 1964.

SILBERMAN, C. Crisis in black and white. New York: Random House, 1964.

SMITH, R. H. Justice and the poor: A study of the present denial of justice to the poor. New York: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, Bulletin #3, 1919.

Sparer, E. V. Social welfare testing. Practical Lawyer, 1965, 12, 14.
Stein, J. Eligibility determinations in public assistance. Univer. of Pennsylvania

Law Review, 1967, 115, 1307.

Tenbroeck, J. California's dual system of family law. Berkeley: U. of California Institute of Governmental Studies, 1964.

Urban School Politics: Professionalism vs. Reform

Marilyn Gittell Queens College

Pluralist concepts of democracy historically have been hinged to a participatory political system. Although modern empirical studies of power have adjusted and redefined some of the unrealistic notions about how a democratic system works, the concept of participation still distinguishes open political systems from closed political systems. Almond and Verba (1965), for example, define the democratic state as one that "offers the ordinary man the opportunity to take part in the political decision-making process as an influential citizen." In general, the concept of participation has been refined from one of broad public participation as it is manifest in voting, petitions, referenda, to a stress on the participation of representative leadership through civic and interest-group action. Nevertheless, participation remains the most significant measure of the character and fluidity of a political system.

In all of the major studies of decision-making in large cities, several areas of policy have been surveyed to substantiate or disprove hypotheses related to the distribution of power. In general, the findings indicate that functional specialization—each area of activity creating its own specialists and professionals—has also resulted in specialization in policymaking. Indeed, looking at the aggregate of city functions, the pluralists have cited the lack of overlap in leadership from one function to another as evidence of a

polylithic power structure or a satisfactorily open participatory system. This conclusion is suggested in Dahl's study of New Haven (1961), Sayre and Kaufman's study of New York City (1960), and Banfield's (1961) study of Chicago. Although each of the studies identified relatively closed decision-making systems in each of the functional areas surveyed, all saw the overall system as open. The assumption implied in these "pluralistic" studies is that although a few men may control decisions in a given functional area, the multiplicity of elite groups city-wide is the more relevant datum in classifying the political system. Sayre and Kaufman (1960), although admitting that central city forces (the mayor and the Board of Estimate) do not really play an integrative role, do not consider that this situation contradicts their overall evaluation of the whole system.

It is clear that functional specialization will produce several distinctive elites within a community, each responsible for policy in a particular area of specialty. If one analyzes more than one function or type of policy, no single group will ever appear to control all of the decisions made in a community. Professionalization and bureaucratic development have assured that. But it should also be clear that the only test of the viability of a multiple elite system as a truly participatory political system is the relationship of decision-making within a subsystem (or functional area) to the system as a whole. Any judgment of the total system must include consideration of the relative openness of various subsystems, their responsiveness to change, and their ability to convert the demands of "clients" into policies. As one student of political research has noted, the pluralists assume that "specialization means that American democracies at the community level are better than they might otherwise be," but they have paid little attention "to the implications of the finding that relatively small numbers of men predominate as active participants over time within a particular domain [Agger, 1964, p. 215].

It is possible to imagine distinctive patterns of relative openness in certain functional areas and lack of openness in others. In short, there is no reason to assume that the mere existence of different areas of activity, each with its own group of policymakers, is equivalent to an open political system.

City Schools as Political Subsystems

City school systems as political subsystems are worthy of specialized analysis for several reasons. First, school systems are traditionally viewed as arousing more public interest than any other civic activity. Therefore, in principle, they should entail a wider base of public participation in this area and would indicate

similar or more restricted public activity in other areas of civic concern. In addition, school professionals pride themselves on the encouragement of public participation in school affairs. Their own ideological underpinnings commit them to public involvement. A study of school policymaking can evaluate how meaningful that ideology has been in achieving participation. Another reason for singling out the school system for analysis is the radical change that has occurred in school populations in large cities over the last two decades. This change has presented a severe challenge to school policymakers and school policy. Perhaps the most immediately important reason for analyzing the area of educational policy is the sheer dearth of information on how school policy is made and who makes it. Educators themselves have been far more concerned with the content of educational policy and have only recently indicated any interest in the policymaking process. Not to be ignored is the fact that education represents the largest item of local expenditure; by most standards it is the most important local government function.

Until recently, social scientists have virtually ignored the school system as a political institution. The 1954 Supreme Court decision exposed this system to public view and invited studies of desegregation policy. Public involvement and concern was aroused and gradually extended beyond the question of desegregation. As experts began to explore educational policy on school integration, they could not avoid the larger issues of how school systems are organized and how decisions are made. In the last decade there has been an increasing concern with these questions,

although published materials are still scarce.

Power in Urban Schools

The author was engaged over the past few years in two studies of power in urban school systems. Each study differed in its perspective and methodology. One study (Gittell, 1967) analyzed school policy in New York City using five areas of decision-making. The second study (Gittell & Hollander, 1968) concerned itself with the level of comparative innovation in six urban school systems.

The areas of decision-making in education in New York City were selected to include the widest possible range of participation by those involved in education, and by the relevance of the policy selected to the over-all education function. Generally, exploration of a continuum of policy was considered superior to exploration of a single policy decision. Historical data and institutional analysis were utilized in all relevant areas. Selected for intensive study were: (1) selection of the superintendent, (2) increases in teachers'

salaries, (3) budgeting, (4) school integration, and (5) curriculum development. Other areas of policy were reviewed in a more cur-

sory way to broaden the scope of the analysis.

Within any school system, the potential participants in school policymaking are essentially the same, although actual participation may vary according to the relative power of each in given circumstances. Legal power is usually divided between a board of education and the superintendent. Within the bureaucracy, distinctions must be made among the central administrative bureaucracy and field administrators, the top supervisory staff, and middle management. Organizations representing these groups are common in the larger school districts, and their activities can be significant. Teachers and teacher organizations, parents and parent organizations are potential participants. Specialized education interest groups (ad hoc and permanent) have been active in many communities, and their role can be vital. In the general community there are other potential participants: local, state, and federal officials, civic groups, the press, business organizations, and individual entrepreneurs seeking the rewards of the school system.

The School System as a Specialized Bureaucracy

The findings of the 1965 study (Gittell, 1967) emphasize that, for the previous two decades, education in New York City had become amazingly insulated from public controls. One could accurately describe the situation as an abandonment of public education by key forces of potential power within the city. Bureaucratization and professionalization were contributing factors. Weber's theory of the emergence of a specialized bureaucracy, monopolizing power through its control of expertise, accurately described the role of the education bureaucracy in New York City (Gerth & Mills, 1946). The claim that only the professionals can make competent judgments had been accepted. Contributing to, and perhaps growing out of, this attitude was the change in the mayor's role to one of noninvolvement. Civic and interest groups (other than the specialized education groups) responded ambivalently. On the one hand, they accepted the notion of the professional competence of the bureaucracy, and, on the other, they recognized the need for reform. They expressed a hopelessness about their ability to change the system. The result was narrow or closed participation in large areas of decision-making. Effective influence in these areas was restricted to an inside core of top supervisory personnel in the headquarters staff of the Board of Education. Policy alternatives were rarely discussed or offered, and the inclination to support the status quo was reinforced.

The study (Gittell & Hollander, 1968) of six urban school districts (Baltimore, St. Louis, Chicago, Detroit, New York, Philadelphia) was undertaken in 1966–1967. It approached the evaluation and comparison of school systems from the perspective of flexibility and innovation. In most school studies, the emphasis has been on outputs related to student achievements. Test results provide a quantitative measurement and have been used rather extensively. Because the tests given in school districts are not comparable, the evaluation is necessarily confined to the individual district. This reduces the possibilities for comparative analysis. Further, the heavily weighted influence of socio-economic factors limits the usefulness of this measure in comparing and evaluating other inputs.

Schools Reflect Local Political Culture

The authors tried an alternative approach that would measure output at the margin in terms of the innovation in a school district. This measure of output has the advantage of reflecting not only financial inputs, but the effectiveness of the administration, and the community and political pressures which are brought to bear on the school board. The measure assumes that adaptability of a school district is its most important characteristic. This assumption is justified on the grounds that the most critical issue facing large city school districts is their ability to adapt their organizations, administrations, and programs to the changing socio-

economic characteristics of their pupil populations.

The study concluded that although school people and systems are divorced from city politics in form, the influence of a city political culture pervades school politics. The school system in St. Louis, for instance, although fiscally independent, reflects the traditionally conservative policies of the St. Louis business community-low taxes and low expenditures are the mainstay of city and school policy. Another conclusion which the study affirmatively suggests was the importance of external forces as change agents. Federal and foundation programs were primary instruments in encouraging innovation. These inputs were conceived as experimentation and had a guaranteed innovation factor. Too often, however, programs were abandoned after funds expired, as was true of the early preschool program in Baltimore; or changes were confined to a small segment of the system, as was the case in the Banneker District in St. Louis. Foundation and federal efforts do not necessarily produce fundamental institu-

On the issue of public participation, many of the groups studied in each city were supportive of established policies. They

hesitated to be critical and, as a result, offered too few alternatives to professional thinking. They generally did not challenge the effectiveness of policies once implemented. Comparative analysis identified the civil rights groups as a general exception to this characterization. These groups have replaced the reformers of the turn of the century as critics of the school system. In some cities they represented the only protest or opposition group. Their influence on policy proved to be limited but their role as an opposition was an important one. The civil rights groups in every city challenged existing policies and reaffirmed that education was indeed a public function-subject, therefore, to public review. Although the more militant groups may have antagonized large segments of the community, and their efforts to achieve integration were unsuccessful, they raised significant questions about school policies and policymaking. In New York City, Detroit, and Philadelphia these groups demanded greater public participation. Their pressures were in a few instances the cause for change in the highly centralized professional structure. This study (Gittell & Hollander, 1968) concluded that innovation can be achieved only as a result of strong community participation which has the power to compel both new programs and the increases in expenditure necessary to finance them. The brief reform experience in Philadelphia suggests that substantial community involvement provides both the pressure for change and a community atmosphere favorable for obtaining the necessary financing.

The Redistribution of Power in Urban Schools

In more recent years the failure of urban schools and city school systems has led to a movement for the complete institutional reform of urban education. A vocal group of reformers made up predominately of non-professionals living in, or identified with, the ghettos have rejected old-style administrative reform and demand a redistribution of power in school policymaking. To effect such a redistribution, they advocate decentralization of large school systems and community control. They no longer accept the values imposed on educational systems by middle-class reformers of past decades, whose purpose was the separation of education from partisan politics. The new reformers argue that traditional reform values, laudable within the context of their original purpose, answer neither the needs of the 1970s nor the interests of a powerless, uninvolved population. Moreover, the ends sought by middle-class reform tradition-standardized procedures, merit promotions, appointment through objective examinations, specialization of function, and centralized leadership—are now considered instruments which maintain the system. They are a means of excluding the community from the system and they are contributory factors in the failure to educate ghetto children. The frustration that has resulted from the professionalization and political insulation of city school systems stems from the way in which these devices are used to close off access to the centers of decision-making. The poor, increasingly alienated from the institutions of society which fail them, find access routes blocked and turn in frustration either to apathy or to militancy. The educational system is not alone in the trend toward over-centralization and over-professionalization. The logical response to these circumstances is the call for broader-based public involvement and community control of urban institutions.

The Case for Decentralization and Community Control

Those who support decentralization and community control of the schools criticize centralized decision-making because they believe it excludes those elements that are essential to a workable system, the parents and the community (Gittell & Hevesi, 1969). They deny the validity of "professionalism" as the criterion upon which a power system should be based. To them, "professionalism" has come to mean bureaucracy in its most rigid form. This, in turn, has resulted in the alienation of parents, community, and students. Community control does not mean an abandonment of professional competence in school administration. Rather, it means that a wider public will participate in policymaking, setting the general direction of educational policy in its community. Advocates of this position recognize that professions with skills and expertise are of primary importance in policy determination, but they suggest that professionals should not maintain complete control because they tend to become self-serving. Hence, a central goal of the proponents of decentralization is the revision of existing mechanisms of professional dominance—such as the rigid merit system and the civil service examination—which restrict access to positions of responsibility. These restrictions bar those who, despite their demonstrated ability to contribute to the education of children, are unable to meet the "objective," culture-laden standards (Gross, 1958).

Supporters of community control also recognize that the administration of education on a centralized city-wide basis deters the adjustment of educational programs to particular local needs. There are, they suggest, compelling problems which arise from cultural pluralism that can no longer be ignored. These issues

cannot be approached through educational policies which emanate from a single source, geared to a median level of performance of hundreds of thousands of students.

Opposition to Community Control

Opposition to community control comes from several areas and is founded on several rationales. Many have concluded that decentralization and community control constitute the radical proposals of a militant minority intent on challenging American traditions. They do not believe increased public participation in policymaking will aid the solutions to school problems. They remain pessimistic about the stimulation of broader involvement under any circumstances. Studies of the distribution of urban power by social scientists generally reinforce that position because they rationalize elitist control in functional areas. Social scientists are satisfied that such a structure meets the demands of a pluralist system because the elites are multiple and do not overlap. They have abandoned the notion of a participatory system and serve to defend the existing structure. These social scientists ignore the possibility that the failure of cities to make necessary adjustments for the resolution of growing racial problems is related to a failure of the multiple-elite structure. An increasing number of groups oppose community control because they believe it abandons the struggle for integration. This position engenders much sympathy. Yet, all the data point to both the failure of integration and the intensification of segregation in every major city. The argument is, at best, well intentioned (Havighurst, 1964).

Interestingly, many of the groups which bitterly fought attempts at integration in cities throughout the country now invoke integration as an argument against community control. Faced with this argument, advocates of community control claim that integration is much more likely to occur when the poor are better able to compete in society—that is, when they reach a level of security on a par with the middle-class. Then, and only then, will the white middle-class begin to accept integration with black people. Some supporters of community control do not accept the argument that decentralization is incompatible with effective integration. A central school agency must exercise the power to adjust school-district lines in a manner designed to attain a level of racial balance that conforms to the court decision. A decentralized school system, legally, has the same sanction to integrate as has a centralized school system. The key issue still is—as it has

always been—the desire and the ability to integrate.

Opponents of community control and decentralization also

fear it will lead to parochialism. Proponents of decentralization counter with the argument that local decision-making may well produce greater conflict among groups in the local community. Because local control can be a technique for developing community identity and the encouragement of active participation in the institutions of a community, it is likely to foster greater diversity. Such a development can, however, be helpful for disadvantaged groups who share common feelings of alienation, mistrust, frustration, and helplessness. Parents and community representatives, for example, in New York City's three experimental decentralization districts have taken a much greater interest in their schools since the experiments in community participation began. In each of the districts-and all are in poverty areas-voter turnout in school board elections has been relatively high, attendance at school meetings is surprisingly large, and an identity with the schools is now voiced by parents for the first time (Gittell & Hevesi, 1969).

Experience in New York City

New York City has been a model of reform in education for other cities. Judging by past experience, events in New York City will be a signal for action in other cities. In 1966, the movement for community control of urban public schools was initiated by East Harlem parents and community leaders about one school, Intermediate School 201. During the past three years, New York City schools have proved a battleground for pro- and anticommunity control forces. A black lay clientele found itself fighting a union of white professionals over who should run the schools. The most recent event has been a state decentralization law which grants little to an urban public and much to the school professionals. It remains to be seen whether this decentralization bill will prove to be the final word on the subject. The New York experience is the most viable case study of urban school reform and should be examined closely. However, New York City should only serve as a model for other cities so they can avert the consequences of the status quo politics which produced conflict and polarization. It is well, therefore, to project some of the trends which are likely to materialize in large city school systems from the evidence accumulated in the school reform movement in New York City from 1967-1969 (Berube & Gittell, 1969). That movement can be analyzed in three phases. The 1968 legislative session was phase one, the Fall school strike phase two, and the 1969 legislative session was phase three.

Phase I: The Initial Plan for Community Participation. In the Fall of 1967, a plan for community participation and school decen-

tralization emerged from the Bundy Plan in New York City (Mayor's Advisory Panel, 1969). Important elements of the plan were largely contained in legislation recommended by the New

York State Board of Regents in the 1968 legislative session.

Both the Bundy and the Regents' plans called for the election of local boards of education in districts throughout New York City (the Bundy Plan called for 30-45 districts; the Regents' legislation, 10 large and 20 smaller special districts) which would have some budget, personnel, and curriculum powers. Both plans provided for retention of a central city education agency to set standards, control capital budget expenditures, and provide other central services. The City Board of Examiners would be eliminated, making appointment and promotion procedures more flexible. New York City schoolmen were alarmed by the prospects of these changes. The president of the Board of Education, the sole dissenting member of the Bundy Panel, sharply criticized the Bundy report: "Serious problems must arise in re-casting, in one single stroke the largest educational system in the world." The professional groups joined in the charge of a "balkanization" of the city system, arguing that the plan would also impede school integration and would be a substitute for needed government spending in the schools. Neither the union nor its new colleague, the CSA (Council of Supervisory Associations), spared expense in their attempts to defeat the passage of a decentralization bill based on the Bundy Plan.

On the other hand, the pro-decentralization forces, which lacked tight organizational direction and unlimited funds, were hampered in their attempts to pressure for a meaningful bill. For example, the two most influential civic organizations, the United Parents Association and the Public Education Association, presented their own drafts of a decentralization bill that departed significantly from the Bundy model. The net effect of the various ideological differences among black and white reform groups was

to enfeeble their collective strength.

A compromise bill, worked out by the State Commissioner of Education (Allen) and the State Board of Regents, renewed hope that the legislature would pass a strong measure. In addition to the mayor, the bill had the support of the governor, the state commissioner of education, and the regents. There was a minimum of legislative support for it. The more liberal or reform city Democrats and the few black legislators were a small coalition which operated for passage of legislation. Most of the legislators were ill-informed on decentralization and were susceptible to pressure from the various groups which lobby in the capitol.

Although the governor had indicated his support for the bill

privately and publicly, he made no effort to move it through the legislature during the session. The mayor's strategy seemed designed to limit his leadership in the undertaking. The support coalition lacked any decisive leadership; confusion and difference

of point of view were constantly evident.

Three demonstration districts were created by the Board of Education in June, 1967. These districts became symbolic elements of decentralization from their inception. The controversies which surrounded these districts were used to undermine the movement toward a city-wide plan. The involuntary transfer of 19 staff members in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville district was effectively used as an argument against decentralization. The 1968 legislature approved the Marchi Bill which provided for expansion of the Board of Education from 9 to 13 members (allowing for a pro-decentralization board to be appointed) and allowed the Board to establish an interim decentralization plan until the 1969 legislative session. This effectively delayed action until 1969.

Phase II: Strike Action Against Community Control. In the Fall of 1968, phase two of the extended school strike action struggle saw the city's schools closed for thirty-six days. Ostensibly this was a United Federation of Teachers (UFT) reaction to the failure to settle the involuntary transfer in Ocean Hill to their satisfaction. Escalation of the conflict produced more intense polarization on the decentralization question. Through the strike, opponents to community control enlisted the support of labor and the Jewish

community (Berube & Gittell, 1969).

The opposition suggested that extremism would be a byproduct of community control. The union had insisted during the strike that abolition of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville district would be a quid pro quo for settlement. They did achieve temporary suspension of the local governing board. Abolition of the demonstration districts became a demand. The union and the CSA joined forces to retain the Board of Examiners (the promotion agency which the UFT had formerly prepared to abolish) and to abolish the demonstration districts in the 1969 legislative session. Hope for achieving any effective decentralization plan was greatly reduced, although the new Board of Education submitted a rather strong plan for consideration. That plan called for 33 local districts, locally elected. Each district would have appointment powers and the Board of Examiners would be abolished. Local budget powers would be limited, but the districts would control curriculum policy.

Phase III: A Legislative Blow Against Decentralization. The politics of decentralization in 1969 reflected the accumulation of good

and bad will engendered by the Fall strike. The new Board of Education, with a majority of the members committed to decentralization, did not provide the new strength for a better organized campaign. In a sense, they became another target for the pro-

fessional and labor coalition.

The state legislation passed in the last day of a delayed 1969 session accomplished for the UFT-CSA what these organizations were unable to achieve by the thirty-six day city-wide school strike. The bill not only abolished the three experimental school districts, but also provided a series of protective devices to guarantee centralization and professionalism. The further accomplishment of removing the first pro-decentralization city Board of Education added to the total success of the re-centralization forces. The replacement of that board first with an interim board, appointed by the Borough Presidents for 14 months, assured added protection to the school professionals. It provided the city with a relatively weak Board of Education. The interim board (a new board was scheduled for election in May, 1970) controlled the setting of school district boundaries. This is an essential determinant of the character of the local district boards which were to be elected in February, 1970. Current school population data under present district boundaries indicate that black and Puerto Rican populations represent a majority in 17 of the 30 districts, or 20 of 33 districts. Shrewd gerrymandering can reduce that control to five or six districts.

Further evidence of the protective aspects of the 1969 bill (i.e., protective of the status quo) are the restrictive provisions regarding personnel appointments. Local boards will have virtually no control over personnel. The new legislation prevents any flexibility and appears to lock-in the present procedures more effectively. It prevents merged lists for principals and requires that all names on the present list be assigned by April, 1970. Many cities have used the merged list as a means to increase the appointment of black administrators; New York City is now prohibited from moving in that direction. It is likely that the legislation virtually closes off appointments of black administrators for at least five years. The bill also provides that any future list of eligibles must be exhausted before new lists can be prepared; this provision will prevent the city from breaking new ground in this area. Transfers of personnel are more difficult to accomplish under the legislation because restrictive provisions are now written into law and appeals machinery is more intricate and detailed. The community superintendent cannot transfer personnel within his own district unless certain school utilization criteria are in question. This provision in itself violates the essence of decentralization, as well as any concept of community control. The matters usually reserved for the union contract and negotiation have now been written into law.

The only assumed concession on personnel is the possibility that certain districts (those whose reading scores fall in the lowest 40 percent) may appoint teachers who have passed the National Teachers Examination and scored within the average grade of the five largest cities. The city teachers' examination remains intact and central assignment of teachers is otherwise retained. Discretion in the assignment of teachers is severely limited. If one considers this new provision a concession by the United Federation of Teachers, it should be noted that the UFT has always supported the use of the National Teachers Examination as a basis of qualification. The law continues the Board of Examiners and their major role of qualifying teachers. The only change in that procedure is that the Chancellor (Superintendent) is now a member of the board.

All budget powers outlined in the legislation are advisory only, and provide no discretion to the community board about priorities. The local boards are, however, to be consulted on budget requests and their unamended requests are to be submitted with the central budget to the mayor for review. A \$250,000 local fund for repairs and maintenance remains controlled by closed competitive city bidding procedures for all contracts over \$2500.

Although the advisory role of local community boards on site selection and expense and capital budgets has been expanded, full discretion remains in the hands of the central city board and

the Planning Commission.

The election procedures established for the city-wide board and the local boards contrast sharply. They show the political manipulation encouraged by the legislation. With borough-wide elections of single board members, the role of minority groups is completely undermined. The majority of the city school population is now black and Puerto Rican, yet these groups cannot effectively exercise political power in borough elections. Undoubtedly, that was the intention of the bill. Financing of elections is unrestricted. That provision should give the UFT carte blanche to finance campaigns and control the people with whom they must negotiate their contract. The first act of the interim board (without the mayor's appointees) was to negotiate the new teachers contract in the spring of 1969. The new contract which has been negotiated and the legislation should close the system off to any meaningful innovation for the next several years.

The local election procedure in contrast to the city-wide

procedure is highly complex and guarantees local minority group conflict. Those most astute (the political club houses) will certainly be able to control the results of the local board elections. No local resident can serve as a board member if he or she is employed by the district. All community people working as paraprofessionals in the schools are eliminated as potential candidates. A restrictive clause automatically removes board members who miss three successive local board meetings. No such provision is prescribed for the central board or any other board in the city.

The support and protection of centralization in the legislation is further reflected in the reduced flexibility of local boards. There is no question but that the minimal progress made by the demonstration districts in this direction is eroded by the bill. All outside funding must be centrally approved and funds are channeled through the central agency and the comptroller's office. Textbooks must be chosen from a centrally approved list. All local decisions on instructional materials and, therefore, curriculum must have central approval. Examinations are centrally prepared and evaluated. The central office can change or install new programs in the local district at any time. It can also adjust local boundaries at whim and remove local personnel.

The establishment of uniform districts of 20,000 minimum school population creates a further limit on experimentation and local prerogative. This provision was directed toward the abolition of the three demonstration school districts which were established only two years ago. All of the programs and personnel appointed by those districts will be lost under the legislation without consideration of their value or accomplishment. Such a direct affront to these communities without consultation or official evaluation gives further evidence of the lack of sensitivity to com-

munity interests or needs.

The failure to achieve meaningful decentralization in New York City after three years of concerted action suggests a serious inability to adjust institutions to current needs and an obvious unwillingness to redistribute power in the system.

Conclusions

Decentralization-community control is an attempt to achieve school reform while retaining the basic framework of public education. For many of those who have been engaged in the struggles repeated failure suggests that nothing short of complete demolition of the system can work. Alternate independent systems (private schools) become increasingly more appealing to those who feel compelled to by-pass the constraints of union and bureaucracy. Things may get worse before they can get better. If they do,

there will be an increasing sentiment for more radical solutions and an unwillingness to compromise with the present structure.

In any policymaking structure, critical processes involve the adjustment of differences, compromise, and conflict of goals. The groups, themselves, are viewed in terms of their own leadership and membership, their resources and resourcefulness. Their pursuit of goals is based on advantage to be gained. The United Federation of Teachers, for example, has great resources to draw upon in the city community—in the form of general public support, union allegiances, and direct pressure on the mayor. The resources of particular groups or individuals, and the way they are used, are essential factors in evaluating power. A key resource in urban communities appears to be professional expertise. The education bureaucracy has become virtually self-contained, sealed by its special training and knowledge. It has expanded its role by treating educational issues as though these were wholly dependent upon expert judgment, which it alone is competent to make. Teachers and lower level staff have also utilized this technique successfully, challenging any differences in judgment as naive or inexpert. Earlier conflicts throughout the country between school boards and superintendents reflected the struggle which ensued from the growing importance of professionalism as a viable resource of the education bureaucracy. The more recent conflict between school professionals and the ghetto community is an extension of the battle.

REFERENCES

- AGGER, R. Political research as political action. In R. Cahill and S. P. Hencley (Eds.), The politics of education in the local community. Danville, Ill.: Interstate Printers and Publishers, 1964.
- Almond, G., & Verba, S. The civic culture. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1965. Banfield, E. C. Political influence. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961.
- Berube, M., & Gittell, M. (Eds.) Confrontation at Ocean Hill-Brownsville. New York: Praeger, 1969.
- Dahl, R. Who governs? Democracy and power in an American city. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.
- Gerth, H., & Mills, C. From Max Weber: Essays in sociology. New York: Oxford Univer. Press, 1946.
- GITTELL, M. Participants and participation: A study of school policy in New York. New York: Praeger, 1967.
- GITTELL, M., & HEVESI, A. G. (Eds.) The politics of urban education. New York:
 Praeger, 1969.
- GITTELL, M., & HOLLANDER, T. E. Six urban school districts: A comparative study of Gross Missian Institutional response. New York: Praeger, 1968.
- GROSS, N. Who runs our schools? New York: Wiley, 1958.

 HAVIGHURST, R. J. The public schools of Chicago. Chicago: The Board of Education of the City of Chicago. 1964.

MAYOR'S ADVISORY PANEL ON DECENTRALIZATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY SCHOOLS.

Reconnection for learning—A community school system for New York City. New York:

Praeger, 1969.

SAYRE, W., & KAUFMAN, H. Governing New York City. New York: Russell Sage

Foundation, 1960.

The Poverty Board: Some Consequences of "Maximum Feasible Participation"

Louis A. Zurcher, Jr. The University of Texas

The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 inaugurated the War Against Poverty and established the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). Under a section providing for the development of local community action programs, the act stated that such programs were to be "developed, conducted, and administered with the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups to be served." Both the

A revised version of this paper will appear as Chapter 5 in the author's forthcoming book, "Poverty Warriors: The Human Experience of Planned Social Intervention."

¹This research was supported by the Office of Economic Opportunity (Grant 66-9744), and was conducted while the author was a staff member of the Division of Social Science Research, The Menninger Foundation, Topeka, Kansas. The cooperation of Robert C. Harder and Simon Martinez, both for merly with the Topeka Office of Economic Opportunity, is gratefully acknowledged. The author also expresses his appreciation to William Simons, Susan Zurcher, Fred Hill, Rosanne Barnhill, Basil Keiser, and Janice Boldridge for their research assistance; and to Drs. William Key, James Taylor, Gardner Murphy, Ivan Belknap, Charles Bonjean, and Norval Glenn for their helpful comments. Final analysis of the data and manuscript preparation were supported by a great from The University of ed by a grant from The Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, The University of Texas, Dr. Robert Sutherland, Director. Without the generous cooperation of the members of the Economic Opportunity Board of Shawnee County, Kansas, Incorporated, the study would not have been possible.

origin and meaning of that mandate were, at least initially, rather unclear (Rubin, 1967). As the act was implemented across the nation, ad hoc interpretations of the degree and kind of participation open to the poor engendered dramatic controversy, particularly concerning the representation, selection, and decision-making power of the poor on the policy-formulating "poverty boards" which governed local community action programs (Carter, 1966; Cloward, 1965; Congressional Digest, 1966; Klein, 1964; Knoll & Whitcover, 1965 a, b; Sanford, 1965; Selover, 1966 a, b). Congress subsequently attempted to resolve how many poor constituted "maximum feasible participation" by amending the Economic Opportunity Act, and declaring that no community action program would be funded unless at least one-third of its board membership were representatives of the poor (Economic Opportunity Amendment, 1966). At the same time, Congress attempted to clarify criteria for board membership, specifying that "the representatives of the poor shall be selected by the residents of areas of concentration of poverty, with special emphasis on participation by residents of the area who are poor."

Rubin suggests that the "maximum feasible participation" idea had a social history prior to its becoming a legislative mandate (1967). Involvement of the beneficiaries in program determination, emphases upon "self-help," and the importance of local autonomy and responsibility were all conceptual cornerstones and practical realities in, for example: the U.S. projects for underdeveloped countries (Kuenstler, 1958; Shamin, 1959), the militant civil rights movement (Wheeler, 1966), and domestic community development programs such as those of Saul Alinsky (Silberman, 1964; Ridgeway, 1965; Riessman, 1966), the Ford Foundation (1964 a, b), Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited and Mobili-

zation for Youth (Federal Delinquency Program, 1962).

Social Psychological Values in Participation

The framers of the Economic Opportunity Act, several of whom had been associated with programs listed above, at least implicitly assumed that "maximum feasible participation" of the poor in OEO community action programs would have both instrumental and social-psychological results over and above the benefits of expanded and improved services. The impact of participation would be instrumental in the sense that numbers of the poor united in social action would provide the political and strategic leverage necessary to open closed opportunity structures. The impact would be social-psychological in the sense that active and meaningful involvement in programs which get results would foster changes in participant self-concept, motivational structure,

and in fact "change the poor who are produced by the system [Moynihan, 1965]." This paper will be concerned with the latter of the two assumptions—with hypotheses generated from the expectation for social-psychological changes among participants

in OEO community action programs.

A number of experimental small group studies, not directly concerned with the poor or poverty intervention, have demonstrated in general that a member's experience of meaningful influence in group decision tends to strengthen his satisfaction with membership, enhance his self-image, and facilitate changes in his attitudes (Coch & French, 1948; Lewin, 1947; Levine & Butler,

1952; Maier, 1950; Preston & Heintz, 1949).

Recently, a paper by Gottesfeld and Dozier (1966) reported an empirical measurement of social-psychological change among a sample of poor people as a function of their active participation in an OEO community action program. The authors found a statistically significant decrease in feelings of powerlessness as measured by Rotter's (1966) I-E Scale, showed an association of that decrease with length of service as an indigenous community organizer, and interpreted their overall findings to indicate "that the aims of community action programs in making the poor more hopeful and ambitious about what they can do in their own behalf are being realized."

Some Hypotheses about Representatives of the Poor

The research upon which the present paper is based included as subjects the membership of an OEO poverty board, and tested two primary hypotheses: (1) Board members who were representatives of the poor would differ significantly from members who were not representatives of the poor in social-psychological variables, often associated with socio-economic status, which are indicative of their general sense of competence and confidence vis à vis society, broadly defined. (2) As a result of their participation in the decision-making processes of the board and its associated committees, the representatives of the poor would show significant changes in those social-psychological variables.

More specifically, it was hypothesized that board members who were representatives of the poor would be significantly lower than the other board members in membership in voluntary associations, in formal education, activism, achievement orientation, and future orientation—as well as, of course, annual family income. Representatives of the poor should be higher in anomie, integration with relatives, isolation, normlessness, powerlessness, alienation, and particularism (Beiser, 1965; Bell, 1957; Haggstrom, 1964; Herzog, 1963; LeShan, 1952; Lewis, 1961,

1966; McClosky & Schaar, 1965; Miller, 1965; Riessman, 1966; Rosen & D'Andrade, 1959; Simpson & Miller, 1963; Sjoberg, Brymer, & Farris, 1966; Stone, Leighton, & Leighton, 1966; Strauss, 1962; Wright & Hyman, 1958). It was also hypothesized that, for representatives of the poor, participation would be associated with significant increases in activism, achievement orientation, and future orientation, and with significant decreases in anomie, integration with relatives, isolation, normlessness, powerlessness, alienation, and particularism. No significant changes were hypothesized for the participating board members who were not representatives of the poor.

It was further hypothesized that for the poor the degree of change on the variables to be measured would be related to the quality of participation, length of participation, and willingness

to continue participation.

Setting for the Study

On May 1, 1965, the Topeka (Kansas) Welfare Planning Council, a volunteer citizens group with a demonstrated interest in local social problems, was awarded a community action planning grant by the Office of Economic Opportunity, Washington, D.C. (OEO). The council summarily established and staffed the Topeka Office of Economic Opportunity (TOEO), which was to be the "community action agency" responsible for developing and administering assorted poverty projects available under the Economic Opportunity Act.

The Welfare Planning Council and Topeka OEO staff together designed a committee complex intended to involve a wide representation of the Topeka citizenry, poor and not poor. The committee complex included three major types: study committees, neighborhood committees, and the Economic Opportunity

Board.

Eleven study committees, each dealing with a specific topic (e.g., employment, housing, recreation, etc.), were to assess community needs and resources, and to make appropriate recommendations concerning future poverty programming. Committee members were to be topic specialists and low-income area representatives, and each committee was to have its own officers.

The council and Topeka OEO staff had designated twelve "Target Neighborhoods" in sections of the city which manifested indices of poverty. Each target neighborhood was to have a target neighborhood committee, whose members and elected officers would be area residents. The target neighborhood committees were to serve as forums for the expression of neighborhood needs and problems.

The third committee component was to be the Economic Opportunity Board; it would be the central decision-making body for the Topeka poverty program. The voting members of the board were to be: the chairman of study committees, the chairmen and vice-chairmen of target neighborhood committees, and representatives from local government, agencies, businesses, and professions, and from religious, civic, and civil rights groups. As initially structured, the board was to have a maximum of seventyfive voting members, of whom at least one-third were to be representatives of the poor. When functionally possible, the board was to be incorporated, the Topeko OEO staff were to become its employees, and the Welfare Planning Council was to terminate its role as a steering body. The board then would have general responsibility for planning, developing, implementing, and coordinating subsequent OEO poverty projects (Topeka OEO Report, 1966; Zurcher, 1968).

By October, 1965, the committee complex was functioning, sixty-four member slots had been allotted, the board had been incorporated, and several poverty projects were being formulated.

The planners of the Topeka poverty program had deliberately designed the committee complex to attract diverse community representation, and particularly to provide opportunity for involvement of the poor in all aspects of the program. They anticipated that "community action programs would be generated and articulated by the low income person, not for the low income person," and that such participation would develop "leadership and confidence" among the participating poor, who should consequently "begin to assume a more active and creative part in society [Topeka OEO Report, 1966]." Participation in the program, especially in the decision-making processes of the Economic Opportunity Board, was viewed by the planners as an "important means" for the poor "to become middle class," not only in material resources but in attitudes and orientations as well (Zurcher & Key, 1967).

Method of Study

Observations, Records, and Interviews. In September, 1965, the author began a study of the Topeka OEO poverty intervention organization and its impact for individual and social change. As part of that broader research, the author and a minimum of three research staff members attended as non-participating observers all of the board's meetings (nineteen regular and seventeen executive sessions) from its incorporation in October, 1965, until the completion of the study in May, 1967. Member statements, interactions, and emotional tones were independently noted by each

observer and his record subsequently compared with those of the other observers and with official board records for accuracy, validity, and reliability. Formal, open-ended interviews were conducted at least twice with all board members; the key participants were informally interviewed as many as one hundred times. Research staff had ample opportunity for close and sustained contact with board members, particularly the Target Neighborhood Officers, both in and out of board sessions.

Questionnaire Data. In November, 1966, after the research staff agreed that more noticeable research intervention would not be disruptive to board dynamics, a questionnaire was administered individually to board members. In addition to biographical items and questions assessing extent of program participation, the

questionnaire included the following scales:

(a) Kahl Activism Scale (1965)—sense of mastery over the physical and social environment.

(b) Srole Anomie Scale (1956)—social malintegration; the internalized counterpart of social dysfunction.

(c) Kahl Integration with Relatives Scale (1965)—degree of dependence upon family.

(d) Rosen Achievement Value Orientation Scale (1956)—value for and motivation toward academic and occupational achievement, particularly regarding striving for status through social mobility.

(e) Future Orientation Items—three items drawn from the Kahl Activism Scale which, based upon face validity, were taken to indicate willingness to plan for the future: (1) Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself; (2) How important is it to know clearly in advance your plans for the future; (3) Planning only makes a person unhappy since your plans hardly ever work out anyway.

(f) Dean Isolation Subscale (1961)—feeling of separation from the majority group or its standards.

(g) Dean Normlessness Subscale (1961)—feeling of purposelessness; absence of values that might give direction to life.

(h) Dean Powerlessness Subscale (1961)—feeling of helplessness; inability to understand or influence the events upon which one depends.

(i) Dean Alienation Scale (1961)—sum total of Isolation, Normlessness, and Powerlessness Subscales; taken to indicate a general syndrome of alienation.

(j) Stouffer-Toby Role Conflict Scale (1951)—value orientation toward institutionalized obligations of friendship (particularism) versus value orientation toward institutionalized obligations to society (universalism).

A few of the items measuring activism, anomie, achievement orientation, or future orientation were identical on two or more of these scales. In the present study, such items appeared only

once on the questionnaire, but were scored as appropriate for each scale. All questionnaire items were randomly ordered. Questionnaire responses from the initial administration were analyzed for significant differences between members who were representatives of the poor and those who were not.

To test the hypotheses of participation-stimulated member change in variables measured by the scales, the questionnaire was re-administered (Administration II) in May, 1967, to board members who had responded to Administration I. Scale scores resulting from the two administrations were compared for significant

indices of change.

Based upon observational and interview data, the quality of member participation (i.e., attendance, activity, leadership, offices held, etc.) in board and associated meetings was assessed. Upon concurrence by research staff, board members were classified as either "Active" or "Inactive" participants, and respondents in those categories compared for differences and changes in scale scores. Since some of the Administration I respondents who had resigned or been eliminated from board membership nonetheless agreed to respond to Administration II, "stayers" were compared with "leavers" for differences and changes in scale scores.

Analyses of Administration I and Administration II vs. I responses by sex, ethnic group, and board member sub-type were performed and are introduced when relevant. Scale scores were intercorrelated; the matrices are presented.

Results and Discussion

Portrait of the Poverty Board

Sixty-one board members completed questionnaires for Administration I. Of the respondents, twenty-three were target neighborhood committee officers (representatives of the poor, hereafter TNOs); thirty-eight were government or agency officials, businessmen, professionals, religious and civic leaders, etc. (Non-TNOs). Of the TNOs, twelve were male and eleven were semale; eight were Anglo-American, ten were Negro-American, three were Mexican-American, and two were American Indian. The median annual family income for TNOs was \$3000 to \$5000, with 44% earning less than \$3000 annually; median level of formal education was high school graduate, with 40% being high school drop-outs. Of the Non-TNOs, thirty-four were male and four were female; thirty-two were Anglo-American, three were Negro-American, and three were Mexican-American. The median annual family income was \$7000+; the median level of formal education was college graduate, with 45% having done graduate work. Differences between TNO and Non-TNO median annual family income, level of formal education, and membership in voluntary associations (TNO = 2; Non-TNO = 4) were each statistically significant (p < .01). TNO medians for age (46 yrs.), board attendance (4 meetings), length of Topeka residency (29 yrs.), and time as board member (8 months) did not differ significantly from Non-TNO medians for age (43 yrs.), board attendance (4 meetings), length of Topeka residency (21 yrs.), and time as board member (10 months).

TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF TNO AND NON-TNO
MEDIAN SCALE SCORES FOR ADMINISTRATION I

	$(\mathcal{N}=61)$	STATE OF STA	ME DOLL	
Scale	TNO $(N = 23)$	Non-TNO (N = 38)	Sign.	
Activism	17.0	18.5	p < .01	
Anomie	6.0	4.0	p < .01	
Integration with Relatives	2.5	2.0	NS	
Achievement Orientation	15.0	17.0	p < .01	
Future Orientation	9.0	10.0	p < .05	
Isolation	16.0	13.0	p < .01	
Normlessness	10.0	6.0	p < .01	
Powerlessness	15.0	12.0	p < .01	
Alienation	40.0	32.0	p < .01	
Particularism	1.5	0.0	p < .02	

Not used as Guttman Scales.

Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test, one-tailed. The Wilcoxon Test was used as a measure of change because of the smorgasbord of scales employed, and the uncertainty about their interval qualities.

Table 1 reveals striking and consistent differences between TNOs and Non-TNOs in the social-psychological variables as measured by Administration I. The differences are statistically significant in the directions expected. That is, TNOs scored lower than Non-TNOs in activism, achievement orientation, and future orientation, but higher than Non-TNOs in anomie, isolation, normlessness, powerlessness, alienation, and particularism.

There are over one thousand OEO poverty boards distributed throughout the United States. Topeka's Economic Opportunity Board is assumed to be fairly typical of the others, though it has a larger membership than most. At minimum, boards are similar in that they all must have no less than one-third of their members representative of and selected by residents in poverty areas. Since the balance of members usually is drawn from higher socio-

differences, paralleling those manifested in the Economic Opportunity Board and presented in Table 1, will exist among the total membership of a given board. What effects would such differences have upon board dynamics, particularly the processes of decision-making? How might such differences influence member perceptions of one another, and perceptions of board means and ends? Poverty boards have been characterized as "conflict ridden." To what extent is such conflict a function of disparate member definitions of the situation, influenced by differing attitudes toward self-in-society?

Observations of Economic Opportunity Board meetings and interviews with the participants revealed patterns of member behavior which reflected TNO/Non-TNO differences in scale variables. The following are some examples of issues around which debate, sometimes heated, centered during early board meetings. The scale variable which seems most closely related to each issue is parenthetically indicated.

Pessimism of Representatives of the Poor

Differences between the initial attitudes of TNOs and Non-TNOs are shown in Table 2. Non-TNOs appeared quite tolerant of program delays endemic to the bureaucratic process, and ar-

TABLE 2
DIFFERING VIEWS OF POVERTY BOARD REPRESENTATIVES

A Maria and a liver	Representatives of the Poor (TNOs)	Middle Class Representatives (Non-TNOs)			
View of Program's Success	Initially pessimistic about mean- ingfulness of their participation.	Optimistic about the program.			
Activism	Felt their efforts would most likely not bring results.	Confident that their efforts would bring beneficial results to the community.			
Anomie	Felt most local officials did not care about the poor. Officials in general were guilty until proven innocent.	Believed their participation on the board would be meaningful. Believed community officials wanted to help with the programs and wanted to invite their participation.			
Achievement Orientation	At first uncertain that the system could be changed. Wary about exerting the energy the program called for, since rewards at that time were unclear.	Conviction that, with dedicated and concentrated work, those community forces which perpetuated poverty could be changed and the local program could be made into the best in the country.			

gued for the importance of "long-range programming," "feasibility studies," etc. TNOs seemed markedly impatient with such delays and insisted upon "action now" (Future Orientation). Non-TNOs tended to identify with the community as a whole and wanted to link the board with as many other community components as workable. TNOs seemed often to indicate perception of a "have versus have-not" or an "us versus them" struggle and, at the onset, to avoid identifying with the community (Isolation). Non-TNOs tended to believe that if the board conformed to OEO standards, if they met the criteria for community need, and if their applications were prepared according to rules and regulations specified by OEO, they could with some confidence expect grants for additional local poverty projects (contingent, of course, upon availability of federal funds). TNOs, on the other hand, did not initially seem willing to invest the rules, regulations, criteria, or procedures with purposeful value, nor to accept the relative predictability of outcome from conformity to those norms (Normlessness). Non-TNOs appeared to be satisfied with their degree of individual influence in board decision-making processes and with the potential impact of those decisions for community change. TNOs did not seem to feel that board action would change much for the poor, nor that their own influence within board decisionmaking processes was significant (Powerlessness). Non-TNOs tended to accept other board members or cooperating officials on the basis of title and to encourage the impartial and objective hiring of program staff. TNOs tended to favor evaluation of others not on the basis of title but rather according to "what kind of guy he was," and to insist that one should give jobs to people he knew or to whom he was related (Particularism) (Segalman, 1967; Zurcher, 1970).

Similar issues pivotal to controversy and debate might be expected in other poverty boards where TNOs (or their counterparts) and Non-TNOs significantly differ in social-psychological variables such as those measured in this study. Also, it might be anticipated that, as was the case in the Economic Opportunity Board, Non-TNOs will tend to dominate the early meetings—perhaps not advertently but by virtue of their familiarity with, and skills and attitudes related to, the structure and functions of

formal meetings.

The differences between TNOs and Non-TNOs presented in Table 1 illustrate the complex task confronting an OEO community action agency like the Topeka OEO. If the agency has implemented the federal mandate, it will have populated its poverty board with poor and not poor, and thus probably will have established a social situation in which conflict is inevitable. Such

conflict certainly is intended to have social benefit and to have potential for engendering social change (Coser, 1956; Lane, 1966). But it is nonetheless conflict, and the community action agency is expected to be the mediator. The agency, as did the Topeka OEO, would purport to be a "bridge" between the TNOs and Non-TNOs and attempt to coordinate their efforts in the board and acquire consensus concerning ways and means of poverty programming. Thus, particularly in the beginning phases of board operation, the community action agency staff may find themselves attempting to relate to and satisfy the demands of both poor and not poor members, possibly to the satisfaction of neither (Zurcher, 1967 a).

Importance of Considering Process as Well as Content

TNO/Non-TNO differences highlight the fact that board dynamics can represent much more than the manifest aspects of program content. The dynamics can reflect a fission or fusion of world views and the travails of socialization. The experience of board process, particularly for TNOs, may be more meaningful

(or frustrating) than the content of board proceedings.

OEO training programs for community action agency staff and board members might profit from including in their curricula not only discussions of poverty program content and formal roles for participants, but discussions of participant interaction, perceptions, and process experiences. Another point for training discussion, and a research hypothesis as well, would be that the kinds of social-psychological differences which exist between TNOs and Non-TNOs might obtain between TNOs and those poverty area residents who are not OEO indigenous leaders or who are not participating in OEO activities. Patterns of issue-related conflicts among those groups might parallel conflicts seen between

TNO and Non-TNO board members (Zurcher, 1966).

Further analyses revealed that TNO males differed significantly (p < .05) from TNO females only on the isolation scale (male median, 14; female median, 18.5) and in reported annual family income (male median between \$3000 and \$5000; female median between zero and \$3000). There were no significant differences between male and female Non-TNOs. Significant (p < .05) ethnic differences were found among TNO medians for activism (Anglo-American, 17.5; Negro-American, 16.0; Mexican-American, 16.5; and American Indian, 14), for normlessness (AA, 8; NA, 10; MA, 13; and AI, 14.5), and for powerlessness (AA, 15; NA, 17.5; MA, 15; and AI, 12). No significant ethnic differences were found among Non-TNOs; however, even though the number of subjects was quite small within each ethnic subdivision, there was enough scale score variation among the subdivisions to suggest for further research the hypothesis that median TNO scale scores may also be influenced by proportion of ethnic representation. The same hypothesis may be offered for proportion of TNO males and females. If TNO sex and ethnic factors are broadly related to social-psychological variables such as those measured here, then poverty boards might expect such differences to stimulate program issue controversy among TNOs themselves, as well as between TNOs and Non-TNOs. It has been observed that no significant sex nor ethnic differences existed among the Non-TNOs. Again, though the number of subjects was very small, it might cautiously be concluded that the differences in social-psychological variables reported here are more closely related to socio-economic than to sex or ethnic factors, but that the influence of sex and ethnic factors becomes more apparent among the TNO group.

Cluster Analyses of Social Psychological Variables

Table 3 presents correlations among scale variables, income, education, and voluntary associations for all board members in Administration I. As might be expected, activism, achievement orientation, future orientation, annual family income, formal education, and voluntary association membership are positively related to one another and negatively related to anomie, integration with relatives, isolation, normlessness, powerlessness, alienation, and particularism. The latter variables are all positively related. The correlation coefficients among anomie, achievement orientation, and future orientation are inflated by those items which the scales have in common. Similarly, the correlation coefficients signifying the relationship of alienation to each of its subscales (isolation, normlessness, and powerlessness) reflect the representation of the sub-scale items in the total alienation scale score. Since respondents' age was not remarkably related to the other variables it has been omitted from the table.

These data support findings of the originators of the several scales concerning inter-relationships among the specific variables measured and the relationships of the variables to socio-economic level. Also, the data further illustrate the directions of differences

between TNO and Non-TNO board members.

Though the correlations were not statistically significant and were of a very low order, TNO board attendance and time as member were positively related to activism, achievement orientation, and future orientation, and negatively related to isolation, normlessness, and alienation. The relations can not be considered change data, but may have indicated the direction of changes

CORRELATIONS AMONG SCALE VARIABLES, INCOME, EDUCATION, AND VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS (ADMINISTRATION I) ed dus rogges abled

	Edu	1 0 0	
	Inc	20 \$	
	Ali Par Inc	1.1.1.05	
	Pow	21. 21. -16. -10.	
1 S 1 1 1 1	Nor		
The same	Iso		
	Rel Ach Fut Iso	46* 51* 57* - 04 - 04 - 11	en o esta
	Ach	- 72* - 46* - 56* - 13* - 13* - 11*	
1	Ano		
	Act		
	Die of the	ership ; <i>df</i> = 55	
	11	Activism Anomic Integration with Relatives Achievement Orientation Achievement Orientation Tys72*34* Solation Tys80*28 Solation Tys72*34 Tys72*34 Tys72*34 Tys72*34 Tys72*34 Tys72*34 Tys23*25 Tys24 Tys25 Tys24 Tys25 Tys27 Tys28 Tys27 Tys27 Tys28 Tys27 Tys27 Tys27 Tys21 Tys28 Tys27 Tys21 Tys22 Tys21 Tys22 Tys21 Tys23 Tys -	
02.00		with Relation natation natation natation natation nully Inconcation association Pearson	
The same of the same of	18 0 St 15	Activism Anomic Integration with Relatives Achievement Orientation Future Orientation Isolation Normlessness Alienation Particularism Annual Family Income Formal Education Voluntary Association Me Note.—Pearson r; N	
	1	Act And Pow Alice Part For Vol.	

which were taking place as a result of subsequent program participation.

Indices of Change on Second Administration

In May, 1967, the questionnaire was again given to all of the Administration I respondents who were accessible and willing. Forty-three Administration I respondents completed questionnaires for Administration II-eighteen TNOs and twenty-five Non-TNOs. Of the TNOs, seven were male and eleven were female; three were Anglo-American, ten were Negro-American, three were Mexican-American, and two were American Indian. Of the Non-TNOs, twenty-one were male and four were female; twenty-three were Anglo-American and two were Mexican-American. TNO and Non-TNO differences in annual family income, level of formal education, membership in voluntary associations, age, and length of Topeka residency were virtually identical to the differences found in Administration I. Non-TNOs again were significantly higher than TNOs in income, education, and voluntary association membership. The medians for board attendance (TNO = 10 meetings; Non-TNO = 11 meetings) and time as board member (TNO = 17 months; Non-TNO = 20 months) of course increased, but still without significant differences between the two groups.

The board, particularly the Non-TNO representation, had been restructured by March, 1967, as required in amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act. The restructuring at least in part explains the decrease in respondents from among the Non-TNO group. Among the forty-three Administration II respondents are eight TNOs and thirteen Non-TNOs who had terminated board membership at some time subsequent to their having

completed Administration I.

Administration II was conducted to provide indices of change and, unlike Administration I (which included all but three of the board members), cannot be considered a "portrait" of the poverty board. Administration II did not include new board members for whom Administration I data were missing, and thus did not

include all the then current board members.

During the seven months between Administration I and Administration II, twelve board meetings were held, supported by ten meetings of the board's Executive Committee (all TNO chairmen, all study committee chairmen). Each target neighborhood committee met at least monthly, and several of the study committees held three or more meetings. Many board members, particularly TNOs, formally and informally discussed and formulated mulated poverty projects with an assortment of local officials.

The board's agenda included such issues as Head Start, Neighborhood Youth Corps, Day Care Centers, a Beautification Project, an Extension Worker Program, and a Neighborhood Center. Considerable debate and concentrated member interaction focused around the development, implementation, or maintenance of those and other programs, whose total budget approached one million dollars. During the seven months between Administration I and Administration II, therefore, TNOs and Non-TNOs were continually and often deeply involved in board and related activities. More than twice as many board meetings were held during that period than in the previous thirteen months of the board's corporate status. TNO verbal participation in the meetings, as indicated by a statement count, increased steadily throughout the seven months.

Changing Orientation of "Poor" Representatives

Table 4 presents and compares TNO and Non-TNO median scale scores on Administration II with median scale scores for the same respondents on Administration I.

TABLE 4
COMPARISON OF TNO AND NON-TNO ADMINISTRATION II
MEDIAN SCALE SCORES WITH ADMINISTRATION I MEDIAN SCALE
SCORES FOR THE SAME RESPONDENTS (N = 43)

The state of the s		NC(N = 18)		Non-TNO $(N = 25)$				
Scale ^a	Admin II	Admin I	Sign.	Admin II	Admin I	Sign.		
Activism	18.0	16.0	b < .05	19.0	19.0	NS		
Anomie	5.0	6.0	NS	4.0	3.0	NS		
Integration		0.0	110	7.0	3.0	No		
with Relatives	2.5	3.0	NS	2.0	2.0	NS		
Achievement	Street Charles			AND DESCRIPTION OF THE PERSON	2.0	149		
Orientation	16.0	14.5	p < .05	17.0	17.0	NS		
Future	10.0	14.5	P \ .03	17.0	17.0	143		
Orientation	9.0	9.0	NS	10.0	10.0	NS		
Isolation	15.5	16.0	NS	14.0	15.0	The second second		
Normlessness	9.0				AND DESCRIPTION OF THE PARTY OF	NS		
Powerlessness		10.0	NS	6.0	6.0	NS		
All	16.0	15.0	NS	12.0	12.0	NS		
Alienation	41.0	41.5	NS	31.0	32.0	NS		
Particularism	0.0	2.0	p < .05	0.0	0.0	NS		

Not used as Guttman Scales.

Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test, one-tailed.

Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test, two-tailed.

As hypothesized, there were no significant changes among Non-TNOs in the social-psychological variables measured. On the other hand, the directional changes hypothesized for TNOs

seem, with some exceptions, to have been supported. As indicated in Table 4, activism and achievement orientation increased and particularism decreased significantly. Anomie, integration with relatives, isolation, normlessness, and alienation decreased though not significantly. Future orientation remained unchanged. Powerlessness ran counter to the trend of results and increased, though not significantly. The latter finding seems to conflict with Gottesfeld and Dozier's 1966 report of decreased powerlessness among indigenous community organizers, but it must be emphasized that neither the participant experience nor the powerlessness measures used in Gottesfeld's and the present study are necessarily comparable. Dean, the author of the alienation scale of which powerlessness is a component, reminds his reader that

alienation may be situationally influenced (Dean, 1961).

At Administration II, TNOs were generally favorably disposed toward the board and its related activities. They had seen some accomplishments, recognized program potentials, were aware of and generally agreed with board goals, and felt very much a part of the board. Such experiences certainly influenced their hypotheses-supporting responses in Administration II. However, they were not content with the director of the local community action agency, who was, they felt, "making too many decisions without us having our say." Several TNOs were actively attempting to influence or replace the director, without much success and with accompanying feelings of frustration. That experience, since it was current with Administration II, might account for the increased powerlessness score. It might further be speculated that TNO increases in the kinds of knowledge, competency, and confidence which moved scale scores in the hypothesized directions developed more quickly than the poverty program's capacity to accommodate them. The disparity between increased skills and motivations, and the opportunity to use them as fully as desired, could have generated an increased sense of powerlessness. If that speculation is even partially accurate, the message for poverty intervention organizations is clear—to stimulate aspirations and inculcate skills without providing an outlet for their use can compound frustration.

Comparing "Active" and "Inactive" Representatives

When TNOs were arbitrarily divided (by consensus of research staff) into "active" and "inactive" categories (on the basis of meetings attended, offices held, observed performance, etc.), the changes in scale scores became more apparent. As shown in Table 5, Active TNOs followed the same pattern of change as TNOs in general (Table 4), but with increases in activism and

TABLE 5 COMPARISON OF ADMINISTRATION II WITH ADMINISTRATION I MEDIAN SCALE SCORES FOR TNOS CLASSIFIED AS ACTIVES VS. INACTIVES AND AS STAYERS VS. LEAVERS

		Actives (N = 13)		Inactives (N = 5)		Stayers (N = 10)			Leavers (N = 8)			
Scale	II	I	p	II	I	p	11	I	p	II	(14 =	0100
Activism	18.0	16.0	< .05	16.0	17.0	NS	18.5	17.0				P
Anomie Integration	5.0	6.0	NS	6.0		NS	5.0	6.0	< .05 NS	5.5	16.5	
with Relative Achievement	s 2.0	2.0	NS	3.0	1.0	< .05	2.0	2.5	NS	3.0	3.0	NS
Orientation Future	16.0	14.0	< .05	15.0	15.0	NS	16.0	14.5	< .05	15.0	14.0	NS
Orientation solation	9.0	9.0	NS	9.0	9.0	NS	10.0	9.0	NS	9.0	9.0	NS
Vormlessness	15.5	15.5	NS	19.0	16.0	< .05	15.5	15.0	NS	16.0	16.5	NS
Powerlessness	8.0		< .05	8.0	8.0	NS	9.0	9.0	NS	8.0	A STATE OF THE PARTY OF	< .05
4 11	16.0	15.0		19.0	15.0	< .05	16.0	18.0	< .05			< .05
Particularism	38.0			45.0		< .05		41.5	SELECTION	40.0	40.5	NS
A SALAN A A CO	0.0		< .05	0.0		< .05			< .05	0.5		< .05
"Not used as	Gutt	man S	icales		E-DE	Li va	10000	SIL		- II beaut	2.0	· .05

Not used as Guttman Scales.

Wilcoxon Rank Sum Tests.

achievement orientation, and decreases in normlessness, alienation, and particularism attaining statistical significance. As did TNOs in general, Active TNOs showed a not significant increase

in powerlessness and no change in future orientation.

The pattern of changes for Inactive TNOs varied considerably from those of Actives and TNOs in general. Inactives, as indicated in Table 5, showed significant increases in integration with relatives, isolation, powerlessness, and alienation, and a significant decrease in particularism. Achievement orientation, future orientation, and normlessness remained unchanged, while activism decreased and anomie increased (not significantly). These results may be interpreted to indicate that the quality of participation in poverty programs is related to the consequent social-psychological impact upon participants. The experience apparently was not neutral for the TNO-either he found opportunity for active participation and subsequently manifested changes in the hypothesized directions, or he for some reason was an inactive participant and manifested changes in directions opposite to those hypothesized (Zurcher, 1967b). Participation can, therefore, have an impact upon some individuals that is the reverse of poverty program expectations.

A comparison of Actives and Inactives on Administration I (see Table 5) yields no consistent initial differences which could explain the variations in change. It may be that the opportunity for active participation is limited for some TNOs, with the development of increased personal frustration. Observational data at least partially support that interpretation—three of the Inactive TNOs felt they did not have the "skills" to become effective participants, and thus hesitated to make themselves "look stupid." To the degree that these findings are valid and can be generalized, they underscore the obligation of community action agencies to eliminate, by organizational flexibility and continuous training programs, factors which might prevent representatives of the poor from experiencing active participation.

Analysis of Active and Inactive Non-TNO categories produced only one notable change. Non-TNO Actives ($\mathcal{N}=18$) showed a significant (p<.05) increase in particularism. This result, buttressed by observational data, may indicate that Active Non-TNOs tended to shift to a more personalistic view of events and individuals, possibly as a result of board experience and interaction with the TNOs. TNOs, as indicated in Table 4, tended to become less particularistic. One might speculate that TNO/

Non-TNO influence, at least on this variable, was mutual.

Comparing "Stayers" and "Leavers"

Eight TNOs terminated their participation in the poverty program between Administration I and Administration II. Some of those "Leavers" quit after becoming disillusioned, some "no longer had time" for participation, and some were not re-elected to TNO positions. As indicated in Table 5, those who remained, the "Stayers," revealed a change pattern quite similar to TNOs in general (Table 4), with one striking exception—a significant decrease in powerlessness. By contrast, Leavers showed significant decreases in normlessness and particularism, a significant increase in powerlessness, and no significant change in the remaining variables. These findings again highlight the fact that participation is not a neutral experience for the TNO, and indicate that to a considerable extent the powerlessness increase for TNOs in general was concentrated among the Leavers. One wonders what course of behavior TNO Leavers might take now, since their perception of norms is clearer but their sense of powerlessness more acute. At least two of the Leavers have become outspoken and somewhat militant opponents of the poverty program.

Overall, time as a TNO and number of attendances at board meetings (Administration II) showed low and not significant negative correlations with anomie, isolation, normlessness, and particularism, and positive correlations with activism and achievement orientation. These relationships are consistent with indices of overall TNO change in variables measured. There was

a slight increase in the number of TNO voluntary association memberships, and a slight increase in mean (but not median) level of income—neither change approaching significance.

Some Other Comparisons

The patterns of change for male TNOs (N = 7) were similar to those in female TNOs (N = 11). Males did, however, show a greater decrease than females in normlessness (Administration II,

median = 9; Administration I, median = 12; p < .05).

Patterns of TNO changes were observed to vary for different ethnic groups, though the validity of interpretations is mitigated by the small number of respondents distributed among the ethnic categories. Anglo-Americans (N = 3) showed increases in activism, integration with relatives, achievement orientation, isolation, powerlessness, and alienation, and a decrease in particularism. Negro-Americans (N = 10) showed an increase in achievement orientation and decreases in integration with relatives, isolation, normlessness, and particularism. Mexican-Americans (N = 3) showed increases in anomie, isolation, powerlessness, and alienation, and decreases in activism, integration with relatives, achievement orientation, isolation, normlessness, and particularism. American Indians (N = 2) showed increases in activism, achievement orientation, future orientation, powerlessness, and particularism, and decreases in anomie, integration with relatives, isolation, normlessness, and alienation. It might appear that Negro-Americans and American Indians manifested changes more in line with the hypotheses than did Anglo-Americans and Mexican-Americans. However, this is not clearly a cultural phenomenon, since nine Negro-Americans and both American Indians were among the Active TNOs and all but one Anglo-American and one Mexican-American were Inactives. The key variable for changes in the direction of the hypotheses thus may be the quality of participation rather than ethnicity. This interpretation is supported by the fact that eight Negro-American TNOs, but only one Anglo-American and one Mexican-American TNO, were among the Stayers. On the other hand, neither American Indian TNO was a Stayer, and yet their changes tended to fit those hypothesized. These tenuous findings call for further research on cultural predispositions toward participation in poverty programs, and on the impact of different kinds of participative experiences upon representatives from different ethnic groups.

Some Conclusions

Data from Administration I supported the hypothesis that TNOs would differ significantly from Non-TNOs in social-

psychological variables indicative of a sense of competence and confidence vis-à-vis society, broadly defined. Those differences, and the corollary differences by sex and ethnic membership, suggest the potential heterogeneity of other poverty boards and indicate the probable impact of such heterogeneity upon board dynamics and decision-making processes. This is not to argue that membership mix is dysfunctional, since to the contrary the varying values and perceptions of a diverse membership may yield significant program innovations through participant democracy. Rather, the point is emphasized that conflicts and their resolution are apt to be facts of board life. Community action agencies who support or are supported by such boards thus would need to maintain enough organizational flexibility to accommodate the give and take of membership mix. Also, the agency would need to be concerned with developing staff and member understanding of the processes as well as the contents of program participation.

Administration I data further supported the view that the scaled variables of activism, anomie, integration with relatives, achievement orientation, future orientation, isolation, normlessness, powerlessness, alienation, and particularism are related to

each other and to indices of socio-economic status.

Comparisons of Administration II with Administration I scale scores for those respondents who completed both administrations generally supported the hypotheses for directional, participation-related TNO change among the social-psychological variables. Correlations among the variables, time as a TNO, and number of attendances at board meetings were congruent with the change data. One might conclude, therefore, that program participation generally had the impact upon representatives of the poor anticipated nationally by the Office of Economic Opportunity and locally by the Topeka OEO. Such a conclusion concurs with the findings of others who have studied individual and social consequences of low-income participation in community action programs (Beiser, 1963; Leighton, 1965; Pearlman, 1965).

Is Participation of Value per se?

The impact of participation upon TNOs, indeed the directions of change in variables, appeared importantly to be related to the quality of the participation and to the TNO's perception of his experience with the program. That finding, and the indication that participation is not in any case a neutral experience for TNOs, should suggest to community action agencies that at least as much attention should be given to careful planning concerning the kinds of participation which representatives of the poor will experience as is typically given to determining their proportional representation. Similarly, the data suggest that attention be given to the possibility that opportunities for participation might be more accessible to or differentially responded to by males and fe-

males, and by members of different ethnic groups.

The degree to which findings presented in this study can be generalized to other poverty programs is problematical and left to the discretion of the reader. Clearly, there is need for comparative research involving poverty programs representative of different geographical locations, organizational styles, and member characteristics. The relationships among specific kinds of participation by specific kinds of individuals in specific kinds of programs—and the associations of those factors with social-psycho-

A broader question remains concerning the degree to which changes in the social-psychological variables measured in this study are associated with behavioral changes and modifications in life style. Furthermore, this study has not questioned the positive value placed by OEO in general, and the Topeka OEO in particular, upon transitions of the poor to a more "middle class" way of believing and behaving. Rather, the purpose has been to translate the assumption of participation-related change into a set of hypotheses, to operationalize the hypotheses with scale-measured variables, and then to test the assumption in a limited fashion with a single case.

REFERENCES

Beiser, M. Poverty, social disintegration, and personality. Journal of Social Issues, 1965, 21(1), 56-78.

Bell, W. A. Social isolation and class structure. Sociometry, 1957, 20, 105-116.

CARTER, B. Sargent Shriver and the role of the poor. The Reporter, May 5, 1966, 35, 18-19.

CLOWARD, R. A. The war on poverty: Are the poor left out? The Nation, August 2, 1965, 55-60.

COCH, L., & FRENCH, J. R. P. Overcoming resistance to change. Human Relations, 1948, I, 512-532.

THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE FEDERAL ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAM: PRO AND CON. Congressional Digest, March 1966, XLV.

Coser, L. The social functions of conflict. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1956.

Dean, D. G. Alienation: Its meaning and measurement. American Sociological Review, 1961, 26, 753-758.

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY AMENDMENTS OF 1966, 80 Stat. 1451, Sec 203 (c) 2 & 3.

THE FEDERAL DELINQUENCY PROGRAM. Objectivities and operation under the President's committee on juvenile delinquency and youth crime. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1962.

THE FORD FOUNDATION. American community development: Preliminary reports by directors of projects assisted by the Ford Foundation in four cities and a state. New York: Ford

THE FORD FOUNDATION. Stirrings in the big cities: The great cities projects. New York: Ford Foundation, Office of Reports, 1964. (b)

GOTTESFELD, H., & DOZIER, G. Changes in feelings of powerlessness in a community action program. Psychological Reports, 1966, 19, 968.

HAGGSTROM, W. C. The power of the poor. In Riessman, F. Cohen, & A. Pearl (Eds.), Mental health of the poor. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1964.

HERZOG, E. Some assumptions about the poor. Social Service Review, 1963, 37,

391-400. KAHL, J. A. Some measurements of achievement motivation. American Journal

of Sociology, 1965, 70, 669-681. KLEIN, W. People vs. politicians: Defeat in Harlem. The Nation, July 27, 1964, 199, 27-29.

KNOLL, E., & WHITCOVER, J. Fighting poverty—and the City Hall. The Reporter, June 3, 1965, 32, 19-22. (a)

KNOLL, E., & WHITCOVER, J. Policies and the poor: Shriver's second thoughts. The Reporter, December 30, 1965, 33, 23-25. (b)

KUENSTLER, P. Urban community center work in underdeveloped countries. Community Development, 1958, I, 27-31.

LANE, R., JR. Sociological aspects of mental well-being. In Mental health in a changing community. New York: Grune and Stratton, 1966.

LEIGHTON, A. H. Poverty and social change. Scientific American, 1965, 212, 21-27. LESHAN, L. Time orientation and social class. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1952, 47, 589-592.

Levine, J., & Butler, J. Lecture versus group discussion in changing behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology, 1952, 36, 29-33.

LEWIN, K. Group decision and social change. In T. H. Newcomb & E. L. Hartley (Eds.), Readings in social psychology. New York: Holt, 1947. Lewis, O. The children of Sanchez. New York: Random House, 1961.

LEWIS, O. La vida. New York: Random House, 1966.

MAIER, N. R. F. The quality of group decisions as influenced by the discussion leader. Human Relations, 1950, 3, 155-174. McClosky, H., & Schark, J. Psychological dimensions of anomie. American Sociological Review, 1965, 30, 14-40.

MILLER, W. B. Focal concerns of lower class culture. In L. Ferman, J. Kornbluh, & A. Haber (Eds.), Poverty in America. Ann Arbor: Univer. of Michigan, 1965.

MOYNIHAN, D. P. Three problems in combating poverty. In M. S. Gordon (Ed.), Poverty in America. San Francisco: Chandler, 1965.

PEARLMAN, H. Self-determination: Reality or illusion? Social Service Review, 1965, 39,410-422.

PRESTON, M. G., & HEINTZ, R. K. Effects of participatory versus supervisory leadership on group judgment. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1949, 44, 345-355.

RIDGEWAY, J. Saul Alinsky in Smugtown. The New Republic, June 26, 1965, CLII, 15 - 17.

RIESSMAN, F. The strengths of the poor. In A. Shostak & W. Gomberg (Eds.), New perspectives on poverty. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966.

ROSEN, B. C. The achievement syndrome: A psychocultural dimension of social stratification. American Sociological Review, 1956, 21, 205-211.

ROSEN, B., & D'ANDRADE, A. Psycho-social origins of achievement motivation. Sociometry, 1959, 22, 185-218.

ROTTER, J. B. Generalized expectancies of internal versus external control of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 1966, 80.

RUBIN, L. Maximum feasible participation: The origins, implication, and present status. Poverty and Human Resources Abstracts, 1967, II, 5-18.

SANFORD, D. The poor in their place. The New Republic, November 20, 1965, 5-6.

SEGALMAN, R. Dramatis personae of the community action program: A built in conflict situation. Rocky Mountain Social Science, 1967, 4, 140-150.

Selover, W. C. Federal pressure felt: U.S. poor gain foothold in local programs.

The Christian Science Monitor, August 2, 1966, 10. (a)

SELOVER, W. C. Old ways bind poverty drive. The Christian Science Monitor, August SHAMIN, I. The role of lay leaders. Community Development, 1959, 80-87.

SILBERMAN, C. E. Crisis in black and white. New York: Vintage Books, 1964.

SIMPSON, R. L., & MILLER, M. Social status and alienation. Social Problems, 1963,

SJOBERG, G., BRYMER, R., & FARRIS, B. Bureaucracy and the lower class. Sociology and Social Research, 1966, 50, 325-337.

SROLE, L. Social integration and certain corollaries: An exploratory study. American Sociological Review, 1956, 21, 709-717.

STONE, I., LEIGHTON, D., & LEIGHTON, A. H. Poverty and the individual. In L. Fishman (Ed.), Poverty amid affluence. New Haven: Yale Univer., 1966. STOUFFER, S. A., & TOBY, J. Role conflict and personality. American Journal of

STRAUSS, M. Deferred gratification, social class, and the achievement syndrome. American Sociological Review, 1962, 27, 326-335.

TOPEKA OEO ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1965-1966. Topeka, Kansas: Topeka Office of Economic Opportunity, 1966. (Mimeographed)

WHEELER, J. H. Civil rights groups—Their impact upon the war on poverty. Law and Contemporary Problems, Winter, 1966, 31, 152-158. WRIGHT. C., & HYMAN, H. Voluntary association membership of American

adults. American Sociological Review, 1958, 23, 284-294.

ZURCHER, L. A. Walking the tightrope: Some role and value conflicts experienced by a poverty program's indigenous leaders. Paper presented at American Sociological Association Convention, Miami Beach, Florida, August, 1966.

ZURCHER, L. A. Functional marginality: Dynamics of a poverty intervention organization. Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, 1967, 48, 411-421. (a)

ZURCHER, L. A. The leader and the lost: A case study of indigenous leadership in a poverty program community action committee. Genetic Psychology Monographs, 1967, 76, 23-93. (b)

Zurcher, L. A. Implementing a community action agency. In M. Shore & J. F. V. Mannino (Eds.), Community mental health: Problems, programs, and

strategies. New York: Behavioral Publications, 1968.

ZURCHER, L. A. Poverty warriors: The human experience of planned social intervention. Austin: Univer. of Texas Press, 1970.

ZURCHER, L. A., & KEY, W. H. The overlap model: A comparison of strategies for social change. Sociological Quarterly, Winter, 1967.

ar afficient in the property of the property o

The second secon

1000, 1 do 1

THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF THE SECOND CONTRACT OF

The state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the s

at the property of the propert

A Three off, the lattice of the management of the lattice of the l

The same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the sa

The state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the s

And the second of the second o

Asserting the Manager Continues of the Manager

Supervisor of the enteredant of the party to the term of the party of the second of th

A CONTRACTOR OF THE PROPERTY O

Social Stereotypes and Social Research

Elizabeth Herzog The Children's Bureau

A main contribution of the report by the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968) lay in a shift of emphasis. According to its message, it is the white majority rather than the Negro minority that needs to be studied and must learn to change, in order to make possible needed and desired changes for the Negro minority. Similarly, a salient moral emerging from the "war on poverty" is that the nonpoor need to be studied and to change, in order to make possible needed and desired changes for the poor, changes that will ultimately benefit the nonpoor also. The general subject of this JSI issue and the specific contributions to it suggest an analogous though not strictly parallel development in relation to social scientists and the poor: recognition of a need to review and modify some research assumptions and habits that weaken the effectiveness of social scientists in the war against poverty and the war against racial injustice-twin wars that are perhaps Siamese twins. The need for continuing review and reassessment is always present and seldom explicitly denied. However, at times it tends to be forgotten or implicitly rejected.

One of several similarities between the situation reflected in the present volume and the one delineated by the National Commission on Civil Disorders' report is that modifications are being urged by members of the group within which change is advocated. Another is that the changes advocated do not represent modifications of avowed principles but rather ways of bringing the deed

into closer conformity with the word.

The following comments grow from recurrent efforts to summarize relevant research on a given topic with a view to finding what we do and do not know about it-what generalizations do or do not stand up in the light of evidence concerning, for example, working mothers, unmarried parents, adoption outcomes, assumptions about "the poor," fatherless boys, prediction of juvenile delinquency. These reviews, on the one hand, have strengthened a belief in the potential contribution of systematic social research to the solving of social-economic problems. On the other hand, they have brought home the danger that, without eternal vigilance, this contribution can be impaired, and the danger that eternal vigilance can give way before the multiple pressures impinging on social scientists with unprecedented force today especially pressures for speed and volume of production and for clearcut, definitive answers to complex questions.

Among the potentials of social research is its ability to contribute to the making or the breaking of social stereotypes, an ability enhanced by what appears to be increased readiness-at least in some quarters—to consider research findings and incorporate them into "poverty programs." The presence of social scientists on federal task forces and advisory committees and in administrative or consultant positions within such programs is among the evidences of this increased readiness. It is therefore the more important that social scientists make conscious efforts

to refrain from adding grist to the stereotype mill.

Slippery Half-Truths

Dictionary definitions of "stereotype" tend to emphasize the word's derivation from photography, its cliché quality, and its tacit denial of individual variation. In current usage it implies also a statement or assumption that is too simple, too widely accepted, and not wholly in accord with-or perhaps wholly

counter to-available evidence.

The stereotype that flatly contradicts available evidence is the kind most easily combatted. The statement that most unmarried mothers are under twenty, for example, is simply untrue. The majority of unmarried mothers are over twenty (Herzog, 1967). More difficult to grapple with are the generalizations and assumptions that are partly true and partly false, or true within limits but misleading if viewed out of context, or true if adequately qualified but false if unqualified.

Do Fatherless Homes Cause Delinquency?

An example of the more difficult variety is the familiar generalization that fatherless homes cause juvenile delinquency. It is almost certainly true that a larger proportion of boys from fatherless homes than from two-parent homes are apprehended delinquents. It may also be true (although this is less clearly established) that a somewhat larger proportion of fatherless boys commit offenses definable as juvenile delinquency than do boys from two-parent homes. But available evidence by no means demonstrates that father absence causes juvenile delinquency.

A recent review of relevant studies held two surprises: (1) the finding of significant association between father absence and juvenile delinquency was by no means as unanimous as is often assumed; (2) some of the more solid studies reached highly quali-

fied conclusions about the meaning of their own figures.

Of 18 studies that met the criteria for review, 7 reported a significant association, 4 reported no significant association, and 7 presented conclusions too mixed or qualified to fall clearly on either side (Herzog & Sudia, 1968). Thus, although fewer found father absence unrelated to juvenile delinquency, the conclusions were as likely to be mixed or qualified as to be unequivocal. Such a count proves little except that a clear association is not to be taken for granted, but this is an important exception.

Bias in Commitment of Delinquents

The mixed findings reported different answers for different kinds of children, variously grouped according to ethnic background, age, income, rural-urban residence, or type of offense. The qualified conclusions were responsive to evidence that boys from fatherless homes are more likely than others to be apprehended and, once apprehended, more likely to be committed (Welfare in Review, 1969; Cicourel, 1968). They are less likely to be put on probation or in foster placement. There are understandable reasons why this should be so: the decisions of police officials are influenced by their judgment concerning the stability of the home to which offenders would be returned (Briar & Piliavin, 1964; Tappan, 1949; Sterne, 1964). Boys from low-income homes (Cicourel, 1968) and Negro boys (Axelrad, 1952) are more likely than others to be committed, and the proportion of broken homes is relatively high in these groups. Commitment often proves to be a road to recidivism, increasing the statistical count of boys from fatherless homes. Thus the documented facts introduce uncertainty about the relative frequency of delinquent behavior (as differentiated from apprehension and commitment) among boys from father-absent homes.

Delinquency and Familial Stress

Another cogent basis for qualified conclusions is furnished by studies that go beyond official statistics and attempt to assess

home climate and family relations. Such studies usually report that the primary association is not between father absence per se and juvenile delinquency. They indicate, rather, that the primary association is with family stress and discord, and lack of adequate supervision (Glueck & Glueck, 1962; Ferguson, 1952; McCord, McCord, & Verden, 1962; Robins, Jones, & Murphy, 1966; Rodman & Grams, 1967). Some investigators suggest that strife and tension preceding the father's departure may contribute far more than his absence to a boy's delinquent behavior (Glueck & Glueck, 1962; Rodman & Grams, 1967; Shaw & McKay, 1932). This interpretation is supported by Nye's (1957) finding that boys in unhappy "intact" homes report more delinquent behavior

than boys in happy broken homes.

The well-known study by the Gluecks (1962) illustrates the ambiguous relation between father absence and reported juvenile delinquency. Although their prediction efforts have been sharply criticized, the study did provide careful analysis based on school, court, and social welfare records and on intensive interviews by social workers, with trained raters and high rater reliability. Among 41 home factors identified as significantly associated with juvenile delinquency, father absence was found in 61% of the delinquent sample as compared with 34% of the control group. However, 14 other factors that are also significant at the .01 level show a larger percentage difference between experimental and control groups, including "unsuitable discipline of boy by mother" (96% in the experimental and 34% in the control group) and "unsuitable supervision of boy by mother" (64% as compared with 13%). Some other items among the fourteen (e.g., paternal harshness, indifference, or hostility) serve as reminders that certain kinds of present-father can promote delinquency, a point brought out also in other studies (Gardner & Goldman, 1945; McCord et al., 1962; Robins, 1966).

Subsequent analysis of the Glueck data by Maccoby (1958) underlined the importance of the mother's role and especially the quality of her supervision. This emphasis was re-enforced by the fact that the New York Youth Board, in later efforts to test the Glueck method of predicting juvenile delinquency, eliminated items involving the father because there were so many broken homes in the low-income area involved and also because their raters concluded (Craig & Glick, 1963) that even a one-parent home could be "cohesive." Similarly, Leslie Wilkins in his Borstal studies eliminated father absence as a factor because it was not

predictive (Wilkins, no date).

Thus the flat statement that fatherless homes cause juvenile delinquency cannot legitimately be made or denied without a

number of qualifications. It may or may not be true that fatherless boys are over-represented among those who engage in behavior defined as delinquent. However, evidence suggests that: (1) if they are, it is not specifically father absence which caused the delinquency, but rather the frequent precursors, concomitants, and consequences of father absence; (2) the presence of some fathers might be more conducive than their absence to delinquent behavior; (3) the difference in frequency, if it exists, is relatively minor and is dwarfed by other factors far more strongly associated with delinquency-including depressed income and community factors (Fleisher, 1966; Chein, 1967; Herzog & Sudia, in press).

In the absence of appropriate qualifications, scientific inquiry suffers, but fatherless boys suffer more-from public attitudes, from the workings of the self-fulfilling prophecy, and from popular ideas about what would help the situation. For the record, it should be added that the juvenile delinquency rate among the predominantly father-absent children in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program is described as "far below the national average [Burgess & Price, 1963, p. 184, italics original]."

Deceptive Models

The example just given is one of many in which complex and interacting factors defy a neat and simple statement. Real life is untidy. For research purposes it often must be reduced to a manageable number of dimensions and variables. Yet in a number of ways the reducing process may introduce distortion. This is especially likely to occur if the schematized model employed is at odds with its real life referent, as in the following examples. These examples, like some of the variables they involve, are not mutually exclusive, but overlap and interact to a degree inconvenient for

research and for orderly presentation.

Dubious Dichotomies. The assumption of an either-or structure is often a way-station on the road to recognizing a continuum or a trichotomy or an intermeshing of complex variables. The broken vs. intact home dichotomy is one that quickly breaks down under inspection (Herzog & Sudia, in press; Sprey, 1967). A whilom dichotomy that by now appears to be discredited is the physical-psychological contrast (Kinsey et al., 1953; Schorr, 1963). One that may have moved into the straw man category is the basic vs. applied research dichotomy that in its day fostered some unnecessary and probably deleterious stratifications of research and researchers (Sussman, 1964). The true-untrue dichotomy has already been referred to.

Another dichotomy that is ripe for retirement is the one that presents male dominance and female dominance as mutually exclusive family conditions. As Bott has pointed out, and as Cohen and Hodges (1963) have pointed up, the father in a family is likely to be dominant in some areas and the mother in others, so that "to describe the working-class family as both 'maleauthoritarian' (or 'patriarchal') and as 'mother-centered' is not paradoxical. They are, indeed, both, depending upon the func-

tional area which one is attending to [Bott, 1957].

The male-female dominance dichotomy has contributed to oversimplification and distortion of the situation assumed to prevail in low-income Negro families, often referred to as "matriarchal." Although the label is objectionable for other reasons, the present objection is to the assumption that family dominance is unitary and is exercised either by one parent or by the other. It violates the segmental nature of dominance within a family and it also ignores the varied valences attached to dominance within different areas. For a woman to be dominant in child-rearing and even in bread-winning does not necessarily make her dominant in male-female relations. Nor do most Negro males and females in poverty think she is so (Jeffers, 1967; Lewis, 1967; Liebow, 1967; Herzog, 1967). A related distortion which is also an example of spurious symmetry (discussed below) is the assumption that because a man is at a disadvantage with regard to jobs and income, a woman is at an advantage in these respects. Actually, despite assumptions to the contrary, unemployment is higher among Negro women than among Negro men, and women's earnings average far lower than men's among those who have jobs (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1966).

Another group that would probably be better off without the male-female dominance dichotomy are the children—of whatever class or color-who are asked to respond to questionnaire items on whether the father or the mother is boss in their homes, thus insuring at an early age built-in misperceptions about the eitheror-ness of dominance, a discouragement of perceiving and valuing cooperative, complementary relationships, and a scrutiny of parental roles that singles out and highlights elements better digested as part of a general home configuration. This kind of comment is often met with a reminder that children already know a lot more than we can point out to them. However, what they sense may not carry the same force as what adults, by such questions, tell them should be measured, compared, and used as a

basis for judging merit or competence.

Dubious Continua. Among the models that both reflect and contribute to dubious assumptions about "real life" is the forcing into a single continuum of two or more separate variables. This, for example, is the model employed by a number of scales intended to measure masculinity-femininity (M-F). On these familiar instruments, a low-M score is regarded as equivalent to high-F, and vice versa. Boys who score high-F are reported as inadequately masculine and girls who score high-M are reported

as inadequately feminine.

A good deal of justifiable criticism has been leveled against some of the specific items employed in such scales (Erikson, 1966; Pollak, 1967; Vincent, 1966). Aside from this consideration, however, there is reason to question the assumption of a single continuum with regard to masculinity and femininity. It has been found repeatedly that highly educated and high SES subjects are more likely than the poorly educated and the low SES to present cross-sex similarities on conventional scales or tests of masculinity and femininity (Maccoby, 1966; Kagan, 1964). It seems probable that two continua would be more useful for assessing adequacy of sex identity, and that an individual's score on one of these continua would not necessarily represent the reciprocal of his score on the other. It may also be that the optimum score would not be located at the extreme high end of either. (That each continuum would require a number of dimensions is yet another story, viz. Coffman, 1967.)

Similarly, it has been found that dependence and independence can be assessed more satisfactorily with two continua than with one (Rossi, 1968). A person may be high on both or low on

both.

Questions about the basic model employed for assessing masculinity and femininity re-enforce a number of other questions about sweeping generalizations often heard concerning the "feminization" of boys who grow up in father-absent homes. Such questions cannot obviate the existence of systematic differences on M-F scales, but they do call for reconsideration of the meaning of such differences—a reconsideration desirable for a number of other reasons not relevant to the subject of dubious continua (Kohlberg, 1966; Kagan, 1964).

Spurious Symmetry. Research models frequently imply that zero is the mid-point in any dimension, and that corresponding plus or minus points are equidistant from it. Thus, if a present father contributes to adequate masculine identity, it is assumed that lack of a resident father to the same degree impairs development of adequate masculinity. If an unwed mother is not severely penalized, then it is assumed that a married mother who succeeds in sustaining a good marriage is not greatly envied and admired.

Merely to make explicit this pervasive assumption may be enough to raise doubts about it. It is explicitly denied in an old Yiddish proverb: "Money is not so good as lack of money is bad."

Kadushin (1969) has paraphrased this proverb to the effect that lack of a father is not necessarily as bad as having a father can be good, a conclusion given some support by Kohlberg (1966). It has also been applied to the view of marriage that prevails among some very low income groups: Lack of marriage is not as bad as having a sound marriage is good (Herzog, 1962). A good deal of systematic though qualitative evidence documents the existence of such one-legged dimensions. And experience suggests that the assumption of a non-existent symmetry can contribute to stereotypes about the effects of fatherlessness and about attitudes toward illegitimacy among the very poor—especially very poor Negroes. Such stereotypes in turn are potent influences affecting public opinions about low-income Negroes, unmarried mothers, and families in AFDC programs. Public opinions in this instance include the opinions of legislators and program administrators.

Snapshot Perspective. A good deal of research depends on captive audiences, and captive audiences are often children. Among some sixty studies relating to father absence, only three employed samples of adults no longer in school. Generalizations about the long-term effects of father absence, accordingly, rest mainly on assessments of the characteristics of children, assessments usually made at a single point in time. Yet longitudinal studies of children in two-parent homes give strong evidence that predictions made in childhood often prove surprisingly unreliable (Bayley, 1965; Kagan & Moss, 1962; MacFarlane, 1963; Mussen, 1962). Moreover, some investigators suspect that some significant differences between children in one-parent and two-parent families may represent developmental lag which is later made up (MacFarlane,

1963; Sears, 1951).

Mischel, for example, reports that father-absent children aged eight to nine displayed behavior interpreted to mean inability to delay gratification, but that father-absent children eleven to fourteen did not differ in this respect from father-present children (Mischel, 1958, 1961). One may question the interpretation in this particular study without doubting its evidence that one-shot studies in childhood are unreliable indicators of later

characteristics.

Uncritical Variables and Single-Strand Fabrics. A familiar research sequence is that after many studies have resulted in public pointing with alarm to a culprit characteristic, it becomes clear that this was not in fact the critical variable, but that the deplored manifestations related to a complex of interacting variables, no one of which in itself dictated the outcome. This sequence occurred in relation to the question of mothers who work outside the home. Some years ago, an alarmed public and alarmed work-

ing mothers were responding to much publicized and little qualified research reports that if a mother works outside the home, her children are likely to become juvenile delinquents. The consensus of investigators today is that the impact on a child of his mother's outside employment is mediated and determined by a complex of factors, including the mother's attitude toward working or not working, the arrangements she makes for him while she works, the child's perception of her employment and its reasons, the attitudes and behavior of other family members, the individual emotional and physical make-up of mother and child, the child's age and sex, and some others (Herzog, 1960; Hoffman, 1960; Siegel & Haas, 1963; Stolz, 1960). It became clear that efforts to assess the effects of maternal employment as a separate and discrete fact of life were like efforts to make a dress from a single thread rather than a fabric with breadth as well as length.

Similarly, the review of studies relating to father absence has led a number of reviewers to the conclusion that the impact of father absence on a child's development is mediated and determined by a complex of interacting factors, including the reasons and extent of the absence, the climate of the home, the mother's ability to supervise her children, her reaction to the father's absence, her individual make-up and stamina, neighborhood norms and influences, the child's make-up and temperament, the economic and social resources of the family (Herzog & Sudia,

in press; Kadushin, 1967; Kohlberg, 1966).

The movement from focus on a single discrete variable to a cluster of interacting factors appears to be part of the natural history of research in many areas. It can represent also the movement from a stereotyped view of such an item as maternal employment or father absence to a more variegated and differentiated picture. Before the shift occurs, however, public feelings may be inflamed against those who possess the characteristic described as socially destructive and in favor of policies or programs based on dubious premises. For example, there have been some who hold that if divorce were more difficult to obtain there would be less juvenile delinquency, or that mothers should not be allowed to work—positions at odds with available evidence.

The movement from single variable to configuration is, of course, impeded by misinterpretation of the significance of statistically significant differences, a consideration more often articulated in theory than observed in pratice (Bakan, 1967; Chilman, 1966). The three related lapses most often encountered are: (a) highlighting differences but slurring over similarities; (b) ignoring the magnitude of the difference and its practical implications; (c) sliding into the implication that every member of a group under

study exhibits the trait shown to be significantly more frequent among its members than among some other group. This kind of flaw—misinterpreting statistical differences—is too familiar and too frequently discussed to require elaboration here. Yet it contributes a good deal more than its rightful share to the reenforcing of popular stereotypes by social research.

Some Far-From-Simple Safeguards

The kinds of misleading models briefly sketched above, and others like them, tend to give way in time before the accumulated weight of evidence. However, they sometimes exact exorbitant toll before they yield—occasionally in the form of harmful or unfair stereotypes apparently buttressed by social research. Continually revised approximations to "the truth" are probably an inevitable element in social research. Several other elements, however, are not inevitable: premature generalization, insufficient qualification, uncritical and unverified citation of findings, lack of replication. These all too familiar concomitants of the research explosion are among the deterrents to the maximum social contribution of social research.

One example will illustrate several of them. Tiller's study of father absence is often cited as "proving" that fatherless boys become "feminized," and has been used as a basis for conclusions relating to fatherless boys in urban American ghettos (Tiller, 1958, 1961; Lynn & Sawrey, 1959; Pettigrew, 1964). Such references virtually never mention that this study involved temporary, recurrent father absence for socially approved reasons; that it involved upper-middle class Norwegian boys in a puritanical rural setting; or that several studies of temporary father absence attribute problems more to the father's return than to his absence.

The boys in the Norwegian study were eight to ten years old. A study of similar boys at an older age (fourteen to fifteen) did not support the finding of "feminization," although the investigator (by processes difficult to follow) deduced evidence of some other problems. Moreover, a careful replication of the first study, conducted in Italy, reported no significant differences between the father-absent and father-present boys with regard to "feminization" but did report one or two other differences in favor of the father-absent boys (Ancona, Cesa-Bianchi, & Bocquet, 1963).

If, as Ancona et al. suggest, the reason for the conflicting findings is the difference in cultural setting, then there is all the more question about applying the Norwegian findings without qualification to Harlem youth. A broader question, however, is raised by the readiness of social scientists to base generalizations and program recommendations on small unreplicated studies

investigating a few selected variables at a single point in childhood, and to cite the findings without the qualifications entered by the investigators. How the broader question can be dealt with remains to be seen, but the first step is to recognize that it exists

and needs to be grappled with.

Cultivating Critical Review. Perhaps one safeguard would be the development of professional standards with regard to the points just mentioned, especially the need for replication and the critical reading of reports before, as Miller and Mishler (1964) put it, their summaries "enter without qualifications into the folklore of the discipline." Selvin's observation (1967) about sociologists applies equally to other social scientists: "A careful examination of the sociological literature shows that many of the most widely acclaimed works have large and demonstrable errors of interpretation. One reason for the prevalence of such errors is that sociologists do not learn to read critically-to compare the author's facts with what he says about them."

Review of proposals by doctoral candidates and by applicants for research grants brings home the need for more critical reading. Not only do blatant errors of interpretation ride unseen, but introductory reviews of relevant literature show a propensity to pluck out the findings that support the hypothesis proposed for investigation and to neglect contrary indications in the same studies. The propensity is human and perhaps unconquerable (as the present author has suspected on the basis of introspection). It can be detected and perhaps corrected if someone other than the applicant has also read the literature. If uncorrected, it

leads to a snowballing of folklore.

Failure to read critically is a problem, but so is failure to read at all. Informal surveys of reactions to three much-discussed reports revealed a surprising number of social scientists ready to express an opinion about their accuracy and their implications, but equally ready to admit that they had not read the report under discussion (Coleman et al., 1966; National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968; U.S. Department of Labor, 1965; Miller, 1967). This may be one reason why qualifications spelled out by the investigator so often evaporate when someone else cites his

Avoiding the Procrustean Approach. Procrustes is known to legend for the practice of placing his victims on a bed and stretching or hacking them until they fit its iron frame—an approach which has some analogies in research practice. The Procrustean approach overlaps and buttresses a number of deceptive research models, but it has effects over and beyond them.

Campbell (1964) has commented that "research conclusions

are at least partial captives of research methods." Others have pointed out that conclusions can also be captives of the theories on which research is based. Neither the tendency nor its recognition is new, but neither has worn out or seems likely to do so in the foreseeable future. Ripple (1953) documented the extent to which research conclusions in the twenties and thirties reflected the theories prevailing in social work and changed in the wake of changing theories. Bordua (1965) has suggested that conclusions about factors contributing to juvenile delinquency depend on the theory of causation espoused. If the hypothesis is that father absence in itself leads to delinquency, the general climate and functioning of the family tend to be ignored. If family climate and functioning are hypothesized as causal, environmental factors tend to be disregarded. If the cause is attributed to community factors, individual family processes tend to be left out. If delinquency is attributed to the opportunity structure prevailing in the society at large, other factors receive scant consideration. Thus, Toby (1965) berates family-focused research for neglecting socioeconomic and community factors; an extensive review of research on juvenile delinquency (Empey, 1967) makes no mention of the broken home or the family; and a social-psychiatric commentary (Redl, 1966) takes both orientations to task for not recognizing each other's domain.

A single-barreled theory unchecked by continuous evidenceoriented testing can be the enemy of accurate perception. A highly structured experiment can show whether previously identified factors are associated with a previously identified reaction. But it is less likely to reveal that some other factor or factors, not included in the research design, are more crucial and determinative

than the ones under investigation.

Tightly structured experiments are useful for hypothesis testing. But exploratory, descriptive research is useful for modifying hypotheses and developing new ones, through illuminating the broader configuration within which identified variables act and interact. Such research today appears to occupy a low position on the academic totem pole, although it ranks high in the roster of research that has contributed to knowledge about human beings. The names of Freud and Piaget come to mind in this connection. In poverty research, more illumination about "the poor" has been gained by studies such as those of Hylan Lewis (1967) and Robert Coles (1965)—to name only two—than by immaculate testing of a few theory-determined variables. Research into the problems of fatherless boys has been limited by the hypotheses it was set up to test, so that at times findings incompatible with the theory have been underplayed or ignored, and the results have

been fitted—as on the bed of Procrustes—to the thesis with which the investigator is preoccupied. If problems of behavior or adjustment are assessed only in relation to father presence or absence, the assessment will not reveal whether they are associated more strongly with precursors, concomitants, and consequents than with the absence itself. If the father's return is not included in theoretical formulations, then studies of temporary father absence will afford no opportunity to inquire whether problems of children

are attributable more to his return than to the separation.

If only color differences are included in theoretical formulations, then there is no opportunity to discover whether differences are attributable more to socioeconomic status than to color. For years this bias has contributed to stereotypes about births out of wedlock among low-income Negroes. When the comparison is based solely on color, the rate among Negroes has been estimated as almost eight times that among whites. Recently it has been estimated that the illegitimacy rate among the poor and near-poor is about eight times that among the affluent (Campbell, 1968). According to the Social Security Index, the proportion of Negroes who were poor or near-poor was twice that of whites, 41% as compared with 19% in 1966 (Orshansky, 1968). If illegitimacy estimates were related to income as well as to color, the Negro-white difference would be drastically reduced. A number of other familiar and relevant factors-including differences in reporting, differences in readiness to marry because of pregnancy, differences in recourse to abortion-would modify the picture still further (Ventura, 1968; Herzog, 1962).

This is a crude illustration of the distortion produced when relevant factors are omitted. Yet a highly structured and sharply focused research design is often incapable of demonstrating that a relevant factor is missing. This kind of distortion occurs, for example, when research focuses only on the problems of poor families and neglects to inquire into their strengths (Coles, 1965;

Riessman, 1964).

A healthier respect for exploratory and descriptive research and its elevation to equal status with hypothesis-testing could help to right the balance. The ideal research balance would include constant interplay between the testing of hypotheses and the opportunity to evolve new ones, as well as to correct some distortions inherent in deceptive research models.

It is a good many years since Allport reminded his colleagues that the "nomothetic" and "idiographic" approaches are complementary and that both are necessary to social research (Allport, 1942). Perhaps he needs to be re-read annually, especially by the gatekeepers to research expertise and resources.

The ideal research balance would include also constant crossfertilization between disciplines. If research findings are to serve as a basis for further testing and development of hypotheses, the time for relating them to findings from other fields may perhaps be postponed temporarily. But if research findings are to serve as guides for poverty programs, the results of any one approach must be fitted into a whole that embraces varied approaches and frames of reference—a whole that includes information digested not only from a wide array of studies but also from a number of disciplines. Alvin Schorr (1963) has forcefully pointed out the relevance for poverty programs of findings relating to nutrition, housing, and medicine as well as the various social sciences.

If the Procrustean approach is allowed to bias social scientists' recommendations for poverty programs, the poor will suffer -or at least will not profit as much as they should from the efforts of the many social scientists committed to helping win the war against poverty. We cannot afford to wait until all the answers are in. But neither can we afford to publicize prematurely answers based on fragmentary findings inadequately analyzed—answers that in effect we do not really have. Nor can we afford to ignore the answers that others have, or think they have, and fail to draw

on them to check or to complement our own conclusions.

REFERENCES

ALLPORT, G. W. The use of personal documents in psychological science. New York:

Social Science Research Council, 1942.

Ancona, L., Cesa-Bianchi, M., & Bocquet, F. Identification with the father in the absence of a paternal model. Achivio di Psicologia, Neurologia e Psichiatria, 1963, 24(4), 339-361.

AXELRAD, S. Negro and white male institutionalized delinquents. American Journal

of Sociology, 1952, 57, 569-574.

BAKAN, D. On method. San Francisco: Josey-Bass, 1967.

BAYLEY, N. Research in child development: A longitudinal perspective. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 1965, 11, 183-208.

BORDUA, D. J. Prediction and selection of delinquents: #17 HEW facts and facets. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965.

BOTT, E. Family and social network. London: Tavistock, 1957.

BRIAR, S., & PILIAVIN, I. Police encounters with juveniles. American Journal of Sociology, 1964, 70, 206-214.

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. The Negroes in the United States: Their economic and social situation. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966.

Burgess, M., & Price, D. O. An American dependency challenge. Chicago: American Public Welfare Association, 1963.

CAMPBELL, A. A. The role of family planning in the reduction of poverty. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 1968, 30, 236-245.

CAMPBELL, J. D. Peer relations in childhood. In M. L. Hoffman & W. Hoffman (Eds.), Review of child development research. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964.

CHEIN, I. Environment and personality in behavior deviation. Address given to New York Society of Clinical Psychologists, May 1967.

CHILMAN, C. S. Some differences between people and statistics. Children, 1966,

CICOUREL, A. The social organization of juvenile justice. New York: John Wiley &

COFFMAN, R. N. An exploration of the dimensions implicit in psychological masculinity-femininity. Unpublished master's thesis, George Washington COHEN, A. K., & HODGES, H. M. Lower-blue-collar-class characteristics. Social

COLEMAN, J. S., ET AL. Equality of educational opportunity. Washington, D.C.: U.S. COLES, R. There's sinew in the Negro family. The Washington Post, October 10,

CRAIG, M. M., & GLICK, S. J. Ten years' experience with the Glueck social prediction table. Crime and Delinquency, 1963, 9, 249-261. EMPEY, L. T. Delinquency theory and recent research. Journal of Research in Crime

and Delinquency, 1967, 4, 28-42.

ERICKSON, E. H. The concept of identity in race relations: Notes and queries.

FERGUSON, T. The young delinquent in his social setting. Oxford: Oxford University

FLEISHER, B. M. The effect of income on delinquency. American Economic Review,

GARDNER, G. E., & GOLDMAN, N. Childhood and adolescent adjustment of naval successes and failures. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 1945, 15, 584-596. GLUECK, S., & GLUECK, E. Family environment and delinquency. Boston: Houghton

HERZOG, E. Children of working mothers. Children's Bureau Publication #382.

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1960. HERZOG, E. Unmarried mothers: Some questions to be answered and some answers to be questioned. Child Welfare, 1962, 339-350.

HERZOG, E. About the poor: Some facts and some fictions. Children's Bureau Publication #451. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967.

HERZOG, E., & SUDIA, C. E. Fatherless-homes: A review of research. Children,

HERZOG, E., & SUDIA, C. E. Children in fatherless families. In B. M. Caldwell & H. N. Ricciutti (Eds.), Review of child development research. New York: Society for Research in Child Development, in press.

HOFFMAN, L. W. Effects of the employment of mothers on parental power relations and the divisions of household tasks. Marriage and Family Living, 1960, JEFFERS, C. Living poor. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Ann Arbor Publishers, 1967.

KADUSHIN, A. Reversibility of trauma: A follow-up study of children adopted when older. Social Work, 1967, 12, 22-33.

KAGAN, J. Acquisition and significance of sex typing and sex role identity. In M. L. Hoffman & L. Wladis (Eds.), Review of child development research. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964.

KAGAN, J., & Moss, H. A. Birth to maturity. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962. KINSEY, A. C., MARTIN, C. E., POMEROY, W. B., & GEBHARD, P. H. Sexual behavior in the human female. Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1953.

KOHLBERG, L. A cognitive-developmental analysis of children's sex role concepts and attitudes. In E. E. Maccoby (Ed.), The development of sex differences.

Berkeley, California: Stanford University Press, 1966.

Lewis, H. Culture, class and family life among low-income urban Negroes. In A. Ross (Ed.), Employment, race and poverty. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967.

LIEBOW, E. Tally's corner. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967.

LYNN, D. B., & SAWREY, W. L. The effects of father-absence on Norwegian boys and girls. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1959, 59, 258-262.

MACCOBY, E. E. Effects upon children of their mother's outside employment. In National Manpower Council (Ed.), Work in the lives of married women. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958.

MACCOBY, E. E. Sex differences in intellectual functioning. In E. E. Maccoby (Ed.), The development of sex differences. Berkeley, Calif .: Stanford University

Press, 1966.

MACFARLAND, J. W. From infancy to adulthood. Childhood Education, 1963, 83-89. McCord, W., McCord, J., & Verden, P. Family relationships and sexual deviance in lower-class adolescents. International Journal of Social Psychiatry, 1962, 8, 165–179.

MILLER, S. M., & MISHLER, E. G. Social class, mental illness, and American psychiatry: An expository review. In Mental health of the poor: New treatment

approaches for low income people. New York: The Free Press, 1964.

MILLER, W. L. Review of The Moynihan Report and the politics of controversy, by L. Rainwater & W. L. Yancey. The Reporter, August 10, 1967, 46-48.

MISCHEL, W. Preference for delayed reinforcement: An experimental study of a cultural observation. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1958, 56,

MISCHEL, W. Father-absence and delay of gratification: Cross-cultural comparisons. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1961, 63, 116-124.

Mussen, P. H. Long term consequents of masculinity of interests in adolescence. Journal of Consultant Psychology, 1962, 26, 435-440.

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS. Report of the commission. New York: Bantam Books, 1968. Nye, F. I. Child adjustment in broken and in unhappy unbroken homes. Marriage

and Family Living. November 1957, 19(4), 356-361. ORSHANSKY, M. The shape of poverty in 1966. Social Security Bulletin. March 1968,

3 - 32.

Pettigrew, T. F. Father-absence and Negro adult personality: A research note. In T. F. Pettigrew, A profile of the Negro American. New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand, 1964.

POLLAK, O. The broken family. Unpublished manuscript, mimeographed, 1967. REDL, F. A new theory of delinquency: It's about time. Children, 1966, 13, 119. RIESSMAN, F. Low income culture: The strengths of the poor. Journal of Marriage

and the Family, 1964, 26, 417-421.

RIPPLE, L. Social work studies of unmarried parenthood as affected by contemporary treatment formulations, 1920-1940. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1953.

ROBINS, L. N., JONES, R. S., & MURPHY, G. E. School milieu and school problems

of Negro boys. Social Problems, 1966, 13, 428-436.

RODMAN, H., & GRAMS, P. Juvenile delinquency and the family: A review and discussion. Appendix L., Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967.

Rossi, A. S. Transition to parenthood. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 1968,

30, 26-39.

SCHORR, A. L. Slums and social insecurity. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963.

SEARS, P. S. Doll play aggression in normal young children: Influence of sex, age, sibling status, father's absence. Psychological Monographs, 1951, 65, (6).

SELVIN, H. C. Implications of the Sibley Report for the undergraduate curriculum in sociology. The American Sociologist, 1967, 2, 79-80.

Shaw, C. R., & McKay, H. D. Are broken homes a causative factor in juvenile delinquency? Social Forces, 1932, 10, 514-525.

SIEGEL, A. E., & HAAS, M. B. The working mother: A review of research. Child Development, 1963, 34, 513-542.

SPREY, J. The study of single parenthood: Methodological considerations. Family Life Coordinator, 1967, 16, 29-35.

STERNE, R. S. Delinquent conduct and broken homes: A study of 1,050 boys. New Haven: College and University Press, 1964.

STOLZ, L. M. Effects of maternal employment on children: Evidence from research. Child Development, 1960, 31, 749-782.

Sussman, M. B. The social problems of the sociologists. Western Reserve University Outlook, 1964, 7-11.

TAPPAN, P. Juvenile delinquency. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949.

TILLER, P. O. Father absence and personality development in children of sailor families. Nord. Psychological Monograph, 1958, Series No. 9.

TILLER, P. O. Father separation and adolescence. Oslo, Norway: Institute for Social Research, 1961.

TOBY, J. An evaluation of early identification and intensive treatment programs for predelinquents. Social Problems, 1965, 13, 160-175.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. The Negro family: The case for national action. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965.

VENTURA, S. J. Recent trends and differentials in illegitimacy. U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Natality Statistics Branch, Division of Vital Statistics, National Center for Health Statistics, 1968. (Mimeo-

VINCENT, C. E. Implications of change in male-female role expectations for interpreting M-F scores. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 1966, 28, 196-199.

WELFARE IN REVIEW. Juvenile Court Cases. May 1969.

WILKINS, L. T. What is prediction and is it necessary in evaluating treatment. Unpublished manuscript, mimeographed, undated.

80

The state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the s

The state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the s

Annual Street Control of Control

ntwick (1) of the first and the first of the second section of the section of the second section of the se

Black Families and White Social Science

Andrew Billingsley University of California, Berkeley

Students of human behavior, policy makers, and citizens who look to the body of knowledge about the human condition which has been generated and reflected by American social scientists will find no area of American life more glaringly ignored, more distorted, or more systematically disvalued than black family life.

Thus, black families who have fared so ill historically in white American society have fared no better in white American social science, and largely for the same reasons. For American social scientists are much more American than social and much more social than scientific. They reflect all the prejudice, ignorance, and arrogance which seems to be endemic to Americans of European descent. Furthermore, because of their skills at communication and their acceptance as authorities on race relations, social scientists do even greater damage to the understanding of black family life than do ordinary citizens.

Still, black families, who have survived some of the most severe oppression at the hands of white society, also show signs of surviving the treatment they have received in social science. Let us consider first some of the evidence for this characterization about the status of black families in social science, then some of the reasons for this state of affairs, followed by some speculations on the consequences of this situation, and finally some of the solu-

tions to the problems.

The Treatment of Black Families in White Social Science

In Black Families in White America (Billingsley, 1968), we described four areas of social science scholarship which have been presented with both the opportunity and the necessity to describe, analyze, and explain the changing status of black family life in America. These areas are: (1) studies of the family, (2) studies of ethnic assimilation and stratification, (3) studies of the experience of black people in general, and (4) studies of social welfare problems and programs. Other areas might be added to this list. It is sufficient, however, to support the generalization we are making. For in none of these major areas of scholarship, where social science studies and theories abound, have black families been subjected to the systematic attention their presence and function in the world demands. An examination of the history of each of these areas of scholarship shows the manner in which black families have been mainly left out, and then distorted when considered.

TABLE 1
BLACK FAMILIES IN SELECTED FAMILY TEXTS

Author and Date	Number of Articles			
	On Families	On Black Families	By Black Authors	References to Black Families
Nimkoff, 1965	18	0	0	1
Kephart, 1966	23	0	0	56
Sussman, 1959	62	1	0	0
Queen & Habenstein,		(Miles) (Bashrair	TOTAL MANAGEMENT	LOD DO THE
1967	25	Served only	0	6
Bell & Vogel, 1968	52	Total Total	0	4

The evidence for this situation, summarized in Table 1, is almost overwhelming. Bell and Vogel's new, enlarged, revised edition of A Modern Introduction to the Family (1968), which contains 52 articles, 18 of them new since the 1960 edition, still finds room for only one article about black families. Further, the new edition substitutes an article about black families by Daniel P. Moynihan for the earlier article by E. Franklin Frazier, an action which is not an improvement but a net setback to the black presence in the family literature.

The concept "Negro" does not appear once in the index of Parsons and Bales Family, Socialization and Interaction Process (1960). M. F. Nimkoff (1965) also ignores black families.

In a 600-page textbook on urban society, Gist and Fava (1964) devote one 20-page chapter to "Urban Family Life in

Transition." This work devotes less than one page to the treatment of Puerto Rican families in New York, less than a page to studies of African families, but not a single page, line, or word to black families in the urban United States.

In William J. Goode's Readings on the Family and Society (1964), more space is given to discussion of black-white marriages than to black families. And black families are considered only in the extended discussions of illegitimacy. Both of these are curious phenomena when viewed from the perspective of the sociology of

knowledge.

The Family, Society, and the Individual, by Kephart (1966), is a good example of the treatment of black families. Of the 23 chapters not one is devoted to black families. In a 34-page chapter on cross-cultural family patterns not a single reference is made to black families. In a 48-page chapter on "minority family types," the author devotes five pages and 40 references to the discussion of black families, considerably less than he devotes to Italian families and less than a fourth of the space which he devotes to Amish families. In a 23-page chapter on "Socio-Demographic Aspects of Divorce" he devotes 1/2 page to a discussion of class and racial factors with eight references to black families. In a 20-page chapter on "Premarital Moral Codes" the author devotes a half page including six references to premarital coitus among black females and two references to "illegitimacy."

Sourcebook in Marriage and the Family, edited by Marvin B. Sussman (1959), does no better by black families. Of the 62 articles, one is devoted to marriage between black and white persons. None is devoted to black couples. In an eleven-page article on "The Normal American Family," Parsons refers to black people six times as a condition, and not at all to black families; it is very representative of other articles in the book. In an eleven-page article on "Boom Babies," the author (Sussman) devotes one page to a discussion of fertility among "nonwhites" with four specific

references to black women and none to black families.

The Family in Various Cultures, by Queen and Habenstein (1967), devotes one of its 25 chapters to black families. The chapter is new for this third edition; it is also unique in that it includes generous references to the work of black scholars.

The Tangle of Pathology

The "Moynihan Report"—An Error Perpetuated

It is nearly five years since the "Moynihan Report" concluded that the structure of family life in the black community constituted a "tangle of pathology . . . capable of perpetuating itself without assistance from the white world," and that "at the heart of the deterioration of the fabric of Negro society is the deterioration of the Negro family. It is the fundamental source of the weakness of the Negro community at the present time [Moynihan, 1965, italics added]." This was an incorrect analysis of the relationship between black families and white society. It reverses the true nature of the influence process at work. It is not weakness in the family which causes poverty and racism—the true tangle of pathology which afflicts black people; it is quite the other way around. The family is a creature of the society. And the greatest problems facing black families are problems which emanate from the white racist, militarist, materialistic society which places higher priority on putting white men on the moon than putting black men on their feet on this earth. Still this analysis, which placed the cause of black peoples' difficulties on the family unit, was eagerly received by the American reading public as the key to understanding black people. Its author has subsequently modified this interpretation. One of the unfortunate consequences of his earlier analysis, however, was that it gave rise to similar analyses by other white students of the black family.

Arrogant Analysis by White Liberals

Thus, nearly five years later, two white liberal social scientists-who call themselves "militant integrationists"-have published a book based on their observations during a nine-month sojourn in a black community (Etzkowitz & Schaflander, 1969). It includes a chapter titled "The Negro Ghetto Non-Family"; it perpetuates the incorrect analysis made so famous by Moynihan, and which has been thoroughly discredited by more careful social analyses (Herzog, 1967, 1970). The authors state very candidly their own view and evaluation of black people: "It is our own belief that there are practically no pluses in Negro ghetto culture. . . . We see nothing but bitterness and despair, nihilism, hopelessness, rootlessness, and all the symptoms of social disintegration in the poor speech, poor hygiene, poor education, and lack of security resulting from a non-family background in which the stabilizing paternal factor is absent and where there is no stable institution to substitute for the family [Etzkowitz & Schaflander, 1969, p. 14]." They go considerably beyond the Moynihan thesis of disintegrating family life as they assert without qualification, "the fact that love, warmth, hygiene, education and family stability are absent for most Negroes." And that, "Booze, gambling, drugs, and prostitution are the inevitable result of the absence of a stable family institution [p. 15]."

These men are as insensitive and arrogant as they are incorrect in their analysis. They insist that the line of causation runs from the family to the society. After describing in very negative terms what they consider "momism," represented by the "harassed, cranky, frustrated, church-going, overworked mothers" who dominate these "non-families" by "driving young children into fierce competition," these white liberal social scientists conclude that "the damage resulting from this typical non-family life often leads to young dropouts and unwed mothers, and to crime, violence, alcoholism and drug addiction [Etzkowitz & Schafland-

er, 1969, p. 15, italics added]."

Despite the incorrectness of their analysis of the relationship between black family life and the white society, their views reflect the views of many people, even some in the social work profession. The authentication of such views by social science scholarship, foundation grants, high university and government positions serves to perpetuate this erroneous thinking, thus preventing enlightened people from getting on with the task of analyzing and helping remove the crippling consequences of institutionalized racism to which the Kerner Commission Report so correctly attributes the most important cause of the difficulties black people face in this country and the most important cause of their outrage

against oppression.

For scholars and students trying to understand family functioning in the black community, the chief fault of the above type of analysis is the attribution of an inverse cause and effect relationship between family and society, and the ignoring of the forces of institutionalized racism. For social planners an additional problem with this analysis is that it ignores the variety and complexity of black family and community life while concentrating on its negative features. Analyses such as these stem almost unchecked from the white Anglo-Conformity perspective which judges black people outside the context of their unique anchor in history, their treatment in this country, and their contemporary social conditions. More important, such analyses ignore the existence of a black subculture, and the strengths of the black community and the black family which have enabled black people to survive in a hostile environment for over 300 years.

Unfortunately, analyses of black families by well-educated, well-meaning, white liberal integrationists come more out of the perspectives which they bring with them to the black community than out of the realities and complexities of life in the black community. The continuation of the white, middle class, outsider, Anglo-Conformity perspective toward black people—born out of a combination of ignorance and arrogance—not only obscures

the realities which our society needs so desperately to understand about black family and community life, but performs a downright disservice to such understanding because of the status of the propagators of this view and their access to the wider society.

Most Black Families are Headed by Men

The plain fact is that in most communities of any size, most black families meet the American test of stability. Contrary to the impression generally circulated by white students of the black family, most black families, even in the ghetto, are headed by men. And in most of these families, even in the very poor ones, most of these men are still married to their original wives. Furthermore, most of these men and many of the women are employed full time, and are still not able to pull their families out of poverty. What we need to know more about is how these families manage. How do they function? How do they manage to meet the needs of their children? Our own experience and research, supported by an increasing body of other studies, suggest that even among the lower class families in the black ghetto, life is more varied then is generally communicated by gross uniform characterizations.

In a new book, David A. Schulz (1969) presents the reader with 146 pages of descriptions, theories, and conjectures about the sordidness of life for low income families in a public housing project before he opens his final chapter with the following observation: "It would be a serious mistake to leave the impression that the problems of the Negro lower class derive mainly from patterns of agonistic sexual development and broken unstable families. Yet, this is one possible interpretation of the data thus far presented [p. 147]." This statement and the orientation it suggests might better have been stated at the beginning of the study and then reflected in the treatment of his data and the modesty of his generalizations. Further, it is difficult to see how his intensive analysis of the behaviors of five low income black families living in a single public housing project could provide an adequate basis for his theoretical generalizations about a three-way typology of black family life. It is indeed doubtful that he would have been supported in making generalizations on the study of so few white families, despite the fact that his own background and experience provides him with much greater knowledge of white families than of black families.

There are four tendencies in the treatment of black families in social science scholarship. The first is the tendency to ignore black families altogether. The second is, when black families are considered, to focus almost exclusively on the lowest income group of black families, that acute minority of families who live in public

housing projects or who are supported by public welfare assistance. The third is to ignore the majority of black stable families even among this lowest income group, to ignore the processes by which these families move from one equilibrium state to another, and to focus instead on the most unstable among these low income families. A fourth tendency, which is more bizarre than all the others, is the tendency on the part of social scientists to view the black, low-income, unstable, problem-ridden family as the causal nexus for the difficulties their members experience in the wider society.

Why Social Science has Failed the Black Family

Why, then, are black families so badly mistreated in social science scholarship? The factors which account for this are many, varied, and complex. Some are historical and some contemporary. Among these factors, however, four stand out as being paramount.

The Family, as an Institution, has been Neglected

The family as an institution has not been given the systematic thought, study, and theoretical speculation such an important institution in society deserves. Much of the literature on families is produced by social scientists whose major interest and competence lies in other areas. They give passing attention to some aspects of family life on their way to studying something else considered more important. An examination of the towering elites in the family literature will reveal that few of these men have devoted their lifetime careers to a study of the family. An examination of men who have reveals that few of them are considered among the towering elites in social science scholarship. Thus, the most important social institution in all of social life is relegated to a type of second class treatment. This is a most telling commentary on the nature, the values, the relevance, and the priority system of American social science. The situation is confounded by the fact that social science scholarship is so heavily dominated by men. In a course I took with Theodore Newcomb, I once heard him say that although he had spent a considerable portion of his career studying small groups, it had not occurred to him until recently that the family was a small group and an appropriate unit of anal-

Blacks are Black, Social Science is White

Secondly, the reason black families have fared so much worse than white families in social science is that they are black and social science is white. For the plain and simple fact is that black

people, as a people, have not been taken seriously by social scientists. Consequently, the institutional life of black people has been generally ignored. We have observed elsewhere that when black people have been the object of analysis by white social scientists, it has been mainly race relations, that is to say, the relations between white and black people rather than the nature of the life of black people which has been at the center of their interests. The ethnocentrism reflected in this behavior syndrome is as pervasive as it is regrettable.

Yet these social scientists have been victimized by their own Anglo-European history and culture. They have tended to view other cultures primarily as objects of assimilation. This accounts in part for the high degree of interest in interracial marriage and

the high interest in color variations among black families.

It also helps to explain why any behavior pattern manifested among black families which differs in degree or kind from what is observed among white families is considered deviant. But more important, this Anglo-European perspective obscures the realities and the complexities of black family life in America. Few white scholars have overcome this bias. A number of black scholars have

also been victimized by it.

This perspective is not something completely of the past. It is reflected, for example, in the kinds of questions which are asked on PhD examinations in the leading graduate departments of social science. A study of such questions in sociology recently published in the American Sociologist (Mack, 1969) showed the considerable uniformity with which the black perspective and, particularly, black families are excluded from the important matters social science scholars are expected to deal with.

Informed Opinions of Blacks are Ignored

A third reason for the mistreatment of black families in social science is the relative exclusion of black scholars from these disciplines and the mistreatment of those who do manage to enter. One searches the social science journals in vain, even in 1970, for a steady stream of contributions from black scholars. Even on matters of book reviews, for example, the white social science journals with their white editors are much more likely to ask a white expert on black people to review books by and about black people than to turn to black scholars for these assignments. The problem with this is not only that it helps to perpetuate the exclusion of black people from social science scholarship, it also perpetuates the "white people know best" tendency, and at the same time produces inferior scholarship on such an important aspect of American life as black families.

Furthermore, one searches the faculties of the major social science departments in the country in vain for a representation of black people there. Nor is the production of black doctorates yet a high priority item for many of these departments. The distressing aspect of this particular pattern of exclusion is that social scientists in the major universities have not been among the leaders in trying to correct the situation. White social scientists, particularly those of the liberal persuasion, are amazingly satisfied that they can adequately reflect the black experience as well as they can the white experience, and better than black scholars can-in part because black scholars are not well "qualified," and in part because they are likely to be "estranged from their own people." White social scientists are much more interested in providing guest lectureships for black militants who have not completed high school, than they are in providing regular appointments for black scholars, militant or otherwise, who have completed their PhDs. It is particularly distressing to observe the smug satisfaction and arrogance reflected as white faculties consider and reject one black scholar after another for positions on these faculties, while continuing to hire white faculty of mediocre talent or worse.

Over-Reliance on Statistical Techniques and Speculation

Finally, much of the mistreatment of black families in social science is due to the nature of the disciplines involved and the manner in which each of these disciplines has come to rely heavily on statistical techniques, large scale surveys, and overarching theoretical speculations. Thus both the theoretical and the methodological interests and imperatives in social science have tended to take them away from a clarification of the nature of black family life in America. It may well be, then, that the established social science disciplines are already too old and rigid (like most other aging institutions in America) to give us the knowledge about black families which is needed without major renewal of these disciplines themselves.

Some Consequences

When we consider the consequences of the manner in which black families have been mistreated at the hands of white social science, we must ask: "Consequences for whom?" And we must look for both positive and negative consequences, as well as for latent and manifest functions.

Neglect of Blacks has Enhanced Status of Social Science

Clearly one of the latent consequences for social science of this pattern of exclusion and distortion of black families has been positive, in the sense that social science has reached relatively high status and acceptance in American society in large measure because it has stayed in the mainstream of American society and has not been unduly involved in studies, explanations, and advocation of "disadvantaged," low status, and "deviant" groups. It has helped to enhance the status of social science in the general community when social science studies and conclusions have been consistent with the general interests of that community. Thus the very distortions of black people sanctioned and perpetuated by social science scholarship have helped to enhance the status of such scholarship in the white racist society which is America.

Encouraging Ignorance and Misinformation

Still another latent consequence which is quite negative has to do with the spread of ignorance among students and the general population. Many young graduate students at the university in which I teach come from some of the best undergraduate social science departments in the country and know almost nothing about black people as a people, and even less about black families. Others come to graduate school with the most crippling kind of misinformation. Many of our brightest graduate students from some of the best colleges with social science majors are convinced from their exposure to social science that black families are characterized by disorganization; that the matriarchal family form is dominant; that most black children grow up without fathers; that female-headed families produce girls who are masculine and boys who are feminine; that children from female-headed families do worse in school than children from two-parent families; and that most low income female-headed black families are supported by welfare and live in public housing projects. It cannot be expected that these middle class white students would have learned any better from their own experience in their families, their churches, synagogues, or their lower schools; it might be expected that they would have learned better in their social science classes in college. But unfortunately the ignorance they brought to college has often been confounded by the misinformation generated and perpetuated therein by social science.

Misguiding Policymakers

And what about policymakers who depend on social science for guidance? The disasters surrounding the issuance of the Moynihan (1965) and the Coleman (1966) reports are two recent and

painful examples of the dysfunctions of social science scholarship for policy development. The first of these reports convinced some important policy-makers and a large number of ordinary citizens that the major problem which black people faced was weakness in the family structure, and if that matter was attended to, the nation would not need to exert extraordinary efforts to assure black people all the rights and privileges white people now enjoy -these matters could take care of themselves. The second report convinced policymakers and educators that if every low income black student could sit next to a middle class white student in school, equality of educational opportunity and achievement would follow without extraordinary efforts to improve the quality of instruction, the educational facilities, and the rapprochement between the school and the community. These are exceptionally abbreviated commentaries on these reports, and they may be unintended consequences of them. But it is clear that neither the Moynihan Report nor the Coleman Report advanced the status of our knowledge about black families and their children sufficiently to guide the policy development of the major institutions of our society-whose responsibility is to meet their needs and who ought to be able to look to social science for enlightenment. The major problem is that both of these studies were conceived, executed, and reported out of the white middle class perspective in social science, with no meaningful participation by black people.

Perpetuating the Depressed Status of Blacks

The consequences for black people directly are more severe. It is only a slight exaggeration to suggest that social science has had no appreciable effect in the struggle to liberate black people from the oppression of the white racist society, nor has social science made any substantial contribution to the liberation of black people from their own sense of inferiority. Much of social science has had the oppositive effect. The social scientists who describe black families in such a negative and distorted manner must bear some of the responsibility for this self-fulfilling prophesy.

Some Rays of Hope?

Is there no hope at all that American social science can clarify the nature of black family life in America? In my view, there is some hope, though not very much. Some white social scientists on their way to some other goal have managed to shed some light on important aspects of black family life. Elsewhere (Billingsley, 1968) we have remarked on the contributions Thomas Pettigrew (1964) has made to the clarification of the black experience in America. Elliot Liebow (1967) has done a very sensitive analysis of the life styles of black men who hang out on a particular street corner in Washington, D.C., an analysis which takes an important step in correcting the manner in which men are left out of black family studies. Jessie Bernard (1966) has amassed an impressive array of studies which help to clarify the "normalcy" of black families in America. Elizabeth Herzog (1967) has exploded much of the mythology about black families which has been generated and perpetuated by other social scientists. Robert Coles (1967) has shown the positive attributes of black families under crises. Gurin and Katz (1966) have shown the strength of black families in motivating their children to aspire to higher education and beyond. Finally, the field waits with a great deal of expectation for a new volume on black families by Lee Rainwater. There are others. But for more hope we must turn toward black social scientists, who can bring to the assignment not only the theories and methods they have learned from white social science, but major modifications and contributions to those theories and methods based on their own lifetime experience as black people in America and their commitment to the liberation of their people from all vestiges of oppression, including the oppression by white social science.

The Best Studies of Blacks are by Black Scholars

Already the best studies of black families have been done by black scholars, despite an assertion to the contrary by August Meier (1969) who thinks that the best studies of black families have been done by white men whom he knows. That is because he does not know the literature very well, or is not a very good judge of studies, or knows little about black family life, or some combination of all three. For, clearly, the works of E. Franklin Frazier (1932a, 1932b, 1948, 1962), Drake (1962), Hylan Lewis (1955, 1961), Camille Jeffers (1967), Lewis Watts (1964), Harry Edwards (1968), Daniel C. Thompson (1963, and with W. Thompson, 1960), Nathan Hare (1965), Charlotte Dunmore (1967), Joyce Ladrer (1967), William Cabbs (1967), Joyce Ladner (1967), William Grier and Price Cobbs (1968) have contributed more to an understanding of black family life in America than have all the white social scientists combined. Yet this is not very much. The major function of the work they have done is to show the necessity and the promise of having more black scholars devoted to the task of clarifying the nature of the black experience from the inside.

But Black Creative Writers Provide Even Greater Insight

In the final analysis one must admit that neither white nor black social scientists have yet provided the insight into the structure and functioning of black family life that has been provided by the more "creative" black writers—including novelists, poets, essayists, biographers, and lyricists. I have just finished reading Bloodline, a collection of short stories by Ernest J. Gains (1968). His portrayal of black family life in the rural south is classic. It is at once subjective and objective. It is successful in capturing the realities of black family life and at the same time provides the basis for several ideal family types. It is so perceptive that it moves beyond art toward science.

Or one could do a lot worse than reading the works of James

Baldwin, particularly Go Tell it On the Mountain (1963).

Or the works of Langston Hughes. One brief excerpt from one of his conversations with Simple will make the point:

"I'm still hoping it will get here in time for Christmas," said Simple. "What?"

"My divorce. But I just got word from that lawyer in Baltimore that he had been held up until he got my money before completing the process. He also writ me concerning on what my wife bases our divorce, now that I have paid. And, don't you know, that woman claims I deserted her."

"Well, did you?"

"I did not. She put me out."

"In other words, you left under duress."

"Pressure," said Simple.

"Then why don't you refute her argument? Contest her claim?"

"That is just why we separated, we argued so much. I will not argue with Isabel now over no divorce. She writ that she did not want to contest. Neither do I. I never could win an argument with that woman. Only once in a wife-time did I win, and I did not win then with words."

"How did you win?"

"I just grabbed her and kissed her," said Simple.

"Why didn't you try that method more often?"

"Because as soon as I kissed her she stopped arguing and started loving. Sometimes it is not loving a man wants. He wants to win—especially when he knows he is right." [Hughes, 1961].

It would be hard indeed for the modern theories and techniques of white-oriented social science to capture or reproduce the essense of the behavior being described in this story.

The Remedies

What, then, are some of the remedies for the situation in which black families find themselves reflected in social science scholarship. Clearly, the social science disciplines like the American institutions they reflect are aging, rigid, and in need of renewal along a number of dimensions. Some of the suggestions being put forward by the Youth Caucus, the Black Caucus, and the Women's Caucus at professional meetings are indicative both of the rigidity and the need for change. The need is pressing for social scientists to move out of their ancient theories, their libraries, their methodological preoccupations and take a good look at the modern world and try to describe it. It is unlikely, however, that the present aging, white male leadership in the social science disciplines can provide that kind of innovative leadership. The first need, then, is for the overthrow of the present social scientific hierarchy.

A second need is for the family as a unit to be elevated in the value and priority system of social science scholarship. In the process, however, social science must develop a more flexible array of techniques, perhaps borrowing heavily from some of the "creative" disciplines in order to understand, describe, and explain black family life with the degree of sensitivity it deserves

and requires.

A third need is for all the social science disciplines to incorporate within themselves a measure of the black perspective. White people cannot do the job alone. They must, in fact, increasingly follow the leadership of black scholars, whom they must

help to produce, sustain, and free.

The standards for the recruitment of major faculty in the major universities which are designed and operate mainly to protect the vested interests of the existing white faculty must give way to a more relevant criteria so that black faculty can be appointed at sufficient status and in sufficient numbers to provide the kind of corrective instruction and research needed by both white and black students and the existing white faculty.

But clearly the kind of leadership which is needed for a new series of studies of black family life in America is not likely to come from the white social science establishment. This leadership must come from black scholars. And, unfortunately, the initiative must be seized by black scholars. It is not likely to be abandoned or even shared gracefully by the existing white experts on black

people.

REFERENCES

BALDWIN, J. Go tell it on the mountain. New York: The Dial Press, 1963.

Bell, N. W., & Vogel, E. F. A modern introduction to the family. (Rev. ed.) New

Bernard, J. Marriage and family among Negroes. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-

BILLINGSLEY, A. Black families in white America. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-

COLEMAN, J. S., et al. Coleman Report: Equality of educational opportunity. U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov't. Printing Office, 1966.

Coles, R. Children of crisis: A study of courage and fear. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967. Drake, St. C. Black metropolis. (Rev. ed.) New York: Harper & Row, 1962.

Dunmore, C. Social psychological factors affecting the use of an educational opportunity program by families living in a poverty area. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Brandeis University, 1967.

EDWARDS, H. Black Muslim and Negro Christian family relationships. Journal of

Marriage and the Family, 1968, 604-611.

ETZKOWITZ, H., & SCHAFLANDER, G. M. Ghetto crisis: Riots or reconciliation? Boston:

Frazier, E. F. The free Negro family. Nashville, Tenn.: Fisk Univer. Press, 1932. (a) FRAZIER, E. F. The Negro family in Chicago. Chicago: Univer. of Chicago Press,

FRAZIER, E. F. The Negro family in the United States. Chicago: The Univer. of Chi-

FRAZIER, E. F. Black bourgeoisie: The rise of a new middle class in the U.S. New York: Collier Books, 1962.

GAINS, E. J. Bloodline. New York: The Dial Press, 1968.

GIST, N. P., & FAVA, S. F. Urban society. (5th ed.) New York: T. Y. Crowell, 1964. GOODE, W. J. (Ed.) Readings on the family and society. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:

GRIER, W., & COBBS, P. Black rage. New York: Basic Books, 1968.

GURIN, P., & KATZ, D. Motivation and aspiration in the Negro college. U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education, 1966.

HARE, N. The black Anglo Saxons. (With an introduction by Oliver Cox) New York: Marzani and Munsell, 1965.

Herzog, E. About the poor: Some facts and some fictions. Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1967. HERZOG, E. Social stereotypes and social research. Journal of Social Issues, 1970,

HUGHES, L. The best of Simple. New York: Hill and Wang, 1961.

JEFFERS, C. Living poor: A participant observer study of choices and priorities. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Ann Arbor Publishers, 1967.

KEPHART, W. M. The family, society, and the individual. (2nd ed.) Boston: Houghton,

LADNER, J. A. Black power: In Mississippi. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, August, 1967.

Lewis, H. Black ways of Kent. Chapel Hill: Univer. of No. Carolina Press, 1955. LEWIS, H. Child rearing among low-income families. Washington, D.C.: Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies, 1961.

LIEBOW, E. Tally's corner: A study of Negro streetcorner men. Boston: Little, Brown,

MACK, R. W. Written doctoral examinations in sociology at some leading universities. The American Sociologist, 1969, 4, 189-226.

MEIER, A. Review of A. Billingsley, Black families in white America. Saturday Review

of Literature, April 5, 1969.

MOYNIHAN, D. P. The Negro family: The case for national action. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Planning and Research, 1965.

NIMKOFF, M. F. (Ed.) Comparative family systems. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1965. PARSONS, T., & BALES, R. F. Family, socialization, and interaction process. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960.

PETTIGREW, T. F. A profile of the Negro American. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand

Co., 1964.

QUEEN, S. A., & HABENSTEIN, R. The family in various cultures. (3rd ed.) New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1967. SCHULZ, D. A. Coming up black: Patterns of ghetto socialization. Englewood Cliffs,

N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969. Sussman, M. B. (Ed.) Sourcebook in marriage and the family. (3rd ed.) Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1959.

THOMPSON, D. C. The Negro leadership class. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,

1963.

THOMPSON, D. C., & THOMPSON, W. The eighth generation: Cultures and personalities of New Orleans Negroes. New York: Harper, 1960.

WATTS, L. G. The middle income Negro families face urban renewal. Waltham, Mass.:

Brandeis Univer., 1964.

Biographical Sketches

ANDREW BILLINGSLEY is Assistant Chancellor for Academic Affairs, University of California, Berkeley, and Associate Professor of Social Welfare. He was recently a Fellow at the Metropolitan Applied Research Center. Dr. Billingsley has a PhD in social welfare from Brandeis University, an MA in sociology from the University of Michigan, an MS in social work from Boston University, and an AB in political science from Grinnell College. He is the author of many articles on social welfare and social work and of Black Families in White America.

WILBUR J. COHEN is the former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. He was also Chairman of President Kennedy's Task Force on Health and Social Security, 1960. He was responsible for piloting through Congress approximately one hundred different legislative proposals during the period 1961–68, including the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Medicare, and the Higher Education Acts. Before joining the Kennedy task force, he was Professor of Public Welfare Administration at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. He has since returned to that university as Dean of the School of Education.

MARCIA FREEDMAN is Senior Research Associate, Conservation of Human Resources Project, Columbia University, and Adjunct Associate Professor of Education, Teachers College. She received an AB from the University of Michigan, MS from Columbia University, and PhD from New York University. The author of *The Process of Work Establishment* (Columbia University Press, 1969), she is presently investigating the dynamics of employment opportunity.

MARILYN GITTELL is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for Community Studies at Queens College of the City University of New York. She is author of Participants and Participation: A

Study of School Policy in New York City and has written extensively on the politics of urban education. Her most recent book (with Mario Fantini and Richard Magat) is Community Control and the Urban School.

MARCIA GUTTENTAG is Associate Professor of Psychology at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, and Director of the Harlem Research Center. She was previously a Visiting Fellow at Yale University. A social psychologist, her current research is concerned with the effects of school social organization on cognitive and motivational variables in children. She is co-editor of the forthcoming Handbook of Evaluation Research.

GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. is Professor of Law, University of Chicago School of Law, Chicago, Illinois. He received his BA at Swarthmore College; his LLB at Columbia. He edited Law in a Changing America, and from 1964 to 1970 was Executive Director, American Bar Foundation.

ELIZABETH HERZOG is presently Project Director, The George Washington University Social Research Group, in Washington, D.C. She was formerly Chief of the Youth and Child Studies Branch, Research Division, Children's Bureau, Office of Child Development. Among her publications are About the Poor: Some Facts and Some Fictions, Children of Working Mothers, Identifying Potential Delinquents, Some Guidelines for Evaluative Research, and (as co-author) Health Services for Unmarried Mothers, Independent Adoptions: A Follow-Up Study, Life is with People: The Jewish Littletown of Eastern Europe.

ADELINE GORDON LEVINE received her BA at Beaver College, her PhD at Yale. She is currently Associate Professor of Sociology, State University of New York at Buffalo. In addition to her teaching duties she is engaged in research on the socialization process in teachers. With her husband, she is co-author of A Social History of Helping Services: Clinic, Court, School and Community.

MURRAY LEVINE is Professor of Psychology and Director of the Graduate Training Program in Clinical-Community Psychology at State University of New York at Buffalo. A product of CCNY with a PhD from the University of Pennsylvania, he has taught at Beaver College and Yale University, and has been a clinical psychologist with the Veterans Administration and the Devereux Schools. With George Spivack he wrote A Rorschach Index of Repressive Style and with Seymour B. Sarason and others he authored Psychology in Community Settings.

JONATHAN WEISS earned both his BA and LLB from Yale. He is Director, Problems of the Elderly Poor, at the Columbia University

Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law. He was formerly Managing Attorney for Mobilization for Youth Legal Service NYC, and Neighborhood Legal Services, Washington, D.C.; has served as consultant to the President's Commission on Civil Disorders, Commission on Mental Health of Children, Office of Economic Opportunity, Project Advisory Board of Neighborhood Legal Services. He has written Right and Wrong: A Philosophical Dialogue between Father and Son, How to Defend a Juvenile Case, and numerous law review articles.

LOUIS A. ZURCHER, JR. is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Texas, Austin, Texas. He has been Research Social Psychologist at the Menninger Foundation, Topeka, Kansas, and is currently Co-chairman of the Poverty and Human Resources Section, Society for the Study of Social Problems, and a consulting editor to the Journal of Applied Behavioral Science and the Social Science Quarterly. He has authored The Leader and the Lost: A Case Study of Indigenous Leadership in a Poverty Program Community Action Committee; (with Alvin Green) From Dependency to Dignity: Individual and Social Consequences of a Neighborhood House; Poverty Warriors: The Human Experience of Planned Social Intervention; and (with Charles M. Bonjean) Planned Social Intervention: A Cross Disciplinary Reader.

The second of the second secon

He was a server of the product of th

The second secon

BILLINGSLEY, ANDREW. Black families and white social science. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26(3), 127-142.

Heretofore black families have been largely ignored in American social science. Very little has been written and what has been written by social scientists has been in the main incorrect and distorted. White social scientists tend to ignore the large group of stable black families in their concentration on the most troubled families in the black community. They then generalize to the larger black society. Ignorance, arrogance, and insensitivity have characterized the works of these scholars as they incorrectly state that family instability has caused the problems of black people in our racist society. There is a great need for new innovative leadership to change the encrusted rigid patterns of American social science into a new relevancy. A higher priority must be given to systematic study of the family including the black family. Our institutions must make a place for black scholars who must in turn seize the leadership needed for a new more accurate series of studies of black family life in America.

COHEN, WILBUR, J. Government policy and the poor: Past, present, and future. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26(3), 1-9.

The role of government in the United States in relation to the poor is examined in historical perspective, with emphasis on the shifting of responsibility from local and state to the larger units of the federal government, on the influences of certain popular formal programs (e.g., Social Security), and on the effects of the recent long period of general prosperity. A suggested federal government program which would be politically acceptable and in the long run preventive of poverty among the American people is outlined.

FREEDMAN, MARCIA. Poor people and the distribution of job opportunities. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26(3), 35-46.

Recent programs and current proposals to alleviate poverty are not designed to alter the social equilibrium, particularly with respect to the distribution of income. The typical process of establishment at work leaves a sizeable group of men outside the norms of attachment and adequate income, while the majority are protected by their organizational ties and memberships. Females, on the other hand, are largely either peripheral workers or fill jobs that lack career prospects. The expectation of higher levels of consumption has led to both legitimate and illegitimate attempts to redistribute wealth, but these attempts run counter to powerful institutional forces. Programs designed to alleviate poverty cannot be expected to produce utopian solutions for what are basically political problems.

DESCRIPTION OF THE STATE AND STATE AND SELECTION OF SELECTION OF THE SELEC

and the property of the proper

COURT, WILLSON, I. Development volter and the piece fruit, present in

they a matriced perspective, with megapies on the charge of the expectation of expectations of the productive of the charge of t

to compression of the commercial of the charge were All State of the state of

the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the s

GITTELL, MARILYN. Urban school politics: Professionalism vs. reform. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26(3), 69-84.

Public education has over the last thirty years become an institution isolated from the public. It has failed to meet the test of an open society, namely, accountability and responsibility to the citizens it serves. This is largely a product of the centralization of decision-making by school bureaucracies and the accumulation of power by professional educators. The quality of public education in large American cities is caught in a spiral of decline which can only be reversed through a revitalization process which guarantees the citizens a meaningful role in school affairs. Decentralization/community control should prove to be the mechanism by which the community can participate and revitalize public education in the United States.

HAZARD, GEOFFREY C., JR. Legal problems peculiar to the poor. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26(3), 47-58.

Long term legal evolution has conferred formal legal equality on all citizens regardless of wealth. However, many rules of law governing market transactions, the distribution of public benefits, and the conduct of private transactions operate adversely upon the poor, or fail to achieve their stated objectives of benefiting them. An array of legal reforms is suggested which could ameliorate some of these shortcomings without unduly interfering with the autonomy and dignity of low income people.

HERZOG, ELIZABETH. Social stereotypes and social research. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26(3), 109-125.

Social scientists can contribute to the making or breaking of stereotypes and stereotypes can aggravate social problems. Most difficult to combat are generalizations partly true and partly false, such as some concerning unmarried mothers and fatherless homes. Deceptive research models are a fertile source of stereotypes, and include dubious dichotomies, dubious continua, snapshot perspective, and culprit variables. A few helpful but not simple safeguards are: painstaking and critical review of research reports, adequate exploratory descriptive research, avoidance of premature structuring, continuing cross-fertilization among different disciplines and different research approaches, and avoidance of the Procrustean approach.

The analysis of the party of th

The state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the s

to the latest of the latest sending land the property of the property of the latest sending the latest sendi

The control of the control of the control of the production of the control of the

The property of the control of the c

LEVINE, MURRAY, & LEVINE, ADELINE. The more things change: A case history of child guidance clinics. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26(3), 19-34.

The privately supported, community child guidance clinic originated in 1921 as part of a program to prevent delinquency. Then as now, juvenile delinquency was viewed as a problem among the poor. The child guidance clinic was meant to encourage and assist other child welfare agencies and institutions to develop a mental hygiene outlook toward their charges, thereby improving their services and eliminating a cause of delinquency. Within ten years, the clinics focused on in-clinic, psychoanalytically oriented therapeutic treatment, almost exclusively. There was a concomitant shift from lower class to middle class clientele, and from difficult problems to easier problems. The social forces making for the change in purpose and orientation include the conservative political milieu of the 1920s, changing social class backgrounds of social workers, and the professionalization of social work. Based on the historical study, comments on the future direction of changes in services are offered.

WEISS, JONATHAN. The law and the poor. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26(3), 59-68.

The poor confront the legal system with a different set of problems and obstacles than others. Two areas of rules are different for them: (1) those governing access and endurance, and (2) the substantive rules which treat them as a special group. The first set of rules appears to be permanently institutionalized, dependent more on society than law. The second is undergoing constitutional attack. The poor are relegated to a status of dependence in relation to institutions, where others can utilize institutional contacts to achieve personal gain. Providing counsel remedies some of this disparity. Agencies of government are concerned with administration rather than constitutional rights; in the absence of legal scrutiny and attack, unconstitutional rules are promulgated against the poor.

ZURCHER, LOUIS A., JR. The poverty board: Some consequences of "maximum feasible participation." Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26(3), 85-107.

Analysis of questionnaire data supported the hypothesis that representatives of the poor on an OEO poverty board were significantly different from representatives of the non-poor in selected demographic and social-psychological characteristics. The impact of those differences upon board dynamics and decision-making is discussed. The hypothesis that participation in the poverty board and its related activities would engender social-psychological change among representatives of the poor was, with some important exceptions, supported by questionnaire, interview, and non-participant observation data. Some sex and ethnic variations appeared among the findings, and are discussed. Suggestions based upon the data are offered to researchers and to poverty intervention organization staff.

THE THE PARTY OF T

the first part of a principal of animal property of the part of a
AND DESCRIPTION OF THE PARTY WARRANT WARRANT CONTRACT CON

The poor annih out his upod section with a children set as articles and advantables of the set of area and care, are quintered for overal 1) these and arrange access and excess and excess and excess and excess and excess and excess and the set of the care and applicate on the particle section in the real discussion and deposit of the poor and are called a set of the care of t

TO RETIRE. LOADS STATE OF LOADS BOOK SHOW WITHOUT STATE OF THE STATE O

The point off are 10 years of beauty are superficiently designed to the control of the point of

The Activists' Corner

Nevitt Sanford The Wright Institute, Berkeley

The last column was mainly a piece called "Freeing Women to Become People" by Mrs. Lenore Borzak of Kendall College, Evanston, Illinois. I promised to solicit comments on it from other women I was sure would have something interesting to say. Here are two such comments, from rather different points of view. The first is by Kathryn Johnson, a project director at The Wright Institute and a member of The Graduate Women's Sociology Caucus and of the East Bay Feminists; the other, by Marjorie M. Lozoff, a psychiatric social worker who was for eight years a staff member of the Student Development Study at the Institute for the Study of Human Problems, Stanford University.

Kathryn Johnson's Comment

Lenore Borzak gives the reader little to sink his or her teeth into. I waited eagerly for her to describe how she presented the course topics—the biological nature of women, their historical revolution, their economic status. These are the broad issues women are thinking about, but I could glean little from her writing about her own position and her grasp of the more subtle questions these themes involved. I was left with the vague feeling that she is no sister and I am not impressed by her reading list which

If Mrs. Borzak intends to write further on this subject, I have

three suggestions.

Suggestion One. Borzak should describe how her course got

started, how her department colleagues reacted, and whether her students formed an action group in response to their experience. These questions are important because their answers will shed light on how courses are incorporated into curricula and will

deepen her concept of relevancy.

Let me be specific by talking about the first women's course at the University of California at Berkeley. Pauline Bart taught the first course about the women's movement, and this grew out of an already formed women's caucus. The caucus began when one of the most promising women graduate students met with a sympathetic woman instructor to tell her that she was so discouraged that she was going to drop out of school. Word got passed around; a meeting of all women graduate students was called. The general feeling among the women who came to the meeting was "There but for the grace of God go I." Each woman spoke about her own insecurities, her doubts about the legitimacy of her presence as the only woman among many men, her fears about straying from traditional roles, her competition with other women, and-most important-the peculiar difficulties women have with being original and critical of existing authority. The group drew together out of need and almost dissolved several times during the first year out of hesitancy to admit the need for sisterhood.

Together, however, we realized that if we felt the same problems, though personal in nature, our feelings must not all be pathological-rather there must be some objective conditions that precipitated our situation. We began to look around and saw that women comprised 31% of the entering graduate student body each year and that the number of women who had received the PhD since the department's inception in 1948 was 24% of the total PhDs attained. Even so, there were no women on the faculty. No wonder we questioned whether or not we should be there! Gradually, the group moved from introspection to political action: meeting with department chairmen in order to get them to hire women faculty (they really haven't budged a bit), and meeting with the admissions committee to equalize the number of women admitted and to assure them of equal opportunities for fellowships, research assistantships, etc. Our course on women grew out of our own searching and represented an extension of our politics.

Departmental reaction to the women's course was mixed The course was consigned, as are black studies courses, to experimental status, a device designed to isolate innovation and prevent its full acceptance. Faculty members were reported to have cautioned women graduate students interested in doing research on women not to enter that field because they couldn't get their work published.

Returning to my point about the need to illustrate curriculum revision dynamics and to better define relevancy, the UC-Berkeley incident is significant in several ways. First, Mrs. Borzak talks about "relevance" in terms of the students' ability to identify with the material. While this is important, the Berkeley example adds to this definition the connotation of application and social action.

We had a women's course at Berkeley because a group of women were beginning to define themselves as an interest group and wanted to assert their identity and right to be. This is why relevance is so controversial. University liberal arts courses such as The History of Contemporary Civilization do not become part of the liberal arts curriculum because they are abstractly and divinely part of "true knowledge." It is no oversight that the economics department at Berkeley does not have a course on the cooperative movement. Courses get into the curriculum because they are part of the culture and reflect the interests of prominent and powerful people who make the decisions and define what is good for students. Experimental course credit and admonishments about low prestige are mechanisms designed to isolate what is threatening.

Suggestion Two. Borzak should spell out in greater detail how she handled the course topics. It's difficult to take issue with her or develop one's own argument without having a backboard to bounce against, but let me try to sketch out some of the kinds of things that, if Mrs. Borzak is up on the current literature, she should be thinking about.

For example, the biological nature of women. The question "To what extent is woman's anatomy her destiny?" might well be turned around to read "Why has woman's anatomy been her destiny?" Phrasing the question this way gets the reader away from biological determinism and into an examination of the social reasons behind giving such importance to women's anatomy. This focus is necessary if we, as women, are to realize that what is often attributed to hormones may be culturally induced and economically motivated. The research of a friend of mine illustrates how this process works. Her dissertation was a study of pill users and non-pill users. Holding hormone level constant, she concluded that the "menstrual blues" had less to do with body chemistry than with the attitudes about themselves that women had internalized from their culture. Why, then, is the myth about body chemistry perpetuated? One reason is to keep women out of the labor market to avoid competition for scarce jobs. This interrelation between cultural stereotypes and economics recently emerged into national headlines when Dr. Edgar F. Berman, former chairman of the Democratic National Policy Committee and Hubert Humphrey's private physician, made the faux pas which cost him his job. He said that physical factors should disqualify women from executive jobs. "If you have an investment in a bank," Dr. Berman was quoted as saying, "you wouldn't want the president of your bank making a loan under raging hormonal influences."

While men like Dr. Berman can't get away with such chauvinistic remarks any longer (at least not and retain a political post), it is harder to make men consider women as more than

childbearers or mothers.

Suggestion Three. Borzak should elaborate on how she handled the topic of women's historical revolution. The movement is presently middle-class based and we are just at the civil rights stage. Fully allowing women to enter the economy will require a restructuring of work in a more radical way than presently conceived. It will also require a drastic change in the nuclear family, possibly toward an extended or communal family arrangement. The degree of change that will occur will depend on the kind of links we, as women, can forge with other groups, on whether or not substantial change is possible in America (this is a problem that troubles both liberals and radicals), and on whether or not class or sex lines will be key. Low-income white women are beginning to organize through domestic and householders unions in the South, and these groups have historically been able to form temporary alliances with blacks.

Addenda. Finally, Mrs. Borzak could have developed two additional points. First, women's interest in the pill. It would be interesting to know who her students were—their background, their age—and if they were interested in the pill from the standpoint of overpopulation or sexual freedom. Second, how did they characterize their own strengths? Apparently, they defined themselves in terms of their relations to men and to children rather than in terms of their intrinsic selves and what they could do. Do men also conceive of themselves in relational roles or in terms of specific functions? If such differences in self-conception do exist, these contrasts would be a fruitful introduction to discussing sex differences and to developing new role models that would combine

the best of both worlds.

The Activists' Corner should, by all means, deal with the women's movement. Besides discussing types of women's courses and ultimately the question of whether there should be a department of warmer's an arrival and the should be a department of warmer's an arrival and the should be a department of warmer's an arrival and the should be a department of warmer's an arrival and the should be a department of warmer's an arrival and the should be a department of warmer's an arrival and the should be a department of warmer's an arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival and the should be a department of warmer's arrival ment of women's studies, or an institute for women's research

there are other more immediate and popular issues. How about a report on reactions of psychologists and psychiatrists to the women's liberation demonstrations at their various conferences? Or how about some commentary on recent women's movement publications not included in Mrs. Borzak's reading list, e.g., Naomi Weisstein's "Kinder, Kirche, Kuchen: The Psychological Constructs of the Female" in The Journal of Women's Liberation, Anne Koedt's "The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm" in Notes From The Second Year, Alice Rossi's "The Beginning of Ideology" in The Humanist, Kate Millet's Sexual Politics, and, finally, Pauline Bart's soon to be published article, "Portnoy's Mother's Complaint."

Marjorie Lozoff's Comment

Lenore Borzak has written a stimulating description of a course which dealt with a vital issue, "Freeing Women to Become People." I would like to describe an analogous course which focused around the problems of personality development of college students. This freshman seminar, like Mrs. Borzak's course, enabled students to become more aware of, among other factors, cultural pressures affecting their behavior. Hopefully, this awareness gave them more freedom to make decisions in harmony with individual needs and aspirations. Mrs. Borzak's course helped students to think of women as individuals who could develop life styles not necessarily limited by the model repetitiously presented in popular magazines. My course helped students view objectively the complications of being a young man or a young woman in a college environment; they were enabled to look beyond their own strivings to observe and empathize with others. As in the Borzak course, my students studied in an academic setting about "normal" individuals struggling to lead fulfilling lives. Although the study of human behavior in laboratory experiments and institutions for the mentally ill contributes to our understanding of human nature, students want to learn about how people in our diversified society adapt to everyday experiences and familiar institutions. There is exciting research about these subjects, and students need academic guidance in discovering and discussing such material. Borzak and Carlson provided such an opportunity.

The freshman seminar I taught at Stanford in 1968 and subsequently to a number of upperclassmen had a similar goal. According to the following evaluation of the course by a young

woman student, it achieved its end:

The emphasis in this course was on the positive adaptive potential of human beings rather than mainly on their pathological behavior. The seminar was an introduction to action research as opposed to laboratory

research and to case studies of "normal" people rather than therapeutic case histories. I find this approach to human behavior more appealing than that offered by the discipline of psychology and since I was considering a psychology major, this aspect of the seminar has been very important to me.

I have greater tolerance and appreciation for the diverse and subtle ways in which individuals adapt to conflict and think I have a much greater capacity for empathy than I did last January. I think I also have a better recognition of the influences and conflicts in my own life and that I can see more clearly new alternatives in developing my own life style. The seminar forced me to really confront my future role as a woman for the first time. The idea of reconciling a satisfying career with the role of wife and mother had seemed almost impossible before. I feel very fortunate to have had a competent and successful woman for a seminar leader.

In spite of the discomfort of including the last sentence, I finally decided that circumstances justified the inclusion. For the six men and three women in this course, the fact that the teacher was an older woman with college-age children, a psychiatric social worker who for nine years had engaged in social science research, presented both the men and women with something to think about. Older women in our society are often portrayed as examples of retarded development, and it is my impression that this attitude complicates the development of young adults of both sexes.

The main purpose of my seminar was to help students understand more about the developmental tasks of students and the complications of achieving gratifying interpersonal relationships. Two quarters seemed a minimum time needed to cut through simplistic and stereotyped concepts of behavior and motivation. In the first quarter, the students read the contributions of Freud, Erikson, Sanford, Robert White, and others, as well as research reports about personality development of college students and their university environment as analyzed by such writers as Joseph Katz, Nevitt Sanford, and Kenneth Keniston. During the first quarter, students were encouraged to focus on understanding concepts as the writers intended them to be understood, and to refrain from airing in the classroom personal insights about themselves resulting from their readings. Arrangements had been made for the students, voluntarily and individually, to discuss such insights with a counselor familiar with the material covered in the course. This arrangement had been made for reasons of economy of time since it was felt that the students needed to grasp difficult theoretical concepts before exploring case material (in the second quarter), and because the purpose of the class was not therapy individual or group. Although the main purpose of the course was

to further understanding of the tasks of young adulthood, the issue of the constraining effects of stereotypic concepts of masculinity and femininity came under scrutiny as a factor complicating personality development. At the end of the quarter, the students wrote term papers describing their perceptions about masculinity and femininity. They had read, among others, the following articles as a basis for discussion: Erik Erikson's "Inner and Outer Space: Reflections on Womanhood" and David McClelland's "Wanted: A New Self Image for Women" from Robert F. Lifton, et al. (Eds.), The Woman in America; John R. Seeley's chapter on beliess from Crestwood Heights; Octavio Paz's "Sons of La Malinche," a chapter in his The Labyrinth of Solitude. Starting with acceptance of the existence of fundamental psychological differences between the sexes, the students grew more skeptical as

they attempted to prove this assumption.

In the second quarter, the students read disguised transcriptions of interviews with college students who had attended Stanford and UC-Berkeley during previous years. These case studies were part of a four year longitudinal study of the impact of the university environment on personality development of college students and dealt with academic and extra-curricular experiences, peer relations, separation from home, self-concepts, and achievement of occupational decisions. As the freshmen read about the lives of other students during four years of college, they saw their first year in a different perspective. Through classroom discussions, they were able to test their ability to use concepts learned in the first quarter and to understand more fully the rootedness of behavior in personality and the operation of defense mechanisms. Toward the end of the second quarter, the students were encouraged to discuss perceptions of a more personal nature, because now a common knowledge of theory and of the college careers of others enabled them to describe personal experiences in an explanatory way rather than primarily to achieve catharsis.

Besides studying case histories, the students learned about research methods used to obtain interview and quantitative data. They read interview schedules, written questionnaire forms, articles and books connected with the research project. Their final assignment was to write a case history using either research skills

or more general observations.

The freshmen, in evaluating the course, mentioned various ways that they had obtained better understanding of themselves and their milieu; they believed that this would give them greater freedom of choice in future decisions. Several students, like the freshman whose comments follow, indicated greater empathy with family members and described themselves as able to differ from their parents in a way that did not involve alienating and destructive behavior:

The case studies have strengthened both my criticism for and sympathy with other people. I am glad that I can now criticize and empathize with the same people. The course freed me from a lot of conventional wisdomnotions about vocation, identity, masculinity, femininity, etc. I have learned to understand my family a lot better and myself a little better. It has reassured me to learn that my end-of-the-freshman-year lack of self-esteem is "normal."

Another student, an athlete and fraternity man, discovered complexities in others:

Understanding of abstract psychological concepts has increased some of my insights into other people, but more than that, it has allowed me to verbalize my own and other people's actions. The individual case studies were superb in allowing one to see many different people's under-the-surface emotions and thoughts and relate their behavior to this. I think I gained more tolerance towards people by realizing that there is more than meets the eye.

The above description of my seminar suggests that Borzak, Carlson, and I entered the same house by different doors. Their course brought to the students' attention various external and internal factors that prevent women from realizing their full potential. In my course, emphasis was on the complexities of human development, the pull of early experiences, the ambivalences, the multiplicity of determinants of behavior, and the recognition that individuals differ in temperament and abilities. Any stereotypic mold, including constraining definitions of masculinity and femininity, denies the fascinating variations that exist among people and impinges upon individual development and fulfillment.

The state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the s

secure of the second and trateger than the

The product of the control of the co

Volume XII: 1956

dir

No. 1 Attitudes and Adjustment in Cross-Cultural Contact: Recent Studies of Foreign Students. M. Brewster Smith, Issue Editor.

No. 2 Human Relations Research in Large Organizations: II. Robert L. Kahn, Floyd C. Mann, and Stanley Seashore, Issue Editors.

No. 3 Religious Conflict in the United States. Don J. Hager, Charles Y. Glock, and Isidor Chein, Issue Editors No. 4

Personality Development During the College Years. Nevitt Sanford, Issue Editor.

Volume XIII: 1957

No. 1 Therapeutic Camping for Disturbed Youth. Elton B. McNeil, Issue Editor. No. 2 Witnesses and Testimony at Trials and Hearings. Joshua A. Fishman, and Rudolph E. Morris, Issue Editors.

No. 3 Brainwashing. Raymond A. Bauer and Edgar H. Schein, Issue Editors. No. 4 Race Relations in Private Housing. Albert J. Mayer, Issue Editor.

Volume XIV: 1958

No. 1 Interpersonal Dynamics in a Desegregation Process. Marian Radke Yarrow, Issue Editor.
No. 2 Adjustment in Retirement. Gordon F. Streib and Wayne E. Thompson, Issue Editors.
No. 3 New Light on Delinquency. William McCord, Issue Editor.
No. 4 Culture Change and the Small Community. Robert J. Smith, Issue Editor.
Volume XV: 1959

Mine AV: 1959
No. 1 Mental Health in the Classroom. John C. Glidewell, Issue Editor.
No. 2 Consulting With Groups and Organizations. Jack R. Gibb and Ronald Lippitt, Issue Editors.
No. 3 Cross-Cultural Studies in the Arab Mid-East and United States: Studies of Young Adults.
Bradford B. Hudson, Issue Editor.
No. 4 December 1 Research in the North and South. Thomas F. Pattierew, Issue Editor. Desegregation Research in the North and South. Thomas F. Pettigrew, Issue Editor.

Volume XVI: 1960

 Mo. 1 Training for Political Participation, Gordon L. Lippitt, Issue Editor.
 No. 2 New Pathways from the Mental Hospital. Henry Wechsler and David Landy, Issue Editors.
 No. 3 America, Mass Society and Mass Media. Warren G. Bennis, Issue Editor.
 No. 4 Leadership and Participation in a Changing Rural Community. John Harding, Edward C. Devereux, Jr. and Urie Bronfenbrenner, Issue Editors. Volume XVII: 1961

No. 1 Social Change and Psychological Patterns. Joseph Adelson, Issue Editor.
 No. 2 Social Psychological Implications of Man in Space. Herbert E. Krugman and Donald N. Michael, Issue Editors.

No. 3 Psychology and Policy in a Nuclear Age. Roger W. Russell, Issue Editor.
No. 4 Trigger for Community Conflict: The Case of Fluoridation. Benjamin D. Paul, William A. Gamson, and S. Stephen Kegeles, Issue Editors.

No. 1 Impacts of Studying Abroad. George V. Coelho, Issue Editor.
No. 2 The Uses of Television. Lotte Bailyn, Issue Editor, Lewin Award, Other Papers.
No. 3 Work, Health and Satisfaction. John R. P. French, Robert L. Kahn, and Floyd C. Mann, Issue Editors.

No. 4 Man, and Satan, Isidor Chein and Henry A. Murray. Robert Chin, Issue Editor.

Volume XIX: 1963

No. 1 Psycho-Cultural Factors in Asian Economic Growth. Manning Nash and Robert Chin, Issue Editors No. 2 American Political Extremism in the 1960's. Harold M. Proshansky and Richard I. Evans,

Issue Editors.

No. 3 Human Factors in Cross-Cultural Adjustment. Sven Lundstedt, Issue Editor.
No. 4 Kurt Lewin Memorial Addresses 1962-63. Robert Chin and Leonard Solomon. Issue Editors. Volume XX: 1964

Jame AX: 1994
 No. 1 Aesthetic Probings of Contemporary Man. Warren G. Bennis, Issue Editor.
 No. 2 Negro American Personality. Thomas F. Pettigrew and Daniel C. Thompson, Issue Editors.
 No. 3 Kurt Lewin Memorial Address 1964, Alfred J. Marrow. Education as Social Invention, Jerome S. Bruner.
 No. 4 Youth and Social Action. Jacob R. Fishman and Frederic Solomon, Issue Editors.

Volume XXI: 1965

No. 1 Poverty Dynamics and Interventions. Berton H. Kaplan, Issue Editor.
No. 2 The Social Responsibilities of the Behavioral Scientist. Kenneth D. Benne, Issue Editor.
No. 3 Addresses and Essays. Kenneth B. Clark, Herbert C. Kelman, Donald N. Michael, et al.
No. 4 Old Age as a Social Issue. Robert Kastenbaum, Issue Editor.
Volume XXII: 1966

No. 1 Urbanization and Social Change in the South. Leonard Reissman and Thomas Ktsanes, Issue Editors

Issue Editors.
No. 2 The Sexual Renaissance in America. Ira L. Reiss, Issue Editor.
No. 3 Misperception and the Vietnam War. Ralph K. White, Author.
No. 4 Man's Response to the Physical Environment. R. W. Kates and J. F. Wohlwill, Issue Editors. Presidential Address 1966, Jerome D. Frank.
Volume XXIII: 1967
No. 1 Conflict and Community in the International System. Elise Building, Issue Editor. Kurt Lewin Memorial Award 1966, Daniel Katz.
No. 2 Problems of Bilingualism. John MacNamara, Issue Editor.
No. 3 Student Activism. Edward Sampson, Issue Editor.
No. 4 Family Planning in Cross-National Perspective. Lee Rainwater, Issue Editor.

No. 1 Values, Attitudes and Behaviors In Social Science and Society. Abraham J. Tannenbaum, Issue Editor. Presidential Address, Milton Rokeach. Kurt Lewin Memorial Address, Muzafer Sherif.
 No. 2 Social Psychological Research in Developing Countries. John DeLamater, Robert Hefner, Rémi Clignet, Levie Bellin, Physics and Psychological Research in Developing Countries.


Issue Editors. No. 3 Personality and Politics: Theoretical and Methodological Issues. Fred I. Greenstein, Issue Editor.

No. 4 Tradition and Modernity: Conflict or Congruence. Joseph Guslield, Issue Editor.
Volume XXV: 1969

June X.V: 1969
1969
No. I Values in Crisis: Racism, War and the Conception of Evil. J. Diedrick Snoek, Issue Editor. Presidential Address, Thomas F. Pettigrew. Kurt Lewin Memorial Address, Morton Deutsch.
No. 2 Alienated Youth. Abraham J. Tannenbaum, Issue Editor.
No. 3 Motivation and Academic Achievement of Negro Americans. Edgar G. Epps, Issue Editor.
No. 4 Selected Papers: 1969. J. Diedrick Snoek, Issue Editor. Presidential Address, Martin Deutsch. Kurt Lewin Memorial Address, Ralph K. White. Volume 26: 1970

No. 1 Ghetto Riots. Vernon L. Allen, Issue Editor.
No. 2 The Poor: Impact on Research and Theory. Marcia Guttentag, Issue Editor.





SOCIAL ISSUES

AUTUMN, 1970

100 VOL. 26 · NO. 4

SELECTED ARTICLES: 1970

Barry E. Collins

KURT LEWIN MEMORIAL ADDRESS: 1970 NEVITT SANFORD

DOMINIC AMANTE
MARTHA W. CARITHERS
ROLAND C. CROOKS
MARVIN CUMMINS
JOHN M. GOERING
DONNA M. HARTMAN
JAMES HOETKER
PHILLIP H. MARGULES
JEFFERY M. PAIGE
GARY SIEGEL
DELORES B. STOREY
LEWIS JOHN WEEBER
CAROL H. WEISS



THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES

Published Quarterly

Copyright 1970 by The SOCIETY. FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF SOCIAL ISSUES

A Division of

THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

Annual Subscription Institutions and Organizations Individuals Single Copy Price

\$9.00 7.00 2.25

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues is a group of over two thousand psychologists and allied social scientists who share a concern with research on the psychological aspects of important social issues. SPSSI is governed by Kurt Lewin's dictum that "there is nothing so practical as a good theory." In various ways, the Society seeks to bring theory and practice into focus on human problems of the group, the community, and the nation as well as the increasingly important ones that have no national boundaries. This Journal has as its goal the communication of scientific findings and interpretations in a non-technical manner but without the sacrifice of professional standards.

Bertram H. Raven, General Editor, JSI, Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024.

SPSSI Officers and Council: Robert L. Kahn, President; Marcia Guttentag, President-Elect; Robert Chin, Past President; John P. Kirscht, Secretary-Treasurer; Council Members: Edgar G. Epps, Richard Flacks, Robert L. Green, Patricia B. Gurin, Marcia Guttentag, Irwin N. Katz, Marc Pilisuk, Harold M. Proshansky, Richard A. Schmuck, David O. Sears.

Society Address: Caroline Weichlein, SPSSI Executive Secretary, P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Subscriptions to the Journal, applications for membership in the Society, changes in mailing address, and requests for information should be sent to Mrs. Weichlein.


Back Numbers: Orders for one or more copies of a particular issue or supplement should be sent to Journal of Social Issues, P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. (See inside back cover for a listing of recent Journal numbers.)

Editorial Committee: Barry E. Collins, Jonathan Freedman, Harold B. Gerard, Jacqueline D. Goodchilds, Reginald L. Jones, William McGuire, Charles Y. Nakamura, Harold Proshansky, Bertram H. Raven, Nevitt Sanford, David Sears, Paul Secord, and Gerald H. Shure.

Managing Editor: Jacqueline D. Goodchilds, Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024.

Second Class Postage paid at Ann Arbor, Michigan

Published quarterly by the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. Send Post Office Department Form 3579 to Publication Office, Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. Printed by Edwards Brothers, Inc.



The Journal of

SOCIAL SSUES AUTUMN 1970 VOL. 26 No 4

o spssi

SELECTED ARTICLES: 1970

Issue Editor: Barry E. Collins

and Dewin Wemorial Address: 1970	
The Kurt Lewin Memorial	137 14
Presentation Morton Deutsch	1
Whatever Happened to Action	
Research? Nevitt Sanford	3
School Desegregation and Racial Cleavage, 1954-1970:	ATTENNA.
A Review of the Literature Martha W. Carithers	25
Intervention Research and the Survey	
Process John M. Goering and Marvin Cummins	49
The Politicization of Evaluation	1
Research	57
Changing Patterns of Anti-White Attitudes	
Among Blacks Jeffery M. Paige	69
Three Studies of the Preferences of Students of	4
Differences of the Preferences of Students of	
Different Races for Actors in Interracial Theatre Productions Iames Hoetker and Gary Siegel	87
1 Todlictions Tames Hoetker and Gary Sieger	0/

The Epidemiological Distribution of CNS	
Dysfunction Dominic Amante,	
Phillip H. Margules, Donna M. Hartman,	105
Delores B. Storey, and Lewis John Weeber	103
The Effects of an Interracial Preschool Program upon Racial Preference, Knowledge of Racial Differences,	
and Racial Identification Roland C. Crooks	137
and Racial Identification Roland G. Grooms	
Biographical Sketches	145
Abstracts	149
	155
The Activists' Corner Nevitt Sanford	155
S. Jerome Kutner and Robert Buckhout Education for the Professional	155
Social Activist	15.
Comments and Rejoinders	163
Lewis W. Brandt Comment on "Attitudes versus Actions" by Allan W. Wicker	163
Index for Volume 26, 1970	167

Editorial Notes

EDITORIAL CONSULTANTS

We would like to express our gratitude to the following editorial consultants who have contributed generously of their time in the selection, evaluation, and improvement of articles and issues during the past year: Vernon L. Allen, Richard D. Ashmore, Adolf A. Berle, Jeanne H. Block, R. Gary Bridge, William Crano, Thomas Crawford, Martin Deutsch, Raymond Franklin, James A. Green, Arthur R. Jensen, Jackie Kimbrough, Louis H. Masotti, Charles Y. Nakamura, Thomas F. Pettigrew, David O. Sears, and Elmer L. Struening.

FORTHCOMING ISSUES

Armand L. Mauss: The Old and the New Left; June L. Tapp: Socialization and the Law; William H. McGlothlin: Chemical Comforts of Man.

COMMENTS AND REJOINDERS

Readers wishing to discuss or comment upon any of the articles in this or other issues of JSI may submit their reactions or criticisms to the editor, Bertram H. Raven, Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024. Criticisms or observations of general interest will be published in a Comments and Rejoinders section of JSI.


SELECTED ARTICLES ISSUE


The Selected Articles Issue will receive approximately 25% of the yearly page total of the Journal of Social Issues and will be devoted to individual articles consistent with JSI policy. The major function of the Selected Articles Issue is to publish empirical studies relevant to contemporary social problems, extrapolations from basic research to important social problems, theories about social problems with a firm foundation in social science, and, to a smaller extent, essays concerning the role of the behavioral scientist in non-academic contemporary society. Purely philosophical essays, exhortations for action which do not deal directly with the role of the behavioral scientist, and general social commentary are not appropriate.

Authors with single papers falling within the province of the Journal of Social Issues are encouraged to submit them to the Selected Articles Editor in triplicate. The paper must be completely double-spaced, including quotations and references. JSI follows the New Revision (1967) of the Publication Manual of APA, which means that bibliographical references are indicated by their publication dates within the text and are listed alphabetically at the end of the paper. Footnotes are collected on a single page and placed at the end of the article. All figures and tables are placed on separate pages and included at the end of the article. Every article must be accompanied by a 100-120 word abstract and a brief bio-

graphical sketch for each author.

Manuscripts for the 1971 Selected Articles Issue should be submitted to the Editorial Office, JSI, Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Calif. 90024.





Nevitt Sanford

The Kurt Lewin Memorial Award Presentation by The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues

to

Nevitt Sanford

The Kurt Lewin Memorial Award was established to honor outstanding achievement in the application of social science to social issues. This year the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues is proud to bestow the Lewin Award on Nevitt Sanford, a man who is known to all of us as a past president of SPSSI, a productive scholar, an inspiring teacher, an imaginative practitioner, and a cornerer of activists. Like Kurt Kewin, he has been a staunch advocate of the view that "there is nothing quite so practical as good theory and nothing so good for theory-making as direct involvement with practice." And what he has advocated, he has practiced.

Over a long and distinguished career, which started in 1932 as a prison psychologist in the Norfolk Prison Colony, included professorships at Berkeley and at Stanford, and is continuing currently as Scientific Director of The Wright Institute at Berkeley, Nevitt Sanford has been both a scholar and practitioner. As an investigator-practitioner, his interest has been focussed on the issue of how to develop each individual's potentialities as fully as possible. His approach has been to examine the person and social system in relation to one another: to scrutinize the tendencies in

society as well as in the individual which give rise to authoritarian behavior; to consider the failure of colleges as well as the failure

of students.

His weighty list of publications—which include such books as Issues in Personality Theory, Search for Relevance, Where Colleges Fail, Self and Society, The American College, The Authoritarian Personality, and Physique, Personality and Scholarship—indicates his continuing intellectual concern with matters of social as well as theoretical import. As his co-editorship of "The Activists' Corner" in the Journal of Social Issues would suggest, he is not content with merely developing useful, new knowledge; he wants to see the knowledge employed actively to help people. With this objective in mind, Nevitt Sanford has recently instituted an audacious and novel graduate training program in social-clinical psychology at The Wright Institute which breaks down the traditional barriers between research and action.

It is indeed fitting to present this Award to Nevitt Sanford who, like Kurt Lewin, has done so much to integrate action and

research.

Kurt Lewin Memorial Award granted by the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues

Levitt Sanford

for furthering in his work, as did Kurt Lewin, the Development and integration of psychological research and social action.

> Morton Deutsch Teachers College, Columbia University

Whatever Happened to Action Research?

Nevitt Sanford1 The Wright Institute

First, a word about my title: when SPSSI's program chairman really turned on the pressure to get a title from me, I had been talking with a friend in operations research who had been doing a cost effectiveness study of one of our great universities. He and his colleagues had been seeking new funding through the Committee on Basic Research of the National Science Foundation and the U.S. Office of Education. These researchers had become quite enthusiastic about their work, believing as they did that they could demonstrate its usefulness to the university. Now my friend had his answer from the committee: they were wildly enthusiastic about the proposal but, of course, could not fund it because it was not "basic."

I wondered how far this rigid separation of research and action had gone. It was clearly apparent that the term "action research" is not exactly on everybody's tongue nowadays. You may note that it appears only once in the index of the program for this convention: where it says "Action research, whatever happened to." Or consider last year's convention, the theme of which was Psychology and the Problems of Society. In the table of contents of the book under that title the only mention of action research appeared in the paper by Dr. Arthur Naftalin, former mayor of Minneapolis, who I suppose had had every reason to be

problem-oriented.

The developmental scheme for college teachers discussed herein is mainly the work of Robert Shukraft.

The contrast with the 1940s and early 1950s seemed to me striking. Particularly during the late 1940s there was an outpouring of reports of action research from the Research Center for Group Dynamics and the Commission on Community Interrelations. One, such as myself, who during that hopeful time was taken up with promoting psychoanalysis and personality research, could and did easily form the impression that action research was most certainly a dominant trend in social psychology.

Yet in 1957 when I spoke before this society about social science and social reform (Sanford, 1965), basing my presentation on the work of my colleagues and myself at Vassar College (Sanford, 1956), Brewster Smith said with surprise and, as I thought, with some pleasure: "So you are really following the old Lewin model of action research." I thought, of course, that mine was a new and improved model; but I knew it could not have existed without the work of Lewin, and was surprised to hear the latter spoken of as if it belonged to the past.

Lewin's Model

What was Lewin's model? I think it was well set forth in his 1946 paper on "Group Decision and Social Change" (Lewin, 1947) written for the first edition of Readings in Social Psychology (Newcomb & Hartley, 1947). The example he used, you will recall, had to do with changing food habits. Action research consisted in analysis, fact-finding, conceptualization, planning, execution, more fact-finding or evaluation; and then a repetition of this whole circle of activities; indeed, a spiral of such circles.

Leon Festinger told Alfred Marrow that Lewin's greatest contribution "on the abstract level may have been the idea of studying things through changing them and seeing the effect. This theme—that in order to gain insight into a process one must create a change and then observe its variable effects and new dynamics—runs through all of Lewin's work [Marrow, 1969, p. 235]." This seems very close to common sense. It is the way to solve any practical problem or to learn any skill. Yet for Lewin this kind of involvement with practical problems was a neverfailing source of theoretical ideas and knowledge of fundamental social psychological relationships.

My reason for asking what has been the fate of this contribution of Lewin's is not just a fascination with history or a desire to preserve intact the work of an admired figure; I am interested in working out a model, for the integration of action and research, that is adequate for today. It may help ensure a better future for such a model if we know something of the vicissitudes

of the old one.

Action Research Today

Action research is still very much alive. It has strong advocates in high places. Martin Deutsch, in his presidential address before this society last year, said that the need for knowledge of the effects of experiences upon development, as a basis for changes in policies and organizations, "clearly points to an emphasis on action programs and action research as fundamental tools of the

social scientist [Deutsch, 1969, pp. 14-15]."

Programs clearly labelled action research, or which could properly be so labelled, are not hard to find. There are, for example, four major ones within walking distance of the Wright Institute in Berkeley. There is Soskin and Korchin's "after-school school," a program for offering people of high-school age what (on theoretical grounds) they seem to need for their development but do not get in school (Soskin & Korchin, 1967); there is Peter Lenrow's "collaborative problem-solving" with teachers and administrators of the Berkeley School System, an action research program with some distinctive new features (Lenrow, 1970); there is the "new careers program" of Joan and Douglas Grant which demonstrated that prison inmates can be an important source of manpower in the human-service fields (Grant & Grant, 1970); and there is the new program of Wilbur Hoff and his associates for training poor people for jobs—to be defined and instituted—in hospitals and clinics (Hoff, 1970). I should mention here too the Wright Institute's new doctoral program in social-clinical psychology (Sanford, 1970b). This program was based on some knowledge of the situation and needs of graduate students and has been guided by theory of individual development and organizational processes. If this program of action research is to flourish and at the same time provide useful general knowledge about organizational innovation and development, there must be more than a few circles of analysis, execution, and fact-finding.

My planned systematic survey of action research programs has not yet taken me beyond the Berkeley city limits, but, even so, I receive reports from time to time of highly significant programs in less favored parts of the country. The latest is Robert Sinnett and Angela Sachson's impeccable evaluation of their project for demonstrating that severely emotionally disturbed students can be provided satisfactory care in a rehabilitation living unit in a regular university dormitory (Sinnett & Sachson,

1970).

The survey of which I speak should pay particular attention to publications in the fields of public health, social welfare, and criminology. It is my impression that more action research on the Lewinian model is done by specialists in these fields than by social psychologists. A great deal of work that is in the spirit of action research, or that is in some important respects like action research, today goes under the heading of "community psychology," as shown, for example, in Adelson and Kalis' (1970) systematic treatment of this subject. It goes on also under the heading of "evaluation research." The approaches to this subject of Donald Campbell (1969), Samuel Messick (1970), and Michael Scriven (1967) carry to a high level of sophistication the essential factfinding feature of Lewin's model. Scriven, indeed, in distinguishing between "formative evaluation," which serves program improvement, and "summative evaluation"-appraisal of the final product-goes a long way toward filling in Lewin's circle with precise operations. Although these three authors assume a division of labor between the evaluators and those responsible for execution, their work shows beyond question that much can be learned from studying the effects of actions.

Trends toward Separating Action from Research

The fact remains, however, that none of this work—true action research, community psychology, evaluation research—is in the main streams of social psychology or social science generally. Although it is true that the great bulk of federal funds for social science goes to applied social science, as academic social scientists never tire of pointing out (e.g., Beals, 1970), how many of these projects could qualify as action research? The emphasis is most certainly not on the study of actions as a means for advancing science but rather on the application to problems of what is already known.

Voices of the Establishment

This separation of science and practice is strongly advocated by leaders in academic social science. Thus George Miller in his presidential address before the American Psychological Association said last year:

Many psychologists, trained in an empiricist, experimental tradition have tried to serve two masters at once. That is to say they have tried to solve practical problems and simultaneously to collect data of scientific value on the effects of their interventions. Other fields maintain a more equitable division of labor between scientist and engineer. Scientists are responsible for the validity of the principles; engineers accept them and try to use them to solve practical problems [Miller, 1969].

Similarly, George Albee, in his presidential address before the same association this year, according to excerpts in *Psychology* Today (Albee, 1970), insisted on the fundamental difference between research and practice and strongly implied that never the twain shall meet. Possibly Miller and Albee do not speak for the majority of psychologists, but they certainly speak for what might be called the psychology establishment.

The psychology establishment has also spoken recently through the psychology panel of the Survey of the Behavioral and Social Sciences under the auspices of the Committee on Science and Public Policy of the National Academy of Sciences and the Problems and Policy Committee of the Social Science Research

Council.

Among the thirteen recommendations of this panel is the one that "psychologists increase their research on problems related to social action programs and field experiments," and, happily, they suggest that this "may provide insights into principles of human behavior that are difficult to study in any other way [Clark & Miller, 1970, p. 133]." The panel thus legitimizes action research, and perhaps we should be grateful for small favors, but it also says that psychologists in general should have more money to go on doing just about what they are doing now. The tone of the panel's report is one of complacency about the achievements of psychology, and there is nothing in it to suggest that the present allocation of resources is about to be radically altered.

The broader social science establishment has also spoken recently through the report of another blue ribbon commission: the Special Commission on the Social Sciences of the National Science Board (Special Commission, 1969). This commission shows considerable sensitivity to the present identity crisis of social science and awareness of the need for fresh approaches to our social problems. I think Kurt Lewin would have applauded, as do I, the recommendation of federal funding for multi-disciplinary, problem-oriented institutes. But, like the other authorities just cited, this commission seems to be stuck with the science-engineering model, in which discoveries are first made (in the lab as it were) and then "applied."

What has happened to action research? I would say now that, contrary to the impression I had in the late 1940s, that it never really got off the ground, it never was widely influential in psychology or social science. By the time the federal funding agencies were set up after World War II, action research was already condemned to a sort of orphan's role in social science—for the separation of science and practice was now institutionalized, and it has been basic to the federal bureaucracies ever since. This truth was obscured for a time by the fact that old-timers in action

research were still able to get their projects funded; this after younger researchers had discovered to their sorrow that action research proposals per se received a cool reception from the funding agencies and were, indeed, likely to win for their authors the repu-

tation of being "confused."

We must, I think, face the fact that the old-timers in action research have not been reproducing themselves—at least not at the usual rate for psychologists. When jobs for action research open up, as sometimes happens, trained people are nowhere to be found. Lipton and Klein, for example, report (concerning their Boston University program for training psychologists for practice and research in problems of change in the community) that a big problem was the absence of adequate role models. They write, "There are few psychologists available to undertake the direct supervision of the student seeking a community-psychology experience. Apparently few psychologists have made their way into fields of application like group relations and community relations [Lipton & Klein, 1970, p. 288]."

In attempting to summarize what I suspect is a familiar story, I would say that we have separated—and then institutionalized the separation of—everything that from the point of view of action research (everything, I would say, that in the sight of God) be-

longs together.

Negative Consequences of the Separation

Analysis of the problem, conceptualization, data gathering, planning, execution, evaluation, training—the intimate family of activities that constituted Lewin's model has been pretty well

dispersed.

The categorical separation of research from practice has had some serious negative consequences for social science. For one thing, it has cut the academic researcher off from lines of investigation that are necessary to the development of his science, for example, the study of phenomena that cannot be experimented upon in the laboratory or the study of social structures that can be understood only through attempts to change them. Again, it has laid the social sciences wide open to the charge of irrelevance, not only by students but by men of affairs. It would hardly occur to a college president to look to the social science literature for help with his problems; and, as Blum and Funkhauser (1965) have shown, social scientists are among the last people state legislators would consult about the problem of drug-abuse.

Much of the trouble comes from the fact that the separation of science from practice raised for academic men—who have a deep interest in the matter—the question of which has the greater

status; and, despite the fact that social scientific work on practical problems poses the greater intellectual challenge, the decision went to "pure" science. A result has been that brave new efforts by federal agencies to do something about the problems of society soon become bogged down. For example, when new bureaus or "study sections" on applied social science are set up, their personnel seek to avoid appearing second-class by being just as hard-nosed or "scientific" as their heroes in the academic social sciences—and end by being just as narrow. Or when centers for research and development are set up within universities, academic social scientists, who are needed to lend prestige to the enterprise, seize the opportunity to get funding for what they were doing already, and things go on much as before. This same tendency is displayed by the newer professional schools of universities -education, social welfare, criminology, public health-which become distracted from their purposes by putting in PhD programs which ape, but do not match, those of the older disciplines.

Sterility of Segregated Experts

Once science is split off from practice, further splits develop. We have on the one side experts in conceptualization, theoretical model-building, research design, experimentation and on the other side experts in planning, in execution, and in evaluation, each class of whom has more and more difficulty in talking with the others. Training follows the general trend of events in science: separated bureaucratically from research and from action at the funding level, it is mainly in the hands of the segregated experts. Sensitivity training, for example, a proceeding of enormous potential and with some solid achievements to its credit, has been lifted out of its natural context of social structure and social practice and rendered free-floating, apparently on the assumption that its recipients are also free-floating.

Small wonder that social science is having an identity crisis, that social scientists generally seem to be well-heeled but unhappy. We do not want to be "mere technicians" who carry out other people's purposes, as Sherif (1968) has so eloquently said; yet, we have so detached ourselves from practical affairs that we do not know enough to make decisions in important matters ourselves. There should be a large place for idle curiosity in a civilized community, yet, if we are not doing action research, we find it hard to indulge our curiosity at a time when our basic institutions seem about to fall to pieces. As liberal intellectuals we would like to make social science available to people who need it the most, that is, the poor and the oppressed, but for this the science-

engineering model—as I will show in a moment—is hopelessly

inadequate.

How did we get into this fix? The basic trouble is the fragmentation I have described and this in turn can be understood as an aspect of the general tendency toward specialization in modern science and scholarship. Effective social problem solving calls for multidisciplinary work, yet departmentalism seems everywhere on the increase. The psychologists' panel mentioned earlier recommended consideration by universities of the idea of a Graduate School of Applied Behavioral Science—but it was careful not to threaten the interests of existing departments and schools; it was out to show that psychology deserves more support, apparently on the assumption that what is good for psychology is good for the nation.

There is, of course, specialization within as well as among the disciplines, in consequence of which we have a fantastic proliferation of bitsy and disconnected and essentially unusable researches. Specialization is a natural accompaniment of high levels of development in science, and it has obviously led to some intellectual and practical pay-off in the past, but the compartmentalization of social scientific activities and the scarcity of efforts to pull things together calls for explanation. Like professional practice, social science has been adapting itself to the requirements of an advanced technological society—which demands more and more segregation of functions and the training of ex-

perts to perform them.

Downgrading the Person

Just as professionals in health, education, and welfare no longer treat or deal with the whole person but only with particular symptoms or functions, so psychologists in their research and theory-making focus more and more on part-functions without bothering to connect them with central structures in the person. Indeed, the very concept of the person, downgraded and ignored,

seems about to disappear from the literature.

I have elsewhere, and more than once, pointed to what seem to me to be the serious consequences of this (Sanford, 1968, 1970a). Not only have we contributed to the dehumanization of our research subjects by reducing them to "respondents" for the sake of enterprises that never yield any benefit to them, and to the dehumanization of ourselves by encouraging self-definition in terms of narrow specialties; we have also been disseminating a most unfortunate image of man. What is for the social scientist now researchable, an aggregate of meaningless "behaviors," becomes for great masses of our people a conception of the self as

fragmented and externalized: one is what one can present to

others in a particular situation.

It is understandable that social science, like most other human activities in our society, should accommodate itself to inexorable social and historical processes. But more than other disciplines and professions it must bear responsibility for what has happened, for it has had the knowledge and the values to permit it to see what was happening. In any case it is certainly up to the social scientists, particularly those who work in universities, to oppose the current trend; they have the necessary knowledge, prestige, access to students, and the power, for they are for all practical purposes the social science establishment.

Some Action Research in Higher Education

What is needed is a contemporary model for action research or, as I prefer to say, research-action. I want in the remainder of this paper to make some suggestions toward the development of such a model. In order to do this it is first necessary to tell something of what my colleagues and I have been doing in recent years. I shall limit myself to work in higher education. (And I might say it is good to have this more or less captive audience. When I have lectured on this subject at numerous colleges and universities during the past 15 years, psychologists, including old friends, have stayed away in droves, presumably to avoid any appearance of being mixed up with an applied, thus lowly, field.)

Research Affects its Subjects

In my 1957 address (Sanford, 1965) I argued that research had direct consequences for its subjects. Mervin Freedman, Donald Brown, Richard Jung, John Bushnell, and I had studied Vassar women longitudinally, interviewing them several times a year for four years. We became convinced that for these students taking part in this research was one of the most important influences of their college years. It also seemed clear to us that reporting our research findings to the whole campus community had a significant favorable impact on the student culture. And so I began saying that the best thing to do for our college and universities was to study them.

At Stanford, beginning in 1961, Joseph Katz and his associates carried on in the same general direction that we had taken at Vassar (Katz et al., 1968). Now there was more feedback to individuals and to the community generally. Students began using these research findings in their discussions of education and campus life in the pages of the *Daily*, the campus newspaper. Mean-

while, of course, we were reporting findings and making various recommendations to management, that is, to administrators and teachers. I won't say these fell on deaf ears, but clearly this is not where the action was.

It became very clear, however, that the research was influencing the campus culture. Students could not read descriptions of, say, the rating-dating pattern at Stanford, talk about this in various formal and informal settings, and at the same time go on behaving in the same way as before. Particularly striking was the fact that some of the research subjects who were interviewed over the years became leaders of the student movement for educational reform, which at Stanford in the middle 1960s was very effective.

A Student Self-Survey

In the fall of 1967 I began teaching a class in higher education at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley. This class continued throughout the year; in the winter quarter the students and I conceived a plan to learn about higher education through the study of students by their fellow students. In the course of preparing a comprehensive interview schedule, students examined themselves and interviewed each other. Thus they learned what were the significant questions. We fully expected that students would report changes in themselves as a result of being interviewed, and that the program as a whole would have a significant

impact on the school.

I reported on this work at the APA meetings in 1968 and last year in the American Psychologist (Sanford, 1969). Fifty students, approximately one-half the student body, were interviewed, yielding a large amount of quantifiable data on life and growth in a graduate school; but what interested us most was evidence that individuals benefited from the experience. They gained new awareness of themselves, their situation, and their goals. As a group they acquired a lively sense of community, of shared purposes, dissatisfactions, and ideas about what needed to be done. A process of change was set in motion. The student body as a whole proceeded to organize itself and to institute a new system for governing the school.

Through this experience, I was made aware of how unsatisfactory and dehumanizing it is to study students without a "bytheir-leave" and with no feedback, on the assumption that the results might some day be used by kindly educators in the interests of students. I predicted student protests against such studies. And I argued that the way to study students was to help students study themselves. This, it seemed, would lower the barrier between researcher and subject and create a situation in which all

hands learned and developed. I reported in that 1969 paper that my theological students were ready to start next on the faculty. It was clear to me then why Vassar College had not adopted the fine recommendations made on the basis of our research. It was not, as I was fond of saying, that one cannot be a prophet in his own village; rather, it was because we had not studied the faculty. Interestingly enough, it appeared in retrospect that they really wanted to be studied but were not disposed to make that clear at the time.

Interviewing the Faculty

So, for the past 18 months some of these same theological students, joined by some others, have been interviewing faculty members at three institutions—and the total sample is now over 120. In two of the institutions, faculty members are approached as individuals rather than as members of departments or schools. In the third institution, a private liberal arts college, the researchers have an understanding with the faculty as a group. We defined ourselves as their allies. The knowledge derived from the interviewing is to be in their interest. They are to be the first to get reports of findings, and these reports will be made to groups of faculty and presented in a way designed to encourage discussion -a procedure that will at the same time yield more information. Work at the third institution was begun only in the late spring of this year and will continue throughout the coming year. Needless to say, we expect some change to occur in the institution, and we expect to be heavily involved as consultants to those we interviewed.

A Model for Research-Action

Implicit in this program is a model of action research. I believe it contains the main features of Lewin's model—that is, analysis, fact findings, planning, execution, and evaluation. There is, however, more emphasis here on research as the action, and less emphasis on the effort to solve particular problems or induce particular changes in behavior. The aim, rather, is to promote liberation and growth and these are considered to be favored by the processes of the research and by the model the researchers present as they carry out their work.

Let us consider some of the main features of the model in

turn.

Analysis. Analysis determines what kinds of questions are to be asked. These should be practical, although somewhat general and open-ended. In the present case the questions were how to

improve teaching, how to change features of academic culture, how to promote the development of individual faculty members. Most social science questions, in my view, should be of this general kind: how to arrange the environment, institution, or the social setting in such a way as to promote the development of all the individuals concerned.

Analysis with attention to the nature of the basic questions can save the researcher a great deal of trouble. Four or five years ago we sent to a government agency a proposal of a longitudinal study of graduate students. We were kept dangling for three years and were never funded. During this waiting period we realized that we were genuinely concerned about graduate students and that we did not need to study them in order to know that many were very unhappy or were not getting what they needed for their development. So instead of undertaking a conventional program of research, we started the new Wright Institute program of graduate training in social-clinical psychology. Now we are really finding out what needs to be done and something about how to do it. Had we been funded we would probably still be bogged down in the analysis of data in which—such is the march of events—we would probably have lost interest.

Fact finding. The aim of promoting individual development

has several important implications.

(a) It is necessary to have a conceptualization of the person and theory concerning how he actually develops. Here, it seems to me, we must go far beyond the highly abstract formulations of Kurt Lewin, filling in a scheme such as his, with particular kinds of needs, dispositions, values, conflicts, and so forth.

(b) An approach that is concerned with individual development must be comprehensive and field theoretical. An interest in changing one aspect of the person or of his behavior must take into account the implications of such change for the total person. And to understand the person we must see him in his total setting. This means that research-action is properly multidisciplinary—and in my view it is only a focus on problems, ultimately problems of human development or human welfare, that will bring about collab-

oration among the academic disciplines.

(c) The concern with human development, of which I speak, is a concern with development now rather than in the future. It means that we must behave toward our subjects in a way that is favorable to development. For example, favorable to their autonomy, privacy, and self-esteem. We go contrary to this value if we use our subjects as means to some other end, including the end of their own well-being in the remote future. Research must, in other words, serve the purposes of its subjects. This does not mean that the researcher must sacrifice his own values. It does mean that he will probably have to say what they are and work out as much agreement with his subjects as possible.

The subject is the client, and reporting to him is an action.

Lewin considered that his action research would favor the purposes of "social management as well as the self management of groups." I think it was easier during World War II, and in the years shortly thereafter, than it is now to assume that "management" would use social science knowledge in the interest of all concerned. For surely there was much more agreement about large national purposes then than there is now. I am not suggesting that we ought to deprive management (that is to say, the administration or educational policy-makers, generally) of knowledge about the functioning of faculty members. Indeed, we intend to publish the findings of our research on faculties and I am going to report some here shortly. But such findings have already

been reported to our interviewees.

Planning. Planning, or "planning ahead," does not have such an important role in the present model as in the action research of the past. There is no point in planning for people who will upset all such plans as soon as they find out that they have not been permitted to take part in the planning. To arrange things in such a way that the "natives" (students, faculty, poor people, ethnic minorities, and so on) can and do take part in the planning readily becomes a goal that supersedes the model of planning from above by experts. In the case of the Wright Institute's graduate school it would have been natural perhaps to have devoted a year to planning, preferably with the aid of a "planning grant," before beginning any operations. Instead we decided to do it now and plan it later. It seemed to us that our graduate students would have to take part in the planning in any case, and that the experience of helping to plan a graduate program would be of considerable educational value. This, however, puts heavy emphasis upon what Michael Scriven (1967) calls "formative evaluation." We institute a procedure, see how it works, and make a change if this seems necessary or wise, always in a spirit of continuous experimentation. I hope that after a decent interval there will be some "summative evaluation," but I also hope that this would be formative for the next program in graduate education.

Research-Action with Faculty

Now, in order to prepare the ground for a suggestion concerning an application of this model, I must report a few results from our study of faculty members. I can report that the interviewing went well and that it is a little hard to understand our reluctance to undertake such work when we were at Vassar. Graduate students are first-rate interviewers of faculty members. Indeed, they probably provoke less defensiveness than would

seasoned investigators. Faculty members, perhaps more than most other people, like to talk about themselves, and, as we know, they rarely have a chance to discuss what most concerns themas teachers and as careerists—with their colleagues. Too often what they say can be used against them. Kindly old deans have, of course, disappeared from the scene; and the faculty wife has probably long since become bored with the whole thing.

It is not true that college and university professors neglect their teaching. They work hard at it, care a great deal about how well they perform, and on the whole think they are pretty good. They are usually hard put to it, however, to offer any rationale for what they do or to say what is the basis of the evaluation of their work. Teaching for them is not a profession and accordingly they deny themselves the satisfactions that most professionals enjoy—such as seeing tangible effects of their efforts. The rewards of their teaching are not altogether lacking. But they are random and unsystematic when they could be regular and durable. This lack of professionalization as teachers is an aspect of what we call academic culture—which is to say, a set of shared beliefs and ways, of the sort that develops in any aggregation of people who live or work together and that strongly influences what (in this case) faculty members actually do.

Faculty Culture—The Need for Change

I will not undertake to describe the whole thing here, but only to indicate some features of the culture that might have to be changed if college teaching is to improve. For example, professors usually identify with their discipline or specialty rather than with the role of teacher. They respect norms concerning how much time one may properly spend with students or how much interest in students one may display. In most institutions the norms are pretty low; if one becomes a popular teacher, he courts the danger of being ostracized by colleagues. Similarly he must beware of "popularism" lest he give away too much of the mystery upon which support of his discipline depends. One should not in conversation with colleagues or other professionals go beyond the bounds of one's own specialty. If something outside of one's specialty comes up for live of the state of the cialty comes up for discussion, he should always defer to other specialists, even though this puts an end to the conversation. Another rule held other rule holds that he should always exhibit a devotion to the highest standards in matters of appointments and promotions and admission of students; let somebody else suggest that a risk be taken in particularly interesting cases.

It all seems pretty grim—as indeed it is. One might be inclined to think that we academic men would be happy as kings

since we are fundamentally free to read and study and look into whatever we like, always have interesting colleagues to talk with, and are surrounded by eager students waiting to get the word. Instead we find in our institutions of higher learning widespread unhappiness and cynicism. Indeed the academic culture seems to decree that it ought not to be otherwise. Since the faculty member is devoted to such high purposes—the pursuit of which is constantly interfered with by people who do not understand—it would seem almost immoral to take any pleasure in what one does. It doesn't help any to be stationed at a prestigious institution. According to James Bess (1970), satisfaction of most human needs is independent of kind or rating of institution. Or to paraphrase Groucho Marx's "happiness won't buy you any money," happiness won't get you a job at Berkeley or Stanford or Harvard.

Stages of Professional Development

It turns out that college professors develop as individuals in much the same way that other people do. Their development is progressive and is marked by distinctive stages, which are only loosely related to chronological age. A particularly important stage is the one we call the achievement of a sense of competence in one's discipline or specialty. The way in which this developmental task is approached and accomplished depends, of course, on what has gone before in the individual life. It depends, for example, on whether the professor was, as a child, "isolated" or "social." Perhaps we should not have been surprised to discover that the overwhelming majority of the professors in our samples were isolated children. Indeed, half of those we interviewed in one liberal arts college were only children. Whether prodigies or plodders, they learned early to enjoy being rewarded by adults for academic achievement, and they learn late, if at all, to participate in the rough and tumble of campus politics. Those mischievous and sometimes disobedient social children who were to become professors were relatively late in discovering their academic potentialities and, though they are likely to wind up in charge of the important committees, and likely to relate easily to students outside of classes, they have a hard time getting over the feeling that they may not be doing the right thing in the classroom.

Until he has achieved academic competence, the professor is not ready to pass on to the stage of self-discovery, in which he gives attention to other abilities, interests, and aspirations, and so expands his personality. Even when a professor is ready to change, however, he finds that he has made commitments and must defend what he has done, while also dealing with the expec-

tations of family and colleagues who, often at some pain, have grown used to him as he is. Our experience is in line with the finding of Lewin that it usually takes some "group decision" to sustain a change.

Ideally, self-discovery is followed by discovery of others, much as in Erikson's (1950) formulation of stages wherein identity is followed by intimacy and generativity. Now the professor is prepared to use all of his skills in genuine relationships with other people; he may find it comfortable and enjoyable to take a father role with some students—those who can stand it or will accept it.

My colleagues and I are convinced that academic culture and patterns of individual growth can be influenced by the sort of research-action I have been discussing. Like the graduate students we studied, faculty members suffer from pluralistic ignorance. They are often delighted to discover that others have been thinking along the same lines as themselves and, when they get together after the interviews, discussion moves to a different level than before, toward the discovery of both self and others. They are often delighted to find that some of their old aspirations are still there and might yet be fulfilled. And some take pleasure in discovering the legitimacy of taking an interest in students.

There is nothing to indicate that professors in psychology or other social science departments are different, on the significant dimensions, from professors in other departments. They are first of all academic men—participants in academic culture. It is not only as statesmen but as representatives and defenders of their academic professionalism that they do their work in the higher councils of organized psychology or social science. Would not psychology and social science then benefit from our approach to

research-action with professors in these disciplines?

Changing the Social Science Establishment

Let us go back to a consideration of the nature of our problems as social scientists. Organized social science is an elite, an establishment, but it is part of a larger system, the political and economic establishment which it often verbally opposes but upon which it depends for support. Like other industries, social science has been polluting its environment. Not only has it been spoiling its research subjects by treating them as means rather than ends; not only has it been disseminating a rather monstrous image of researchable man; it has been creating an enormous amount of waste in the form of useless information. Much of what ought to be left to decompose we now make great plans to retrieve. From the developmental point of view it looks very much as if the system were designed by and for professors still in the stage of

achieving a sense of competence.

We have to make some changes. But how? We are confronted with the old problem: we can't change the system without changing the individuals in it, and we can't change the individuals without changing the system. Where is a start to be made? One possibility is to bring pressure to bear from outside-in the form of money, of course. The usual procedure is to build new structures on top of or alongside those we already have. The U.S. Congress may take an interest in this matter; and if by some chance they should ask me, I would say the main thing is to restore the independence of social science. We do not want to be "mere technicians" (Sherif, 1968), and we do not know enough to make major practical decisions, but we do have much to offer people who are interested in changing themselves singly or collectively. Social science needs to be free of national and state political and economic establishments so that it can work out mutually beneficial relationships with people who do not ordinarily benefit from its activities, and the individual social scientist needs to be free of the social science establishment so that he may contribute according to his own lights.

The best way to accomplish this would be for the government to give the money to students and professors. Students would then, in a free market, pass enough of it along to professors so that they, freed of the demands of grantsmanship, could with the help of students integrate teaching, research, and action in a single humanistic undertaking. But since students are not always the best judges of whom they might best study with, there ought to be a guaranteed annual minimum research fund for each

professor.

The funding of project research ought to be abandoned. It has spoiled the academic community, damaged—almost beyond repair—undergraduate education, given status to trivia, created an expensive bureaucracy, and corrupted thousands of investigators. This change will have to come from above for the funding apparatus has no built-in mechanisms for self-correction. A friend of mine, an anti-establishmentarian from way back, who has said publicly many times that most of our published experimental work fails to meet minimum scientific standards, has recently been induced to serve on a NIMH study committee. She will inevitably help to perpetuate what she decries, but, as she says, "NIMH has done a lot for me."

I would not, however, put the control of social science research back into the universities if I did not have an idea as to how the academic culture might be changed. The action just recommended would, of course, be a force for change, but we could hardly rely on it exclusively. We should at the same time approach the problem from the other side, involving faculty members in the social science disciplines in the kind of research-action that has been described. There should be studies of departments, colleges, professional schools, universities, state psychological associations, the American Psychological Association.

The idea is not exactly new. Some years ago when the psychology department at Berkeley was caught in one of its perennial crises, the dean of Letters and Science appointed a committee to see what could be done. When a question about the role of institutes came up at one of the meetings of this committee, its chairman said, "What we need is an institute for the study of the

psychology department!"

A Self-Survey of the Social Sciences

There has been much recent discussion of studying the APA. How might this be done? Shall a task force of the Central Office select a national sample to whom questionnaires are mailed, the data being made available to a committee who will use it to plan our lives? I would say not. This sort of thing might have been all right in past studies of students and other "natives," but surely for ourselves we can arrange something more humanistic. At least we can be clients at the same time that we are subjects.

So let a few professors and students from Hayward State study a department at San Francisco State, and a group from the latter institution study a department at Berkeley, while some professors and students from Berkeley carry out a research-action at Hayward. No master plan would be needed, for those who were studied would in each case take part in the planning, contributing questions they wanted asked of others and of themselves. All that would be needed to begin would be general agreement that all hands would be interviewed. A process of change started in this way could easily continue under its own steam. For the model that has been offered is not only designed to encourage professors to be subjects of action-research, but also to arouse interest in the carrying out of action-research. The particular example that I have offered—that is, of studying academic culture—is in my view the key to acceptance of action-research by professors who need to be rescued from one another.

I would predict that departments or schools studied in the way described would never be quite the same again. The potential for change in these structures was further revealed, it seems to me, by the Cambodian crisis, which in many institutions led to what was for many faculty and students an exhilarating change in inter-

personal relationships and role definitions. There is much doubt now as to whether such changes will persist. The model I am advocating could not only lead to the kind of opening up and the sense of community evoked by the Cambodian crisis, but since the research-action would shake up the old structures, with all concerned being fully conscious of what was happening, and would at the same time liberate the energies needed for the formation of new structures, we should not expect so much reversion to the old ways.

What happened in particular departments or schools could easily spread and start discussions of our identity crisis on a national scale. The widespread use of the present model would have good effects of a more general nature. By demonstrating our ability and our willingness to study ourselves we would go some way toward restoring trust in our competence to study

others singly and collectively.

The study of a department or even of a profession may seem small and timid compared with consulting for national policy-making bodies or advocating policies before legislative assemblies, but how can social science be better on the national scene than it is in microcosm? If we are to build a better society, a good place to begin is with making our own department, institution, school, or association a truly human community. If it is our purpose to liberate women and other "minorities," let us begin at home. If we are to promote human development generally, let us begin by showing that we know how to promote the development of our students.

Actually, I am not neglecting the impact of our work on the larger community. I agree with those writers such as Miller (1969) and Snoek (1969) who suggest that our influence on the body politic has been less through the dissemination of knowledge than through the presentation of an image of man. Of course, I take a dimmer view than do these writers of the sort of image we have been presenting. But I strongly agree that our major influence is through what we do and are. The good that we may do will derive less from the models we finally build in our own domains, than from the model we present in the building. And this, I hope, will be a model of man trying to understand and to improve himself and his society.

REFERENCES

ADELSON, D., & KALIS, B. (Eds.) Community psychology and mental health. Scranton: Chandler, 1970.

Beals, R. L. Who will rule research? Psychology Today, 1970, 4.

ALBEE, G. W. The short, unhappy life of clinical psychology. Psychology Today, 1970, 4.

Bess, J. L. Patterns of satisfaction of organizational prerequisites and personal needs in university departments of high and low quality. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1970.

Blum, R., & Funkhauser, M. Legislators views on alcoholism: Some dimensions relevant to making new laws. Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 1965, 26,

666-669.

CAMPBELL, D. Reforms as experiments. American Psychologist, 1969, 24, 409-429. CLARK, K. E., & MILLER, G. A. (Eds.) Psychology. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970.

DEUTSCH, M. Organizational and conceptual barriers to social change. Journal of

Social Issues, 1969, 25(4), 5-18.

Erikson, E. H. Childhood and society. New York: Norton, 1950.

GRANT, J., & GRANT, J. D. Client participation and community change. In D. Adelson & B. Kalis (Eds.), Community psychology and mental health. Scranton: Chandler, 1970.

HOFF, W. New health careers demonstration project. Berkeley, Calif.: Institute

for Health Research, 1970. (mimeographed)

KATZ, J., et al. No time for youth. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1968.

LENROW, P. Strengthening early education: Collaboration in problem solving. Berkeley, Calif.: Berkeley Unified School District, 1970. (mimeographed)

LEWIN, K. Group decision and social change. In T. M. Newcomb & E. L. Hartley (Eds.), Readings in social psychology. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1947.

LIPTON, H., & KLEIN, D. C. Training psychologists for practice and research in problems of change in the community. In D. Adelson & B. Kalis (Eds.), Community psychology and mental health. Scranton: Chandler, 1970.

MARROW, A. J. The practical theorist: The life and work of Kurt Lewin. New York:

Basic Books, 1969.

Messick, S. Evaluation of educational programs as research on the educational process. In F. F. Korten, S. W. Cook, & J. I. Lacey (Eds.), Psychology and problems of society. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 1970.

MILLER, G. Psychology as a means of promoting human welfare. American Psy-

chologist, 1969, 24, 1063-1075.

NEWCOMB, T. M., & HARTLEY, E. (Eds.) Readings in social psychology. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1947.

Sanford, N. (Ed.) Personality development during the college years. Journal of Social Issues, 1956, 12(4), 1-75.

SANFORD, N. Social science and social reform. Journal of Social Issues, 1965, 21(2),

54-70. SANFORD, N. I know how it is done but I just can't do it: Discussion of Rollo May's paper. In R. B. MacLeod (Ed.), William James: Unfinished business. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 1968.

SANFORD, N. Research with students as action and education. American Psychol-

ogist, 1969, 24, 544-546.

Sanford, N. The decline of individualism. Public Health Reports. 1970, 85, 213-219. (a)

SANFORD, N. The Wright Institute's program for training in social-clinical psychology. In N. Matulef (Chm.), Mental health training: Revolution in professional training. Symposium presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Miami, September, 1970. (b)

Scriven, M. The methodology of evaluation. In Perspectives of curriculum evaluation. (American Educational Research Association monograph series on curriculum evaluation) Climate and Clim

lum evaluation) Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967.

SHERIF, M. If the social scientist is to be more than a mere technician. Journal

of Social Issues, 1968, 24(1), 41-62.

SINNETT, E. R., & SACHSON, A. A rehabilitation living unit in a university dormitory setting: Final report. Manhattan, Kansas: Kansas State University Counseling Center, 1970. (mimeographed)

SNOEK, J. D. Editor's introduction to selected papers: 1969. Journal of Social

Issues, 1969, 25(4), 1-3.

Soskin, W., & Korchin, S. Therapeutic explorations with adolescent drug users.
Unpublished manuscript, Psychology Clinic, University of California, Berkeley, 1967

keley, 1967.

SPECIAL COMMISSION ON THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. Knowledge into action: Improving the nation's use of the social sciences. Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1969.

The control of the state of the

The state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the s

10 August of the Obligation of the Control of the C

The state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the s

School Desegregation and Racial Cleavage, 1954–1970: A Review of the Literature¹

Martha W. Carithers²

Division of Social Science Research
The Menninger Foundation

Since the 1954 decision of the Supreme Court outlawing de Jure segregation in the schools, a spate of empirical studies, discussions, and opinions have appeared in the scholarly and popular press on school desegregation. This paper reviews the empirical studies appearing since that decision which deal with school desegregation and racial cleavage. It focuses upon the patterns and the consequences of interracial association under different conditions of school segregation. Since patterns of interracial behavior are mediated by attitudes, this review also includes those studies of attitude change which are directly relevant to racial cleavage.

Although other authors have reviewed selected aspects of desegregation, and their work has proven helpful to this paper, we know of no prior review which focuses specifically upon patterns of racial cleavage and association. Generally the concern has been with scholastic achievement, school performance, or attitude

This paper was made possible through a part of Research Grant RD-1234-P from the Vocational Rehabilitation Administration, of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

The author wishes to express her gratitude to Drs. James B. Taylor and Frank A. Petroni for their encouragement, advice, and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper; and to Carol Griffin, Marianne Ptacek, and the Menninger Library staff for their help in the search of the literature.

change. For instance, Katz (1964, 1968) and Berkowitz (1967) reviewed evidence regarding desegregation's effects on scholastic achievement and performance; Proshansky (1966) reviewed studies of intergroup attitudinal development and, from these, Proshansky and Newton (1968) reviewed determinants and consequences of Negro self-identity. Silberman (1964, Ch. 9) offered an overall discussion of de facto segregation; Coleman (1966) offered an exhaustive examination of the American school. In contrast, our concern is with the determinants—social, attitudinal, and behavioral—of social distance or closeness among black and white school children.

It seems appropriate at this time to examine studies that have been made in this area to see what we have learned about interracial associations and to suggest the implications of these studies for better understanding the process of interracial socialization in school. In general, the focus of this review is upon school

desegregation and its effect upon interracial association.

In examining the literature, it becomes apparent that early in his life the child develops an awareness of racial differences and attaches values to these differences. No matter at what point in his school life desegregation takes place—kindergarten through high school—the child does not approach integration in vacuo. This early awareness of racial difference, along with the values attached to such difference, plays a part in the formulation of the stereotypes which the child carries with him through his school years. Such racial evaluations are manifest or latent, and are modified or reinforced from the child's perception of racial attitudes held by those who—at that moment, for that child—are most influential. Generally, for the young child, it is the parent who is most influential; for the older child, it is the peer group.

For these reasons, the first section of this review deals with studies which describe the growth of racial awareness and evaluation during the formative years. This section presents these studies as helpful in providing a base of understanding and in suggesting certain further leads in studying the effects of increased

interracial association.

The second section reviews literature on the effects of the desegregated school upon the child's attitudes and behavior. Also covered are studies of what can be called "social preference": the child's demonstrated preference for black or white in his interaction.

Sources used in searching for studies relevant to racial associations in desegregated schools were: Psychological Abstracts; Dissertation Abstracts; The Educational Resources Information Center, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; and the bibliogram

raphies of Miller (1966), St. John & Smith (1967), and Weinberg (1967). Although these sources provided access to most of the relevant literature, there is no guarantee the review is exhaustive; it does provide a sampling of major studies in the field.

Racial Awareness and Evaluation: What the Child Brings to the Desegregated School

There has been general agreement and acceptance of several findings in the area of children's initial attitude toward racial differences. As early as 1947, Clark and Clark, using four dolls (two black and two white) for identification, reported that very young Negro children-even when correct usage of "white," 'colored,' or "Negro" was not known—preferred white to black. This white preference existed in both Northern and Southern children, with the Southerner less likely to reject the black doll; the Northerner making fewer self-identifications with the Negro. White preference was most pronounced in the light-skinned Negro group (80% showed self-misidentification); the darkskinned group was consistently more accurate in its choice of appropriate doll than either the light- or medium-skinned group. Clark later wrote: "These findings clearly support the conclusion that racial awareness is present in Negro children as young as three years old. Furthermore, this knowledge develops in stability and clarity from year to year, and by the age of seven it is a part of the knowledge of all Negro children [Clark, 1955, p. 19]." Clark added that Horowitz (1939), Goodman (1952), and Radke, Traeger, & Davis (1949) "have shown that the same is true of white children."

In a study of young children in an interracial nursery school, Goodman (1952) showed that three- and four-year olds were very much aware of racial differences, and preferred white skin for themselves and their friends. She listed six major determining factors in racial awareness: individual attributes; individual situation; models; needs and interests; values; and characteristic ways. Goodman suggested "high awareness and strong feeling will result from a combination of a majority of . . . these [p. 184]."

Similarly, Landreth and Johnson (1953) stated that at the age of three the Negro has learned "skin color is important, that white is to be desired, dark to be regretted [p. 78]." Three- and five-year old Northern white children from the upper and lower classes and Negro lower class children were presented with a picture inset test. It was found that white upper class children "apparently perceived the picture inset series as a matching

problem... skin color per se was not perceived as an important factor in the choice." The "white lower-class group resembled the Negro in showing significant differences in their choice of white skins when paired with black and brown skins." Coles (1966), writing of the Negro Southern child, noted the "drawings of these young children reveal their emerging sense of shame and worthlessness, their feelings of weakness before white skin and their envy of it [p. 337]." Furthermore, Morland (1958), studying 454 nursery school children in six Southern schools, one of which was a Negro school, found that awareness increased with age—and most rapidly in the fourth year—with the white child higher in recognition ability.

The acceptance of and agreement upon the results of these studies seem to have changed little over 30 years, as shown by Criswell (1937) and by Dentler & Elkins (1967). The results of pre-1954 studies greatly affected the 1954 Supreme Court decision on desegregation (Hill & Greenberg, 1955; Muse, 1964; Sarratt, 1966); and by admitting this evidence, the Court opened a new area and gave prestige to the social sciences and to social science.

research (Berger, 1957; Speer, 1968).

It is ironic, in view of the social importance of these earlier studies, that their methodological base has recently been severely questioned. One finding of these studies (particularly of the Clarks')—that of self-misidentification—was questioned on the basis of method. Greenwald and Oppenheim (1968) commented that self-misidentification by 80% of the light-skinned Negro children in the Clarks' study has "had strong impact. . . . The results might also have led psychologists to pursue such mediating factors as 'denial of racial identity' and 'confused self-image'

[p. 49]."

Arguing that "perhaps the light-skinned children were objectively correct: the white doll may have resembled their skin color more than the dark doll," Greenwald and Oppenheim replicated the Clarks' study with these changes in method: 75 Northern Negro and white nursery-school age children were asked openended questions; and a third doll (mulatto) was added. All dolls were identical except for skin color. Here it was found that the introduction of another skin color reduced the self-misidentification of the light-skinned Negro group markedly (to 11 percent); reduced the dark-skinned Negro group to 0 percent; while the medium-skinned Negro group's self-misidentification remained at essentially the same level as that found by the Clarks. The self-misidentification of white children in the study was about the same in degree as the Negro children's—perhaps even more—suggesting "a certain amount of misidentification . . . regard-

less of race [p. 52]." Yet this study also found, as did the studies before it, that all children preferred the white doll (it was seen as "good," "nice," and as "preferred for play"); and that the skin color of the doll was correctly labeled by the children. "Apparently, then, different samples and sample sizes, the differences of an entire generation, the use of different dolls, and also white examiners did not bring about appreciably different answers to

these basic questions [p. 51]."

Very young children may or may not identify themselves correctly—the subtle spectrum of skin coloring from white to black presents them with a confusing problem. But even preschool children are aware of racial differences and make evaluations on the basis of skin color: White is "nice"; black is not "nice"; white is "good"; black is "bad"; and the white doll is the one a child wants to play with best. These sobering findings have held their reliability for twenty years. It is against this background of pre-formed attitudes that we must understand the challenge and response posed by the integrated school.

Correlates of Interracial Attitudes in the Desegregated School

Since Proshansky (1966) has provided a thorough review of studies of intergroup attitudinal development, we will here focus specifically upon studies relevant to the desegregated school. Most studies assume that the social effects of desegregation are likely to be influenced by the students' pre-existing attitudes towards race. As Proshansky (1966) has noted, research on such attitudes generally assumes that: "(a) intergroup attitudes are learned; (b) they are multicausally determined; and (c) they are functional or need-satisfying in character for the individual [p. 330]."

There is general agreement on the influence of parental and peer attitude upon the child's attitude. Sartain (1966), studying the attitudes of parents and children toward desegregation, found favorable parental attitudes to be correlated with high socioeconomic status, active church participation, non-Southern regional background, and low authoritarianism. Parents who felt favorably towards desegregation also perceived a greater percentage of the community and their friends (peer group) as favorable than did those parents who opposed desegregation. A strong positive relationship was found between the child's attitude and his perception of parental and peer attitudes. These findings point to the importance of perception of attitude, as opposed to stated attitude, as a basis for the role modeling. But it carries yet another implication. The lack of relationship between reported attitudes and attitudes expressed in behavior has long been noted; it may be

that the children are most accurately aware, not of what the parents report their attitude to be, but rather of what their parents actually do. In this sense, their reports may provide a more "valid" estimate of parental attitude than is given by any attitude scale.

In a study of attitude change toward Negroes and school desegregation among white participants in a summer institute, Kinnick (1967) found negative correlations between the level of education, authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, and favorable attitudes toward desegregation. He also found that favorable attitudes toward Negroes varied directly with income—supporting the hypothesis that negative attitudes are linked with potential economic threat.

Alexander and Campbell (1964) found the peer group to be the most influential force in college choices of white, male, high school seniors. Graham (1967) found that white college students who have the most positive interracial attitudes "appear to be those who have taken the time and the energy to understand one

another as persons [p. 26]."

Most studies of Negroes' attitudes (as opposed to whites') point to social class differences (Frazier, 1957a, 1957b; Parker & Kleiner, 1964). Lower-class blacks generally have a more unfavorable response to whites in the South (Cothran, 1951) and in the North (Lincoln, 1961). Studies of Negro personality suggest that the consequences of frustration and deprivation differ by social class (Kardiner & Ovesey, 1951; Pettigrew, 1964b). Part of the class difference lies in parental attitudes. Clark (1955) wrote, "The major parental pressure upon the middle-class or upper-class Negro child is the demand that he be a living refutation of the stereotyped picture of the primitive and inferior Negro [p. 58]." Pettigrew (1964a) emphasized the need for a greater

understanding of the total Negro personality.

In his study of black students' reasons for enrolling in desegregated white high schools, Crockett (1957) found no support for the hypothesis that students with high socioeconomic status and with high ability would be more apt to transfer to integrated schools. In general, seniors remained in segregated schools and underclassmen transferred. This suggests the importance to segregationist behavior of peer group ties; a senior occupies a prestigious position in the school, and to transfer—especially to an integrated school—would threaten that prestige. McDowell (1967) found that high school Negroes' willingness to associate with whites depended upon: the situation, educational status, extent of voluntary experience with white peers, and the kind of whites perceived. Most important was the blacks' anticipation of the whites' reactions to association.

Grossack (1963), studying Negro and white Southern ninthand tenth-grade children, reported that black children are more favorable to desegregation than white children; and both black and white children see adults as favoring desegregation, with the black child less likely to perceive adults as favorable. Johnson (1966), studying racial attitudes of Negro Freedom School participants and of black and white civil rights participants, obtained results similar to those of Grossack. In this study, the Negroes and the civil rights participants held positive attitudes toward blacks, despite their perception of most whites as having negative attitudes. Johnson suggested that finer lines of differentiation be drawn between Negroes from different backgrounds and from different groups within the community.

In sum, the child's initial attitudes towards desegregation are concordant with his perceptions of parental attitudes. Among whites, negative attitudes seem to be linked with low parental education, low socioeconomic status, ethnocentrism, and authoritarianism. These findings are in accord with the classic views on racial prejudice (Myrdal, 1944), and concordant too with Lipset's

(1960) postulate of "working class authoritarianism."

Not surprisingly, these pre-existing attitudes are moderated by situational and peer group pressures, and under certain circumstances may not be much manifest in behavior (Rosner, 1954; Rose, 1956; Deutscher, 1966). There is also some evidence that such attitudes may differ during different developmental stages, and that the relative influence of peers and parents may change with maturation. On these matters, however, no solid comparative data were discovered in a search of the literature. Rather, developmental changes in attitude and behavior have generally been studied outside the context of parental, group, or class pressures.3

In determining attitudinal causation, it seems reasonable that the variables of parental and peer attitudes, authoritarianism, socioeconomic status, Northern or Southern background, and educational level might be related in some configural pattern. We might get closer to knowing what the process is if a study were undertaken in which each variable was examined by means of multivariate analysis. Some studies have dealt with three or

³Historically, studies of the relationship between racial attitudes and overt that or cally, studies of the relationship between racial attitudes and behavior span a thirty-year period (La Piere, 1934; Ehrlich, 1969). Explanations of discrepance there is a superior base ranged from general land of span a thirty-year period (La Piere, 1934; Enrich, 1967). Enrich, 1967, Enrich Rutner, Wilkins, & Yarrow, 1952) to an empirical study of the influence of reference group support as the important variable (Fendrich, 1967). Work in his general area has recently been subjected to serious challenge, both conscheral area has recently been subjected to school copiually and methodologically (Ehrlich, 1969; Deutscher, 1969).

four of the variables, but the weight of each of them-and just how they are all related—is unknown.

Attitude Change, Interracial Associations, and Cleavage in the Desegregated School

In the literature for the effects of desegregation on interracial association, studies fall roughly into three categories. The largest number of studies deal with what can be called social "preference": the demonstrated preference for black or white. Most of these focus either upon the influence of sex or the influence of age on racial cleavage.

The second group of studies in desegregated schools have investigated interracial contact, cleavage, and attitude change. This group, smaller than the "preference" group, focuses more upon active acceptance or rejection as a result of interracial

The third group, still smaller, is that of actual participation by black students in the desegregated school's daily life.

Preference Changes: Age-Linked Characteristics of Cleavage

As noted earlier, studies indicate that the pre-school child is aware of racial differences and has formed evaluations. In 1955, Clark wrote, "The racial and religious attitudes of sixth graders are more definite than the attitudes of pre-school children, and hardly distinguishable from the attitudes of high school students. Thereafter there is an increase in the intensity and complexity of these attitudes, until they become similar (at least, as far as words go) to the prevailing attitudes held by the average

adult American [p. 24].'

Eighteen years before, Criswell (1937) noted that selfpreference varies directly with grade in school: "Separation into racial groups is usually absent until grade three. Cleavage reaches its highest point in grade five [p. 89]." After grade five, there is variable and unequal cleavage among girls; among boys, there is either equal cleavage or one group has prestige over the other. The fact that older children have more animosity and hostility had been reported outside the school in studies by Gesell & Ilg (1946), Traeger and Yarrow (1952), and Allport (1961). In addition Landreth and Johnson (1953) found that "age differences in each group (white upper class, white lower class and Negro lower class) were, in general, in terms of accentuation of a group pattern already present at three years. For example, preference for white skin color in the white lower class group became more significant at five years than at three, and preference for brown over black in

the Negroes showed a similar trend in increased significance [p. 78]."

Dwyer (1958) reported that the lower the age, the more accommodating were the students, and that interracial associations were more informal on the elementary level than at a higher educational level. St. John's (1964) findings support Dwyer: In two New England high schools with a one-sixth Negro population, she found that interracial associations were more formal than informal, and that interracial association was little affected by whether the students had, or had not, attended an integrated

elementary school.

Singer (1967) studied black and white fifth-graders in segregated and unsegregated schools, and found that desegregated blacks were more accepting of whites than segregated blacks; that desegregated whites see blacks as more aggressive and nonachieving; and that desegregated black children were more willing to "color" themselves in a "draw yourself" test than were segregated children. This suggests that the desegregated Negro child may be more willing to differentiate himself from whites, and more willing to accept his race. It also suggests that desegregation may reinforce rather than lessen negative stereotypes among the whites. This too may differ by age. Campbell and Yarrow (1958) found that eleven- to thirteen-year-olds were more aggressive toward the black than were eight- to ten-year-olds. They wrote: "Older white children initially direct nearly twice as much aggression toward their Negro cabin mates as toward their white peers [p. 31]." This tendency does not appear in the younger white group, and Negro children showed "no age differences in amount or direction of expressed aggression."

Studies of high school-age and college students support this pattern. As early as 1946, Deutschberger found a discontinuance

of voluntary association with unlikes after age thirteen.

St. John (1964) found that black high school students in the North preferred to associate with blacks more than whites preferred to associate with whites. Earlier, Lundberg and Dickson (1952) reported that members of various ethnic groups preferred members of their own group. In contrast, Gordon (1967), in a study of a Northern, predominantly Jewish, suburban high school with an eight percent black population of lower socioeconomic status, found that blacks showed less tendency toward self-preference in selecting friends and leaders than did whites; he also found that white Catholics and Jews showed more preference for the Negro than did white Protestants. But Katz, Goldston, & Benjamin (1958) found that in a college biracial work group blacks spoke more often to whites than vice versa.

Some studies have focused on choice of friends as an indication of preference. Bradley (1964) reported that when 149 high school and 82 college black students from desegregated schools were asked to name five former friends, a significantly higher number named blacks than named majority-group white friends; however, white friends were named more often by the college group. It is likely that social and personality factors play a part in sociometric choice; Webster and Kroger (1966) found, from 312 California high school Negro students of both sexes, that blacks with one or more white friends had greater self-esteem.

Diener (1967), studying Northern elementary school teacher trainees, found that the needs, values, and attitudes of younger Negro student teachers (18-32 years) more closely approximated those of whites than the needs, values, and attitudes of older,

Negro student teachers (age 33-58).

Rice and White (1964) tested a group of both college and non-college Southern white females. Each group showed more competition and aggression against black opponents (in a game) than against white opponents. These findings suggest that college experience made no measurable difference in preference and

cleavage—in communities where prejudice is valued.

Other studies point to the highly complex nature, among older students, of the effects of desegregation upon attitudes and behavior. Here again, the evidence points to increased cleavage with age. In a study of black students at a large Northern university, Bindman (1965) found black students isolated and alienated by the university's bureaucracy, staff, and administration, and by the white students—which reinforced their suspiciousness of whites. Graham (1967), in a study of a program to provide disadvantaged students with a college education, suggested that black students had the ability and desire, but little will to learn. They were wary of authority and suspicious of the white middle class. The black males, in particular, were preoccupied with their identity crises.

In a related study, Parsons (1966) found the same age-linked and sex-role cleavage patterns between Mexican-Americans and Anglos that have been reported for black and white. He also reported that Mexican-American stereotypes were largely held by elementary school Anglo children, and that the Mexican-Americans have assumed certain aspects of the Anglo stereotypes. It is not unreasonable to assume that this "self-fulfilling prophecy" of stereotypes can easily operate also within the black-white desegregated school. How it works and in what areas—an educated guess would be in athletics—is not really known or understand

In sum, these studies have pointed to interracial association patterns related to age: (a) early awareness of differences, at times by three years; (b) informal associations in elementary school; (c) awareness of differences crystallizing early—at times by seven years, at least by the fifth grade; (d) patterns of cleavage continuing through high school, except on a formal basis; (e) cleavage into college, in which the black feels alienated.

Preference Changes: Sex-Role-Linked Characteristics of Cleavage

Although Campbell and Yarrow (1958) reported observations from an interracial camp and not a desegregated school, their findings are relevant here. They suggested that desegregation holds "the greatest initial hazards for Negro girls. The Negro girls come to desegregation weighted with feelings of self-rejection and the recognition of the favored social and power positions of the white girls [pp. 36-37]." The authors believe that Negrowhite relationships among boys are more tenable than among girls. They attributed this to such factors as the boys' "greater tolerance of aggression," "the availability of adult role models," "culturally valued attributes (e.g., muscular strength and athletic skill)" and "the not too dissimilar occupation roles of lower class white and Negro males." The Negro girl "has fewer positively valued adult role models and attributes to share in equal status with white girls." The authors mention the cultural attribute of physical beauty, the Negro girls' acceptance of whites' values of beauty, and the few occupational choices open to them.

Criswell (1937), in a study of 950 boys and girls in a Northern school with a 75 percent Negro population, reported greater cleavage between sexes than between races. In the early grades, for example, a white boy prefers a Negro boy to a white girl—even when a class has only one white boy and girl. She also found "From grade five on, girls' groups show a variable and unequal cleavage, colored girls withdrawing more than do whites. Boys develop either equal cleavage or structures in which one group

has a great deal more prestige than the other [p. 89]."

Thirty years later, Gordon (1967) reported more social interaction between black and white male students than between black and white female students in a predominantly Jewish high school with an eight percent Negro population. He found, too, that with integration the white student's academic achievement continued at its generally high level, but that wide differences remained between the generally low-achieving blacks and high-achieving whites. These differences were greatest between white and black females. In a border-state school district with ten percent Negro population, Dwyer (1958) found that boys adjusted more readily Goodman (1952) said, "Among Americans personal appearance is more stressed for girls than boys. We find in our sample that girls appear among high-awareness children more often than do boys. The connection between learning that personal appearance is important and taking note of racial appearance is demonstrated in this difference between girls and boys as well as in the

differences between Negroes and whites [p. 178]."

Singer (1967), studying fifth grade black and white children, found marked sex differences in ethnic attitudes: segregated superior I.Q. white girls and desegregated average I.Q. white girls were the two groups expressing the most willingness to associate with blacks; high I.Q. segregated and desegregated Negro girls saw whites as aggressive, as nonachievers, and were least willing to associate with whites; and desegregated Negro boys were more willing to associate with whites than were segregated Negro boys.

In short, the bulk of evidence indicates that interracial associations are more threatening to the Negro girl than to the Negro boy. Consequently, the girl has a much more difficult time. Petroni (1970) demonstrated that the Negro girl's social position is more tenuous: the white girl can draw from black or white boys.

Interracial Contact, Cleavage, and Attitude Change

Studies of actual interracial contact have produced seemingly conflicting results. Some have found that, with contact, there is more interracial acceptance, less prejudice, and a raising of Negro self-esteem. Other studies have not supported these findings,

noting instead that there is less interracial acceptance.

First, of those studies finding a decrease in racial cleavage, Singer (1967) found desegregated white fifth graders more willing to associate with blacks than de facto segregated white students, and that interracial contact appeared to lead to more favorable attitudes on the part of whites. In an earlier study, Yarrow, Campbell, and Yarrow (1958) found that after a two-week interracial summer camp experience, whites still preferred whites as friends, but "there is a significant drop in the extent to which they are the favored group [p. 27]." Also, the integrated situation positively affected the Negro children's concept of their race and self-esteem; they were less sensitive to their black peers' unfavorable behavior; Negro girls showed a "lessened tendency to reject other Negro girls on friendship ratings"; and there was a "generally systematic tendency for them to describe other Negro children in more favorable terms than initially." In a longitudinal study, Campbell (1958) found that a "change in attitude by whites to blacks was related positively to the amount of contact with blacks."

Following two weeks at an integrated camp, Campbell and Yarrow (1958) reported "girls of both races have moved toward reduced cleavages at both overt and covert levels... The change is not complete (white girls, for example, still tend to stand as favored ideals for their Negro cabin mates, and the Negro girls still channel most of their aggression toward members of their own race), yet necessary beginnings of change have occurred, particularly changes reflecting an enhancement of the Negro girl's self-concept [p. 36]." Kinnick (1967), too, found a positive correlation between interracial association and attitude toward school desegregation among participants at a summer institute. Horowitz' (1936) early study showed that sixth-grade white boys from an integrated school showed more positive preference for interracial social situations than did segregated white boys.

In contrast to these studies, other investigators have found that interracial association may lead to greater cleavage between whites and blacks. Thus, Dentler & Elkins (1967) found children in Negro segregated and naturally desegregated schools more prejudiced than whites in segregated schools. Furthermore, when the socioeconomic status of the school neighborhood was controlled, "this difference between white segregated and naturally unsegregated schools increased [p. 75]." A related behavioral finding is reported by Anderson (1967) in a study of 150 black lourth-, fifth-, and sixth-graders in five desegregated and five segregated schools in Tennessee. The desegregated black students showed higher scores on a scale of "antisocial attitudes." Since this was the single significant difference found in the study, which used multiple comparison and a variety of scales, it could have been easily arrived at by chance. Differential social processes may underlie some of these findings. Thus, Graham (1967) reported that, by sticking together, disadvantaged college students (44 Negro out of 50) intimidated the regular students. Bronfenbrenner (1967), too, spoke of the effects upon the white student; he suggested that, in general, the black male student is likely to feel inadequate in an integrated classroom, that this inadequacy is likely to result in disruptive behavior, and that the white child "is likely to take on some of the aggressive and disruptive activities of his Negro classmates [p. 919]."

Some studies have reported little, if any, change in attitude after interracial contact. For example, Kupferer (1954) tested a sample of Connecticut high school girls in a physical education class for eight weeks and found few positive changes. In 1963, Lombardi reported that there was no general attitude change toward blacks among junior high school whites after seven months of integration. Lombardi did find, however, that more favorable attitudes were related to the mother's educational level. Grossman

than girls to desegregation; boys interacted more in school. (1967), in a related study of neighborhood change, found the

effects of "threat" and "contact" were equal and opposing forces

for attitude change.

Webster's (1961) study of black and white junior high school children in California before and after integration, together with a non-integrated control group, revealed that white children were less accepting of Negroes after integration. Haggstrom (1964) rejected Webster's findings and pointed to "several methodological problems connected with this study." He suggested that other research has pointed to cleavage at the sixth and seventh grade level and that Webster cannot then interpret less acceptance as resulting from contact. Haggstrom uses Webster's study, however, to "illustrate(s) the necessity of avoiding the assumption that school desegregation will immediately affect the attitudes of white children to the advantage of Negroes or even increase the number of interracial friendships."

Whitmore (1957) measured the attitudes of white eighth-, tenth-, and twelfth-graders before desegregation and five months later, and found that the eighth-graders and two groups of tenthgraders held more favorable attitudes; however, this change was unrelated to contact in the class and may have been a result of more positive adult feelings about white-black school relations.

These seemingly inconsistent results of contact may, in part, be explained on two counts. First, the microscopic look at the direction of attitude change after desegregation—the attitude and social distance scale administered individually before and after integration—can only offer evidence of attitudes of that individual at that time in that situation. Such studies tend to investigate an individual's prejudicial attitudes outside of the framework of his community membership and to overlook the normal processes of

developmental change.

Yet it is obvious that racial attitudes are formed and mediated by social and group processes. Sherif (1967) has noted that prejudice is a social institution, "a product of group membership," derived from community membership and not from contact with an individual member of the group against whom the prejudice is directed. We know that very young children are aware of racial differences and make value judgments based upon them. We know these attitudes are maintained through parental and peer attitudes and the perception of these attitudes. As the child enters school and is able to participate in group activities, his awareness of differences and prejudicial attitudes become a part of his selfidentity and of his identity as a group member. Yet, most inves tigators have not studied member-in-group, but individuals. We

also know that, as a member-in-group, the individual may react to different groups in different—even opposing—ways depending upon the situation. Nevertheless, few studies have attempted to link prejudicial attitudes with the sub-groupings that are a part of the school community.

An exception is provided by a descriptive study by Petroni & Hirsch (1970), who investigated interracial attitudes and behavior through open-ended interviews as perceived by sub-groups within the desegregated school. Their findings clearly show that the effects of desegregation on behavior are markedly different for different groups.

ferent groups, both among the white and the black students.

Second, the neglect of group structure and process in most investigations is surprising, since we have known for some time that contact alone will not automatically produce favorable attitudes by one group toward another. Thus, in 1946, Deutschberger suggested that the hypothesis that day-to-day contact with unlikes leads to greater inter-ethnic tolerance was untenable. Similarly, Campbell and Yarrow (1958) noted, "In light of available evidence the simple and attractive view that face-to-face contact per se leads to a favorable change in intergroup relations has been found inadequate [p. 37]."

Indeed, research on school desegregation has often been faulted for its failure to examine the pertinent intervening variables. As Proshansky (1966) has pointed out: "School desegregation by legal fiat does not by any means insure social integration between racial groups in this genuine sense [p. 354]." He continued, "Cooperative and equal-status interracial contacts in the school setting can, but will not necessarily, reduce ethnic prejudice [p. 356]." Katzenmeyer (1963) suggested that integration per se is not enough; and Dentler and Elkins (1967) reported that attitudes found in a naturally desegregated school are not prototypes of the attitudes one finds in a planned desegregated school.

Nor is such criticism only emerging in recent years. Goodman (1952) noted, "Frequency of interracial contacts is probably of less significance than type of contact [p. 179]." Dwyer (1958) found very little carry-over from one interracial contact to another; but did find interaction increasing with duration of integration.

Drake and Cayton (1962) wrote: "Almost mystical faith in 'getting to know one another' as a solvent of racial tensions is very widespread. It is undoubtedly true that mere contact is likely to result in some degree of understanding and friendliness. It is qually true, however, that contact can produce tension and reinforcement of folk-prejudices [pp. 281–282]."

Later, Mack (1965) noted, "The rapid change in the status of the Negro will be accompanied by an increase in interracial conflict [p. 40]." He listed three necessary conditions for conflict: intergroup contact, intergroup competition, and visibility.

All three are present in the desegregated school.

In retrospect, it appears that most attitudinal research on the effects of school desegregation has erred in being too simplistic and atheoretical. It has seldom looked at the processes of group interaction which are likely to result in favorable or unfavorable attitude shifts. Although a voluminous literature exists on attitude change, group conflict, and group cooperation, this theoretical perspective seldom has entered into the thinking of the investigator. Unhappily, in this field it appears that when you ask a simplistic question you get a confusing answer.

Interracial Contact, Cleavage, and Behavior Change

Compared with those measuring attitudes or social distance, few studies have focused upon Negro participation in the everyday activities of desegregated schools. Findings that have been

reported are few and spotty.

St. John (1964) found black high school students, in a longdesegregated setting, participated in athletics and held office in non-academic school organizations as frequently as did whites. Gordon (1967) found black students participated in fewer extracurricular activities, with the significant exception of football and basketball. He also found that white students showed an increased interest in participation in a number of non-academic areas after integration, which may imply white response to a perceived "threat." Gottlieb and TenHouten's (1965) study of three urban Northern high schools uncovered the following pattern of black participation: Negroes desegregating a previously segregated school participate in activities with little cross-racial interaction; as the number of blacks equals that of whites, separate systems arise; as the blacks become the majority, they participate in all

In 1966, Proshansky wrote:

At the level of the individual, changes in intergroup behavior and intergroup attitudes occur without much relationship to each other. This has to be expected, for intergroup behavior is determined by more than the person's intergroup attitudes alone. It is also determined by other motives in the individual, interacting with the circumstances in which he finds himself. The implications of this fact for the ongoing programs of desegregation in schools . . . are self-evident [p. 362].

Summary and Discussion

From the literature, certain patterns emerge:

- (1) The child—as early as three years—is aware of racial differences.
- (2) The child holds attitudes that are greatly dependent upon his perceptions of parental, peer, and school attitudes, and upon his perceptions of their support for his attitudes.
- (3) The demonstrated preference of white for white and black for white may be changing.
- (4) Cleavage starts in elementary school with boy and boy against girl and girl; but with the onset of puberty, the cleavage develops racially.
- (5) The Negro boy seems better able to adjust and is more accepted in interracial associations with boys and girls than is the Negro girl.
- (6) There is no general agreement about the effects of interracial contacts on attitude change. Some studies have found heightened tolerance; some heightened resistance; some no change. There seems to be, however, a general agreement that interracial contact per se will not bring about increased tolerance or acceptance.

In 1956, Williams, Fisher, and Janis suggested that the thenrecently desegregated school might serve well as a "natural laboratory" for social science research. In spite of this great "natural laboratory," and in spite of the flood of material outpouring from it, this laboratory has not produced a great amount of genuinely helpful material. Perhaps what this review points to, more than anything else, is the confusing, spotty, and inconclusive nature of research in this area.

It appears that the problem lies in the nature of the questions asked of this laboratory. Most researchers have implicitly viewed the school community as a static totality, as an undifferentiated mass. Yet three decades of sociometric studies and of investigations in social stratification have shown the social world of the student to be highly differentiated, made up of subgroups with varying values and varying responses to change. For example, the world of the middle-class black student is likely to be much different from that of the student from the black ghetto; the college-bound white student is apt to have different values from those of the non-college-bound white student. Most recently Petroni and Hirsch (1970) have demonstrated how group membership determines the student's perceptions; and how the student's responses and behavior are colored by his group's interrelationships with other groups.

Thus it is not enough to ask, "What are the effects of desegregation?" The question is too broad, too vague. More precise questions are needed, questions which focus upon the social groupings and social processes accompanying desegregation. What is the social life of the school like? Does it foster group competition? Group cooperation? With what effects on attitude or behavioral change? Under what conditions do students act as a cohesive group? Is there a chance for group participation in the problems of the school community? Under what conditions can a chance for positive goals be fostered? What are the group processes and intergroup relationships under different conditions of desegregation? What happens to whom under what conditions? In short, we need to look in a more differentiated way at the individuals embedded within a school community, responding to each other and to the school environment. As Sherif (1967) has said, "One has to study behavior in the framework of the actual interaction process with its developing reciprocities [p. 429]."

Not only is there a need for a more differentiated view of the social world of the student, a need for more descriptive studies, there is also a need for a more activist and experimental approach. All of the studies reviewed here have been correlational or else have focused on group differences. No one has systematically set up the kind of group experiments which would allow an assessment of racial cleavage under different conditions of desegregation. Yet the way is open for the introduction and manipulation of various conditions between the groups. The type of study pioneered by Sherif (1967) would seem especially appropriate to the study of group process in desegregation. In a naturalistic camp situation, Sherif has shown ways of manipulating group process to: (1) produce in-group solidarity, (2) introduce friction, and (3) produce intergroup integration. Such experimental studies carried out in the desegregated school would not only clarify the processes which lead to, or away from, racial cleavage, but might also provide practical techniques for reducing racial conflict in real-life settings.

What variables might be manipulated in such situations? The prior works of a descriptive nature that have been done have shown some possibilities. Petroni and Hirsch (1970) suggest that students are divided into natural differentiated groups and that each group has somewhat different reactions to the integrated situation. In terms of this study, each group (black militants, middle-class, "elite," white "hoods," conservatives, "hippies," etc.) may be expected to act differently in interracial situations. Groups could be placed in conflicting and cooperative situations, using Sherif's (1967) suggestions of: common enemy, supreme individual achievement, leadership techniques, and superordinate goals. Petroni (1970) suggested that mating and dating play an important role in integrated social situations. Perhaps role-

playing around this issue might prove illuminating.

In addition to the social structural variables of group membership and of social life drawn from descriptive studies, the way is also open to situational studies through the use of current experiments-in-process occurring in many American schools, which offer a different setting for desegregation studies. The "street school" experiments in Philadelphia and Chicago offer such a source. These can be studied alone or compared to the standard classroom situation, to see if environmental change affects interracial association. Does this kind of loose, studentparticipatory curriculum provide an atmosphere for more mutual trust? One available source—popular, at that—says of Philadel-phia's Parkway Program, "There have been no racial incidents, though blacks and whites tend to keep apart [Time Magazine, 1970, p. 55]." Not only are there extra-classroom experiments that can be studied, but intra-school experiments. What are the effects of curriculum changes such as: team teaching, modular planning, independent study, and discussion classes? The rapid change in the traditional high school situation itself provides an even richer "natural laboratory" for descriptive and manipulative studies.

It is obvious that much research needs to be done. Especially at a time when black militancy and white reaction is on the increase, when certain forms of cleavage are advocated by volatile groups of students, and when on the college and high school level some blacks have already achieved their own form of resegregation, our fifteen years of scholarship look weak indeed. We simply do not know what happens to whom under what conditions of school desegregation.

REFERENCES

ALEXANDER, C. N., JR., & CAMPBELL, E. Q. Peer influences on adolescent educational aspirations and attainments. American Sociological Review, 1964, 29,

ALLPORT, G. W. Patterns and growth in personality. New York: Holt, Rinehart &

Winston, 1961.

ANDERSON, L. V. The effects of desegregation on the achievement and personality patterns of Negro children. (Doctoral dissertation, George Peabody College for Teachers) Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1967. No. 66-11,237.

Berger, M. Desegregation, law, and social science. Commentary, 1957, 23, 471-77.

Berger, M. Desegregation, law, and social science. Commentary, 1957, 23, 471-77. BERKOWITZ, M. I. Studies of school desegregation and achievement: A summary. Pitts-

burgh, Pa.: Commission on Human Relations, 1967.

BINDMAN, A. M. Participation of Negro students in an integrated university. (Doctoral dissertation, University of Illinois) Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms 1065. films, 1965. No. 65-7076.

Bradley, G. H. Friendship among students in desegregated schools. Journal of Negro Education, 1964, 33, 90-92.

Bronfenbrenner, U. The psychological costs of quality and equality in education. Child Development, 1967, 38, 909-25.

CAMPBELL, E. Q. Some social psychological correlates of direction of attitude

change. Social Forces, 1958, 36, 335-40.

CAMPBELL, J. D., & YARROW, M. R. Personal and situational variables in adaptation to change. Journal of Social Issues, 1958, 14(1), 29-46.

CLARK, K. B. Prejudice and your child. Boston: Beacon Press, 1955.

CLARK, K. B., & CLARK, M. Racial identification and preference in Negro children. In T. M. Newcomb & E. L. Hartley (Eds.), Readings in social psychology. New York: Henry Holt, 1947.

COLEMAN, J. S. et al. Equality of educational opportunity. Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Department of Health, Education & Welfare, 1966.

COLES, R. Southern children under desegregation. In B. J. Bergen & C. S. Thomas (Eds.), Issues and problems in social psychiatry. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1966.

COTHRAN, T. C. Negro conceptions of white people. American Journal of Sociology,

1951, 61, 458-67.

Criswell, J. H. Racial cleavage in Negro-white groups. Sociometry, 1937, 1, 81-89. CROCKETT, H. J., JR. A study of some factors affecting the decision of Negro high school students to enroll in previously all-white high schools, St. Louis, 1955. Social Forces, 1957, 35, 351-56.

DENTLER, R. A., & ELKINS, C. Intergroup attitudes, academic performance, and racial composition. In R. A. Dentler, B. Mackler, & M. E. Warshauer

(Eds.), The urban R's. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.

Deutschberger, P. Interaction patterns in changing neighborhoods: New York and Pittsburgh. Sociometry, 1946, 9, 303-15.

DEUTSCHER, I. Words and deeds: Social science and social policy. Social Problems, 1966, 13, 235-54.

DEUTSCHER, I. Looking backward: Case studies on the progress of methodology in sociological research. American Sociologist, 1969, 4(1), 35-41.

DIENER, R. E. A comparative study of selected needs, values and attitudes of Negro and white elementary education students. (Doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan) Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1967. No. 67-1726.

DRAKE, St. C., & CAYTON, H. R. Black metropolis. (Rev. ed.) New York: Harper &

Row, 1962.

DWYER, R. J. A report on patterns of interaction in desegregated schools. Journal of Educational Sociology, 1958, 31, 253-56.

EHRLICH, H. J. Attitudes, behavior, and the intervening variables. American

Sociologist, 1969, 4(1), 29-34.

FENDRICH, J. M. Perceived reference group support: Racial attitudes and overt behavior. American Sociological Review, 1967, 32, 960-70.

FRAZIER, E. F. Black bourgeoisie. Glencoe: Free Press, 1957. (a)

FRAZIER, E. F. The Negro middle-class and desegregation. Social Problems, 1957, 4,291-301. (b)

GESELL, A. L., & ILG, F. L. The child from five to ten. New York: Harper & Bros., 1946.

GOODMAN, M. E. Race awareness in young children. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1952.

GORDON, L. An acculturation analysis of Negro and white high school students. (Doctoral dissertation, Wayne State University) Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1967. No. 67-660.

GOTTLIEB, D., & TENHOUTEN, W. Racial composition and the social systems of three high schools. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 1965, 27, 204-12.

Graham, J. The Antioch program for interracial education—the first three years. 1964-1967. Unpublished manuscript, Antioch College, Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1967.

GREENWALD, H. J., & OPPENHEIM, D. B. Reported magnitude of self-identification among Negro children: Artifact? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,

1968, 8(1, Pt. 1), 49-52.

GROSSACK, M. N. Attitudes towards desegregation of Southern white and Negro children. In Author (Ed.), Mental health and segregation. New York: Springer, 1963.

GROSSMAN, J. S. Psychological determinants of reaction to neighborhood racial change. (Doctoral dissertation, Western Reserve University) Ann Arbor, Mich.:

University Microfilms, 1967. No. 67-4640.

HAGGSTROM, W. Segregation, desegregation, and Negro personality. In M. Weinberg (Ed.), Learning together. Chicago: Integrated Education Associates, 1964.

HILL, H., & GREENBERG, J. Citizen's guide to desegregation. Boston: Beacon Press,

1955.

HOROWITZ, E. L. The development of attitude toward the Negro. Archives of Psychology, 1936, 194, 47.

HOROWITZ, R. E. Racial aspects of self-identification in nursery school children.

Journal of Psychology, 1939, 7, 91-99.

JOHNSON, D. W. Racial attitudes of Negro Freedom School participants and Negro and white civil rights participants. Social Forces, 1966, 45(2), 266-73. KARDINER, A., & OVESEY, L. The mark of oppression: A psychological study of the American Negro. New York: Norton, 1951.

KATZ, I. Review of evidence relative to effects of desegregation on the intellectual

performance of Negroes. American Psychologist, 1964, 19(6), 381-99.

KATZ, I. Factors influencing Negro performance in the desegregated school. In M. Deutsch, I. Katz, & A. R. Jensen (Eds.), Social class, race and psychological development. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968.

KATZ, I., GOLDSTON, J., & BENJAMIN, L. Behavior and productivity in biracial

work groups. Human Relations, 1958, 11, 123-41.

KATZENMEYER, W. G. Social interaction and differences in intelligence test performance of Negro and white elementary school pupils. (Doctoral dissertation, Duke Univer-

sity) Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1963. No. 63-2227.

KINNICK, B. C. An experimental study and analysis of attitude change toward Negroes and school desegregation among participants in a summer institute sponsored under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Doctoral dissertation, Auburn University) Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1967. No. 67-4665.

KUPFERER, H. J. An evaluation of the integration potential of a physical educa-

tion program. Journal of Educational Sociology, 1954, 28, 89-96.

KUTNER, B., WILKINS, C., & YARROW, P. B. Verbal attitudes and overt behavior regarding social prejudice. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1952, 47,649-52.

LANDRETH, C., & JOHNSON, B. Young children's responses to a picture and inset test designed to reveal reactions to persons of different skin color. Child De-

velopment, 1953, 24, 63-80.

LA PIERE, R. T. Attitudes and actions. Social Forces, 1934, 13, 230-37. LINCOLN, C. E. The Black Muslims in America. Boston: Beacon Press, 1961.

LIPSET, S. M. Political man: The social basis of politics. New York: Doubleday, 1960.

Lombardi, D. N. Factors affecting changes in attitudes towards Negroes among high school students. Journal of Negro Education, 1963, 32, 129-36.

LUNDBERG, G. A., & DICKSON, L. Selective association among ethnic groups in a high school population. *American Sociological Review*, 1952, 17, 23-35.

MACK, R. W. The changing ethnic fabric of the metropolis. In A. Kerber & B. Bommarito (Eds.), *The schools and the urban crisis*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965.

McDowell, S. F. Prejudices and other interracial attitudes of Negro growth. Washington, D.C.: Howard University, 1967.

MILLER, E. W. The Negro in America: A bibliography. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966.

MORLAND, K. J. Racial recognition in nursery school children in Lynchburg, Virginia. Social Forces, 1958, 37, 132-37.

Muse, B. Ten years of prelude. New York: Viking, 1964.

Myrdal, G. An American dilemma. New York: Harper, 1944. 2 vols.

PARKER, S., & KLEINER, R. J. Status, position, individuality and ethnic identifi-

cation of the Negro. Journal of Social Issues, 1964, 20(2), 85-102.

Parsons, T. W., Jr. Ethnic cleavage in a California school. (Doctoral dissertation, Stanford University) Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1966. No. 66-2602.

Petroni, F. A. Interracial dating: The price is high. *Trans-action*, 1970, in press. Petroni, F. A., & Hirsch, E. A. 2-4-6-8, When you gonna integrate? New York: Behavioral Publications, 1970.

Pettigrew, T. F. The American Negro personality: Why isn't more known?

Journal of Social Issues, 1964, 20(2), 4-23. (a)

Pettigrew, T. F. Profile of the American Negro. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1964. (b)
Proshansky, H. M. The development of intergroup attitudes. In L. A. Hoffman & M. L. Hoffman (Eds.), Review of child development research. Vol. 2. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1966

York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1966.

PROSHANSKY, H. M., & NEWTON, P. The nature and meaning of Negro subidentity. In M. Deutsch, I. Katz, & A. R. Jensen (Eds.), Social class, race
and psychological development. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968.

RADKE, M., TRAEGER, H. G., & DAVIS, H. Social perceptions and attitudes of children. Genetic Psychology Monographs, 1949, 40, 327-447.

RICE, G. E., & WHITE, K. The effect of education on prejudice as revealed by a

game situation. Psychological Record, 1964, 14(3), 341-48.

Rose, A. M. Intergroup relations vs. prejudice: Pertinent theory for the study of social change. Social Problems, 1956, 4, 173-76.

Rosner, J. When white children are in the minority. Toward of Educational States.

ROSNER, J. When white children are in the minority. Journal of Educational Sociology, 1954, 28, 69-72.

St. John, N. H. De facto segregation and interracial associations in high school. Sociology of Education, 1964, 37, 326-44.

St. John, N. H., & Smith, N. Annotated bibliography on school racial mix and the selfconcept, aspirations, academic achievement and interracial attitudes and behavior of Negro children. Cambridge, Mass.: Publications Office, Center for Research and Development on Educational Differences, Harvard University, 1967.

SARRATT, R. The ordeal of desegregation. New York: Harper, 1966.

SARTAIN, J. A. Attitudes of parents and children towards desegregation. (Doctoral dissertation, Vanderbilt University) Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1966. No. 66-10,999.

SHERIF, M. Social interaction. Chicago: Aldine, 1967.

SILBERMAN, C. E. Crisis in black and white. New York: Random House, 1964.

Singer, D. Interracial attitudes of Negro and white fifth grade children in segregated and unsegregated schools. (Doctoral dissertation, Columbia University) Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1967. No. 67-2836.

SPEER, H. W. A historical and social perspective on Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka with present and future implications. U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Project No. 6-8939, Contract No. OEC 3-7-068939-2841, May, 1968.

TIME MAGAZINE, 95(12), March 23, 1970.

TRAEGER, H. G., & YARROW, M. R. They learn what they live. New York: Harper, 1952.

Webster, S. W. The influence of interracial contact on social acceptance in a newly integrated school. Journal of Educational Psychology, 1961, 52, 292-96.

Webster, S. W., & Kroger, M. N. A comparative study of selected perceptions and feelings of Negro adolescents with and without white friends in integrated urban high schools. *Journal of Negro Education*, 1966, 35, 55-61.

WEINBERG, M. (Ed.) School integration: A comprehensive classified bibliography of 3100

references. Chicago: Integrated Education Associates, 1967.

WHITMORE, P. G., JR. A study of school desegregation: Attitude change and scale validation. (Doctoral dissertation, University of Tennessee) Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilm, 1957. No. 20,501.

WILLIAMS, R. M., FISHER, B. R., & JANIS, I. L. Educational desegregation as a context for basic social research. American Sociological Review, 1956, 21,

577-83.

YARROW, M. R., CAMPBELL, J. D., & YARROW, L. J. Acquisition of new norms: A study of racial desegregation. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1958, 14(1), 8-28.

A reality to teached, are troughtful of a statement of taken from Limited and Accept Millians of principles on American Experies Assembly and the American Mills of a Section 1997, the concity of TOA ON, with a company and the American American Section 1997, the contract of the contract and the

OVER AN ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE

A server of the server and a server of this contract of the server of t

The second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of th

The state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the s

Which the design of the state o

To Vace Held Stitem in at N meton 1981

The second secon

Continue to the last of the last transport to the second transport transpo

The second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of the second of th

The second secon

Intervention Research and the Survey Process¹

John M. Goering **Washington University**

Marvin Cummins University of Oregon

Conducting survey research in America's ghettos is becoming increasingly problematic. Conventional survey research opera-tions have failed recently to achieve acceptable levels of response in low-income areas. For example, the Institute for Survey Research at Temple University reported a "much lower completion rate in 1966 than we have experienced in many years," in a survey of lower income Negroes (Temple University, 1968). The reasons for this are cited as the suspicion and hostility of the ghetto populari lation. An NORC survey of a low-income population conducted in Boston last year reported rates for incompletion and refusal of approximately 30 to 40 percent.² An OEO survey of non-whites in Topeka, Kansas reported a 21 percent refusal rate and an inability to contact 31 percent of assigned households (OEO Survey, 1966). The New York Times, in November, 1968, carried an article headlined "Gallup Scraps Harlem Poll Because of False Data." Gallup noted "hostility" as the major reason why data

Revision of a paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, September, 1969.

M. Axelrod, personal communication, October 10, 1968.

were falsified and the survey scrapped. He commented that "the difficulties of doing a scientific poll in Harlem are extreme. The big mistake I made was agreeing to do this without knowing all

the problems of Harlem [New York Times, 1968]."

In contrast to these reports about difficulties of conducting surveys in the ghetto, a research division of the Social Science Institute of Washington University concucted a survey of ghetto populations in St. Louis in the summer of 1968 and experienced no discernible hostility from the community while gathering over 1000 interviews with a refusal rate of 5.8 percent. The interviews, which lasted approximately 45 minutes, included over 80 questions, 15 percent of which were open-ended and the remainder structured and attitudinal scale items. An original sample frame of 1400 households, half white and half black, were selected in a multistage probability sample employing the listing of household units in randomly selected blocks of low-income census tracts in the inner city. The head of household was interviewed, producing information on 1014 households and 4207 individuals. The interviews were generally completed on the first contact with only 7 percent of households not found at home after three callbacks; the remaining households, roughly 15 percent of the original sample frame, were vacant.

The question that we faced after the completion of interviewing was why had our survey been relatively successful or, conversely, what is the explanation of the failure of "scientific" survey procedures in many ghetto surveys? The focus of our answer will be upon the interaction of the researcher's values with his research techniques and, secondly, upon the interaction of the researcher with the community being studied. After reviewing some of the relevant details of our research procedures we will attempt to evaluate traditional survey research principles in the light of our own experience. This analysis of our experiences for clues to our success provides both suggestions for improvements in survey research and a perspective for the reorientation of the place of research in the processes of social reform. In brief, the thrust of our argument will be that survey research should be more closely articulated in goals and methods with the population being studied, a strategy we are loosely calling "intervention

research."

Intervention Field Research Procedures

The content of the intervention with which we were concerned was the creation of a system of decentralized, neighborhood health centers in St. Louis. Funds were available for new centers; the need was for research to establish specific medical pathologies and to determine the content and locations for a new

system of health care.

The first stage of the survey process, a critical one that assured the success of the survey, was obtaining the consent and cooperation of ghetto neighborhood agencies. Our first contact, with a minister in the Negro ghetto, pointed out the necessity for consultation with community leaders. It was the first of several explicit warnings by agency and neighborhood representatives that failure to make the proper contacts and arrangements would result in lack of cooperation from respondents, who were "sick of being studied without results."

Contact with these agencies was necessary to obtain their approval and, more important, their cooperation in providing a staff of interviewers from among the residents of the local community. Our argument is that "gatekeeper" organizations (Richardson, Dohrenwend, & Klein, 1965) are of significant and increasing importance to the success of social science research among the poor. One of the most manifest reasons for the rejection of researchers relates to the broad context of the participatory revolution which has as its central axis the decentralization of control to the local neighborhood level. The poor, by attempting to get a handle on the power needed to control their own environment, are informing social scientists that their "scientific" tools are seen as part of the configuration of power which built and maintains the ghetto. Reform and evaluation at a distance are unacceptable to the new forms of community organization and control which are arising in association with the moves toward black separatism and minority group power.

In a series of discussions between the researchers and personnel of the various agencies, specific pressures were exerted by the neighborhood agencies for applied uses of the research money and for the utilization of particular segments of the neighborhood population as interviewing personnel. After several rounds of discussion on these points the project was "approved" and the local agencies began to recruit neighborhood women for training as interviewers. Forty-five women, in approximately equal numbers of blacks and whites, literate and of low-income, were

recruited.

Some Suggested Modifications in Survey Process

The observations in this section constitute evaluation of the basic assumptions, or ideology, of survey research and suggestions for modification of elements of the survey process. An intervention

strategy does not require modification of all of the elements of the survey process. There is much that works well without modification. The point to recognize is that survey research principles are not an abstract, foolproof process, but require modification or adaptation to the needs and demands of the research setting.

Interviewers as Community Representatives

The first modification of survey principles in intervention research is in terms of the image of the research staff as scientists writ-small. Survey texts are fond of referring to the interviewer as: "A technician who manipulates the instrument, takes the appropriate readings, and records the results. In this sense the interviewer's function parallels that of scientific technicians in other fields [Cannell & Kahn, 1953, p. 332]." The interviewers engaged in intervention research are, however, community representatives and not pure scientists. For all of the interviewers the constraints of race and poverty were more relevant than the role expectations of science. All were concerned about the problem of medical care and its solution and not solely with data collection per se. Interviewers in intervention research obtain information for the purpose of changing existing conditions; their criteria for relevance are community- and not research-based. Interviewers should be recruited, then, from the local neighborhoods and defined as community representatives as well as employees.

Establishing Legitimacy and Accountability

A second modification of the survey process involves the basis of legitimacy for the interview situation. While the instrumental motivation of the respondent is given token attention in survey texts, the critical basis of legitimacy for the traditional survey is non-directive rapport (Kahn & Cannell, 1968). The competent interviewer is to maintain the flow of information through the manipulation of "encouragements, silences, guggles, and interruptions [Richardson et al., 1965, pp. 198-206]," and through a more general "understanding" and "acceptance" of the respondent. It is this acceptance or liking which is presented as the fulcrum of the interview process. The limitation of stressing intrinsic, psychological motivation as the touchstone of the interview is that it uses only interpersonal criteria for establishing legitimacy and accountability in the survey process. The content of the research project—its worthwhileness to the local community—is irrelevant. It is the interviewer's skill at rapport-making which establishes the acceptability and legitimacy of the survey to the respondent. In contrast, the legitimacy of intervention research is that of community problem solving and not simply of artificial, individually

articulated rapport; it is the legitimacy of the problem and not of knowledge for its own sake. There is a greater concern, then, both with the instrumental motivation of respondents and of the interviewers. It is the interviewer's acceptance of the legitimacy of the research enterprise, in the context of problem solving, which provides the new fulcrum for the survey process.

Using the Language of the Ghetto

A third modification relates to autonomous language systems in the ghetto. Survey research guides often speak of the importance of establishing a common frame of reference with the respondent, to be achieved through the matching of interviewer's attributes with potential respondent's. Language and its cultural variants are considered of secondary importance to the establishment of rapport. This is, however, an uncertain priority for the ghetto. Recent research by linguists and anthropologists is establishing the existence of distinctive verbal styles and idioms in American ghettos. Not only does the language of ghetto residents tend to differ from that of the general population, but the idiom varies from ghetto to ghetto (Kochman, 1969; Abrahams, 1970). A translation between the standardized, formal language of the researcher and the public language of the ghetto assumes a critical place in the survey process (Bernstein, 1961). Language cannot express simply a technical or scientific purpose but must be re-legitimated within the new context of planned intervention. All terms and choices of questions are subject to approval related to the new legitimacy.

Reciprocity between Researcher and Interviewer

The interviewer's judgment of the worthwhileness of the research leads to a curiosity and criticism about every component of the effort at intervention. There is, therefore, a significant interaction between the researcher and the interviewer, an interaction with the reciprocal effect of sensitizing the interviewers to research strategies and the researchers to community problems and issues. This orientation requires a style of organization for the conduct of survey research in the ghetto which is more lateral and personal than hierarchic. It would, then, be an error to approach the survey process with the attitude that "the problems of survey organization and administration are like those encountered in most business undertakings [Parten, 1950, p. 125]." What is required is a flexible pattern of research operation aimed at developing awareness on both sides rather than focusing on efficiency of organization.

Two important factors which require no modification are,

firstly, the place of role playing and practice interviewing for the interviewing staff. The practical aspects of role playing are vital in developing interviewer skills and obtaining good data from lowincome interviewers. In addition, it is essential to check on interviewer bias to determine whether the data reflect the real situation or the interviewer's commitments. Our own checks on interviewer bias indicate that no significant influence was exerted upon the respondents. The interviewers were interviewed before the field work began. Their responses were then compared with the responses of the respondents they had interviewed. There were no statistically significant associations in the two sets of responses to a randomly selected set of questions.

Conclusions

At its inception, the orientation of survey research was to poverty and reform. The process was quickly converted, however, into a more "scientistic," market-research oriented technique (Abrams, 1951). Survey research became an instrument for the improvement of social science rather than for improvement in the lives of the poor. It now appears necessary to change the role of the researcher from one who observes and asks questions of other people with no direct benefit to the people concerned, to one who contributes to the benefit of the people in whom he is interested. In intervention research the role of the researcher is changed from that of applied scientist to that of a researcher whose perspective and techniques are organized for planned change. The personal and ideological programs of research are made explicit, with a clear commitment to change in the needless suffering of ghetto life. The range of topics to be researched is not defined by abstract theoretical considerations or by the interests of the highest bidder, but by the exigencies and needs of the underdog (Gouldner, 1968). Our argument is that it is no longer possible to be value free and conduct research in the ghetto (Gans, 1967), but rather it is necessary to work with the felt and apparent needs of the poor for the abolition of poverty.

Many believe that the ideology of scientific objectivity has castrated the effectiveness of social science research since the 1930s (Tumin, 1969). It does not seem possible for the country, or the poor, to tolerate the uncontrolled, unregulated expansion of survey research without considering the costs and responsibilities of this expansion. It is both a legitimate and necessary requirement for social research and researchers to define for themselves, or to have defined for them, the extent of their obli-

gations to the social exchanges called research.

REFERENCES

ABRAHAMS, R. D. Positively black. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1970.

ABRAMS, M. Social surveys and social action. London: William Heineman Ltd., 1951.

Bernstein, B. Social class and linguistic development. In A. H. Halsey et al.

(Eds.), Education, economy and society. New York: Free Press, 1961.

CANNELL, C. F., & KAHN, R. L. The collection of data by interviewing. In L. Festinger and D. Katz (Eds.), Research methods in the behavioral sciences. New York: The Dryden Press, 1953.

GANS, H. J. Poverty and culture: Some basic questions about methods of studying life-styles of the poor. Paper presented at the meeting of the International Committee on Poverty Research, University of Essex, April, 1967.

GOULDNER, A. W. The sociologist is partisan: Sociology and the welfare state. The American Sociologist, 1968, 3 (May), 103-116.

KAHN, R. L., & CANNELL, C. F. Interviewing: Social research. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Vol. 8. New York: Macmillan Company, 1968. KOCHMAN, T. Rapping in the black ghetto. Transaction, 1969, 6 (February),

26-34.

NEW YORK TIMES. Gallup scraps Harlem poll. November 1, 1968.

OEO Survey. Interviews with 740 people in the low-income areas of Topeka, Kansas. Unpublished document, Topeka, Kansas, 1966.

PARTEN, M. Surveys, polls, and samples: Practical procedures. New York: Harper,

1950.

RICHARDSON, S. A., DOHRENWEND, B., & KLEIN, D. Interviewing: Its forms and functions. New York: Basic Books, 1965.

TEMPLE UNIVERSITY. Bulletin of the Institute for Survey Research, October, 1968.

TUMIN, M. M. Some social consequences of research on race relations. In H. P. Dreitzel (Ed.), Recent sociology. Vol. 1. On the social basis of politics. London: Macmillan, 1969.

The same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the same of the sa The state of the s

The Politicization of Evaluation Research

Carol H. Weiss

Bureau of Applied Social Research Columbia University

Researchers who undertake the evaluation of social action programs are engaged in an enterprise fraught with hazards. They are beset by conceptual and methodological problems, problems of relationship, status, and function, practical problems, and problems of career and reward. To add to the perils of the evaluation career, evaluation is now becoming increasingly political.

Increasing Visibility and Scope of Evaluation Research

Evaluation reports are becoming front-page news. Policy decisions sometimes hinge on whether evaluation shows good results from an action program or not. The Westinghouse Learning Corporation-Ohio University evaluation of Head Start made waves at the White House. The Coleman Report has received explicit attention from the President and the Congress, and if its meaning and its implications are still a matter of debate, the study clearly has had an influence on the formation of educational policy. Where once evaluators bemoaned the neglect of their results by policy makers, they are more and more being given an active role in decision making.

Most evaluation studies, of course, are still filed and forgotten. But the case of the exceptional headliner today is likely to be common tomorrow. Increasingly, legislation and administrative regulations require evaluation of social programs, large sums of public monies are being expended, and results are publicized and

considered in decision-making councils.

Evaluation has always had explicitly political overtones. It is designed to yield conclusions about the worth of programs and, in so doing, is intended to affect the allocation of resources. The rationale of evaluation research is that it provides evidence on which to base decisions about maintaining, institutionalizing, and expanding successful programs and modifying or abandoning unsuccessful ones. This function as handmaiden to policy is probably the characteristic of evaluation research that has attracted competent researchers, despite all the discontents and disabili-

ties of its practice.

Not so long ago, innovative social action programming and its accompanying evaluation were small-scale enterprises. The greatest effect that evaluation could have would be to encourage further street work with gang youth (by the sponsoring agency and maybe one or two agencies like it) or discouraging individual counseling sessions for clinic patients. The effects tended to be localized, since programs and their evaluations were bounded. Even where similar programs were operated nation-wide, program staffs were so aware of the unique circumstances of their own school or hospital or organization that they saw little carryover of the results on someone else's program to their own

The big change is that both programming and evaluation are now national in scope. Programs may actually be no more standardized in form, content, and structure than they ever were, but they are funded from a common pot and bear a common name: "community action program," "Head Start," "model cities," "legal services," "neighborhood service centers," "Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act," "maternal and

child health program," and so forth.

The evaluation, too, is large-scale, not limited as in the past to the "pilot" or "demonstration" program. Evaluation is mandated in much recent legislation in the areas of poverty, manpower, and education—and funds provided. Thus the evaluation of the Work Incentive Program (WIN), sponsored by the Departments of HEW and Labor, is looking at fifty projects in all parts of the country. The NORC study of the impact of community action agencies on local institutions has been expanded from fifty to a hundred communities. The evaluation of multi-service centers sponsored by the Office of Economic Opportunity now includes study of fifty multi-purpose programs, twenty limited-purpose

programs, and twenty grass roots organizations. Such extensive coverage is common practice in many recent evaluation endeavors. A recent Urban Institute review of federal evaluation practice (Wholey et al., 1969) explicitly recommends jettisoning the single-project evaluation in favor of multi-project evaluation.

With studies of this scope and concomitant expense, it is not unexpected that some fanfare attends their completion. The evaluator, unaccustomed to the political spotlight, finds old dif-

ficulties exacerbated and new problems burgeoning.

Criticisms of methodology. Once evaluation studies are seen as likely to have important political consequences, they become fair game for people whose views are contradicted (or at least unsupported) by the data. A first line of attack is the study's methodology. Critics of every persuasion seem able to locate experts who find flaws in the sampling, design, choice of statistics, measurement procedures, time span, and analytic techniques even though their real criticisms derive less from methodology than from ideology. Whatever the motivation, a study whose conclusions enter the political arena must be prepared for searching scrutiny of its methods and techniques.

The experimental model remains the ideal in evaluation methodology, with random assignment of subjects to an experimental group which is exposed to the program stimulus or to a control group which is not. An added advantage of experimental design in political terms is that it is scientifically respectable. But the difficulties of applying the experimental model in field studies are legion; in large-scale social programs they are often overwhelming. Control groups with random assignment are rare

amenities.

Nor is it clear that the experiment is always the best and most relevant model. Critics (Weiss & Rein, 1969; Guba & Stufflebeam, 1968) have pointed out its customary limitations. Traditional experimental design deals with a stable standardized treatment; it collects before and after measures over a "full cycle" of the program, and uses specified goal criteria. Its results, then, disclose the extent to which a consistent program has reached its stated goals, but rarely why the observed results occur, what processes intervene between input and outcome, or what the implications are for improving the effectiveness of the program. For programs whose goals and emphases shift in midcourse, the experiment cannot distinguish the effects of the old from the new, nor will it provide much feedback to programs that need quick help in planning and implementing changes. Most of these limitations are not intrinsic to the experiment—e.g., if interim measures of success are available, short-cycle quick-feedback results are possible—but they are accurate assessments of most experimental

evaluation practice.

Quasi-experimental designs (Campbell & Stanley, 1966) free the evaluation from some of the experiment's restrictive conditions, particularly in randomization, and are more compatible with the program environment in which the evaluator works. As a means of ruling out plausible rival explanations (other than the effect of the program) for the outcomes observed, they can be highly effective and useful; additional controls can be added on one at a time to protect against sources of invalidity that the designs leave free. But again the usual—although by no means inevitable—thrust of the study is the degree of change toward the desired goals. Little attention is generally paid to how the program develops, to variations among units, outside events that affect programming and participation, adequacy of program operation, unanticipated consequences, etc.

Interesting developments are taking place in methodology to study the series of events that ensue from the development of a sheoretical program strategy through its implementation and short-run and long-term effects. Systems approaches and process-oriented qualitative analyses, for example, are being applied to large-scale programs. But none of these departures, not even the quasi-experiment, has attained the legitimacy of experimental design. When methodology is subject to attack, evaluators are wary of the untried tack. Many apparently prefer to stick unimaginatively to the book, rather than risk the penalties of pioneering.

Relationships with funding bodies. The new-style evaluation money, although larger in amount than ever before, comes ringed around with restrictions. Not only do the government "RFPs" (requests for proposal, the specifications of the research to be done and its scheduling) specify many of the details of objectives, indicators, timing, analysis, and reporting which used to be thought of as the evaluator's bailiwick, but government agencies are requiring increasingly close surveillance during the course of the study. Some are requiring biweekly conferences or monthly reports. The reason is, clearly, the sad experience that many agencies have had with evaluation. Academic evaluators have been known to bend the purposes of the study to suit their own disciplinary interests. (One story, possibly apocryphal, is that one three-year evaluation of public services, because of the investigators' interest, was turned into a study of the speech patterns of local residents.) Their adherence to schedules and deadlines has been characterized by "academic freedom." Commercial investigators, on the other hand, while generally sticking more closely to the intent of the contract, have cut some uncuttable corners.

and the credibility of the research has suffered.

Whatever valid reasons gave rise to agencies' current supervisory practices, they inevitably raise questions about the autonomy of the evaluation. Government agencies may seek only to enforce standards of relevance and research quality, but they almost inevitably become suspect of political pressure, pressure to vindicate the program and justify its budget. The agency retains, after all, the authority to cut off the study in the middle if "progress" is poor. The evaluator can be forgiven for uneasiness about the direction of his research.

Relationships with program personnel. Program staff have rarely liked evaluators poking their noses into the operation of programs or measuring outcomes. Whatever soothing explanations are offered about "testing program concepts" or "accountability to taxpayers," the evaluator is a snoop. To the program operator, who knows that his program is doing well, evaluation is at best unnecessary and at worst, if it shows few positive effects, a calumny and a threat to the future of the program, his job, and

needed help to clients.

Today, with the visibility of evaluation becoming greater, program staff are increasingly aware of the implications of releasing data. They see the inferences that will be drawn even from service figures (if temporary beds for overflow patients are not included in the hospital's figures on "number of beds," budgetary allotments will be lower), and they are wary of feeding data into the evaluator's "insensitive indicators" of program success. Thus, access to data may be restricted. Occasionally what program staff them "more relevant" data may be supplied. Even where this is not so, the general atmosphere of uncordiality can dim the evaluator's spirits and his study.

Drawing recommendations. In the increasingly political context of evaluation, the act of drawing implications from study data between chancier than ever. Many evaluations are "black box" studies: the evaluator takes "before" measurements on factors relevant to program goals, the subjects are then exposed to the program (an unexamined entity like a black box), and then he integrals "after" measurements. He concludes that the program has succeeded in achieving its goal(s) to the observed extent.

To go from such data to recommendations requires what Faul Lazarsfeld calls a leap; in many cases, the data do not provide even a jumping-off point. If a job training program doesn't improve the rate of employment, what do you know about future directions? The data aren't informative about the kinds of modifications that should be made. There is a discontinuity between the mady and recommendations of a course of action. With large-

scale decisions hanging in the balance, evaluators exercise their

non-data-based speculatory talents at their own risk.

Null results. Probably the most serious political problem of all is that evaluation results, with dismaying frequency, turn out to be negative. Over the past several years, careful and competent studies have shown few positive effects from such varied programs as psychotherapy, probation services, casework, school desegregation, public housing, and compensatory education. Elinson (1967), reviewing the results of ten of the most competent and best known published evaluations, found that none of them demonstrated much success. To judge from evaluations, most action programs do not make much change in the behavior of individuals and groups. The evaluator thus is in the position of turning thumbs down on someone's program. The problem is particularly troublesome because old established programs are rarely evaluated. It is the new and innovative program that is subjected to evaluation. The evaluator and his negative findings are gutting the venturesome program and giving aid and comfort to the barbarians.

We say, of course, that null evaluation results need not lead to the abandonment of programs but to their improvement. The Nixon administration, after the poor showing of Head Start in the national evaluation, did after all increase its budget and call for more experimentation in its content. Nevertheless, the proclivity to the negative remains a fact of evaluation life, and there are those who are uneasy about the effects of this saturnine cast. They fear that not only will it lead to premature abandonment of new programs; it may be more likely to lead to the abandonment of evaluation. As an illustration, Ward and Kassebaum (1966), in a paper reporting the null results of group counseling in a correctional institution, report that the state agency's response to the study was to expand the program and close down access to researchers. The next section of this paper discusses alternatives to traditional evaluation procedures with a view to accentuating the

positive.

Alternatives

A number of courses are open. One hopeful direction is to place less stress on evaluations of over-all impact, studies that come out with all-or-nothing, go/no-go conclusions. More resources should be allocated to evaluations that compare the effectiveness of variant conditions within programs (differing emphases and components of program, attributes of sponsoring agency structure and operation, characteristics of participants) and begin to explain which elements and sub-elements are associated with more or less success. Such an approach produces data

of interest across a wide range of programs and has high utility in

pointing direction for further program development.

The Follow Through program has developed an elegant evaluation design to do this kind of study, with several different program strategies being studied in 60 or 70 sites. Some early reports were not hopeful about the possibilities of carrying out the study as designed.

However, political considerations apparently resulted in complete local choice of strategy, with the result that the planned variations are not present in the design, and the finest evaluation techniques, even if applied to each local program, will not yield very useful information as to which strategies tend to work best in which demographic situations. . . Finally, the lack of use of comparable pretest and posttest measures over the various Follow Through strategies essentially assures an ultimate lack of comparability [Light, 1968, pp. 765-66].

More recent reports indicate that all is not lost yet (Stanford Research Institute, 1969). Although communities do select the Follow Through program model that they implement, it is still possible for researchers to compare the results of each model in different sites. (The main problems that the study is having involve the communities' difficulties in implementing the program with sufficient intensity to make a difference in the classroom and their inability or unwillingness to maintain the program

strategy as prescribed in the model.)

Comparative study, even without conscious and orderly variation, can have great power. If the evaluator is clever, he can capitalize on variations that occur naturally. Many government programs, as noted above, are not so much unitary programs as a congeries of diverse efforts addressed to the same problem. Within the programs there are different emphases and different content and procedures. The evaluator may be able to identify the different theories that underlie the differing emphases, categorize them—and the program activities—along a number of significant dimensions, and then relate the types of program to program outcomes. Through meticulous specification of program inputs, of participants, and of environmental conditions, evaluation can increasingly locate and identify the factors that make for relative program effectiveness.

¹That there is a continuing effort to develop and implement sophisticated evaluation designs despite all the buffeting that evaluators take, is a tribute to the people that man the field. One suspects that a good part of the optimism and ambition results from turnover; as one year's crew of hopeful evaluators burns out during re-entry into the atmosphere of program reality, a new generation comes in.

Another circumstance that evaluators (and people who fund evaluations) would do well to avoid is premature evaluation. Evaluators have been lecturing their program counterparts for a generation on the need to involve them even before the program begins operation. Don't just bring us in on the ground floor, they have said, bring us in to help dig the foundation. That is all to the good, and people in various locations have evidently learned the lesson. But sometimes this has led to evaluation's assessment of results during the start-up period, before the program has learned how to organize itself and put its concepts into practice. When evaluation goes on while the program is still groping for direction, misinterpretations can occur. Lack of success may be attributed to a particular program and program model that never had the chance to see the light of day.

Etzioni (1960) has suggested another order of approach, a "system model" rather than a "goal model." Although his original paper was directed at the study of organizations, it is almost equally applicable to evaluation. The system model recognizes that organizations engage in activities other than achievement of their goals. A study, therefore, should not focus exclusively on goal attainment but should look also at measures of the effectiveness of other organizational functions, such as recruiting resources, maintaining the structure, achieving integration into the

environment.

A study that adopted the system model for analyzing a delivery organization (Georgopolous & Tannenbaum, 1957) used three measures to judge effectiveness: organizational productivity (the goal), flexibility in terms of adaptation to change, and relative absence of intraorganizational strain or tension. The latter two characteristics can be conceived as means to the goal and investments in the organization's capability to achieve its goal over

the long run.

In evaluation research, the system model might include indicators of such other aspects of program effectiveness as the ability to get grants, recruit qualified staff, gain political support in the community, etc. This would have advantages in assessing the latent functions of programs, as well as in identifying the real and important second-order effects (e.g., providing an organization that speaks for the poor). But over the long run, whatever its other contributions, a program may well be expected to demonstrate some positive results on client outcome measures as well.

Implications of Evaluation: A Radical Critique

In a basic sense, the bent toward the negative that is characteristic of social action evaluations is not something to be masked or shunted aside. To the extent that null results are real and not an artifact of primitive methodology, they betoken serious weaknesses in social programming. The spate of negative results across a whole gamut of programs betokens a series of important shortcomings.

Basic social science. One component is the shortcomings in basic social science. The behavioral sciences do not give many answers to questions on the causes and processes of social ills. Nor do they have much to say about the processes of social change and the conditions necessary to bring desired changes about. Therefore, evaluation may well be revealing the error in the theories and assumptions on which programs are based.

Suchman has stated the issue beautifully:

If a program is unsuccessful, it may be because the program failed to "operationalize" the theory, or because the theory itself was deficient. One may be highly successful in putting a program into operation but, if the theory is incorrect . . . the desired changes may not be forthcoming: i.e., "the operation was a success, but the patient died." Furthermore, in very few cases do action or service programs directly attack the ultimate objective. Rather they attempt to change the intermediate process which is "causally" related to the ultimate objective. Thus, there are two possible sources of failure (1) the inability of the program to influence the "causal" variable, or (2) the invalidity of the theory linking the "causal" variable to the desired objective [Suchman, 1969, p. 16].

Obviously much remains to be known in order to plan social change efforts wisely. Programs based on intuitive wisdom and extrapolations from past experience are not good enough. Impor-

tant theoretical and research contributions are due.

Program development. Even with basic knowledge at less than adequate levels, we do not put into practice all we know. Instead of profound re-thinking of program services, there is quick adoption of some fashionable prescription which, whatever its other virtues, is likely to attract funding. Instead of innovative approaches to programming, there is tinkering with the mixture as before to give it a shiny new surface but leave the essential ingredients unchanged.

Very few programs are born without roots in the existing order of things. There are ties and obligations to old agency philosophies and ways of work and to the assumptions and methods of traditional professions. The people engaged in program development activities are not likely to come from, or particularly value, the social science frontier. Nor, on their side, are social scientists doing much applied research on the development of programs. Little is done to apply existing theory and knowledge to program development, to study means for securing acceptance

of new programs, or to analyze alternative methods for their implementation within bureaucratic structures. On no side does there seem to be encouragement for radical departures from the

past.

Management. The administration and management of new programs, particularly the large-scale programs of recent years, have been woefully deficient. In part this has been because of the effort to bring members of new groups (blacks and other minorities) into management when previous experience had been denied them. But much of the problem has no such justification. In fact, a good share of the fault lies in Washington with its shifting rules, perpetual crises and demands, incredibly complicated procedures

for funding and re-funding, and political pressures.

Program structure. Certainly a major reason for null evaluation results on social action programs lies in the structure of programs. Fragmentary projects are created to deal with broad-spectrum problems. We know about multiple causality. We realize that a single-stimulus program is hardly likely to make a dent in deeprooted ills. But the political realities are such that we take what programs can get through Congress (or other sources) when we can get them. Each then becomes elaborated in its own structure. Even when successive programs are legislated that are broader in scope and resources, as in the case of programs to deal with poverty, the early structures survive. Each continues doing its own thing with sparse recognition of their interrelatedness. The fragmentation of program structures and authority leads to disjointed (and ineffective) services. Competing and conflicting bureaucracies, jockeying for power and prestige, are not apt to make big inroads in the problem.

Today's programs are the result of a series of uncoordinated decisions, disjointed, poorly matched, often working at crosspurposes. They are run by different levels and organs of government—city, county, independent school system, state, special district. They are funded by, and responsive to, different federal agencies with differing purposes and ideologies. Rarely are they responsive directly to the local governmental unit or to the people

whom they serve.

The influx of federal programs and federal funds in the social service field has been an attempt to meet needs that local government has largely ignored for generations. But the organizational structures that accompany federal programs and money have complicated an already intolerable fragmentation of services and authority. What is seriously required is basic reform in local governmental institutions, so that services are provided and coordinated at a level meaningful to individuals. No federal patching

or categorical funding has been able to coax, bribe, or order this kind of control. The political scientists' prescription-metropolitanization of area services and decentralization of local services to a level responsive to the people—sounds even more important today than it did a generation ago, if no more politically feasible. Local control of government services, which theoretically can bring about coordination on the neighborhood level, has a host of hurdles to surmount before it even gets to tackle the job.

Time for risk-taking. It is time that we recognized the failure of our moderate, piecemeal, cheap solutions to basic social problems. They have been tried, and evaluation research has found them wanting. Bold experiments are called for. It is a fraud to perpetuate variations on outmoded solutions to problems that are rooted in our system of social stratification. If more and more services to the poor do not enable people to move out of poverty, perhaps we have to look to ways of redistributing income so that the poor are no longer poor. Similarly, we may have to question such hardy assumptions as compulsory education to age sixteen, imprisonment of lawbreakers, the private practice of medicine.

Evaluation research may even be able to help chart the new and risky courses if Congress will appropriate funds for smallscale, truly experimental, pilot programs. The programs would be designed for research, not service, and would be under research control to ensure minimal interference with experimental conditions. Although years of melancholy experience with "demonstration" programs should caution against great optimism, it may be possible to develop program-and-evaluation pilots that are neither co-opted, politically pressured, nor ignored.

Summary

In the deepest sense, there is nothing null about recent evaluation research. The newly-visible large-scale evaluations are progressively disclosing the bankruptcy of piecemeal approaches to social programming. Unless society's limited domestic resources are invested more wisely, significant changes are not likely to occur. This is as important a conclusion as evaluation can provide.

REFERENCES

CAMPBELL, D. T., & STANLEY, J. C. Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for research. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966.

ELINSON, J. Effectiveness of social action programs in health and welfare. In Assessing the effectiveness of child health services, report of the Fifty-sixth Ross Conference on Pediatric Research. Columbus: Ross Laboratories, 1967.

ETZIONI, A. Two approaches to organizational analysis: A critique and a suggestion. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1960, 5, 257-78.

Georgopolous, B. S., & Tannenbaum, A. S. A study of organizational effectiveness. American Sociological Review, 1957, 22, 534-70.

Guba, E. G., & Stufflebeam, D. L. Evaluation: The process of stimulating, aiding, and abetting insightful action. Working paper, Evaluation Center, Ohio State University, November, 1968.

LIGHT, R. J. Report analysis: National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.

Harvard Educational Review, 1968, 38, 756-67.

STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE. Highlights of the longitudinal evaluation of the national follow through program, 1968-9. Working paper, Stanford University, 1969.

Suchman, E. A. Evaluating educational programs. The Urban Review, 1969, 3(4),

15-17.

WARD, D. A., & KASSEBAUM, G. G. Biting the hand that feeds. Paper presented

at the meeting of the American Sociological Association, 1966.

Weiss, R. S., & Rein, M. The evaluation of broad-aim programs: A cautionary case and a moral. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences,

1969, 385, 133-42.

WHOLEY, J. S., DUFFY, H. G., FUKUMOTO, J. S., SCANLON, J. W., BERLIN, M. A., COPELAND, W. C., & ZELINSKY, J. G. Federal evaluation policy: An overview. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1969.

Changing Patterns of Anti-White Attitudes Among Blacks¹

Jeffery M. Paige University of California, Berkeley

In the period from the end of World War II to the middle sixties social psychological research on anti-white attitudes among blacks has attempted to find a general psychological mechanism to account for black hostility to whites. Although at present it would seem that most blacks have eminently rational reasons for resenting their treatment by the white majority, it was possible for some time to believe that anti-white attitudes were held by an unrepresentative minority of blacks. Attitude surveys conducted at widely different times in the post-war period found that lew blacks were willing to express anti-white attitudes to interviewers, even when the interviewers themselves were black. In addition, the same studies found that the best educated, best informed, and most militant blacks were the least anti-white. These findings were interpreted in a theoretical tradition based on the authoritarian personality studies (Adorno et al., 1950). Since most blacks were at least overtly pro-white it seemed reasonable

This essay was one of three awarded honorable mention in the 1968 Gordon Allport Intergroup Relations essay contest. The research upon which this discussion is based was supported by a grant from the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders supervised by Nathan Caplan. Details of the sampling procedure and various indices used may be found in the report of the National Advisory Commission (1968) and in Paige (1968).

to inquire what special personality characteristics led to anti-white feelings among the rest. Authoritarianism, self-hatred, lack of education, and Southern socialization were all suggested as possible sources of anti-white sentiment. While the findings from such studies are discussed as if they were general characteristics of minority group personality, it is clear that the generality of such assertions is limited by the particular historical and social situ-

ation in which the original studies were conducted.

The social context of black attitudes has clearly changed since the late forties and fifties when much of the research on minority group attitudes was originally carried out. During this period the most active and militant black spokesmen stressed cooperation with white allies, increased contact with whites and the integration of previously all white institutions. Since the Watts riot in the summer of 1965, militant black leaders have increasingly emphasized racial pride and distrust of white institutions and intentions. Thus it would be reasonable to ask whether the correlates of anti-white attitudes among blacks have changed along with the nature of inter-group conflict. It is the general hypothesis of this study that the correlates of anti-white attitudes have changed and that they have changed in response to the exigencies of political conflict. The results of studies carried out in a period of integration cannot therefore be extrapolated to a period of direct and often violent conflict.

While the generality of findings from the 1945-1965 period may be limited, there is remarkable agreement on the patterns of correlations among attitude measures reported by a number of different researchers. Grossack (1957), Steckler (1957), Noel (1964), and Marx (1967) agree on the following statements about

(1) Authoritarianism as measured by items derived from the California F scale (Adorno et al., 1950) is positively associated with anti-white feeling and negatively associated with in-group solidarity or racial pride.

(2) Anti-white attitudes are positively associated with black self-hatred measured either by acceptance of the white stereotype of blacks or by agree-

ment with more general deprecatory statements about blacks.

(3) Militance as measured by concern with black rights or by protest activity is positively associated with in-group pride and negatively associated with

Personality Explanations of Anti-White Attitudes

These empirical relationships have typically been explained in terms of underlying personality dynamics. The fundamental assumption of such arguments is that attitudes reflect personality characteristics which, in turn, are a product of early socialization

experiences. Even if one accepts this general causal scheme there are a number of difficulties in accounting for the observed relationships. The relationship between black self-hatred and antiwhite feeling is usually explained by postulating a psychological mechanism associating low self-acceptance with distrust of other people (see the discussions of Pettigrew, 1964, pp. 35-36, and Marx, 1967, p. 196). This explanation has also been suggested in a number of studies of anti-Semitism among Jews (Himmelhoch, 1950; Adelson, 1953; Radke-Yarrow & Lande, 1953; Sarnoff, 1951). In all these studies rejection of the in-group (Jews in this case) was positively associated with rejection of various outgroups. The low self-acceptance argument does not, however, provide a parallel explanation for rejection of out-groups among members of majority groups. In this case, extreme positive attitudes toward the in-group, such as super-patriotism, are associated with rejection of minority out-groups. It is not clear why the psychological mechanism linking self-acceptance and acceptance of other should cause in-group pride to be associated with high prejudice in majority group members and low prejudice in minority group members.

The association between high levels of authoritarianism and anti-black feeling is usually explained by noting the authoritarian's concern with power and dominance and the relatively powerless position of most minorities. Black authoritarians would be more likely to accept the negative stereotypes of bigoted members of white society since they will tend to adjust their views to conform with those of people in positions of authority, and most such positions will be occupied by whites. This explanation is inconsistent with the fact that authoritarianism is correlated with anti-white attitudes among blacks. If authoritarian blacks perceive whites as a dominant group, why do they not show the appropriate respect for those in power? In order to explain the black authoritarians' anti-white attitudes it is necessary to invoke the general distrust of other people which is said to be characteristic

of white authoritarians.

Research on the demographic correlates of anti-white attitudes among blacks, like that on the psychological correlates, shows a surprising amount of agreement over the period from 1945 to 1965. Two major studies of black attitudes conducted 15 years apart report surprisingly similar results. A research group under the general direction of Robin Williams at Cornell conducted surveys in four cities (Elmira, New York; Steubenville, Ohio; Bakersfield, California; and Savannah, Georgia) in 1948 and 1949 (summarized in a series of publications: Noel, 1964; Johnson, 1957; Williams, 1964). The Cornell group found that

anti-white attitudes were more frequent among the old, among women, among the married, among the poorly educated, and among Southern-born migrants living in the North. Marx (1967), in a survey of black attitudes in metropolitan areas conducted in 1964, reports that anti-white attitudes are more common among women, among those not oriented toward "intellectual values," and among Southern migrants living in Northern cities. Marx, however, found that anti-white attitudes were more common among the young rather than the old, the reverse of the Cornell group's finding. While a number of ad hoc explanations of these relationships are provided by Williams (1964) and Marx (1967), the most convincing overall interpretation is provided by Johnson (1957) in his discussion of the Cornell survey results for Elmira, New York. He distinguished between an old black creed based on avoidance, apathy, self-hatred, and hostility toward whites and a new black creed stressing militance, integration, and lack of prejudice toward whites. Studies conducted in a period of social change would show a mixture of both strategies with the more conservative, tradition-oriented groups within the black community supporting the old creed of withdrawal and distrust. Thus the older blacks, women, the married, and the Southern-born should be less likely to adopt the new strategy of militance, integration, and pro-white attitudes and would still subscribe to the old pattern of avoidance and distrust of whites.

Johnson's line of reasoning can easily be extended to account for the attitudinal as well as the demographic correlates of antiwhite attitudes. Since the new black creed of militance requires collective action to achieve integration, it would be difficult for a militant black to support anti-white attitudes. Similarly, if problack attitudes are understood as a measure of commitment to blacks as a group, and if those individuals most committed to group concerns are the most militant, then the more pro-black individuals should also be the most pro-white in the social context of a movement toward integration. Finally, authoritarianism, by definition, represents support for traditional values and submission to authority. Thus authoritarian attitudes would be inconsistent with movements aimed at change, especially change in the structure of white-black authority relationships. Similarly, belief in the positive qualities of blacks would be inconsistent with the contrary view of many whites in positions of authority. Anyone subscribing to authoritarian ideology then would appear as anti-white only relative to the more militant, pro-black individuals who are concerned with integration. This argument does not depend on assumptions about the nature of underlying personality structure or about practices of child rearing. It is, of

course, dependent on the nature of the political struggle between blacks and whites.

Strategic Functions of Anti-White Attitudes

The dominant issues at the time Johnson's research was conducted—the late forties—involved a shift from a strategy of distrust and withdrawal to one of trust and integration. In the late sixties it would seem that a third stategy involving direct confrontation with the white authority structure had become increasingly important. A similar set of three strategies has been described by both Pettigrew (1964) and Simpson and Yinger (1962) in discussions of the general pattern of minority response to discrimination by majority groups. Pettigrew describes three responses of minorities to majorities: moving away, moving toward, and moving against. "Moving away" in Pettigrew's terminology means either passive withdrawal or active separatism, and resembles closely Johnson's old black creed of withdrawal. "Moving toward" includes efforts to achieve integration or to adopt white manners and attitudes, and corresponds closely to Johnson's new black creed. "Moving against" takes the form of direct confrontation with whites and may lead to the overt aggression of a riot. This strategy would seem to describe the pattern of racial confrontation of the late sixties. The importance of this typology of strategies for the present analysis is that each strategy includes a corresponding ideology with regard to whites. Moving away would be associated with distrust and fear of whites; moving toward, with trust and affiliation; moving against, with open hostility. In each case attitudes toward whites are part of a broader political ideology which suggests practical strategy for dealing with the white majority. As the usefulness of a political strategy increases, the attitudes associated with it will become more widespread. This does not necessarily imply that every black calculates his own best interest and decides to adopt the appropriate views about whites, although this may be the case for some political leaders. It only suggests that once a new political strategy has proved successful for any substantial number of blacks, there will be a strong tendency for those who have adopted the successful strategy to resolve the dissonance between their behavior and their attitudes by changing the attitudes.

The usefulness of a particular strategy depends on a number of political factors, such as the political resources of the minority, the willingness of the majority group to use force, or the availability of allies within the majority group. In a situation of rigid caste segregation such as that which existed in the United States

before World War II, direct attempts at integration or expressions of hostility toward whites would be useless if not dangerous to blacks as a group. Violations of the caste line or demands for increased access to jobs or public facilities were met by severe sanctions including the Southern lynching and the Northern urban pogrom or "race riot." In a segregated system in which infractions of caste barriers are met with force, the safest strategy is one of disengagement and withdrawal. This passive adjustment would be expected among most blacks during the early part of this

century in both the North and the South.

In a slightly more open system in which some white institutions are open to small numbers of well-educated middle-class blacks, attitudes of withdrawal and distrust would no longer be useful for advancing black interests. Anti-white attitudes would be inconvenient since the admission of talented blacks to predominantly white institutions depends on the sympathy of white liberals. Thus moving toward is the most practical strategy, at least for the politically active middle class, and it is the one which the most ambitious and militant blacks would be expected to adopt. Militant action to increase integration became a useful strategy with the opening of previously all white institutions to limited numbers of blacks in the period beginning with the end of World War II. In the late sixties it became possible for small numbers of blacks to move into white institutions and to use public facilities. In fact these rights were frequently guaranteed by law. The success of the predominantly middle-class movement for integration probably exerted considerable influence on attitudes in the black community in the period when most of the studies reviewed above were conducted.

In the late sixties, however, blacks in urban ghettos in the North became increasingly important as political actors and the strategies which had dominated the movement at the time of middle-class leadership were no longer adequate. Jobs for welleducated blacks are of little utility if ghetto schools are incapable of providing a reasonable education. Access to public facilities is relatively meaningless if the facilities themselves are starved for funds. Guarantees of civil liberties for blacks are of little importance if the police force supposedly defending these liberties behaves like an occupying army. Since schools, public facilities, and police were all controlled by white-dominated city governments, political action increasingly took the form of demands for black control alternating with violence against white property and struggles to defend blacks against the activities of predominantly white police forces. Thus the nature of political conflict changed to direct confrontation between urban blacks and white political

power. The mobilization of large numbers of blacks in urban ghettoes provided the opportunity for the development of a more

militant, nationalistic, anti-white leadership.

In summary then, in a period of strict caste segregation, most blacks adopted a strategy of moving away; in a period of limited integration for middle class blacks, political ideology was dominated by the drive for increased integration; and in a period of urban ghetto mobilization, moving against became an increasingly important strategy among black leaders. This analysis of changing strategies permits predictions to be made about the attitudinal and demographic correlates of anti-white attitudes in the late sixties. If we assume that moving against is a new and increasingly important strategy in ghetto areas, then the subgroups most receptive to change would be the most likely to adopt the new strategy and its corresponding anti-white attitudes. Johnson argued that young, single, Northern-born males should be the least traditional groups and consequently should have been more receptive in 1948 to the developing strategy of militant action for integration. In the context of the late sixties, the groups most receptive to change would adopt the new strategy of moving against. While conservatism in 1948 meant distrust of whites, it now implies relatively less hostility toward whites than does the more radical position. Thus the old, the female, the married, and the Southern born should now be less anti-white than the young, the male, the unmarried, and the Northern born.

Similar predictions can be made concerning the attitudinal correlates of anti-white attitudes. If pro-black attitudes are considered as indicating a commitment to group political action, and if this action increasingly tends toward moving against, then antiwhite attitudes would be associated with pro- rather than antiblack attitudes and with high rather than low levels of militance. As long as whites remain in a position of dominance, authoritarian attitudes will be associated with the whites' negative assessment of blacks. Hence authoritarianism should continue to be associated with anti-white attitudes. The changing relationship of anti-white and pro-black attitudes would suggest, however, that high authoritarianism would be negatively associated with anti-white feeling. Since favorable attitudes toward blacks are associated with negative attitudes toward whites, it should follow that authoritarians, who are less favorable toward blacks, would be less anti-white. The shift from moving toward to moving against then leads to a shift in the social and psychological correlates of out-group rejection to a pattern similar to that observed in majority groups. Group pride and solidarity are posi-tively associated with militant attitudes toward out-groups.

If these deductions about the relationship of anti-white attitudes to strategies of inter-group conflict are correct, and if furthermore it may be assumed that the strategy is changing from moving toward to moving against, then the following predictions can be made:

(1) Young black males who are most receptive to new strategies should have higher absolute levels of anti-white attitudes in the late sixties than during the period of activity in support of integration.

(2) Tradition-oriented elements in the black community should now be less anti-white; the old, the female, and the Southern born should be less prejudiced than the young, the male, and the Northern born.

(3) Authoritarianism should continue to be negatively associated with racial pride, but should now also be negatively associated with anti-white feeling.

(4) Racial pride should be positively associated with anti-white feeling.

(5) Militance should be positively associated with in-group pride and antiwhite feeling.

Survey Design and Analysis

In order to test these predictions a number of questions on attitudes toward blacks and whites were included in a survey concerned with patterns of participation in the July, 1967 riot in Newark, New Jersey. Interviews were conducted with a probability sample of 236 black males between the ages of 15 and 35 who lived in the Newark riot area. The interviews were conducted by black interviewers in January and February of 1968. In order to insure comparability with earlier research, a number of questions used by the Cornell research group in 1949 were repeated in the Newark questionnaire. Despite the obvious differences which may exist between the two samples, it is possible to make some general statements about temporal differences in the results reported in 1949 and in 1968. Two indices of anti-white feeling from the Cornell research were used in Newark. The first of these presented the respondent with the statement, "Sometimes I hate white people," and asked for an agree/disagree response. The second was a modified three-item social distance scale which presented three progressively more intimate situations and asked the respondent if he would find each distasteful if the person or persons involved were white. The three situations were eating at the same table with a white person, going to a party where most of the people there were white, and marrying a white person. In the analysis that follows respondents who found two or more of the situations distasteful have been classified as high on social distance feelings.

Increased Anti-White Attitudes of Young Males

The first prediction above calls for a higher level of anti-

white attitudes in 1968 than in 1949 among young males. Since the 1949 sample consisted of males and females 16 years of age and older and included a Southern city (Savannah), it is not directly comparable with the Newark data. It will be recalled, however, that in the Cornell study the youngest blacks were the least prejudiced, females were more prejudiced than males, and Southerners were more prejudiced than Northerners. Thus the level of anti-white attitudes for young Northern-born males in the 1949 sample must be lower than the value reported for the sample as a whole.

HATRED OF WHITES AND SOCIAL DISTANCE (percentages)

	Newark Sample 1968	Cornell Sample 1949
100000	Sometimes I Hate White People ^a	
Agree	61	28
Disagree	39	72
Total N	(234)	(665) ^b
		Distance
3 (high)	18	17
2	17	18
1	32	24
0 (low)	33	41
Total N	(235)	(805)

 $^{\circ}\chi^{2} = 64.90, p < .001.$ Does not include Steubenville, Ohio.

 $^{\circ}\chi^{2} = 7.19, p < .10.$

As the data in Table 1 indicate, only 28 percent of the respondents in the Cornell sample as a whole agreed that "Sometimes I hate white people." Williams said of this low level of agreement, "This may appear to be one of the more remarkable find: findings of this study, the more so because the item said 'sometimes' and the responses were given without exception to Negro interviewers [1964, p. 281]." In the Newark sample the level of anti-white feeling is more than twice as high. In fact there has been a shift from a small minority saying in 1949 that they sometimes hate white people to a numerical majority in 1968.

Social distance feelings on the other hand do not seem to show a similar dramatic increase. As the data in Table 1 indicate, there has been only a small increase in the proportion of antiwhite responses. Such a difference given the crude nature of the comparison is clearly insufficient to reject the null hypothesis. Thus there seems to be a sizeable increase in direct expression of hostility toward whites without a similar increase in social distance feelings. This difference may in part reflect the differing nature of the two attitude indices. Social distance reflects outright hostility, but it is also a measure of fear and distrust. Williams reports no significant relationship between these two measures of prejudice in his total four-city sample. The substantial difference on the hatred of whites measure, however, lends some support to the initial prediction.

Conservative Blacks are Less Anti-White

The second set of predictions concerned change in the demographic characteristics of anti-white individuals. Specifically, the more conservative elements in the black community—the old, the female, and the Southern born—should now be less rather

TABLE 2
HATRED OF WHITES AND SOCIAL DISTANCE BY AGE IN NEWARK (percentages)

	(Percentages)	Market Street Control of the Control	/
	15–25 A	ge 26-35	2=
	Sometimes I Hate White People		
Agree	67	55	
Disagree	33	45	
Total N	(138)	(92)	
TT: -1	Social Distance		
High	39	22	
Low Total N	61	88	
	(137)	(92)	K
$^{a}v^{2} = 4.76 \text{ h} < 05$			-

 $[\]chi = 4.76, p < .05.$ $\chi^2 = 8.26, p < .005.$

than more anti-white than the young, the male, and the Northern born. Age is a particularly important variable since it can be understood as an index of generational change. If a study is conducted at a single point in time, it is impossible to distinguish between generational change and maturation effects. There is no reason to assume that people grow more ethnocentric as they grow older, but even if this were the case, the effect should be repeated in studies conducted at other times. Thus if the young are more as an index of the direction of attitude change within the black community. The reader may recall that Williams (1964) and Marx (1967) report opposite findings on the relationship between age and anti-white attitudes. In the 1949 Cornell study, the young were less anti-white; in the 1964 Marx survey, the young

were more anti-white. If these differences are real, it suggests that some change in black attitudes had begun to take place as early as 1964. The data presented in Table 2 replicate Marx's finding. The young are distinctly more anti-white than the old on both

hatred of whites and social distance measures.

Unfortunately the Newark sample consisted entirely of males, so it is not possible to test directly change in the relationship between sex and anti-white attitudes. Data are available, however, from a survey conducted by Meyer and Caplan in Detroit just after the July riot (Meyer, 1967). Their sample consisted of 437 black Detroit residents 15 years of age or older. As was the case in Newark, the sample was drawn from the riot area and all interviewers were black. No direct questions on anti-white attitudes were included in their questionnaire, but there was one indirect

TABLE 3
HATRED OF WHITES AND SOCIAL DISTANCE BY REGION OF SOCIALIZATION (percentages)

		Region		
ille!		North	South	
		Sometimes I Hate White People		
	Agree	69	51	
	Disagree	31	49	
Total N	(141)	(89)		
	Social Distance			
	High	38	29	
	Low	62	71	
	Total N	(143)	(87)	

 $[\]chi^2 = 7.68, p < .01.$ $\chi^2 = 2.30, p < .25.$

question. Respondents were asked to indicate whether the following statement was true or false: "Civil rights groups with both white and Negro members would be better off without the whites." Of 181 males, 27 per cent considered the statement to be true; of 192 females, 21 per cent gave that response. Thus there was a small (non-significant) tendency for men to be more anti-white in their responses than women, the reverse of earlier findings.

The final measure of tradition orientation is the region in which the respondent grew up. Both Marx and the Cornell group found that those who were born in the South were considerably more anti-white than those born in the North. As the data in Table 3 indicate, just the opposite is the case for the Newark sample. On both measures, those who reported that they grew up in

the North were more hostile to whites than those who said they

had grown up in Southern or border states.

Thus the changing pattern of demographic correlates of antiwhite attitudes tends to support the predictions based on the changing context of black-white relations. Those sub-groups in the black community which might be expected to be slowest to accept a new mechanism for dealing with whites are the least anti-white. The prediction was strongly confirmed for age and region of socialization and less strongly supported for sex.

Authoritarianism, Racial Pride, and Anti-White Feelings

The predicted changes in the social psychological correlates of anti-white attitudes were similarly tested by including survey questions dealing with authoritarianism and attitudes toward blacks. Respondents were asked to respond either "agree" or "disagree" to four items from the California F scale and to five items from McClosky's study of anomie (McClosky & Schan, 1965). The following items were utilized for authoritarianism: (1) Human nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict; (2) A few strong leaders could make this country better than all the laws and talk; (3) What young people need most of all is strict discipline by their parents; and (4) Sex criminals deserve more than prison; they should be publicly whipped or worse. For anomie the items were: (1) Everything changes so quickly these days that I often have trouble deciding which are the right rules to follow; (2) With everything in such a state of disorder, it's hard for a person to know where he stands from day to day; (3) The trouble with the world today is that most people really don't believe in anything; (4) People were better off in the old days when everyone knew just how he was expected to act; and (5) What is lacking in the world today is the old kind of friendship that lasted for a lifetime.

Authoritarianism has been found to be associated empirically with a social psychological measure of anomie developed by Srole (1956a, 1956b). Srole (1956b) and Roberts and Rokeach (1956) have both demonstrated that anomie as measured by Srole's scale is independently associated with ethnocentrism. McClosky's measure is similar and is also empirically associated with ethnocentrism. The anomie items were included as a check on the expected relationship between authoritarianism and attitudes toward the in-group and out-group. If anomie behaves the same way as does authoritarianism in black samples, it should be negatively associated with racial pride and positively associated with anti-white feeling. For these predictions to hold there should also be a high correlation between the two measures, an effect which

has been demonstrated by Srole and by Roberts and Rokeach. The item responses on the authoritarianism and anomie scales were summed and the mean score used as an overall index, high

scores indicating high authoritarianism and/or anomie.

Black self-hatred was measured by an item taken from Noel's (1964) study of anti-Negro feeling ("Negroes are always shouting about their rights but have nothing to offer") and by two additional indices constructed for this study. The first of these asked the respondent to indicate whether he would prefer to live in a neighborhood that was all Negro, mostly Negro, 50/50 Negro and white, or mostly white. Responses to this item were organized on a four point scale with a high score indicating choice of an all Negro neighborhood. Near the beginning of the interview respondents were asked what racial term they preferred to use in describing themselves; the choices were "black," "Negro," "colored," and "no preference." The term "black" was considered the most positive of the racially descriptive terms (as in "black is beautiful") and a preference for this term was considered an index of positive identification with the in-group.

TABLE 4
INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG PERSONALITY AND ATTITUDE INDICES

Variables	X ₂	X ₃	X4	X5	X ₆	X7
X ₁ Authoritarianism	.41	32	23	.26	09	08
X ₂ Anomie		30	20	.43	14	05
X ₃ Prefer Black Neighborhood			.45	19	.44	.22
A4 "Black" Identity	and the	Mar V		11	.31	.18
X ₅ Self-Hatred	Sizable		7	10 0 2 1	03	02
X ₆ Social Distance		11	35.			.22
X7 Hatred of Whites		Barrel 2	(2) (2.1) (3.1)			200

The interrelationships among these indices and the two measures of anti-white attitude are presented in Table 4. Social distance was measured by the number of situations the respondent found distasteful, with a possible range from 0 to 3. For the hatred of whites item, a high score indicated an agree (anti-white) response. It is clear from Table 4 that the measures of authoritarianism and anomie used in the Newark survey are highly associated (r = .41), as was the case in the Srole and in the Roberts and Rokeach work with white samples. Similarly the relationship between authoritarianism and rejection of the in-group (anti-black feeling) was replicated in the Newark data: the higher the authoritarianism score, the lower the preference for an all Negro neighborhood (r = -.32) and the less likely the respondent is to

prefer being called black (r = -.23). Finally, the higher the authoritarianism score, the greater the tendency to express anti-

Negro feeling as measured by Noel's item (r = .26).

A similar pattern can be observed for the anomie index. Those high on anomie are less likely to want to live in an all Negro neighborhood (r = -.30) and are less likely to want to be called black (r = -.20). There is a strong tendency (r = .43) for those high on anomie to disparage other Negroes. Thus the relationship between authoritarianism and anti-Negro prejudice among blacks found in earlier research has been replicated in this study, and the results for the anomic measure are parallel, as would have

been expected from research on white samples.

The predictions made for the remaining relationships of interest, however, differ from those expected on the basis of past research. Although the previous work on minority group attitudes indicated that self-hatred is associated with hatred of out-groups, the opposite is, in fact, true of the data in Table 4. Those who are most strongly identified with being black are the most likely to be anti-white. This pattern is, of course, what one would expect to find for a majority group, but it is unusual for a minority. Preference for a Negro neighborhood is strongly related (r = .44) to social distance feelings and to expressed hatred of whites (r = .22). Self-description as black is also associated with both social distance (r = .31) and hatred of whites (r = .18). There is no significant relationship between hatred of Negroes and anti-white feeling (r = -.03 for social distance, -.02 for hatred of whites).

The data in Table 4 also indicate that while authoritarianism and anomie are not positively associated with hatred of whites or social distance feelings as was the case in past research, the association is non-significant rather than positive. Despite the negative relationship between authoritarianism and in-group pride and the positive relationship between pride and hostility to whites, the predicted relationship between authoritarianism and anti-white

attitudes does not appear in these data.

The other correlations however, tend to support the relationships between in-group solidarity and out-group rejection which would have been expected if moving against were the dominant reaction to white discrimination. The general psychological mechanism associating acceptance of self and acceptance of others does not seem to be the correct explanation of the previously observed anti-black, anti-white relationship. Instead this relationship was apparently a result of a particular historical circumstance the existence of a civil rights movement aimed at increased integration.

Militance, Black Pride, and Anti-White Feelings

The final group of predictions concerned the relationship of militancy and anti-white and anti-black attitudes. When civil rights activity or support for civil rights actions was used as an index of militance, pro-black and pro-white attitudes predicted militance. In the current social context, moving against is the most widespread strategy; consequently anti-white attitudes should be associated with current forms of militance. Pro-black attitudes, since they can be seen as indicating concern for blacks as a group, should be associated with collective action whatever its particular social form.

TABLE 5
SELF-REPORTED RIOT PARTICIPATION AND ANTI-WHITE ATTITUDES
(percentages)

Participation	Hate White People		Social I	Distance ^b
Pattern	Agree	Disagree	High	Low
Rioter	55	32	56	39
Non-Rioter	45	68	44	61
Total N	(142)	(72)	(81)	(155)

$${}^{a}_{b}\chi^{2}_{z} = 12.33, p < .001.$$
 ${}^{a}_{b}\chi^{2}_{z} = 7.16, p < .01.$

TABLE 6
Neighborhood Preference, Black Identity, and Riot Participation

Participation	N	eighborhoo	d Preferen	ice ^a	Self Des	
Pattern	All N	Most N	50/50	Most W	Black	Other
Rioter	65	40	38	33	57	38
Non-Rioter	35	60	62	67	43	62
N	(51)	(60)	(97)	(3)	(97)	(137)

 $[\]chi^2 = 10.75, p < .025.$ $\chi^2 = 8.59, p < .005.$

The index of militancy used in this study was self-reported riot participation, an extreme form of moving against but one in which large numbers of urban blacks have become involved. In the Newark survey, participation in the July 1967 riot was determined by asking two questions at different points in the interview. The first of these simply asked if the respondent had been active in the riot and listed the following alternatives: "very active," somewhat active," "slightly active." The respondent had actively to deny riot participation since this alternative was not provided. The second question, later in the interview, consisted

of a list of specific riot-related activities. The respondent was asked to indicate whether he had engaged in any of the listed activities, and was classified as a rioter if he either admitted some degree of activity or said that he had engaged in one of the specific forms of riot activity, or both. The specific activities which led to classification as a rioter were yelling at police and soldiers, picking up goods and taking them home, breaking windows, entering stores, making fire bombs, throwing fire bombs. Almost all the respondents who admitted some specific form of riot activity indicated they were involved in looting (picking up goods, breaking windows, entering stores), while relatively few were involved in arson.

The data for testing the predicted relationship between this index of militancy and attitudes toward blacks and whites are presented in Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 indicates that self-reported riot participants are considerably more hostile to whites on both measures of anti-white attitudes. Table 6 demonstrates the less obvious relationship between in-group pride and riot participation: the greater the preference for a Negro neighborhood and the greater the preference for being called black, the greater the riot participation. Consequently, the predicted relationship between militance and both anti-white and pro-black feeling is strongly supported by the survey data. The changing pattern of militant behavior has produced a corresponding change in attitudes toward whites. The association between in-group pride and militance—which is based on the idea that those more committed to Negroes as a group would be more likely to participate in collective action in support of group demands—remains unchanged whether the militance involves civil rights activity or riot participation.

Conclusions

Both the demographic and psychological determinants of anti-white attitudes have changed markedly as the social context of group conflict has changed. In a period of transition between an older black creed of distrust and avoidance and a newer creed of militance and integration, the more conservative elements in the black community were more likely to be distrustful and unfavorable toward whites. At present the transition is between the older idea of integration and moving toward, and the newer ideology of hostility and moving against. The same conservative elements are now less anti-white, again finding themselves behind in the pace of social change. The relationship between in-group and out-group pride, frequently described as a general psycholog-

ical mechanism, is actually tied to the nature of the conflict situation. Those high on racial pride are more likely to adopt attitudes which are useful for satisfying group goals at a particular historical period. In the fifties this meant being pro-integration and pro-white; in the late sixties it has come to mean strong anti-white feelings and violence directed against white property and institutions. Because of the relatively constant power differential between the races, authoritarian attitudes are associated with anti-black attitudes regardless of the nature of the ongoing social conflict. The association between authoritarianism and anti-white feeling, on the other hand, seems to be closely tied to this conflict.

These findings have three direct implications. First, psychological mechanisms such as scapegoating or low self-esteem frequently used to explain attitudes concerning ethnicity are unlikely to be useful in understanding anti-white attitudes among blacks. In fact any explanation, including authoritarianism, which postulates relatively enduring personality mechanisms would be unable to account for three different correlational patterns found during a twenty-five year period. If it can be demonstrated that ethnic attitudes change rapidly in response to political change, it would be contradictory to explain these same attitudes by postulating particular child-rearing practices or elaborate psychoanalytic processes when the explanation must be revised every five or ten years.

Secondly, attempts to describe feelings about whites in the black community as a whole will yield ambiguous results. A national sample of black Americans at present would include large numbers of older blacks living in the rural South who still believe in moving away and hence distrust and fear whites, a substantial middle-class group both North and South who still support integration as a goal and hence are relatively pro-white, and an increasingly large group of urban blacks who are hostile to whites. Viewing blacks in the United States as a homogeneous group has probably always been an over-simplification, but seems particularly unfruitful with regard to attitudes about whites at

Finally, since 1968 when the survey reported here was conducted, the Black Panther party has achieved national prominence. Whatever its actual base of support, it is clear that the party strategy of coalition with poor or radical whites suggests that the findings reported here may rapidly become obsolete even among young, urban blacks in the North on whom the findings are based. The specific findings would change, but the principle that attitudes follow the pattern of political conflict would be confirmed.

REFERENCES

Adelson, J. B. A study of minority group authoritarianism. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1953, 48, 477-485.

ADORNO, T. W., FRENKEL-BRUNSWICK, E., LEVINSON, D. J., & SANFORD, R. N. The authoritarian personality. New York: Harper, 1950.

GROSSACK, M. N. Group belongingness and authoritarianism in Southern Negroes: A research note. Phylon, 1957, 46, 125-131.

HIMMELHOCH, J. Tolerance and personality needs: A study of the liberalization of ethnic attitudes among minority group college students. American Sociological Review, 1950, 15, 79-88.

JOHNSON, R. Negro reactions to minority group status. In M. L. Barron (Ed.), American minorities. New York: Knopf, 1957.

MARX, G. Protest and prejudice: A study of belief in the community. New York: Harper and Row, 1967.

McClosky, H., & Schan, J. H. Psychological dimensions of anomy. American Sociological Review, 1965, 30, 14-39.

MEYER, P. Detroit Free Press, August 29, 1967, p. 11.

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS: Report. New York: Bantam, 1968.

NOEL, D. L. Group identification among Negroes: An empirical analysis. Journal of Social Issues, 1964, 20(2), 71-84.

PAIGE, J. M. Collective violence and the culture of subordination: A study of the July 1967 riots in Newark, New Jersey, and Detroit, Michigan. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1968.

PETTIGREW, T. F. A profile of the Negro American. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1964. RADKE-YARROW, M., & LANDE, B. Personality correlates of differential reactions to minority group belonging. Journal of Social Psychology, 1953, 38, 253-272. ROBERTS, A. H., & ROKEACH, M. Anomie and authoritarianism: A replication.

American Journal of Sociology, 1956, 61, 355-358.

SARNOFF, I. Identification with the aggressor: Some personality correlates of anti-Semitism among Jews. Journal of Personality, 1951, 20, 199-218.

SIMPSON, G. E., & YINGER, J. M. Racial and cultural minorities. (3rd ed.) New York:

Harper and Row, 1962.

SROLE, L. J. Anomie, authoritarianism, and prejudice. American Journal of Sociology, 1956, 62, 63-67. (a)

SROLE, L. J. Social integration and certain corollaries: An exploratory study. American Sociological Review, 1956, 21, 709-716. (b)

STECKLER, G. A. Authoritarian ideology in Negro college students. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1957, 54, 396-399.

WILLIAMS, R. M. Stranger next door. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964.

Three Studies of the Preferences of Students of Different Races for Actors in Interracial Theatre Productions¹

James Hoetker and Gary Siegel

Central Midwestern Regional Educational Laboratory, Inc. St. Ann, Missouri

The three-part study summarized here was part of a longer series of investigations of high school student responses to an experiment in interracial theatre (Hoetker et al., 1970) conducted in connection with the Educational Laboratory Theatre Project in Los Angeles. This project, jointly funded by the Office of Education and the National Endowment for the Arts, was a three-year undertaking that brought professional performances of classic plays to thousands of high school pupils who otherwise would not have had the experience of seeing live theatre. The project operated in three sites—Rhode Island, New Orleans, and Los Angeles. The plays given in the Los Angeles project were performed by the Inner City Repertory Company (ICRC), an adjunct of the

This report is based on research done at the Central Midwestern Regional Educational Laboratory, Inc. (CEMREL), a private non-profit corporation supported in part as a regional laboratory by funds from the United States Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Office of Education, and no official endorsement by the Office of Education should be inferred.

Inner City Cultural Center, and a company unique in its devotion to interraciality. Rather than doing plays that were oriented toward social problems or in any way "revolutionary," the ICRC did quite conventional "literary" plays that were cast in a manner that struck many as revolutionary. In casting roles, the ICRC quite simply "behaved as if there were no such thing as race."

A few white educators involved in the project objected to "subjecting" students to interracial theatre on the grounds that this would inflame racial prejudices and turn the students away from theatre itself, but most expected that the interracial theatre experience might accustom white students to interracial cooperation and give them an appreciation of the talents of non-white performers, thereby generally broadening and liberalizing the racial attitudes of these students. The theatre people and some "minority" educators were even more concerned that the example of minority actors making it successfully in an integrated situation could, through a process of identification, increase the minority student's racial pride, improve his self-concept, and better his estimation of his own chances to rise in the world.

In the studies reported here the preferences of students for actors of different ethnic groups were examined. The ways that students assigned various dramatic and social roles to actors and actresses of different ethnic groups were analyzed to see if they differed as a function of the students' race, sex, socioeconomic

status, or amount of prior exposure to interracial theatre.

Related Studies

Research on interracial behavior and person perception has found increasing evidence that among many segments of the black population the "identification with the aggressor" phenomenon, commonly found in research in the 1940s and 50s (e.g., Clark & Clark, 1947; Goodman, 1952; Steckler, 1957), is no longer extant. This appears to be especially true among adolescent and youngadult blacks where black identity, pride, and self-assertiveness have become more and more visible (e.g., Kirkhart, 1963; Derbyshire & Brody, 1964; McPartland, 1968).

At the same time there appears to have been a general broadening of racial attitudes among whites—again, especially among younger whites (Secord & Backman, 1964; Bettelheim & Janowitz, 1964). Bogardus (1958) has found whites showing a lessening in social distance, and the replicated Princeton studies (Karlins, Coffman, & Walters, 1969) indicate improvements in the

perception of ethnic groups by whites.

Experimental efforts to reduce social distance and increase interracial acceptance have generally focused on white attitudes

toward blacks (McDowell, 1967). These attempts to reduce racial antagonisms have commonly exposed subjects to some form of interracial stimulus, either directly in interracial social situations or indirectly through the use of films or books or other media. Intimate personal interaction under favorable circumstances has been found significantly to reduce social distance between whites and blacks (Mann, 1958; Yarrow, Campbell, & Yarrow, 1958). But experiments involving exposure to media have been carried on predominantly among whites (e.g., Litcher & Johnson, 1969). Black reactions to multiethnic stimuli have been more talked about than empirically investigated.

Subjects

Students in twelfth-grade English classes from four Los Angeles high schools were the subjects in the studies reported in this paper. The four schools are representative in important ways of the range of public schools in the Los Angeles district, having been selected from lists of schools having certain racial and socioeconomic characteristics. For the purposes of reporting these studies, each of the schools is given a ficticious name. The first school, here called "Los Altos," serves the children of very well-to-do suburban whites. The second, "Central," has a large enrollment of Oriental and Mexican-American students, most of them from homes at a middle socioeconomic level. The third school, "Lewis," has a virtually all-white student body from homes in which the lather is likely to be a skilled laborer and union member or a white collar worker in a non-executive position. The fourth school, "Langston Hughes," has an entirely black student body, and many of the students' parents are unskilled laborers or receive public assistance. Los Altos and Hughes High Schools figure in all three of the studies. Central is included only in the first study; Lewis is represented in the second and third.

Method

Following in the tradition of studies of intergroup relations which have dealt with preferences for dolls, photographs, described persons, and so on, students were asked to choose—for particular new dramatic and social roles—actors and actresses from the cast of a play that they had just seen performed. The instruments used in each of the studies consisted of an annotated cast of characters from the play just seen and a set of descriptions of a smaller number of new roles for which the students were to choose players from among those in the cast of the play they had just seen performed.

There was no way to control many aspects of the stimulus

events (the plays). From prior experience, we expected that there would be events which would interfere with our data-gathering plans to such an extent that large extraneous errors would be introduced. In particular, it was anticipated that, between performances, there might be changes within the casts of the plays, and, therefore, that some subjects might be exposed to a somewhat different stimulus set than others.

Therefore, a strategy was adopted of replicating the study three times across two plays, using different samples of students from the same schools, and each time varying the details of the task which the students were asked to execute. Within each of the studies, every effort was made to minimize error. The three studies should be considered as the three parts of a single investigation, with attention being given primarily to those significant effects which were consistent across the three studies.

Study I

The task given the students was that of casting a new play from among the actors and actresses in the cast of West Side Story—the play which the students had just seen. Each student was given a cast of characters from West Side Story, a description of each character's role, and the name of the actor or actress who had played the part. No mention was made of any actor's race.

TABLE 1
SUBJECT SAMPLE FOR STUDY I

	Male	Female	Failed to indicate sex	Total
Los Altos	12	26	DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY	39
Central	13	15	Comment of the second	29
Hughes	26	23	4	53
Total	51	64	6	121

The second part of the instrument included a plot summary of the new play the students were to cast. The plot that was used was a loose adaptation of Galsworthy's Strife, and included five characters. The primary characters were John Anthony, a company president, and David Roberts, the leader in a strike that was closing a factory owned by the company. The three minor characters were Roberts' wife, another labor leader who replaces Roberts at the end of the play, and Anthony's secretary. Major changes in the female roles in West Side Story during the time of the study led to our dropping from the initial analysis the two roles in the new

play for which females were eligible-Mrs. Roberts and the

secretary.

The total number of actors listed on the cast of characters of West Side Story was nine, equally divided between white, black, and "other minority" categories. The number of students from whom usable responses were obtained was 121, distributed as in Table 1. Eliminating the female roles meant that only three of the five choices made by each student would be analyzed. With 121 students participating in this study, there were 363 choices made from the nine actors. The choices given by the students in each school to actors of each ethnic group were distributed as presented in Table 2.

TABLE 2 CHOICE PATTERN FOR STUDY I

disa and and the	Los Altos	Central	Hughes
Black actors	39%	36%	43%
White actors	19%	12%	10%
"Other minority"			
actors	42%	52%	47%

As can be seen from this table, the distribution of each school's choices by race was quite similar. All three schools recasted more "other minority" and black actors than white actors. Although chi-square analysis on the frequencies of the choices did not show a significant between-school difference, it is interesting to note that the white students (Los Altos) chose more white actors than did the other two schools, that the black students (Hughes) chose more black actors, and that the students from the school with the largest number of non-black minority students (Central), chose more "other minority" actors.

Analysis found the choices for the three male roles to be unrelated to the sex of the students or amount of experience with the theatre project. Casting by race for specific roles in the new play likewise did not vary significantly among schools, sexes, or varying amounts of experience. In casting the company president (naturalistically, a "white" role), students from all three schools most often chose one of two actors, one of them black and the other Mexican-American. The role of the labor leader was most frequently given to one particular minority actor by students from all three schools.

The races of the actors assigned by different groups of students to the roles of Anthony and Roberts were then considered. Here significant differences were found in the ways that the pair

of roles were cast. The white students from Los Altos more frequently cast actors of two different races in the roles than students from the other two schools. Eighty-seven percent of the choices for the two roles made by Los Altos students involved actors from two different ethnic groups, while only 55 percent of the choices from Central and Hughes involved actors of two

ethnic groups.

Three possible explanations are suggested: (1) that the white middle class respondents may have accepted the conventions of interracial casting more fully than have the other students; (2) that, since the two roles in question are the major ones, the non-white students from Central and Hughes may have tended to give the most important parts to minority actors (none of the single-race pairs cast by students from these schools were white); or (3) that Los Altos students, more than those from the other schools, saw the conflict in the play to have racial overtones and, accordingly, cast the pair interracially.

Analyzing the way the schools filled the two major roles, it was found that the students from Hughes, who chose the fewest white actors to fill the new dramatic roles (10 percent), selected a white actor for either one of the two major roles only 4 percent of the time—the other white actors picked by Hughes students (6 percent) were for the one minor male role. No similar pattern was

found in the choices made in the other two schools.

In spite of complications due to cast changes, the casting of the husband-wife pair in the new play was then examined. Here, however, there were no similar differences between schools. Certainly, if (as suggested above) the between-school differences in the casting of the company president-labor leader pair were due to resistance to the interracial casting concept, one would expect the effects to be even stronger when it came to the casting of man and wife roles. But about two-thirds of the respondents in each school chose an actor and actress of different ethnic groups to play the parts of Roberts and his wife.

One important difference between the two pairs of characters is that the wife's role in the plot of the new play was a secondary one, so the tendency to give more important parts to actors of one's own race, posited as a possible explanation for the between-schools differences in the casting of Anthony and Roberts, would not have been so strongly at work. The notion that the ethnicity of the respondents might affect not the choice of actors, but the importance of the role assigned them, rose from examination of the data. And, as is usually the case with post facto hunches, it was difficult to estimate from the data what might have been called a "promotion effect."

Study II

The second study was also a play-casting study essentially the same as the one just reported, but the white working class school ("Lewis") replaced "Central." Students (there were 100 usable responses) who had just seen the play Room Service were asked to recast the actors into a new play. The dramatic plot of the new play involved four characters: (1) a midwestern small town capitalist and Rotarian (a very "establishment" figure); (2) his son, who at college becomes somewhat radicalized, rejects his father's way of life, and intends to marry a girl "whose background is radically different from his" in some unspecified way (this is the central issue in the plot); (3) the girl's father; and (4) a Reverend Grant, an unsympathetic figure, from whom the boy seeks help and gets only moralistic lectures. Because the character list from Room Service contained only two small female roles, the girl herself was not included in the casting.

TABLE 3

	CHOICE INTIER	A TOR BIEB. II	
10V-0.151	Los Altos	Lewis	Hughes
White actors Non-white	57 (55%)	81 (55%)	54 (36%)
actors	47 (45%)	67 (45%)	94 (64%)

During this version of the play-casting study, there again were some cast changes in the production which was serving as the stimulus event, a fact which somewhat complicated the study. The first two schools to attend the play—Los Altos and Lewis saw the same cast, which consisted of four black, seven white, and three "other minority" actors and actresses. However, before students from Hughes saw the play there was some shifting of roles resulting from two cast changes. While this was unfortunate (since it possibly confounded effects due to saliency or attractiveness of role played), the changes did not radically affect the racial composition of the cast, which for Hughes consisted of five blacks, seven whites, and two "other minority" actors.

The additional black actor added to the production seen by Hughes might have changed the racial make-up of the cast enough to cast doubt on any comparisons between schools, except that this particular actor was a newcomer to the repertory cast. As a result, he had not built up a popularity with the students through his appearance in other roles, and he played a minor role in this

play.

If the student responses are grouped into white and non-white categories, the racial composition of the Room Service cast seen by each school was the same: seven white actors and seven non-white actors. The distribution of each school's choices is presented in Table 3. This distribution yields a chi-square of $12.56 \ (p < .001)$. It is very doubtful that the addition of one black actor in a minor role could by itself have made this much difference. Neither the sex of the student respondent nor the respondent's amount of experience with the theatre project was related to the racial make-up of the cast selected for the new play, either within a school or for the whole sample.

TABLE 4
CHOICE PATTERN FOR MAJOR ROLES (STUDY II)

2 DATE: (MATER)	Los Altos	Lewis	Hughes
White actors Non-white	59%	61%	21%
actors	41%	39%	79%

The student responses for the two major roles alone—the father and son, omitting the other two characters—are considered separately in Table 4. Comparing this distribution to the preceding one (the choices for all roles), the among-school differences in choices of white and non-white actors are seen to be more pronounced when the major roles alone are considered. Not only did both white and black students tend to cast more members of their own racial groups in the new play, they even more strongly tended to cast them in the two major roles. This latter tendency is strongest among the black students from Hughes.

Turning to the casting of particular roles within the new play, there were notable differences among the schools in the casting of the father and his son and differences among the schools in the degree to which they were willing to integrate the two parts by casting a father and son of different ethnic groups. There was a significant tendency for the black students to choose actors of their own race for both major roles and to prefer (more than the white students) single-race as opposed to integrated casting of this pair of roles in the new play. Ninety-six percent of the white students at Los Altos and 76 percent at Lewis cast a white actor in the role of the father. Only 36 percent of the black students at

²Elaborate measures were taken to justify probablistic analyses of the data when cast changes did occur; the reader is referred to Hoetker et al. (1970) for fuller discussion and a report of the results of multivariate analyses of covariance.

Hughes cast this part white. In casting the role of the son, a majority of students from each school chose a non-white actor (Los Altos, 77 percent; Lewis, 54 percent; and Hughes, 95 percent). It seems clear that, if students from Hughes were reluctant to cast whites into the lead roles, there was also a reluctance on the part of some students from Lewis to cast blacks in the role of the son—for which part, objectively and in the judgment of the students as a whole, the best-suited available actor was a young black. Also notable is the large number of black actors chosen for the son's part by Los Altos students, 96 percent of whom had chosen a white actor for the father's part. This and the findings reported below would seem to indicate that the Los Altos students, at least, had accepted the convention of casting by criteria other than the naturalistic (racial) ones.

TABLE 5
FATHER-SON CHOICE PATTERN (STUDY II)

an All and	Los Altos	Lewis	Hughes
Pair of one race	19%	48%	65%
Pair integrated	81%	52%	35%

The following table shows the percentages of choices for the lather-son roles in which the father and son were the same race, and also the percentages of choices in which one was white and the other non-white. The chi-square for the frequencies in Table 5 is 12.829 (p < .01). It was the students at Hughes who more often preferred actors of a single ethnic group—most often black in the father and son parts. Not wanting to integrate the father and son pair may have been the reason for the failure of a large percentage of Lewis students to choose the black actor apparently best suited for the son's role. Analyses of the choices for fatherson pairs found them to be unrelated to amount of experience with the theatre project for the sample of respondents taken as a whole. However, within Hughes, the between-sex differences were significant ($\chi^2 = 6.7, 2 \, df, p < .02$), with black girls being more likely than boys to integrate the father-son roles. This is, perhaps, an indication that black identity sentiments are stronger among young black males than black females.

There also seemed to be differences in the extent to which students in different groups perceived the underlying conflict in the plot of the new play to be a racial one. If a student cast the parts of Mr. Richwell (father) and George Richwell (son) from one ethnic group, and the part of Mr. Soames (the girl's father)

from another, we might infer the possibility that he has perceived the "radical difference" between the son and his girl friend as a racial one and the play as one about the difficulties of inter-group romance, along the line of Abie's Irish Rose or Guess Who's Coming to Dinner. (If, of course, a student conceived the play in this way, but so completely accepted the interracial casting convention that he nonetheless assigned the roles without regard to naturalistic consistency, there would be no way we could tell it from his responses.)

Among the Los Altos students, only five (of 26) respondents did not integrate the father-son pair, and in each of these cases both roles were filled by whites. In two cases, Mr. Soames was cast as black, and in three he was white. At Lewis, 14 (out of 37) respondents chose both members of the pair from one racial group, and 13 of the pairs were white. Only one of the respondents

TABLE 6
CHOICE PATTERN FOR UNSYMPATHETIC CHARACTER (STUDY II)

	Los Altos	Lewis	Hughe
Within Own	40.00		George and
Ethnic Group	38%	35%	38%
To Other	THE PARTY THEO IN	UNE BELLEVISION OF THE	
Ethnic Group	62%	65%	62%

who chose a white father and son chose a black Mr. Soames, seven chose a white Mr. Soames, and five chose an "other minority" person for the role. At Hughes, 23 (out of 37) respondents cast the father and son from the same ethnic group, and in 22 of the cases both were cast as black. Thirteen of the 22 who chose black Richwells cast Mr. Soames as white and eight cast him as black. Overall, despite the tendency of the Hughes students to overchoose blacks, they chose more whites than blacks for the Soames part.

Whatever detailed sense one might care to make of these differences, one thing seems evident, and that is that it was the students at Hughes (the "black" school) who were most aware of, and most strongly influenced by, racial considerations, both in their choices of actors and in their assigning actors to parts in the

new play.

One final comparison, in regard to the part of the minister, whom, as noted, we had tried to draw as a character unsympathetic to adolescents. Table 6 shows the percentage of choices for the Reverend Grant role that were made within as compared to across ethnic group. Each of the groups, it is clear, was reluctant

to cast a member of its own race in the role of a moralistic square. It may say something about contemporary racial stereotypes that the part of the minister was assigned to a white by more than half the students at Hughes. The middle-class white students at Los Altos, on the other hand, gave about three-quarters of their choices for the role to the two "other minority" actors in the cast; while the working class white students at Lewis chose black and "other minority" actors about equally for the minister's role. This suggests that ethnocentric considerations were not operating blindly, to determine that such and such a number of all choices should be given to actors of a particular race, but were operating more subtly and intelligently, to determine that actors of particular races would be assigned to particular sympathetic or unsympathetic roles.

Study III

The two studies just reported examined the ways that students assigned dramatic roles to actors and actresses of different ethnic groups. This study examined the ways that students assigned actors to social roles of varying degrees of intimacy. The subjects in this study were the same students who participated in the second play-casting study; the data for both that study and the present one were obtained during the same class periods.

Each student was given an annotated list of the characters in Room Service and instructed to "answer each of the questions... by writing in the name of one of the actors or actresses." The four questions required a student to choose actors for different sorts of social roles, which ranged from the impersonal to the intimate. The students were instructed that they could choose the same actor or actress for any number of the roles. The four questions

were as follows:

(1) Which of these actors or actresses would you like to see appearing in a TV series?

(2) Which of these actors or actresses would you like to have come speak to

(3) Which of these actors or actresses would you like to get to know as a friend?
 (4) Which of these actors or actresses would you have liked to have had as an aunt or uncle when you were young?

In choosing actors for social roles the students were not under the sorts of constraints imposed by the play-casting task. They did not, for example, have to consider the physical suitability of an actor for a role, nor did they have to restrict their choices for particular roles to young or old actors, nor did they have to choose a certain proportion of males to females.

In the cast of characters from Room Service given the students, 12 of the 14 characters were male (85 percent). With the students free to choose any actor or actress for any social role, 85 percent of all choices went to male players, with no differences between groups in numbers of choices given to males and females. Fiftyeight percent of all choices were given to black actors, though less than 40 percent of the available players were black. Seventy-eight percent of all choices went to non-white actors, though only half

TABLE 7
CHOICE PATTERN FOR STUDY III

	Los Altos	Lewis	Hughes
White actors Non-white	28%	30%	11%
actors	72%	70%	89%

of the Room Service cast was non-white. The choices of the students in each school were distributed as shown in Table 7. As can be seen, all three groups chose more non-whites than whites—but the imbalance was greatest for Hughes. The difference is significant ($\chi^2 = 18.090, 2 \, df, \, p < .001$). Chi-square analyses of preference frequencies as a function of sex and amount of theatre experience

ence were not significant.

Students from all three schools chose more non-whites for social roles than they did for dramatic roles, but the choices for the second play-casting study and the present study correlated $41 \ (p < .10)$. The major differences between the two sets of choices were accounted for by the students giving multiple choices to two young black actors, so that the two received almost four times as many choices in the social role study as in the play-casting study. At the same time, a middle-aged white actor, who had been most-chosen for the father part in the play-casting study, received only a quarter as many choices in the social role study.

The next question was whether students made different choices for roles of varying degrees of intimacy. Would, for example, white students be more willing to choose actors of another ethnic group for the "TV actor" or "speaker" roles than for the "friend" or "relative" roles? Figure 1 plots the percentage of non-white performers chosen by each group for each social role. Only the Lewis students showed any appreciable difference across the four roles; and that difference is in what would be the anticipated direction—choosing fewer non-white actors as the roles increased in intimacy. However, differences in the preferences for non-

whites across the social roles were found to be non-significant for

all three schools, including Lewis (where p < .10).

Most white students apparently did not use race as a basis for deciding on an actor's suitability for even the most intimate of the four social roles (despite the differences in roles 3 and 4, whites always over-chose non-whites). But the black students quite definitely preferred non-white actors and actresses for each




FIGURE 1.
Percentage of choices given to non-whites for the four social roles (Study

the roles. The frequencies of non-white choices were significantly different between schools for the two more intimate roles Role 3, Friend: $\chi^2 = 6.2$, p < .05; Role 4, Relative: $\chi^2 = 9.6$, < .01). There were no significant differences between choices the four roles as a function of the students' sex or theatre

experience—either when the students were taken as a whole or when each school was analyzed separately.

Conclusions

As noted at the beginning, the findings in which the most confidence may be placed are those which were consistent over two or three of the studies, despite differences in casts, subjects, and tasks. Most notable of the findings consistent across all three studies was that students from all three schools chose non-white actors, and especially black actors, more frequently than would be expected on the basis of the ratios of non-whites in the casts. Not many years ago, it is unlikely one would have found this obvious preference for blacks even among black students, let alone among whites. In these investigations, black students were found very strongly to prefer the black members in the repertory company cast and, in the second and third studies, to choose significantly more black performers than were chosen by white students. The black students seemed, generally, to be the most conscious of race. They consistently chose blacks for the major roles in the new plays and, for all the social roles, chose black performers about 90 percent of the time. In casting the new dramatic situations, black students were least apt to cast important role-pairs interracially.

As a factor in selecting actors to fill the various roles presented in the studies, race appeared to be of negligible importance to the middle class white students from Los Altos. Other considerations, such as age, attractiveness, and acting ability, apparently were more important in the selection of actors to fill the roles. Race may have played a somewhat larger part in the selections of some of the students from the lower SES white school, Lewis, as indicated by the finding that students from Lewis were

less likely to integrate important role-pairs.

The objection has been made that perhaps more blacks than expected were chosen to fill the various roles in these studies simply because the blacks were the better actors or more attractive people. It is certainly possible that students were responding to actor characteristics other than race, but this does not make the finding of a preference for blacks any less remarkable. Recognition of black ability is not a traditional American custom. Social research is replete with examples of blacks themselves failing to recognize in blacks abilities equal or superior to those of whites doing the same job. That race is of less importance than ability in a person preference task, is not a trivial finding. To carry this a step further, if, in the second study, when the students were asked

to fill dramatic roles, the white students were choosing blacks primarily for reasons of acting ability, it would be reasonable to expect that they would choose fewer blacks to fill the social roles presented in the third study. However, the reverse was true. It might also be expected that there would be a difference in selections between the first two social roles, which have some relation to ability, and the last two, which do not. There was not.

If this over-choosing of non-whites for dramatic roles and, even more strongly, for social roles is taken as evidence of the white students' identifying with, empathizing with, and even preferring actors of other ethnic groups under certain conditions, then the question must be asked: How is this finding compatible with everyday experience and with the simple fact that records of our interviews with both adults and students at Los Altos and Lewis are filled with expressions of anti-Negro and anti-minority

feelings (Hoetker et al., 1970)?

The explanation may be along these lines. Only about 50 percent of the students in the sample classes at both white schools participated in the project, although almost all the students had seen at least one play previously. In contrast, more than 75 percent of the students from Hughes participated. (Almost all of the students at Central participated, but this was because the Central administration made attendance practically mandatory; the administrations in the other three schools were quite permissive about attendance.) The attendance figures for the white schools would permit the inference that strongly prejudiced students had, before this study began, simply withdrawn themselves from participating in an interracial program that they found distasteful. Thus the participating white students were representative not of all the students at the white schools, but of that portion of the students who were comfortable in interracial situations or who were committed or sympathetic with minority aspirations.

We asked non-participating students to explain to us why they had not attended the play in question. Between five and ten percent of the replies from white students indicated that the pupil had not attended the play because he was absent from school for some legitimate reason. Many more explained they had chosen not to attend because of the pressure of studies, dissatisfaction with the quality of the previous plays, or just because they did not care for theatre. Very few of the explanations touched on racial matters, and some of these (maybe one percent of the total) were phrased in terms of dislike for the behavior of students from the black schools with whom they attended the plays. Contrary to this, interviews with teachers often elicited the explanation that many white students had stopped participating in the program

because they could not enjoy the show in the company of black students who persistently misbehaved. It would be an injustice to interpret such explanations as invariably being tinged with racial prejudice, since objectively there were small numbers of students from particular black schools who were a consistent embarrassment, especially to their more responsible classmates. But it is notable that students themselves much more rarely expressed such sentiments

It cannot be established from the information at our disposal whether the white students participating in the program differed from those who had discontinued their participation. But the hypothesis is a more reasonable one than the available alternatives -that racial feelings among whites are negligible or that the choices made in situations such as the ones in these studies are unrelated to actual sentiments. So the conclusion to be reached from the data would have to be that black students strongly preferred black actors for both social and dramatic roles, while there was a substantial minority of white students who either ignored race and made their choices on other grounds (e.g., the talent or personality of the actor chosen) or actually tended to prefer nonwhites for these roles, with this minority being somewhat larger among upper-middle class white students than among working class white students. The patterns of preference, however, were not significantly related to sheer amount of experience with interracial theatre—possibly because those who needed most to see examples of interracial cooperation chose to avoid seeing such examples.

Whatever factors in the larger culture may account for the patterns which are described in these studies, it is clear that they have drastically altered the patterns of preferences described in research done up through the middle sixties. Black students have become much more chauvinistic, racially, while young whites have become much less sure about the place that non-whites should be kept in.

REFERENCES

BETTELHEIM, B., & JANOWITZ, M. Social change and prejudice. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.

BOGARDUS, E. S. Racial distance changes in the United States. Sociology and Social Research, 1958, 43, 127-135.

CLARK, K. B., & CLARK, M. P. Racial identification and preference in Negro children. In T. M. Newcomb and E. Hartley (Eds.), Readings in social psychology New York, Holy Pinchalogy chology. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1947.

DERBYSHIRE, R., & BRODY, E. Identity and ethnocentrism in American Negro college students. Mental Health, 1964, 48, 65-69.

GOODMAN, M. E. Race awareness in young children. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1952.

HOETKER, J. et al. Final report on the Educational Laboratory Theatre Project. St. Ann, Missouri: CEMREL, Inc., 1970.

KARLINS, M., COFFMAN, T. L., & WALTERS, G. On the fading of social stereotypes: Studies in three generations of college students. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1969, 13, 1-16. Kirkhart, R. Minority group identification and group leadership. Journal of Social Psychology, 1963, 59, 111-117.

LITCHER, J., & JOHNSON, D. Changes in attitudes toward Negroes of white elementary school students after use of multiethnic readers. Journal of Educational Psychology, 1969, 60, 148-152.

MANN, J. H. The effects of interracial contact on sociometric choices and per-

ceptions. Journal of Social Psychology, 1958, 50, 143-152.

McDowell, S. F. Prejudice and other interracial attitudes of Negro youth. Washington, D.C.: Howard University, 1967. (ERIC: ED 019 390).

McPartland, J. The relative influence of school desegregation and of classroom desegregation on the academic achievement of ninth grade Negro students. Baltimore: John Hopkins University, September 1968. (USOE Project No. 6-1610).

SECORD, P. F., & BACKMAN, C. W. Social psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill,

Steckler, G. A. Authoritarian ideology in Negro college students. Journal of Ab-

normal and Social Psychology, 1957, 54, 396-399.
YARROW, M. R., CAMPBELL, J. O., & YARROW, L. J. Acquisition of new norms: A study of racial desegregation. Journal of Social Issues, 1958, 14(1), 8-28.

The Epidemiological Distribution of CNS Dysfunction

Dominic Amante, Phillip H. Margules, Donna M. Hartman, Delores B. Storey, and Lewis John Weeber

West Shore Mental Health Clinic

Central nervous system (CNS) dysfunction, or brain damage, is known to arise from the operation of a broad spectrum of causal variables during the prenatal, the natal, and the postnatal developmental stages (Birch, 1964; Coleman, 1964; Yacorzynski, 1965; Siegel, 1967). Brain damage may be induced at any Point in the life cycle from the earliest stages of embryonic development to the final stages of senescence. Some of the major causal variables of interest include such factors as genetic mutations and chromosomal aberrations (Hardy, 1965; McClearn, 1968; Jensen, 1969); endocrinological malfunction (Hardy, 1965; Levine, 1968; Ferreira, 1969); trauma and accident; toxic and infectious conditions of many kinds (Hardy, 1965; Ferreira, 1969; Birch & Gussow, 1970); extreme conditions of sensory restriction or sensory bombardment (Lindsley, 1968; Riesen, 1968; Hunt, 1969a); malnutrition and undernutrition (Scrimshaw, 1967; Platt, 1968; Hunger, U.S.A., 1968; Birch & Gussow, 1970); and various complications of pregnancy, labor, and delivery (Pasamanick & Knobloch, 1961; Hardy, 1965; Ferreira, 1969; Birch & Gussow, 1970). These are the major biological and psychological determinants of brain damage. There is, however, another important group of causes, to which little systematic attention has so far been directed, which are largely social in nature. One of the major purposes of this paper is to call attention to these social factors and to indicate some of the ways in which they may interact with biological and/or psychological variables to produce brain dam-

age and its sequelae.

From all indications CNS dysfunction is not randomly distributed in the population at large. Rather, cases of brain damage in children are highly concentrated in the poor white and black segments of the community. Furthermore, the prevalence of such problems appears to be considerably more extreme in the case of black children of lower socioeconomic origin relative to their white counterparts (Bronfenbrenner, 1967, 1970):

Though the Negro infant is not biologically inferior at the moment of conception, he often becomes so shortly thereafter. The inadequate nutrition and prenatal care received by millions of Negro mothers result in complications of pregnancy which take their toll in extraordinarily high rates of prematurity and congenital defect. Many of these abnormalities entail neurological damage resulting in impaired intellectual function and behavioral disturbances, including hyperactivity, distractibility, and low attention span. Of particular relevance is the significant role played by paranatal and prenatal factors in the genesis of childhood reading disorders [1967, p. 913].

Some of the reasons behind this unfortunate state of affairs, partially summarized by Bronfenbrenner, are known. In summary fashion, the primary determinants behind the epidemiological distribution of brain damage appear to involve interclass and interracial differentials in terms of general physical and mental health, the prevalence of undernutrition and malnutrition, inadequate pre- and post-natal child care, and, possibly, pathogenic conditions of altered environmental stimulation impinging upon the organism during critical periods of development (Deutsch, 1968; Mechanic, 1968; Riesen, 1968; Pinkney, 1969; Ferreira, 1969; Kosa, Antonovsky, & Zola, 1969; Birch & Gussow, 1970). Further, as indicated by Birch and Gussow (1970), there is evidence that certain of such conditions—including higher rates of physical pathology, undernutrition and malnutrition, and inadequate medical care—appear to be considerably more prevalent within the lower class black population relative to the lower class white population. Presumably, therefore, these factors determine the interracial differentials in terms of the rate of CNS dysfunction among black and white populations of roughly comparable socioeconomic status.

Over the years, Benjamin Pasamanick and his co-workers have reported a series of studies which are more than pertinent

to the understanding of the epidemiological distribution of brain damage (Pasamanick, 1958; Kawi & Pasamanick, 1959; Knobloch & Pasamanick, 1960; Pasamanick & Knobloch, 1961). Their research indicates that a number of variables are correlated with childhood neurological problems. The most important of these include complications of pregnancy on the part of the child's mother, complications of labor and delivery during the process of birth, and prematurity on the part of the child. Relative to prematurity, Birch and Gussow observe the following:

Of all the known complications of pregnancy and parturition, no single condition is more clearly associated with a wide range of insult to the nervous system than the too early expulsion into the world of a child scarcely able to function as an independent organism. Survivors, especially those in the lowest birth-weight ranges, are at much greater risk than full-term infants of severe neurological, mental, sensory, or other defects [1970, p. 51].

Pasamanick's data indicate rather clearly that the distributions of prematurity and complications of pregnancy were closely linked to both social class and race. In addition, other possibly interreated variables of etiological significance were considered, including malnutrition, stress, infection, and "psychosocial deprivation [Pasamanick & Knobloch, 1961, p. 91]." They demonstrated that prematurity was negatively correlated with socioeconomic status in the white sample, and that its frequency was higher in the Negro population. The incidence figures were 5.0 percent and 7.6 percent for the upper and lower white socioeconomic groupings respectively, and 11.4 percent in the Negro sample. Relative to the distribution of complications of pregnancy, the data are even more striking. An incidence figure of 5.0 percent was reported for the white upper socioeconomic group, 14.6 percent for the white lower socioeconomic group, and 50.6 percent in the case of the Negro sample (Pasamanick & Knobloch, 1961). Prematurity and the various perinatal complicating conditions were also indicated to be closely related to certain symptomatic indicators of CNS dysfunction, such as behavioral problems and academic learning disabilities. These varied observations are highly consistent with the empirical data reported in this paper. The latter research involved the utilization of simple objective sociological and psychological techniques designed to delineate clearly the epidemiological distribution of brain damage in the area of Muskegon, Michigan.

It should also be observed that the data of Pasamanick and his co-workers are quite consistent with the data of a variety of other investigators in the United States (Donnelly, Flowers, Creadick, Wells, & Greenberg, 1957; Ross, 1964; Donnelly, Flowers,

Creadick, Wells, Greenberg, & Surles, 1964; Ferreira, 1969). Furthermore, there is some evidence that the same trends (involving an inverse correlation of rates of complications of pregnancy with social class) are cross-culturally valid (Kincaid, 1965; Sarram & Saadatnejadi, 1967; Ferreira, 1969; Birch & Gussow, 1970). The association of poverty—a social condition—with the various complications of pregnancy, labor, and delivery which are known, in turn, to be associated with the induction of fetal or neonatal neurological handicaps—a biological condition—appears to be quite strong.

Theoretical Considerations

Pasamanick and Knobloch have developed a theoretical scheme to conceptualize their data, the main propositions of which include the following:

- (1) Since prematurity and complications of pregnancy are associated with fetal and neonatal death, usually on the basis of injury to the brain, there must remain a fraction so injured who do not die.
- (2) Depending upon the degree and location of the damage, the survivors may develop a series of disorders. These extend from cerebral palsy, epilepsy, and mental deficiency through all types of behavioral and learning disabilities which are a result of damage sufficient to disorganize behavior development and lower thresholds to stress.
- (3) Further, these abnormalities of pregnancy are associated with certain life experiences, usually socioeconomically determined, and consequently. . .
- (4) They themselves and their resulting neuropsychiatric disorders are found in greater aggregation in the lower strata of our society [1961, pp. 74-75].

It is important to observe that the interpretation or explanation is

essentially environmental—not genetic—in nature.

This is certainly a useful theoretical scheme. However, it is not entirely definitive. It does not clearly specify antecedent and consequent events, and it does not extend itself far enough beyond the limited number of variables of interest to trace out fully the potential ramifications of CNS dysfunction. Moreover, it does not suggest the most feasible directions in which to move relative to the establishment of preventive programs, if indeed these are considered to be desirable. For these reasons, it would be efficacious to construct a new theoretical or interpretive scheme, essentially interdisciplinary in nature, which will order and conceptualize the data in a more satisfactory manner.

A multi-disciplinary theoretical scheme, roughly consistent with a general systems approach (Buckley, 1968), is here pre-

sented. It is designed to conceptualize the problems in terms of a series of antecedent and consequent conditions involving the interaction of biological, psychological, educational, sociological, and anthropological variables. The theoretical scheme utilized implies a determinative or causal chain of interlocking events, and is composed of a series of interrelated propositions which form a true system ". . . in the sense that determinate relations of interdependence exist within the complex of empirical phenomena [Parsons & Shils, 1951, p. 5]." Naturally, the assumption is that the empirical events represented by the theoretical propositions are causally linked in a series of antecedent and consequent conditions. One causal event is assumed to activate another which, in turn, triggers another, and so forth throughout the entire system. Theoretically, therefore, the interlocked chain of events specified is assumed to be largely self-perpetuating in operation, unless and until it is modified in some fashion. It should be observed, however, that by and large the data supporting the scheme are based on correlational relationships—a factor which precludes the kind of causal inferences mentioned above until more definitive data (hopefully of an experimental nature) are available. At the present time, it should be regarded as nothing more nor less than a very tentative conceptual scheme, the final utility and/or status of which is still quite uncertain.

The basic theoretical scheme, designed to account environmentally for the differential frequency of CNS dysfunction in various socioeconomic strata and/or racial groups, is as follows:

The Induction of CNS Dysfunction and Associated Effects

A. Interclass and interracial value, attitudinal, behavioral, and experiential differentials on the part of the parental generation conducive to the induction of CNS dysfunction relative to the filial generation (A Sociocultural Variable).

B. The consequent induction of CNS dysfunction (A Biological Variable).

C. The emergence of perceptual-motor problems and/or intellectual deficits symptomatic of the underlying CNS dysfunction (A Psychological Variable).

D. The eventual onset of various kinds of academic "learning disabilities," such as reading problems, related to the perceptual-motor difficulties and/or the intellectual deficits (An Educational Variable).

E. Consequent academic underachievement (An Educational Variable).

F. The determination of reduced socioeconomic status consequent upon academic underachievement—largely by means of occupational determination, in the case of the male, and by means of marital selection, in the case of the female (A Sociological Variable).

G. The final induction of an emotional-motivational set, state, or "frame of mind"—consequent upon progressive, continuous, or ongoing socialization in a given region or sector of the social (class) structure—conducive to the

development of the values, the attitudes, the behavior, and the experiences associated with factor "A" (A Social-Psychological Variable).

The self-perpetual chain of interrelated events is presented diagrammatically in Figure 1.




FIGURE 1.
The self-perpetual chain of interrelated events.

The scheme may be utilized to conceptualize the events leading to CNS dysfunction during both the pre- and the post-natal developmental stages. Further, it should be observed that the scheme is essentially intergenerational in nature. That is, it seeks to delineate a mechanism by which CNS dysfunction is socially transmitted from one generation to the next. It is necessary to be quite explicit about this. A reasonably sharp distinction has to be

made between those causal factors behind the epidemiological distribution of brain damage which are primarily genetic and those which are environmental. The environmental factors may be congenital or post-natal. The congenital factors operate during the period of intra-uterine development while the post-natal causes, of course, impinge upon the organism sometime after birth. The present scheme is not genetic, although the genetic explanation may, depending upon future research, represent an important alternative to the environmental explanation (Jensen, 1969). In all probability, however, if the environmental explanation is eventually indicated to be too limited, an interaction model will have to be invoked which is broad enough to incorporate both environmental and genetic variables:

Prenatal environment refers to the aggregate of all conditions external to the conceptus proper capable of affecting the life and development of the new organism. However, the consideration of environmental factors can never be totally divorced from the genetic issue. At all times, in fact, the question of interactions between environmental factors and genetic endowments appears to be of utmost importance [Ferreira, 1969, p. 39].

The Nature-Nurture Controversy

In order properly to comprehend this entire set of events it is necessary to recognize that it is intimately tied to the so-called "nature-nurture" controversy and that the main participants in this continuing dialogue have been, and still are, biologists, psychologists, and sociologists. The controversy centers around the respective contributions made to thought, feeling, and behavior—not to mention certain parameters of biological structure and function—by two divergent sets of variables which are, on the one hand, fundamentally biological (and largely genetic) in nature, and, on the other hand, environmental. The genetic variables are of course intrinsic to the organism; the environmental variables are extrinsic. It may reasonably be assumed that some portion of the variance in all thought, all feeling, and all action is a complex function of genetic variables, environmental variables, or some combination of the two (Anastasi, 1965). Spuhler conceptualizes it in these terms:

Social facts at large cannot be explained by biology alone or by sociology alone. There is no individually or socially important human behavior independent of culture; there is no human behavior independent of genes. All complex human behavior is a vector outcome of variable human genotypes interacting in a variable nonhuman environment with variable social and cultural things and events [1968, p. 110].

Obviously, this is a synthetic interpretation. It should be

carefully contrasted with extreme or antithetical interpretations of the "either-or" format alluded to above. We should clearly recognize, therefore, that it is not entirely appropriate to conceptualize the environmental-genetic issues in such simple dichotom-

ous terminology.

It may certainly be assumed, however, that the relative magnitude or the importance of the environmental or genetic effects is variable. In the case of certain disorders involving CNS dysfunction, such as mongolism and phenylketonuria (PKU), the genetic factor has historically been of critical importance (Hardy, 1965; Tatum, 1966; Baumeister, 1967). In spite of the genetic etiology, however, in the case of some such disorders-specifically PKUthe phenotypic expression of the underlying genotype may be environmentally manipulated. The important point to observe is that from all indications the frequency of such genetically determined instances of brain damage is distinctly limited relative to the total number of cases of CNS dysfunction—the great majority of which are a function of a host of environmental variables impinging upon the organism during the pre-natal, the natal, and the post-natal periods of development (Birch, 1964; Yacorzynski, 1965; Siegel, 1967; Birch & Gussow, 1970). Therefore, at the present time it is assumed that a basically environmental theoretical scheme designed to conceptualize the events behind the epidemiological distribution of CNS dysfunction is entirely appropriate.

What the present theoretical scheme attempts to demonstrate, among other things, is that certain variables—which are largely sociocultural in nature—actually alter the physiochemical intra-uterine environment in such a manner as to induce CNS dysfunction on the part of the conceptus during the embryonic and/or fetal developmental stages, largely independent of the genotype. For example, extreme conditions of malnutrition during the pre- or post-natal stages of development may induce severe CNS dysfunction regardless of the fact that the underlying genotype may predispose toward average, or even superior, neurological development. If general intelligence (IQ) is thereafter seriously depressed, or if the various other symptomatic indicators of CNS dysfunction emerge, the major factor to consider is obviously not the genetic variable per se, but the genetic factor interacting with the environmental variable (malnutrition). Further, as suggested by this particular example, of the two components encompassed by the interaction term, the environmental

factor is clearly the more critical.

The Primary Theoretical Variables

In a very general sense, we might argue that in large part the ecological distribution of CNS dysfunction is a product of the interrelationships of three broad sets of variables. These are: (1) certain external environmental influences, (2) factors which appear to be intrinsic to the state of poverty involving the medically-oriented behavior of the poor, and (3) certain structural or organizational factors revolving around the operation of the medical care system in the U.S.A.

External Environmental Influences

There are several important environmental variables to consider. At this point the most important of these appear to involve interclass and interracial differentials in terms of selective exposure to sources of food, air, and/or water pollution (Cassell, 1968; Ferreira, 1969), poor housing conditions (Gist & Fava, 1964; Clark, 1965; Schoor, 1968), nutritional variables (Platt, 1968; Cravioto, 1968; Birch and Gussow, 1970), unhealthy work conditions, and, perhaps, pathogenic conditions of environmental stimulation—involving sensory deprivation, perceptual isolation, and sensory bombardment—which impinge upon the organism during critical periods of development (Lindsley, 1968; Riesen, 1968). Some of these factors—such as nutritional variables and pathogenic conditions of stimulation—have been investigated rather extensively. Consequently, they are important variables to consider relative to the distribution of brain damage.

Nutritional Variables. The distribution of malnutrition and undernutrition along class and racial lines may be the major factor behind the epidemiological distribution of CNS dysfunction. The basic variable of interest is protein-calorie malnutrition, which is known to produce a multiplicity of symptoms including alterations of stature and weight, the arrest of biochemical maturation and functioning, and a complex of mental and behavioral symptomatology indicative of underlying CNS dysfunction. Cravioto has indicated some of the neurological consequences of

malnutrition:

If there is a strong possibility that malnutrition interferes with intersensory organization, a few words about the possible mechanisms of action may be relevant. Theoretically, malnutrition could act either directly by interfering with the development of the central nervous system, or indirectly Malnutrition also modifies the growth and biochemical maturation of the brain. The increase of cell cytoplasm, with the exten-

sion of axons and dendrites—one of the two main morphological processes associated with the growth of the human brain at birth—is largely a process of protein synthesis [1968, pp. 48-50].

It is apparent that protein-calorie malnutrition is an extremely important variable directly conditioning progressive, ongoing neurological development. Malnutrition, particularly during the critical periods of development, may distort this general process of neurological development and eventuate in CNS dysfunction

and its sequelae.

A number of authors (Rajalakshmi, Govindarajan, & Ramakrishnan, 1965; Platt & Wheeler, 1967; Scrimshaw, 1967) have called attention to the generality of the effects of malnutrition—particularly with reference to the underdeveloped nations of the so-called "Third World." Malnutrition appears to activate a series of events which function in such a manner as to maintain poverty and/or the socioeconomic status quo. This series of events is initiated with the destruction of the neurological substrate behind learning, and it terminates with the inhibition of upward social mobility. A reasonable inference at this point is that this same series of events characterized primitive man and retarded his social and economic development for untold eons of time.

We should not lose sight of the fact that the problems centering around malnutrition on the international scene probably differ from those on the domestic scene only in scope. CNS dysfunction and all of the other symptomatic indicators of proteincalorie malnutrition are probably common to the state of poverty wherever and whenever it appears. It may also be true that malnutrition in some form characterizes certain segments of middle and upper class society. Finally, while it is true that people can adapt—physiologically and behaviorally—to the effects of malnutrition, there is little evidence that this adaptation is ultimately functional for the people concerned (Dubos, 1968). Clearly, malnutrition is associated with more negative than positive effects.

Sensory Alterations of a Pathological Nature. The linkage of CNS dysfunction and sensory restriction is now well-established (Riesen, 1958; Rosenzweig, Krech, Bennett, & Diamond, 1962; Rosenzweig, 1966; Hunt, 1969b). The important question, of course, revolves around the epidemiological distribution of brain damage and the probability that it was preceded by adverse conditions of sensory restriction, particularly perhaps during the critical developmental stages of infancy. As Jensen (1969) has observed, it is not entirely clear that in fact the lower social classes are characterized by more obvious conditions of sensory restriction, in spite of the fact that this is at least implicitly assumed by many

authors (Deutsch, 1968). It may well be that sensory restriction is

only one factor to consider.

Sensory bombardment may be an important variable to consider in its own right. It is interesting to observe in this connection that several authors have recently called attention to the adverse effects of crowding and noise level relative to fetal and/or neonatal development (Kincaid, 1965; Ferreira, 1969). There is some possibility that the pregnant mother and/or the newborn child is at unusual risk in the "teeming slum" of the modern metropolis—a risk factor associated with conditions of crowding and high levels of auditory stimulation. On this point, we are in complete agreement with Riesen:

An impoverished sensory environment results in the arrest of behavioral development, in retarded biological development, and in anatomical and physiological changes in the nervous system. At the other extreme, sensory bombardment produces an overstimulation which in time may result in severe damage to neurons of relay centers and in chronically heightened sensory thresholds. Data already in hand clearly imply an intermediate optimum of stimulation level for development and maintenance of neural elements of behavior, depending upon specific behavioral outcomes used as criteria [1968, p. 293].

At any rate, our assumption is that the probability of CNS dysfunction is heightened in the case of any child who is subjected to extreme and prolonged conditions of sensory deprivation, perceptual isolation (monotony), or sensory bombardment during critical periods of neurological development. The prevalence of such conditions may be greatest wherever "cultural deprivation" prevails. As Gordon (1968) and Deutsch (1968) have suggested, cultural deprivation is essentially a function of reduced socioeconomic status. Consequently, we should expect such pathogenic conditions of stimulation to be more prevalent in the lower regions of the stratification system in any given community. We state therefore as a very tentative hypothesis: Cultural deprivation is integrally related to pathogenic conditions of environmental stimulation such as sensory deprivation, perceptual isolation, and sensory bombardment—phenomena which may be capable of inducing CNS dysfunction, acute or chronic, during the pre- and/or post-natal periods of development.

The Medically-Oriented Behavior of the Poor

Relative to the poor and their utilization of existing health services, one component of the problem is captured by Oscar Lewis's concept of the "culture of poverty [Lewis, 1969]." This would appear to involve a general way-of-life which is conducive

to ill health. The presumed indicators of this state of affairs are varied. For example, the poor appear to be less sophisticated in the use of diagnostic, preventive, and treatment facilities; they vary in terms of their capacity to assess illness rationally, to experience anxiety in connection with illness, and to seek out the relevant medical resources to cope with it; they are more prone to utilize a lay referral system rather than the medical referral system; and they may be suspicious, apathetic, indifferent, and even hostile toward the use of medical care facilities and/or their representatives (Rosenblatt & Suchman, 1964; Rosengren, 1964; Zola, 1964; Scott, Illsley, & Biles, 1956; Mechanic, 1968, 1969; Kosa & Robertson, 1969; Rosenstock, 1969; Birch & Gussow, 1970). In general, the poor appear to have little comprehension of illness or disease; they may perceive it in idiosyncratic or unconventional ways relative to their middle class counterparts; and they may react uniquely to it. For the most part these behavioral patterns appear to be disadvantageous for the poor in the sense that they predispose toward more illness, less adequate treat-

ment, and probably a reduced life expectancy.

Further, we should consider the possible interrelationships between maternal emotional factors and congenital malformations (Ferreira, 1969). For example, Rosengren (1964) reports that the lower class female perceives herself as more "sick" during the period of pregnancy relative to middle class females, she conceptualizes her sickness in magical terms, and she views her sickness as a personal crisis. This may be important in view of the fact that there may well be physiological correlates to these emotional reactions which have some bearing on the epidemiological distribution of brain damage. We should recall in this connection the well-known General Adaptation Syndrome (GAS) popularized by Hans Selye (Morgan, 1965; Selye, 1969). Psychophysiologically, there is reason to assume that a complex spectrum of mental and somatic processes are activated by acute or chronic stressful situations (Cofer & Appley, 1964; Morgan, Thompson, 1967). Now, if it is indeed true, as Kohn (1969) and Freid (1969) have suggested, that various forms of situational stress—such as marital disruption, migration, forced residential relocation, physical illness, unemployment, downward social mobility and/or blocked upward mobility, and so forth—are in fact more prevalent in the lower regions of the stratification system, then the presence of such situations may contribute both to the induction of individual psychopathology on the part of the pregnant mother and, possibly, to the production of congenital malformations on the part of her offspring.

Relative to such malformations, some forms of which might

entail neurological complications, the effect would be physiologically mediated by biochemical alterations in the intra-uterine environment which, in turn, were the products of the stress the woman was subjected to and/or her psychological reactions to this stress. The direction of causal influence in such cases would presumably move from the level of social organization to the intrapsychic dimension and, ultimately, to the physiological level. There is, then, some possibility that the distributions of maternal psychopathology, complications of pregnancy, and fetal neurological handicaps are all interrelated. It should be recalled in this connection that the most serious forms of psychopathology namely, schizophrenia—are definitely highly concentrated in the lower social classes (Faris & Dunham, 1939; Hollingshead & Redlich, 1958). Further, it might reasonably be assumed that some physical disorders have similar effects. For example, certain infectious conditions which run high in lower class populations such as syphillis (Mechanic, 1968)—directly contribute to the epidemiological distribution of CNS dysfunction and/or do so in interaction with other factors—such as inadequate medical care. Relative to other infectious conditions, it is possible that their contribution is effected through the induction of high fever during the post-natal period, a loss of appetite, and so forth. Finally, it should also be observed that neurologically handicapped children, regardless of etiology, are probably more likely to demonstrate thought or behavioral patterns indicative of emotional maladjustment (Frostig & Horne, 1964; Koppitz, 1964). Presumably at least in part this is a function of the "social unacceptability" of certain thought or behavioral phenomena typically assumed to be related to underlying CNS dysfunction—that is, the failure of such individual phenomena to "fit" with the prevailing cultural values and/or definitions of normalcy.

These global interclass and interracial indicators of differentials in values, attitudes, behavior, and emotional and physical conditions may be useful in that they provide some picture of the temporal-spatial context out of which more specific effects may emerge. Nevertheless, more molecular indicators of the relevant medically-oriented behavior of the pregnant woman or of mothers of young children must be discovered in order to evaluate the sociocultural variable in our theoretical scheme. Fortunately,

there are data available.

Birch and Gussow have recently reviewed a great deal of evidence indicating that the poor—and especially the black poor—receive inadequate pre-natal and post-natal child care. They report, "Even from this brief look it is evident that the poor woman, especially if she is non-white, often conceives and bears her chil-

dren with a minimum of professional advice or attention [Birch &

Gussow, 1970]."

The poor are more likely to seek medical care at public health clinics or at the emergency wards of large urban hospitals, rather than through the private practicing physician system. During the period of pregnancy, poor women are more likely to seek care later in the pregnancy cycle, to consult infrequently with professional medical specialists, and, occasionally, to have their children delivered by non-professional workers (such as midwives) under less than desirable obstetrical conditions. Further, the poor deliver their children when they are too young or too old and they do so too often-and all of these patterns of childbearing appear to predispose toward congenital malformations. Finally, it is well-known that the poor are less prone to seek out adequate pediatric care for their children during the post-natal period and to secure appropriate medical care for themselves. Presumably, for all of these reasons the rates of CNS dysfunction tend to be considerably higher in populations of lower class childrenparticularly non-white children.

The Ethnocentric Bias and the Organization of the Medical Care System

Obviously, as Valentine (1968), Carmichael and Hamilton (1967), and Duff and Hollingshead (1968) have indicated, there is much more to consider here than the supposed inherent deficiencies of the poor themselves. The reference here is to the operation of ethnocentrism-one variant of which is racism (Lessa, 1964)—or to prejudice and discrimination relative to the delivery of adequate medical services (Newsweek, 1969; Roth, 1969). Essentially the same problem has been observed in connection with the delivery of psychiatric services (Hollingshead & Redlich, 1958; Myers & Schaffer, 1954; Hunt, 1963). The general run of the research in this area has revealed a most interesting paradox: the poor in general are characterized by the more severe forms of physical and mental pathology and receive inferior treatment, while the more affluent segments of the population are characterized by less serious forms of physical and mental pathology and receive superior treatment. There is certainly sufficient evidence available to suggest that there is a good deal more to consider than simply the "resistance" of the lower class patient population to the reception of adequate medical services. Perhaps, in fact, the major component of the problem involves the "resistance" of middle or upper class medical specialists to extend adequate medical treatment to the lower class patient population. Therefore, the effects of ethnocentrism should be seen as a major vari-

able superimposed over the entire theoretical scheme.

Generally speaking, ethnocentrism links the problems of the poor to the society as a whole. It is far too simple to assume that the problems in question spring entirely from characteristics inherent in the poor. This is truly a social problem involving the maladaptive interaction of various segments of the society with one another. Perhaps as Thomas Szasz (1967, 1969) has repeatedly suggested relative to "mental illness," we inadvertently manufacture physical pathology because it is economically, politically, and socially functional for us. It is possible that the ecological distribution of brain damage is, to some unknown degree, a product of certain latent or unintended functions associated with our conventional political, economic, educational, and medical institutional arrangements. Perhaps related to this ethnocentric bias are certain structural features revolving around the formal and informal organization of the American medical care system. It is abundantly clear, for example, that the medical care system in the United States is organized along social class lines (Roth, 1969).

Correlated with the dual organization of the medical care system are certain marked differentials in the quality and the quantity of medical care, in the type of doctor-patient relationship patterns manifested, and the ecological distribution of physicians and medical care facilities within the metropolitan region and in rural areas (Langer, 1966; Marden, 1966; Roth, 1969; Birch & Gussow, 1970). Medical care is more easily available for the middle class patient population, and it is within the range of middle class financial means; for the middle class its bureaucratic organizational structure is easily adapted to, and the quality of medical care provided tends to be of a superior nature. The opposite situation prevails for the poor. The doctor-patient relationship is of a gemeinschaft-like nature in the case of the middle class patient and of a gesellschaft-like nature in the case of the lower class patient. Rosenblatt and Suchman (1964) point to an obvious "cultural conflict" between the rational, highly organized, impersonal, bureaucratic, medical mechanism—dominated by middle and upper class societal representatives—on the one hand, and the largely uninformed, occasionally irrational, superstitious, and fearful lower class patient population on the other hand. Obviously, the poor have real problems articulating their health needs with the bureaucratic strictures of the medical machinery they encounter.

In summary, then, the ecological distribution of brain damage appears to be a complex function of the interaction of a set of social forces differentially impinging upon various social class groupings and/or ethnically divergent groups. Moreover, the relationship between CNS dysfunction and social structure is reciprocal. While it may be true that the social structure produces the epidemiological distribution of brain damage, the physical pathology so induced reciprocally alters the social structure—the system of interpersonal interactions and/or the stratification system. Brain damage on the part of any given individual or group of individuals may be a partial determinant of various parameters of interpersonal interaction, family and peer group organization (Freedman, Helme, Havel, Eustis, Riley, & Langford, 1968), educational achievement (Birch & Gussow, 1970), general behavior (Birch, 1964; Pasamanick & Knobloch, 1961), and, ultimately, social class placement.

Other Theoretical Considerations

The data reviewed above pertain primarily to factors A and B in our theoretical scheme. There is of course a broad spectrum of other material related to the remaining theoretical propositions.

The propositions that perceptual-motor problems are in some cases symptomatic of underlying CNS dysfunction and that they may eventuate in the induction of learning disabilities of one kind or another are based on a good deal of implicit, if not explicit, consensus (Kawi & Pasamanick, 1959; Kephart, 1960; Pasamanick & Knobloch, 1961; Frostig & Horne, 1964; Frostig, Lefever, & Whithlessey, 1966; Jastak & Jastak, 1965; Johnson & Myklebust, 1967). The relationship between general intelligence and neurological integrity has recently been reviewed by Guilford (1967). The prevalence of learning disabilities or generalized academic underachievement has both individual and societal consequences of a rather serious nature (Jastak & Jastak, 1965; Clark, 1964). The societal consequences stem from the interrelatedness of institutions, which are organically bound together, and the merging of educational and societal interests (Gross, 1959; Clark, 1964). The linkage of academic achievement, occupational determination, and socioeconomic status is well-known by sociologists (Hughes, 1959; Clark, 1964; Svalastoga, 1964; Bell & Stub, 1968; Brookover & Ericksen, 1969; Heller, 1969). Data indicating that reduced socioeconomic status is a function of academic underachievement has very recently been published by Hathaway, Reynolds, and Monachesi (1969a, b). Finally, the basic dynamics of the socialization process and its possible relationship to the present theoretical scheme are highlighted in numerous sociological works (Wilson, 1966; Clausen, 1968; Johnson, 1968).

Some Deductions and Implications

Based on the theory and the data presented above, it is a reasonable inference that the ecological distribution of brain damage, empirically specified, is not random. In fact, it may be assumed that cases of CNS dysfunction are highly concentrated in certain regions of the metropolitan complex-specifically, in the ghetto-to the relative exclusion of other areas, such as suburbia and perhaps the rural hinterland. Rates of brain damage appear to be highest in the central city region, reduced in the suburban zone, and of questionable magnitude in the rural-urban fringe (Gist & Fava, 1964). More generally, the distribution of CNS dysfunction is a product of reduced socioeconomic status and racial group membership. The prevalence of brain damage appears to be extremely high in certain sectors of the populationparticularly in the black subculture—and in those blighted regions of the community where poverty is a way of life. This follows directly from a comparable distribution of a variety of pathogenic conditions—including high rates of physical and mental pathology on the part of poor pregnant women and poor newborn children, malnutrition and undernutrition, inadequate medical care, and so forth—which may predispose toward the induction of brain damage.

We might regard the ecological distribution of brain damage as a dependent variable which is functionally related to a set of independent variables. These independent variables are a group of social forces which, for the most part, appear to be coterminous with social class position and/or racial group membership and which are linked to the pathogenic conditions alluded to above. If these inferences are reasonable, and if this general line of reasoning is logically valid, then the following three hypotheses

should be true:

(1) The ecological distribution of CNS dysfunction is not random.

(2) Rates of CNS dysfunction are inversely correlated with socioeconomic status

in the case of all children.

(3) Cases of CNS dysfunction are differentially distributed along racial lines; rates of brain damage are higher among black children at any given social class level relative to white children of comparable social class position.

These hypotheses may be regarded as a test of factors A and B in our theoretical scheme. In this connection, we have some tentative and limited empirical data to report.

The Empirical Data

Methodological and Procedural Considerations

In the spring of 1969 a small-scale community research proj-

ect was executed in the area of Muskegon, Michigan. The basic purpose of the research project was to determine if the ecological distribution of CNS dysfunction at the local level could be determined by simple and objective sociological and psychological techniques. The Bender Gestalt-administered, scored, and evaluated according to the Koppitz (1964) method of analysis-was utilized as the measure of neurological integrity, and the Hollingshead Index of Social Position (Hollingshead & Redlich, 1958; Myers & Bean, 1968) was employed to assess socioeconomic status (SES). Five separate social classes are encompassed by the index: Upper-Middle (Class I), Middle (Class II), Lower-Middle (Class III), Working (Class IV), and Lower (Class V).

Within the geographical area of study, eight separate schools of variable SES and racial composition were selected. All of the schools were highly segregated along racial lines. A total sample of 219 subjects (148 white Ss and 71 black Ss) was secured. The sample so obtained, all of them third grade children of either sex, was tested with the Bender Gestalt by a qualified psychologist in

school during regular hours.

The parents or guardians of these children were contacted to obtain permission to test their child in school. The range of positive responses varied from a low of 72 percent at one school to a high of 96 percent at another school; in most of the schools, the range of permission varied from 82 percent to 92 percent. If permission was granted, the parents or guardians were sent a brief questionnaire designed to elicit the information necessary to measure social class position.

From the pool of data available, varying numbers of cases were randomly selected for more detailed statistical analyses. The latter involved the use of analysis of variance techniques, multiple regression analysis, and "dummy variable" analysis, which entailed the dichotomization of social class into non-manual (classes

I, II, and III) and manual (classes IV and V) categories.

Results

All three hypotheses were given limited support by the research data. Our second hypothesis was less strongly supported because there was an uneven number of Ss in each of the five social classes. Sample sizes of less than 30 whites were obtained in social class positions I, II, and V; most of the white Ss were in classes III and IV-and by far most of them in the latter positionapparently reflecting the dominant socioeconomic structure of the community at large. Conversely, the great majority of black Ss were in the lowest two social class positions (IV and V). Unfortunately, therefore, the distribution of the black sample along social

class lines precludes an understanding of the magnitude of the problem of brain damage in middle and upper class samples of

TABLE 1
THE EPIDEMIOLOGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF CNS DYSFUNCTION
IN WHITE SS ACCORDING TO SOCIAL CLASS

Charles a desired			Social Clas	8	
	1	П	Ш	IV	V
Number (N)	14	20	35	55	23 '
Percent Diagnosed Brain Damaged	29%	10%	3%	25%	26%
Percent of Brain Damaged Ss Diagnosed Minimal	75%	100%		71%	100%

TABLE 2
THE EPIDEMIOLOGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF CNS DYSFUNCTION
IN NEGRO SS ACCORDING TO SOCIAL CLASS

	Social Class					
	1	11	III	IV	V	
Number (N)	1	and like	4	14	26	
Percent Diagnosed Brain Damaged			25%	50%	69%	
Percent of Brain Damaged Ss Diagnosed Minimal			100%	43%	28%	

TABLE 3
THE EPIDEMIOLOGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF CNS DYSPUNCTION ACCORDING TO SCHOOL, SOCIAL CLASS, AND RACE

	School Identification							
The Brand	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Modal SES Rating	ш	ш	IV	IV	IV	IV	v	v
Race	White	White	White	White	White	White	Black	Black
Number (N)	23	34	24	19	24	23	27	45
Percent Diagnosed Brain Damaged	4%	15%	25%	21%	25%	22%	26%	58%

Negro children. A similar problem is present in the case of white children in our sample due to the small number of S_s in social class positions I (N = 14) and II (N = 20).

It should also be observed that the data related to the black sample are even further limited due to the fact that the testing at one of the black schools (see Tables 3 and 4) was biased by the school personnel, who "practiced" the children on the Bender Gestalt designs prior to the arrival of the research staff. This rather interesting maneuver effectively reduced the rate of visual-motor malfunction—and/or neurological disability as objectively measured by the Bender Gestalt—by a factor of approximately one-half relative to the performance of a "naive" sample of black Ss at a second school—a result which was statistically significant well beyond the .01 level. Perhaps, therefore, compensatory education, involving "perceptual training," is required and is effective in black ghetto schools—an inference, in fact, which originally motivated the research team to execute the community study.

TABLE 4

Analysis of Variance: The Effects of Exposure and Practice on the Bender Gestalt in the Case of Negro Children (N=52)

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Squares	F
Between Schools	105.3077	melles person	105.3077	10.3571**
Experimental Error	508.3846	50	10.1677	
Total	613.6923	51	THE STREET	

^{**}p < .01

Interestingly enough, the limited data available in the case of the white sample suggest that the relationship of CNS dysfunction and social class position is curvilinear—not linear (see Table 1). Rates of brain damage appear to be considerably higher than originally suspected in the two upper class positions (29 percent and 10 percent in classes I and II respectively). The reasons for this, aside from sampling error, are not clear. We suspect that the rates are in part a function of an unspecified number of adoptive children in these class positions, the presence of socially mobile but obstetrically incompetent mothers who themselves derive from lower socioeconomic backgrounds (Birch & Gussow, 1970), or perhaps the presence of certain pathogenic conditions which are more prevalent in the upper socioeconomic strata than originally suspected (such as untreated infectious disease, emotional maladjustment, malnutrition, heavy smoking or drinking, and so forth). Obviously, it will take a good deal of future research to definitively answer these questions.

Within the limits of our data, we report the following tentative results. Rates of brain damage per 100 white Ss at social class positions III (N = 35), IV (N = 55), and V (N = 23) were, respectively, 3, 25, and 26 (see Table 1). That is, 3 percent of the class

TABLE 5

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: SOCIAL CLASS AND CNS DYSFUNCTION (N = 70 WHITE SC)

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Square	F
Between Classes	48.0572	Sound All bear	48.0572	10.17**
Experimental Error	321.3143	68	4.725	o mi Hangara
Total	369.3715	69		THE PARTY NAMED IN

**p < .01

TABLE 6

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: AGE, SEX. AND CNS DYSFUNCTION (N = 80)

Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Square	F
Age	9.1125	1	9.1125	2.53
Sex	.6125	land toll	.6125	.17
Age × Sex	1.5125	1 1	1.5125	.42
Within Cell	273.1500	76	3.59	
Total	284.3875	79		

TABLE 7

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: SOCIAL CLASS, RACE, AND CNS DYSFUNCTION (N = 56)

Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Square	F
Race	117.1607	1	117.1607	13.855**
Social Class	4.0179	1	4.0179	.475
Race × Social Class	5.6536	1	5.6536	.669
Within Cell	439.7214	52	8.456	AND THE SA
Total	566.5536	55	21 F	

**p < .01

Ill children appeared to be neurologically handicapped, 25 percent of the class IV children were so afflicted, and 26 percent of

the class V children. In the case of the white sample of children, the frequency of minimal brain damage exceeded the frequency of maximal brain damage. The severity continuum of CNS dysfunction employed is based on the Bender Gestalt visual-motor developmental (D) score, which itself is a function of relative error

magnitude.

Rates of brain damage per 100 black children at social class positions IV (N = 14) and V (N = 26) were, respectively, 50 and 69 (see Table 2). That is, 50 percent of the class IV children appeared to be brain damaged according to the set of psychological test parameters analyzed, and 69 percent of the class V children. Combining classes IV and V into a total sample size of 40 (which of course is still pathetically small), 58 percent of the black children appear to be neurologically handicapped. Further, in the case of the black sample, the frequency of maximal brain damage exceeded the frequency of minimal brain damage-constituting, therefore, a direct reversal of the minimal-maximal severity pattern observed in the case of the whites. It is apparent, then, that the black population of children is characterized not only by higher overall rates of brain damage relative to the white population, it is also characterized by more severe cases of brain damage. Moreover, the ecological patterns indicated are roughly consistent with the observations of a variety of other investigators (Pasamanick & Knobloch, 1961; Bronfenbrenner, 1967; Birch & Gussow, 1970).

Various statistical analyses confirm the essential patterns indicated above. An ANOVA design was employed to test for class differences in a white sample of 70 Ss at social class positions III and IV. The obtained F statistic (see Table 5) was significant at the .01 level. Rates of brain damage therefore run considerably higher in white class IV children relative to white class III

children.

A second ANOVA design was utilized in order to determine if rates of brain damage varied according to age and/or sex (see Table 6). The obtained F statistic was insignificant, suggesting

that these variables are largely irrelevant.

Finally, a third ANOVA design was employed (see Table 7) to determine the relationship of CNS dysfunction to race, social class position, and the interaction of the two. The obtained F values indicate that only the main effect of race is statistically significant. The fact that race is the more important predictor of childhood neurological status was also demonstrated by a series of regression analyses. Multiple correlation (R) values ranging from .46 in the general regression analysis to .63 in the case of the dummy variable analysis were obtained. The empirical evidence allows us to make an important inference. Within limits, and depending upon the results of future cross-validation studies, it may be possible to utilize certain bits of sociological (demographic) information—such as race and social class position—to predict a biological variable, neurological status, with some degree of

accuracy.

The reader must bear in mind that the empirical data reported are characterized by several weak points. For example, the sample of Ss employed is extremely small, it is time-bound, geographically limited, and probably not entirely representative in view of the fact that the Ss selected were volunteers. Further, the diagnostic techniques utilized, while reasonably sophisticated from a psychometric point of view, are certainly far from perfect. We regard the entire research project as a rather extended pilot study—nothing more or nothing less. The basic results must be replicated (utilizing a variety of research designs in various geographical and social loci) or cross-validated before we can be truly certain of the ecological distribution of CNS dysfunction. Until that time, the reader is advised to approach the empirical data with the utmost caution.

General Discussion

The basic empirical data, limited though they are, rather clearly suggest that the prevalence of CNS dysfunction is considerably more extreme than tradition would lead us to expect. The reasons for this are conceptualized in terms of our basic theoretical scheme. In the most fundamental sense, poverty and discrimination appear to be the major factors which produce the distribution. We should note that poverty probably does not inevitably produce such results. For example, Mechanic (1968) cites data indicating that poor Jewish immigrants to America had the lowest rates of infant mortality of any group studied, including the native white population, in spite of poverty. As Pasamanick and Knobloch (1961) have observed, the poverty-associated factors that induce high rates of infant mortality are also the factors that in all probability partially produce the epidemiological distribution of brain damage. It will be critically important to specify such "exceptions" in the future in order to strengthen the theoretical scheme.

At this point, however, there are more immediate problems which must be dealt with. Two of the most important of these include the potential racial implications and the possibility of

prevention.

Racism

We are extremely ambivalent concerning our data. On the one hand, the findings are unfortunately subject to major distortion or mis-interpretation; in this sense they are potentially both destructive and dangerous. Conversely, we definitely wish to confront the data and their implications in order to initiate a positive and systematic resolution of certain underlying social problems

which we believe to be of critical importance.

There is no doubt that the data will be controversial from a social point of view. The findings will be extremely attractive to the racially inclined individual—and this will be not only undesirable but perhaps dangerous. We wish to avoid the implications of racism. We recognize, however, that our wishes are largely irrelevant. If in fact the reader is so motivated, he will interpret the findings in accordance with his own wishes, fears, or convictions. It is therefore necessary, at least briefly, to consider the meaning of racism and the rationale upon which it is constructed.

We might begin with the observation that while race itself is largely a biological concept (Montagu, 1963; Gottesman, 1968a), racism is a sociological concept (Lessa, 1964; Pinkney, 1969). The confounding of these two concepts has led to very unfortunate consequences. Unfortunately, racism is logically compatible with genetic formulations. In such a case biological inheritance, or "protoplasmic continuity," may then be regarded as the underlying variable determining the supposedly inherent inferiority of one race relative to another. It is more difficult to support such notions environmentally simply because few if any psychological or cultural characteristics are truly immutable or inherent in the sense that genetically determined characteristics are.

Racial notions of various sorts are socially constructed for a variety of reasons, usually in order to justify the exploitation or the domination of one group of people by another. Racism is intrinsically value-laden. For the most part there are no scientific data to support racial presuppositions. If it is argued that in fact there are such data, it is nearly always possible to demonstrate that the data referred to are limited, and sometimes critically so. For example, the well-known interracial differences in terms of general intelligence, conventionally measured, may be conceptualized genetically (Jensen, 1969) or environmentally (Kline-

berg, 1951).

Relative to interracial and/or interclass IQ differentials, it may be possible to devise a critical experiment to test these opposing interpretations. As an approximation to such a test, we might observe that for the most part the available evidence is

predicated on a research design which does not normally control for neurological status (Kennedy, VanDeRiet, & White, 1963). Large groups of white or black Ss of varying socioeconomic status are typically uncritically selected and tested with conventional psychometric instruments. Naturally, major differences between the classes and the races are indicated. In all probability the observed differences are largely a function of the fact that the groups so selected contain an unspecified number of neurologically handicapped Ss, and these Ss pull the group averages down. If the entire group was neurologically screened to begin with, and the neurologically normal or deviant Ss appropriately compared with other Ss of similar neurological status, and the conventional tests then administered, the supposedly obvious or inevitable IQ differentials between the groups might collapse to zero and/or statistical insignificance.

We should clarify our position on the genetic-IQ issue at this point. We are not denying that the genotype is one determinant of phenotypical differences in general intelligence (Anastasia, 1965; Gottesman, 1968a; Jensen, 1969; Vanderberg, 1968). But it must be recalled that the phenotype is a product of a multiplicity of factors or variables, only one of which is represented by the genotype (Guilford, 1967). Our final conclusion is that there are interclass and interracial differences in terms of measurable intelligence; both environmental and genetic factors appear to contribute to these IQ differentials. At the present time we are assuming that the major factors contributing to group differences are environmental in nature. On this point we are in essential agreement with

Gottesman:

My evaluation of the literature on race differences has led me to conclude that the differences observed between the mean IQs of Negro Americans and other Americans can be accounted for almost wholly by environmental disadvantages which start in the prenatal period and continue throughout a lifetime [1968b].

There is another point to consider relative to the rationale behind racism, and that is that it is simply illogical. It is well-known that a variety of behavioral aberrations or physical disease conditions vary as a function of age, sex, social class position, occupation, ethnic background, and so forth—a point that is very well supported by the general epidemiological literature. For example, schizophrenia appears to be considerably more prevalent in the lower socioeconomic strata, while neuroticism appears to be more widespread in middle or upper class circles (Faris & Dunham, 1939; Hollingshead & Redlich, 1958). Conventional crime is closely related to reduced socioeconomic status,

but of course "white collar" crime is the sport of many of those in the higher reaches of the stratification system (Mannheim, 1965; Schur, 1969). There are such phenomena as "disorders of the poor"'-bronchitis, pneumonia, epidemic and infectious diseases, and so forth—and of course "disorders of the rich"—coronary heart disease, duodenal ulcers in older men, the leukaemias, poliomyelities, and so on (Lerner, 1969). Various respiratory disorders may be occupationally determined, as in the case of certain miners. Age may be a potent variable relative to the induction of certain disorders (senile psychosis and arteriosclerosis), while sex is the major factor in disorders such as the various complications of pregnancy and gynecological disturbances. Examples might be multiplied indefinitely, but the point is really quite simple. Conditions such as these presumably fluctuate or vary according to the operation of certain well-defined (or at least potentially definable) causal agents such as stress, air pollutants of various sorts, infectious or viral agents in certain environmental loci, and so on. They do not necessarily vary according to the prevailing social mores, whatever those are. It is therefore apparent, relative to our own data, that the brand of interpretive logic that supports the conclusion that the Negro is inherently inferior because the black population is characterized by high rates of a particular physical disorder—namely, CNS dysfunction-will also support the hypothesis of inferiority of the white population, which would appear to be characterized by higher rates of white collar crime, coronary heart disease, and even certain neurological disorders (such as poliomyelities). Now this mode of thought is not only uncomfortable, it is also unproductive. Behavioral aberrations and disease conditions are not necessarily altered by labelling processes that eventuate in the social designations of "inferiority" and "superiority." And they are not altered by social inaction. They are altered, if one is so motivated, by the systematic search for the causal factors behind the disorder -and the ultimate elimination of those factors.

Prevention

We believe that prevention is the most critical factor to consider at this point. There is reason to suspect that the problems in question may become more prevalent in the future if proper steps are not taken to counteract them (Birch & Gussow, 1970). The concepts of prevention promulgated by Gerald Caplan (1964, 1968) are highly relevant here:

One public health preventive model that I have found useful is that which divides the field into three levels: Primary prevention, which encompasses measures to reduce incidence—the rate of new cases over a certain time

period; secondary prevention, which denotes measures to reduce prevalence—the rate of new and old cases at a point in time; and tertiary prevention, which focuses on lowering the rate of residual defect in the population of former patients [Caplan, 1968, p. 11].

Obviously, this model of prevention is broad enough to encompass measures designed both to prevent the problem from emerging and to control it if it does emerge or increase. Conceptually, it advocates the systematic elimination of the disorder relative to the people unfortunately afflicted. We believe that the model is relevant and applicable to the problems centering around the ecolog-

ical distribution of CNS dysfunction.

The theoretical scheme proposed here suggests that preventive efforts could be initiated at several points simultaneously or successively. It is our contention that primary and secondary prevention are more important than tertiary prevention, but we believe that preventive efforts should move along all three fronts. Primary or secondary prevention might involve a number of key factors such as the elimination or the reduction of poverty, racism, and discrimination, inadequate medical care, inferior education, and so forth. Tertiary preventive efforts might involve the creation of a full range of medical, psychological, and social facilities attached to the school (but capable of reaching deep into the preschool period) which would provide a broad spectrum of diagnostic, treatment, and research services. A major component of the tertiary preventive effort would involve "compensatory education" in all of its varied forms (Hunt, 1969b).

Conclusions

Our data are quite consistent with those of other investigators, all of which clearly suggest that the ecological distribution of CNS dysfunction is not random. There is, however, one important exception which should be mentioned at this point. The reference here is to a study recently reported by McDermott, Harrison, Schrager, Wilson, Killins, Lindy, and Waggoner (1968). According to the data reported by these investigators, there is no essential relationship between the frequency of CNS dysfunction and such demographic variables as social class and race. We strongly suspect that the results of this study are a function of sampling bias, since apparently all of the data were secured from the records of a children's psychiatric hospital. The authors considered the fact that their data could be biased due to a selection factor, but they rejected the possibility. Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare the data from this study with our own data due to the differences in sampling methodology. What is called for at this point is more field research related to the ecological distribution

of brain damage—not inter-agency data.

It is, again, our contention that CNS dysfunction is not randomly distributed in the community at large. The problems in question appear to be extremely prevalent and intense in certain sectors of the population—specifically in those blighted regions of the community where poverty is the predominant mode of life. At this point we believe that prevention is the most important problem to consider. There are too many children whose basic potential-whose general adjustment, happiness, and satisfaction —is unnecessarily threatened by brain damage. The problems are serious. The hour is late. It remains to be seen if America is able or willing to rise to the challenge—or if she is not (Killian, 1968).

REFERENCES

Anastasi, A. Individual differences. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965. BAUMEISTER, A. A. (Ed.) Mental retardation. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1967.

BELL, R., & STUB, H. R. (Eds.) The sociology of education. Homewood, Illinois:

The Dorsey Press, 1968.

BIRCH, H. G. (Éd.) Brain damage in children. New York: The Williams and Wilkins Co., 1964.

BIRCH, H. G., & Gussow, J. D. Disadvantaged children: Health, nutrition and school failure. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1970. Bronfenbrenner, U. The psychological costs of quality and equality in educa-

tion. Child Development, 1967, 38, 909-25. BRONFENBRENNER, U. Two worlds of childhood: U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970.

BROOKOVER, W. B., & ERICKSEN, E. L. Society, schools and learning. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1969. Buckley, W. Modern systems research for the behavioral scientist. Chicago: Aldine

Publishing Co., 1968. CAPLAN, G. Principles of preventive psychiatry. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1964. CAPLAN, G. Conceptual models in community mental health. Harvard Medical

School. Private Publication, January 14, 1968.

CARMICHAEL, S., & HAMILTON, C. V. Black power. New York: Vintage Books, 1967. CASSELL, E. J. The health effects of air pollution and their implications for control. Law and Contemporary Problems, 1968, 33, 197-216.

CLARK, B. R. Sociology of education. In R. E. L. Faris (Ed.), Handbook of modern sociology. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1964.

CLARK, K. B. Dark ghetto. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965.

CLAUSEN, J. A. (Ed.) Socialization and society. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1968. COFER, C. N., & APPLEY, M. H. Motivation: Theory and research. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964.

COLEMAN, J. C. Abnormal psychology and modern life. Chicago: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1964.

CRAVIOTO, J. Nutritional deficiencies and mental performance in childhood. In D. Glass (Ed.), Environmental influences. New York: The Rockefeller University Press, 1969 versity Press, 1968.

DEUTSCH, C. P. Environment and perception. In M. Deutsch, I. Katz, and A.

Jensen (Eds.), Social class, race, and psychological development. New York: Holt,

Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968.

Donnelly, J. F., Flowers, C. E., Creadick, R. N., Wells, H. B., & Greenberg, B. G. Paranatal, fetal, and environmental factors in perinatal mortality. American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, 1957, 74, 1245-56.

DONNELLY, J. F., FLOWERS, C. E., CREADICK, R. N., WELLS, H. B., GREENBERG, B. G., & Surles, K. B. Maternal, fetal, and environmental factors in prematurity. American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, 1964, 88, 918-31.

Dubos, R. Environmental determinants of human life. In D. Glass (Ed.), Environmental influences. New York: The Rockefeller University Press. 1968.

DUFF, R. S., & HOLLINGSHEAD, A. B. Sickness and society. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.

FARIS, R. E. L., & DUNHAM, W. H. Mental disorder in urban areas. Chicago: The

University of Chicago Press, 1939.

FERREIRA, A. J. Prenatal environment. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1969.

FREEDMAN, A. M., HELME, W., HAVEL, J., EUSTIS, M., RILEY, C., & LANGFORD, W. S. Family adjustment to the brain-damaged child. In N. W. Bell, and E. F. Vogel (Eds.), A modern introduction to the family. New York: The Free Press, 1968.

FRIED, M. Social differences in mental health. In J. Kosa, A. Antonovsky, and I. K. Zola (Eds.), Poverty and health. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

FROSTIG, M., & HORNE, D. The Frostig program for the development of visual perception.

Chicago: Follett Publishing Co., 1964.

FROSTIG, M., LEFEVER, W., & WHITHLESSEY, J. Administration and scoring manual for the Marianne Frostig developmental test of visual perception. Palo Alto: Consulting Psychologists Press, 1966.

GIST, N. P., & FAVA, S. F. Urban society. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co.,

1964.

GORDON, E. W. Programs of compensatory education. In M. Deutsch, I. Katz, and A. Jensen (Eds.), Social class, race, and psychological development. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968.

GOTTESMAN, I. Biogenetics of race and class. In M. Deutsch, I. Katz, and A. Jensen (Eds.), Social class, race, and psychological development. New York: Holt,

Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968. (a)

GOTTESMAN, I. Beyond the fringe-Personality and psychopathology. In D. Glass (Ed.), Genetics. New York: The Rockefeller University Press, 1968. (b) GROSS, N. The sociology of education. In R. K. Merton, L. Broom, and L. S.

Cottrell (Eds.), Sociology today. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959. GUILFORD, J. P. The nature of human intelligence. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,

HARDY, J. B. Perinatal factors and intelligence. In S. F. Osler, and R. E. Cooke (Eds.), The biosocial basis of mental retardation. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins

HATHAWAY, S. R., REYNOLDS, P. C., & MONACHESI, E. D. Follow-up of the later careers and lives of 1,000 boys who dropped out of high school. Journal of

Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1969, 33, 370-80. (a)

HATHAWAY, S. R., REYNOLDS, P. C., & MONACHESI, E. D. Follow-up of 812 girls 10 years after high school dropout. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology,

HELLER, C. S. Structured social inequality. London: The Macmillan Co., 1969. 1969, **33**, 383–90. (b)

HOLLINGSHEAD, A., & REDLICH, F. C. Social class and mental illness. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958. Hughes, E. C. The study of occupations. In R. K. Merton, L. Broom, and L. S.

Cottrell (Eds.), Sociology today. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959.

HUNGER, U.S.A. A Report by the Citizens' Board of Inquiry into Hunger and Malnutrition in the United States. Washington, D.C.: New Community Press, 1968.

HUNT, J. M. Has compensatory education failed? Has it been tried? Reprint Series No. 2. Environment, heredity, and intelligence. The Harvard Educational Review, 1969, 130-52. (a)

HUNT, J. M. The challenge of incompetence and poverty. Urbana: University of Illinois

Press, 1969. (b)

HUNT, R. C. Socio-cultural factors in mental disorder. In E. P. Hollander and R. C. Hunt (Eds.), Current perspectives in social psychology. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963.

JASTAK, J. F., & JASTAK, S. R. The wide range achievement test. Wilmington: Guid-

ance Association, 1965.

JENSEN, A. How much can we boost IQ and achievement. Reprint Series No. 2. Environment, heredity, and intelligence. The Harvard Educational Review, 1969, 1 - 123.

JOHNSON, D. J., & MYKLEBUST, H. R. Learning disabilities. New York: Grune &

Stratton, 1967.

JOHNSON, H. M. Socialization. In R. R. Bell and H. R. Stub (Eds.), The sociology of education. Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968.

KAWI, A. A., & PASAMANICK, B. Prenatal and paranatal factors in the development of childhood reading disorders. Society for the Research in Child Develop-

ment, 1959, 24 (Whole Monogr.).

KENNEDY, W. A., VANDERIET, V., & WHITE, J. C. A normative sample of intelligence and achievement of Negro elementary school children in the Southeastern United States. Society for Research in Child Development, 1963, 28 (Whole Monogr.).

KEPHART, N. C. The slow learner in the classroom. Columbus: Charles E. Merrill

Books, 1960.

KILLIAN, L. M. The impossible revolution. New York: Random House, 1968.

KINCAID, J. C. Social pathology of foetal and infant loss. British Medical Journal, 1965, 1, 1057-60.

KLINEBERG, O. Race and psychology. In UNESCO Series: The race question in modern science, 1951, 7-36.

KNOBLOCH, H., & PASAMANICK, B. Environmental factors affecting human development, before and after birth. Pediatrics, 1960, 26, 210-18.

KOHN, M. L. On the social epidemiology of schizophrenia. In A. Kiev (Ed.),

Social psychiatry. New York: Science House, Inc., 1969.

KOPPITZ, E. The Bender Gestalt test for young children. New York: Grune & Stratton, 1964.

Kosa, J., Antonovsky, A., & Zola, I. K. (Eds.), Poverty and health. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969.

Kosa, J., & Robertson, L. S. The social aspects of health and illness. In J. Kosa, A. Antonovsky, and I. K. Zola (Eds.), Poverty and health. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969.

LANGER, E. The shame of American medicine. The New York Review, May 26,

LERNER, M. Social differences in physical health. In J. Kosa, A. Antonovsky, and I. K. Zola (Eds.), Poverty and health. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969.

LESSA, W. A. Racism. In J. Gould and W. L. Kolb (Eds.), A dictionary of the so-

cial sciences. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1964.

LEVINE, S. Neuro-endocrine factors in mother and infant. In Perspectives on human deprivation: Biological, psychological, and sociological. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1968. Pp. 291-93.

LEWIS, O. The culture of poverty. In D. P. Moynihan (Ed.), On understanding

poverty. New York: Basic Books Inc., 1969.

LINDSLEY, D. Growth, maturation and development. In Perspectives on human deprivation: Biological, psychological, and sociological. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1968. Pp. 273-82.

Mannheim, H. Comparative criminology. New York: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1965.

MARDEN, P. G. A demographic and ecological analysis of the distribution of physicians in metropolitan America, 1960. American Journal of Sociology, 1966, 72, 290-300.

McClearn, G. E. Contributions of genetics to biological and behavioral development and influence of various deprivations. In Perspectives on human deprivation: Biological, psychological, and sociological. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of

Health, Education, and Welfare, 1968. Pp. 286-91.

McDermott, J. F., Harrison, S. I., Schrager, J., Wilson, P., Killins, E., Lindy, J., & WAGGONER, R. W. Social class and mental illness in children: The diagnosis of organicity and mental retardation. In S. Chess and T. Alexander (Eds.), Annual progress in child psychiatry and child development. New York: Brunner/Matzel, 1968.

Mechanic, D. Medical sociology. New York: The Free Press, 1968.

MECHANIC, D. Illness and cure. In J. Kosa, A. Antonovsky, and I. K. Zola (Eds.), Poverty and health. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969.

MONTAGU, A. Race, science and humanity. New York: D. VanNostrand Co., Inc., 1963.

Morgan, C. T. Physiological psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965.

Myers, J. K., & Bean, L. L. A decade later: A follow-up of social class and mental illness. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1968.

Myers, J. K., & Schaffer, L. Social stratification and psychiatric practices: A study of an out-patient clinic. American Sociological Review, 1954, 19, 307-10. Newsweek. If you're black and sick. July 7, 1969.

PARSONS, T., & SHILS, E. A. (Eds.) Toward a general theory of action. New York:

Harper & Row, 1951.

PASAMANICK, B. The contribution of some organic factors to school retardation in

Negro children. Journal of Negro Education, 1958, 27, 4-9.

PASAMANICK, B., & KNOBLOCH, H. Epidemiological studies on the complications of pregnancy and the birth process. In J. Caplan (Ed.), Prevention of mental disorder in children. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1961.

PINKNEY, A. Black Americans. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969. PLATT, B. S. Nutrition and psychosocial deprivation. In Perspectives on human deprivation: Biological, psychological, and sociological. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1968. Pp. 282-86.

PLATT, B. S., & WHEELER, E. F. Protein-calorie deficiency and the central nervous

system. Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology, 1967, 9, 104-05. RAJALAKSHMI, R., GOVINDARAJAN, K. R., & RAMAKRISHNAN, C. V. Effect of dietary protein content on visual discrimination learning and brain biochemistry in the albino rat. Journal of Neurochemistry, 1965, 12, 261-71.

RIESEN, A. H. Plasticity of behavior: Psychological aspects. In H. F. Harlow and C. N. Woolsey (Eds.), Biological and biochemical bases of behavior. Madison:

University of Wisconsin Press, 1958. RIESEN, A. H. Relations between sensory deprivation and development of the nervous system. In Perspectives on human deprivation: Biological, psychological, and sociological. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1968. Pp. 293-97.

ROSENBLATT, D., & SUCHMAN, E. A. Blue-collar attitudes and information toward health and illness. In A. B. Shostak and W. G. Gomberg (Eds.), Blue collar

world. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964.

Rosengren, W. R. Social class and becoming "ill." In A. B. Shostak and W. G. Gomberg (Eds.), Blue collar world. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964.

ROSENSTOCK, I. M. Prevention of illness and maintenance. In J. Kosa, A. Antonovsky, and I. K. Zola (Eds.), Poverty and health. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

University Press, 1969.

Rosenzweig, M. R. Environmental complexity, cerebral change, and behavior.

American Psychologist, 1966, 21, 321-32.

ROSENZWEIG, M. R., KRECH, D., BENNETT, E. L., & DIAMOND, M. C. Effects of environmental complexity and training on brain chemistry and anatomy. Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 1962, 55, 429-37. Ross, R. A. Some important factors in perinatal mortality statistics in a rural

state. American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, 1964, 88, 342-48. ROTH, J. A. The treatment of the sick. In J. Kosa, A. Antonovsky, and I. K. Zola (Eds.), Poverty and health. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969. SARRAM, M., & SAADATNEJADI, M. Birth weight in Shiaz (Iran) in relation to ma-

ternal socioeconomic status. Obstet. Gynec., 1967, 30, 367-70.

SCHOOR, A. L. How the poor are housed in the United States. In S. F. Fava (Ed.), Urbanism in world perspective: A reader. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1968.

Schur, E. M. Our criminal society. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969.

Scott, E. M., Illsley, R., & Biles, M. E. A psychological investigation of primigravidae: III-Some aspects of maternal behavior. Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, 1956, 63, 494-501. Scrimshaw, N. S. Malnutrition, learning and behavior. The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 1967, 20, 393-502.

SELYE, H. Stress: It's a G.A.S. Psychology Today, 1969, 3, 25-26.

SIEGEL, E. Helping the brain injured child. New York: Association for Brain Injured Children, 1967. SPUHLER, J. N. (Ed.) Genetic diversity and human behavior. Publications in An-

thropology, No. 45: Wenner-Gren Foundation, 1968.

SVALASTOGA, K. Social differentiation. In R. E. L. Faris (Ed.), Handbook of modern sociology. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1964.

SZASZ, T. S. The myth of mental illness. In T. Millon (Ed.), Theories of psycho-

pathology. Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1967.

SZASZ, T. S. Interview with Thomas Szasz. The New Physician, June, 1969.

TATUM, E. L. The possibility of manipulating genetic change. In J. Roslansky (Ed.), Genetics and the future of man. New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1966.

THOMPSON, R. F. Foundations of physiological psychology. New York: Harper & Row,

VALENTINE, C. A. Culture and poverty. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968.

VANDERBERG, S. G. The nature and nurture of intelligence. In D. Glass (Ed.), Genetics. New York: The Rockefeller University Press, 1968.

WILSON, E. K. Sociology: Rules, roles, and relationships. Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1966.

YACORZYNSKI, G. K. Organic mental disorders. In B. B. Wolman (Ed.), Handbook

of clinical psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965.

ZOLA, I. K. Illness behavior of the working class: Implications and recommendations. In A. B. Shostak and W. G. Gomberg (Eds.), Blue collar world. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964.

The Effects of an Interracial Preschool Program upon Racial Preference, Knowledge of Racial Differences, and Racial Identification

Roland C. Crooks¹ Mount Allison University

The general paucity of research in the area of attitude development in young children permits us to say very little at present concerning the development of racial attitudes, their nature, or the conditions which may cause them to change. A few studies (e.g., Ammons, 1950; Clark & Clark, 1939a, 1939b, 1947, 1950; Horowitz, 1939) would seem to indicate that children as young as three and four are capable of making discriminations between the physical characteristics of Negroes and whites. The frequency of discrimination increases with chronological age. The studies also indicate that by the age of four, both Negro and white children show a preference for and identify with the physical characteristics associated with white children. While these findings are of great significance, further information is necessary for an understanding of the development of racial attitudes and the mechanisms by which they might be changed.

Using a method first devised by Clark and Clark in 1939, the present study first attempted to replicate some of these ear-

The author wishes to thank the Board of Directors of the Brunswick-Cornwallis Preschool, Halifax, Nova Scotia, and especially Mrs. Catherine Verall, Headteacher, for their co-operation in making this research possible.

lier findings. The racial preference, knowledge of racial differences, and racial identification of lower-class urban preschool children were examined. Unlike the original study, both Negro and white children were used. In addition, an attempt was made to determine the effect of an enriched preschool program upon these three response measures.

Method

Subjects

Sixty-eight 4–5 year old male and female subjects made up the total sample. Two experimental groups, one white and one Negro, of 17 subjects each were employed. They consisted of children from an interracial neighborhood characterized by low family incomes, overcrowded dwellings, and large families. These children had just completed one school year in an enriched preschool program. The program was characterized by a numerical balance between Negro and white children and a deliberate attempt on the part of Negro and white teachers to create an atmosphere of racial understanding and self-respect. This was done, for example, by deliberately emphasizing racial differences and discussing these differences in favorable terms.

Two control groups, one white, one Negro, consisted of children from similar environments, but who had not had any preschool experience. Subjects of the control group were obtained through the preschool and various social agencies. Many of these children had applied for acceptance into the preschool program but were not accepted because of space limitations, late application, etc. Otherwise they fully qualified. Although one cannot be certain using such a method of assignment that the control and experimental groups were comparable, the experimenter's acquaintance with family background and living conditions of many children in the experimental and control groups suggests that

indeed they were.

Procedure

The procedure used was that of Clark and Clark (1947). All subjects were tested individually by a white experimenter. Each child was presented with four dolls, alike in every respect except skin and hair color; two of the dolls were brown with black hair

²The present research was carried out before the results of Greenwald and Oppenheim (1968) were reported. The inclusion of white comparison groups is supported by their results.

and two white with blond hair. For each half of the subjects in each group, the order of presentation of the dolls was reversed.

The experimental task was to respond to a series of eight requests designed to reveal color preference (1-4), knowledge of racial differences (5-7), and racial identification (8). In a standard order, the child was asked, "Give me the doll that:

- (1) you would like to play with
- (2) is a nice doll
- (3) looks bad
- (4) is a nice color
- (5) looks like a white child
- (6) looks like a colored child
- (7) looks like a Negro child
- (8) looks like you."

Results

Control Groups

In an attempt to verify the findings of the original study, the data for the control groups were analyzed separately. The data for these and for the experimental groups are presented in Table 1. Racial preference measures (items 1-4) are expressed in terms of the proportion of subjects choosing the doll of their own color. These values indicate that the majority of Negro children tended to choose the white dolls, as did the white children. Responses to item 3, requesting the doll that "looks bad," indicate that Negroes tended to reject the brown doll as did white children. The significance of the relationship between color of the control group subjects and responses on racial preference was tested by chisquare (see Table 2). Significant chi-square values were obtained on all racial preference measures. That is, there appears to be a relationship between the color of the control group subjects and their expressed racial preference.

Responses to items 5, 6, and 7, designed to reveal knowledge of racial differences, are expressed in terms of the proportion of subjects making the correct choice. Chi-square analyses were done to estimate the relationship between color of control group subjects and knowledge of racial differences. No significant chi-square values were obtained. The obtained frequencies indicate that the majority of both Negro and white subjects at this age have a well developed knowledge of the concept of racial difference between white and colored. A comparison of the values for items 5 and 6 with those of item 7, which required the child to indicate the doll which looks like a Negro child, indicates a slight but non-significant decrease in the number of children making a correct

choice. This suggests that the concept of Negro may not be as well defined in these children as are the concepts of white and colored.

TABLE 1
RESPONSES OF SUBJECTS ON RACIAL PREFERENCE,
KNOWLEDGE OF RACIAL DIFFERENCE, AND
RACIAL IDENTIFICATION

	Cor	itrol	Experi	mental
Race Preference ^a	Negro (N = 17)	White (N = 17)	Negro (N = 17)	White (N = 17)
, Di-	.24	1.00	.41	.82
1. Play with	.12	.59	.41	.59
2. Nice doll	.94	.24	.71	.18
Looks bad Nice color	.18	.76	.65	.24
Knowledge of Racial Difference ^b		Mark HE	The land	far fore
5. White	.65	.71	.94	.59
6. Colored	.76	.76	.94	.88
7. Negro	.53	.47	.65	.59
Racial Identification ^a				
8. You	.24	1.00	.59	1.00

^aProportion of subjects choosing the doll their own color.

TABLE 2
CHI-SQUARE VALUES INDICATING SIGNIFICANCE OF
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RESPONSES AND
SUBJECT GROUP

		CR. Philips		
To Serie I	Control	Experimental	Negro	White
Item	Negro vs. White	Negro vs. White	Experimental vs. Control	Experimenta vs. Control
1	17.93***	4.48**		1.46
2	6.31**	A CHARLES OF THE PARTY	2.42	STATE OF THE STATE OF
2 3	14.69*	7.64***	1.82	Salaran Tools
4	9.56***	4.29**	5.95**	7.53***
5	_a _a	4.09**	2.88*	Total Control
6				提供的
7			製造者を上して	
8	17.93***	6.48**	3.04*	WITH THE THEFT

Note: *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.

"Chi Square ≤ 1

Responses to item 8 are expressed in terms of the proportion of subjects identifying with the doll of their own color. The ma-

^bProportion of subjects making the correct choice.

jority of Negro subjects tend to identify with the white doll as do all white subjects. The obtained chi-square value indicates the relationship between color of subject and racial identification to be highly significant.

Experimental Groups

The data for the experimental groups were analyzed in the same manner. Significant chi-square values were obtained on items 1, 3, and 4, designed to reveal racial preference. That is, there appears to be a relationship between color of the subject in the experimental groups and expressed racial preference. In addition, the significant chi-square values obtained on items 5 and 8 indicate a relationship between color of the subject in the experimental group and knowledge of racial difference (with whites less accurate), as well as racial identification (with blacks less accurate).

Effects of the Preschool Program

The significance of the relationships between experience in the interracial preschool program and racial preference, knowledge of racial differences, and racial identification was also tested by chi-square. The obtained values indicate that Negro children who experience an interracial preschool program show greater own-color preference than children without such experience. As indicated in Table 2, a significant chi-square value was obtained on item 4. All other differences were in the same direction, with that on item 2 closely approaching statistical significance. For the white groups also, a significant chi-square value was obtained on item 4. This would seem to indicate that white children who experienced an interracial preschool program show significantly greater Negro color preference than do white children without such experience.

On requests designed to reveal knowledge of racial differences there was one significant chi-square value, that for the Negro group on item 5. No significant values were obtained in the

white group.

The data for item 8 indicate that a greater number of the Negro nursery school children identified with the doll of their own color than did Negro control group children. The obtained chisquare value indicated this difference to be marginally significant. There was no difference in obtained frequencies between the white experimental and control groups.

Discussion

The results of the present study corroborate those of the original one. They indicate that, between 4 and 5 years of age, Negro and white lower-class urban children living in an interracial neighborhood already have clearly established racial preferences and some knowledge of racial differences as related to skin color. However, this awareness of racial differences does not necessarily determine a socially accurate racial self-identification. It is significant that the original findings of Clark and Clark (1947) regarding Negro students were replicated in the present study. In contrast to the original study which employed Negro experimenters, the present one used a white experimenter for all

groups.

Response differences between Negro and white children of the non-nursery school group with respect to racial preference and identification are of special interest. Negroes tended to prefer the white dolls and reject the brown ones as did white children. Moreover, it is significant that correct self-identification was made by 100 percent of the white children; whereas, only 24 percent of the Negro children made correct identifications. Although 7 out of 10 of these Negro children are aware of racial differences, only 2 out of 10 in the same group made socially correct identifications with the colored doll. On the basis of this evidence, as well as anecdotal evidence gathered during the experimental sessions, it seems reasonable to suggest that the relative inaccuracy of Negro identification reflects not simple ignorance of self, but rather unwillingness or psychological inability to identify with the brown doll. The validity of this suggestion could be further tested in research employing different types of test materials (such as dolls of varying skin color), Negro and white experimenters, and subjects who differ in socioeconomic status and in their frequency of contact with members of the other race.

What are the conditions which cause children, particularly white ones, to show unmistakable signs of the onset of racial bigotry at this very early age? What are the conditions which cause Negro children at a very young age to sense that they are marked and that there is something wrong? Why do they like what they see across the color line and find it difficult to like what they see on their own side? An hypothesis by Goodman (1952) offers one suggestion regarding the type of learning mechanism by which such behavior may be acquired. During the process of early socialization, parents are likely to use consistently certain words to describe conditions which they like. Through a long reinforcement history such associations become well established in the child's behavioral repertoire. The word clean, for example, quite naturally suggests other things such as whiteness, brightness, and some of the pleasant feelings of being around these conditions. Everyday experiences with preschool children suggest

that they do tend to make such associations. They will chatter about their clean hands or clean shoes with obvious pride and pleasure. Their references to dirtiness just as clearly mean dis-

approval or displeasure.

The author submits that, when the child is placed before the dolls in this particular situation, it is the white doll that looks clean to him and the brown one dirty. Because he associates whiteness with cleanliness and cleanliness with a pleasant feeling and perhaps praise from his parents, the white doll is chosen

more frequently than the brown one.

The second aim of this study was to determine the effect, if any, of the interracial preschool program upon racial attitudes. Results from the nursery school groups would suggest that by some means the program is effective in breaking down certain established forms of behavior and is successful in building new ones. What is present in the nursery school setting is a hypothetical state, of a quality quite unlike that which is experienced in the real worlds of these children. Equal numbers of Negro and white children were present with both Negro and white teachers; a great deal of emphasis was placed upon the development of selfrespect, especially in Negro children. It is suggested that these experiences have strongly influenced the development of the more positive attitudes displayed by both Negro and white children in the nursery school group. Obviously, much more research is needed. We must now attempt to determine those psychological processes which are contributing to this significant change. When this is done, the program can have much wider application and significance for the broader reaches of education.

The results of this study have undoubtedly asked more questions than they have answered. However, one implication is very clear. It reveals the necessity for attacking problems of prejudice in very young children and for preventive interracial education programs in the very early years. Attitudes can be changed.

REFERENCES

Ammons, R. B. Reactions on a projective doll-play interview of white males 2-6 years of age to differences in skin color and facial features. Journal of Gene-

tic Psychology, 1950, 76, 323-341.

CLARK, K. B., & CLARK, M. P. Segregation as a factor in the racial identification of Negro preschool children: A preliminary report. Journal of Experimental

Education, 1939, 9, 161-163. (a)
CLARK, K. B., & CLARK, M. P. The development of consciousness of self and the emergence of racial identification in Negro preschool children. Journal of

CLARK, K. B., & CLARK, M. P. Racial identification and preference in Negro children. In T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley (Eds.), Readings in social psychology. New York: Holt, 1947.

- CLARK, K. B., & CLARK, M. P. Emotional factors in racial identification and preference in Negro children, Journal of Negro Education, 1950, 19, 341-350.
- GOODMAN, M. Race awareness in young children. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1952.
- GREENWALD, H. J., & OPPENHEIM, D. B. Reported magnitude of self-misidentification among Negro children—artifact? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1968, 8, 49-52.
- HOROWITZ, R. E. Racial aspects of self-identification in nursery school children. Journal of Psychology, 1939, 7, 91-99.

Biographical Sketches

DOMINIC AMANTE graduated from Aquinas College with a BA in 1965 and from Western Michigan University in 1967 with a two-year Master's Degree in the field of clinical psychology. He is presently working for his PhD at WMU in the field of sociology. His major interests in the field of psychology are motivation, physiological psychology, learning theory, psychopathology, and objective personality assessment; in the field of sociology he is interested in medical sociology, social psychiatry, poverty, crime, delinquency, and social stratification. He is presently working as a clinical psychologist at the West Shore Mental Health Clinic in Muskegon, Michigan.

ROBERT BUCKHOUT is a Lecturer in the Department of Psychology, California State College, Hayward. He received his PhD in psychology from Ohio State University in 1963. His major interests include attitude change, emotional correlates of social behavior, and social problems in Southeast Asia.

MARTHA W. CARITHERS is a Research Assistant in the Research Department of The Menninger Foundation. She holds a BA from Antioch College. Her work at Menninger has included experience with research on ghetto psychiatry, urban systems, and community response to disaster. Currently, she is working with James Taylor on a psychophysical approach to personality scaling, and as Editorial Assistant to Gardner Murphy on his second revision of Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology.

ROLAND C. CROOKS is Assistant Professor of Psychology, Department of Psychology, Mount Allison University, Sackville, New Brunswick, Canada. He received the BA and MA degrees from Dalhousie University and has completed all but the dissertation requirements for the PhD degree. He has worked as a research associate and consultant in preschool programs for culturally deprived children and has published in the areas of physiological and child psychology. He is presently engaged in attitude research using Canadian Negro and Indian children and in research on reading disabilities in young children.

MARVIN CUMMINS is Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology, Washington University, St. Louis. He received his PhD in sociology from the University of Colorado at Boulder. He is currently finishing a book on interactional processes of police behavior in a suburban setting. The book will be published under the title of *The Coppers*. His other interests include research into deviance and medical sociology.

JOHN M. GOERING is Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at Washington University. He received his PhD in sociology from Brown University. He is currently working on an analysis of material regarding cultural and situational constraints on the adaptations of the poor to the urban environment. Other research interests include comparative analysis of adaptational problems of newcomers to metropolitan areas and a historical examination of the effects of ethnic and racial violence upon the political structure.

DONNA M. HARTMAN graduated from Hope College with a BA. Her MA in clinical psychology from Western Michigan University is pending. She was a Staff Psychologist at West Shore Mental Health Clinic in Muskegon, Michigan from 1967 to 1970 and is presently employed as a Staff Psychologist at the Ottawa County Community Mental Health Clinic in Grand Haven, Michigan. Her major interests in the mental health field are in psychodiagnostics, psychotherapy, and modern psychological learning theory.

JAMES HOETKER received his BS from Southeast Missouri State College, taught high school English, and received an MA (English) and EdD (Instructional Process) from Washington University, St. Louis. From 1967 to 1970, he directed research on the Educational Laboratory Theatre Project for the Central Midwestern Regional Educational Laboratory, Inc. (CEMREL). His special interests are in research on aesthetic response, instructional objectives, and teaching methods. His publications include a monograph and textbooks on drama as an instructional method, and articles in American Educational Research Journal, Research in the Teaching of English, Foreign Language Annals, and English Journal. He is currently Associate Professor of English, University of Illinois, Urbana.

S. JEROME KUTNER is the Administrative Coordinator of the California School of Professional Psychology, San Francisco Campus. He received his PhD in psychology from the New School for Social Research. He is engaged in a longitudinal study of the side-effects of oral contraceptives.

PHILLIP H. MARGULES graduated with an AB from the University of Michigan in 1948 with a major in psychology and a minor in zoology. In 1949 he received an MS from the University of Utah in psychology, and he has done additional graduate work at the University of Utah and at the University of Michigan. He was Chief Psychologist at Caro State Hospital from 1950 to 1958. He is presently a certified consulting psychologist for the State of Michigan and Chief Psychologist at the West Shore Mental Health Clinic in Muskegon, Michigan. His major interests are in encephalopathy and reality therapy.

JEFFERY M. PAIGE is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Berkeley and a Research Associate in its Survey Research Center. While completing work for his PhD at the University of Michigan, he served as a consultant to the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. He is currently engaged in a cross-national study of rural class structure and agrarian radicalism in emerging nations.

NEVITT SANFORD is Director of The Wright Institute in Berkeley, an action-research organization that has incorporated the Institute for the Study of Human Problems which he founded at Stanford in 1961. A Harvard PhD, he has been a prison psychologist, a practicing psychoanalyst, and a director of major studies in child development, personality assessment, authoritarianism, the social psychology of higher education, and alcohol problems. He has been President of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, a member of the American Psychological Association's Board of Directors, and Chairman of its Policy and Planning Board. His latest book is *Issues in Personality Theory*.

GARY SIEGEL received his BA (Philosophy) from Our Lady of the Snows Scholasticate, Pass Christian, Mississippi; an MA (Sociology) from St. Louis University; and from 1968 to 1970 worked as a Research Assistant for the Central Midwestern Regional Educational Laboratory, Inc. (CEMREL). His special interests are in person perception and race relations. He is spending 1970–1971 in Europe and will return to St. Louis University to complete a doctorate in sociology.

DELORES B. STOREY received a BA degree in 1946 from Michigan State University, majoring in French and Spanish; an MA degree in 1961 from Western Michigan University in counseling; and a PhD degree in 1967 from Michigan State University in counseling psychology. She has worked as a foreign language teacher, high school counselor, at the Counseling Center at Michigan State University, as a psychologist at West Shore Mental Health Clinic in Muskegon, Michigan, and has recently entered private practice. Her professional interests include group therapy and learning disabilities in children.

LEWIS JOHN WEEBER graduated from Calvin College with a BA in 1961 and earned an MSW in 1963 at Michigan State University. He was a member of the Peace Corps from 1963 to 1965 in Africa and taught in African schools for the next two years. He joined the staff at West Shore Mental Health Clinic in Muskegon, Michigan in 1967; he is presently employed as a Social Worker at the Ottawa County Mental Health Clinic in Grand Haven, Michigan. His major interest is in the area of mental health relative to elementary and secondary education.

CAROL H. WEISS has for the past five years been a Research Associate at the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, and is Program Director of the Bureau's recently created program on evaluation. She has conducted evaluation studies (as well as research on interviewing and on the utilization of social research), and has served as consultant on evaluation to the Model Cities Administration, NIMH, OEO, Office of Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Development of HEW, National Council on Crime and Delinquency, United Way of America, Urban Institute, and other governmental, private, and research organizations. She is currently directing an NIMH-sponsored study entitled, "Program Evaluation: An Analysis of Experience and an Approach to Solutions."

AMANTE, DOMINIC, MARGULES, PHILIP H., HARTMAN, DONNA M., STOREY, DELORES B., and WEEBER, LEWIS JOHN. The epidemiological distribution of CNS dysfunction. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26(4), 105-136.

Central Nervous System (CNS) dysfunction is not randomly distributed in the urban population at large. Rather, cases of brain damage in children are highly concentrated in the poor white and black segments of the community. From all indications, the prevalence of such problems appears to be more extreme in the case of black children of lower socioeconomic origin relative to their white counterparts. A multi-disciplinary theoretical scheme is presented which is designed to conceptualize the distribution in terms of a series of antecedent and consequent conditions involving the interaction of biological, psychological, educational, sociological, and anthropological variables. The major variables hypothesized to account for the patterned distribution of CNS dysfunction involve interclass and interracial differentials relative to general health, diet, the adequacy of pre- and post-natal child care, and the quality and quantity of sensory stimulation impinging on the organism during critical periods of development. The "primal cause" behind the distribution is assumed to be general ethnocentricism—one variant of which is racism. Prevention is indicated to be the most critical problem at the present time.

CARITHERS, MARTHA W. School desegregation and racial cleavage, 1954_1970: A review of the literature. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26(4), 25-47.

This paper reviews studies—most appearing since the 1954 Supreme Court desegregation ruling—concerning racial preference, racial cleavage, and interracial association in desegregated schools. Except in a few areas, the findings of these studies are inconclusive or conflicting. It is suggested that future research might well focus more upon the effects of desegregation on the groups within the social structure of the school. Under some conditions of desegregation, group rivalry may develop; under other conditions, group alliances. These are likely to influence racial attitudes and behavioral cleavage. Naturalistic research which describes group processes, followed by research which manipulates intergroup relations in the school setting, might provide a greater understanding of interracial relations and might point the way towards more effective action and policy.

CROOKS, ROLAND C. The effects of an interracial preschool program upon racial preference, knowledge of racial differences, and racial identification. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1970, **26**(4), 137-144.

This study examined the effect of an interracial preschool program upon racial attitudes and extended to white children the Clark and Clark work on the development of racial attitudes in Negro children. The experimental groups, one white, one Negro, consisted of children from economically deprived environments who had just completed one year in an enriched interracial preschool program; two control groups were from comparable environments but without preschool experience.

Results indicated that, by the age of four, Negro and white children from this particular (Canadian) population have clearly established racial preferences and a knowledge of racial differences and make identifications in a racial sense. Significant differences between the experimental and control groups were interpreted as favoring an interracial preschool program as a means of develop-

ing positive racial attitudes.

The state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the s

the hard was to entire the court was a supply of the court of the cour

partition of approach to an engine of the control o

AUT YELK, S. JERKERPS, and AUGSTROUTS AUGSTRO Leaderconferences.
Specimen forces and objects (Check Tokus, 1991, 1999), 12-463

T is the basis in probabilities of the polynomial T in T is the T in T is the T in T

PAIGE, JEFFERY M. Changing patterns of anti-white attitudes among blacks. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26(4), 69-86.

Studies of anti-white attitudes among blacks from the end of World War II to the middle sixties, despite the limited historical period, are frequently discussed as if they represented general characteristics of anti-white attitudes. However, data from a 1968 survey in Newark, New Jersey indicate that these earlier patterns of relationships do not characterize anti-white attitudes among urban blacks in the late sixties. General psychological mechanisms involving postulates about underlying personality structure cannot account for the relatively rapid change in the correlates of anti-white attitudes. Anti-white attitudes are a flexible part of a more general political ideology describing the most practical strategy for dealing with members of the white majority. As the strategies change to adapt to changing political circumstances, the attitudes change with them. Thus statements about the determinants of anti-white attitudes are relatively meaningless unless they are related to the political context in which those attitudes are held.

SANFORD, NEVITT. Whatever happened to action research? Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26(4), 3-23.

The social science establishment, in pace with technology, has separated "science" from practice and favored over-specialization generally. Not only has action research thus been orphaned, but vital scientific questions have been neglected, scientists have tended to become technicians, and benefits of social science have been denied the most needy people. We need a model of social science activity which, while embracing Lewin's model, makes the subjects of research its primary clients. Since their further development—which is the basic aim of social research—is affected by the processes of inquiry, they should take part in the planning of research and be the first to know its results. This model has worked well in interview studies not only of students but of college professors, whose academic culture it is capable of changing. The social science establishment can be modified by a similar approach to the consciousness of its members. Since we influence others more by our actions than by our knowledge, action research directed to ourselves can improve the image of social science and of man.

WEISS, CAROL H. The politicization of evaluation research. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26(4), 57-68.

This paper describes the growing visibility of evaluation research and the effects of its overt entry into the political arena on the evaluator. Ways of dimming the political implications of evaluation, particularly when conclusions about program success are negative, are discussed. But negative conclusions can be highly significant. When findings of many action program evaluations are added together, the result is a serious critique of current approaches to social programming.

problems as an area of legitimate professional activity, we will have to begin the process of change in the schools which spawned

us.

This change implies more than the tokenism inherent in hasty one-time courses in the Psychology of _ in Racism, Sexism, Violence, etc.). Most college administrations welcome such piddling efforts in order to pacify and co-opt the student activists striving for relevance. Such efforts titillate rather than educate, and are usually taught by temporary or untenured faculty.

The far more challenging prospect lies in the possibility of training a psychologist to be a thoroughly professional social change agent with all the skills, breadth of knowledge, and chutzpah that this label implies. In short, we at least would be better prepared to ask the question of what to do if we had more company. In a serious vein, we firmly believe that the training of social change agents is not only desirable but even possible within

the present system.

Toward this end, we are proposing a radical change in the teaching of psychology at all levels which basically recognizes social issues as nexuses around which skills may be taught. Rather than partitioning these skills into present modules, we are proposing a model which, like the real world, assumes that social change itself is at stake when a psychologist sets out to do research. Establishing real achievable goals during the training of the social change agents may provide the experience upon which a future career as a change agent can be built.

The goals thus determine the methods and skills to be studied. The philosophy of social science becomes one in which a value commitment to social change is admitted to be an essential part of the scientific process itself, as the recent debate on the genetic basis of intelligence points up. Instead of a neutral objective scientific observer, we envision welcoming the biased social scientist with a commitment to social action based on his theory-

which can be judged on its merits.

There are two mutually alienating factions in the social sci-

ences: the traditional purists and the political activists.

Traditional social science has become so obsessed with emulating the precision of the physical sciences that value and meaning have been considered sources of contamination or confusion. The process of doing research (or publishing) has become an end in itself. Social relevance is not a hallmark of operationism.

By contrast, the emerging political activists, so vocal at our conventions, tend to eschew theory as being counterproductive to social change. They say that "what we need is action." But what action should be determined to some extent by theory. It is our basic belief that behavioral theory would be greatly enhanced if it were more relevant, even at the price of rigor. Thus, a philosophic goal of a social action orientation to training programs is relevant theory development.

We want to report some modest efforts in the proposed direc-

tion in which we have recently been engaged.

Case Studies

The second author, while a Visiting Professor at the University of California, Berkeley, edited with 80 undergraduate students Toward Social Change: A Handbook for Those Who Will; this soon to be published book resulted from a course in social problems. Some excerpts from the book's foreword tell the story of how this experiment in social action education came about:

The idea for a handbook on social change edited primarily by students grew during the winter of 1969 in Berkeley as my assistant, Caryl Sutton, and I pondered innovations in undergraduate education. I was scheduled to teach a course in Social Problems during the spring 1970 quarter—a course which seemed like a natural vehicle within which teams of students could function as research groups oriented toward critiquing the problem and making recommendations for change which could be taken seriously by the people and agencies who are able to change things. We hoped that genuine involvement in a relevant project would enhance the professional training of future social change agents.

Thus began a series of one-hour meetings with interested students where ideas could be exchanged and people shanghaied into the project. We called it Project SAP—an acronym for Social Action Project—and began to approach publishers with the idea of gaining a publisher so that the students would be oriented to the tangible goal of editing a published work. We obtained a contract and a small advance from Harper and Row.

The aim of the book which evolved from meetings was for students to speak to students on their views about social problems which affect their lives. My role as a professor was that of a catalyst, deadline-watcher and senior editor. We implored those who signed up for the "course" to meet in social problem interest groups—either suggested by me or generated by them—and be prepared to work on their own to collect information. Our guidelines were to find sharp critiques, overviews, interviews, pictures, cartoons, songs, poetry and any other media which would help to shape a specific point of view about the social problem. They were to use these materials to write an introduction and specific conclusions aimed at social change—all accompanying a definitive set of readings. Our models were the teams of "Nader's Raiders" who have done so much to promote social change by using information as an instrument for stirring the public.

Some eighty undergraduate students signed up, dividing themselves into twelve research teams in such areas as violence, education reform, drugs, etc. One group joined us with their own project—white community in-

volvement. Each team scheduled meetings either in Project SAP headquarters (a hastily converted laboratory) or in one of their own homes. Despite the absence of formal class hours or grade pressures, most students ended up working harder on Project SAP than on any of their other courses. I met with each team twice during the first couple of weeks but after that, they were on their own.

The students—of all ages from seventeen to thirty-five—responded magnificently. Where the teams found gaps, confusion or blandness in the literature, they went out, got information and wrote their own material. Taking advantage of facilities and knowledgeable people in the San Francisco Bay area, they conducted interviews or did site visits to new drug treatment centers. A full-time policeman, who was also a student, added an unusual dimension to the violence team (especially at Berkeley) by writing a first-hand account of the cop in a student riot. The students uncovered a number of recent unpublished papers which are more pointed than most published works: Chaos and humor were frequent, highlighted by the fact that the leader of the population group had a baby boy shortly after turning in the manuscript.

The hectic work did not go entirely smoothly. The students had to live through a period of intense social change brought on by the invasion of Cambodia and the murders at Kent State and Jackson State in May, 1970. These events had a profound effect on all of us as many of us put our work aside to help out in the anti-war effort. The Berkeley campus was reconstituted into a major anti-war center which emphasized constructive political work in the community and through the system. Many of our student editors played key roles in this movement, while to our delight, they continued to work on the book. This proved to be a painful division of energy for most, and the impact of these events can be clearly seen in the tone and content of the book. The initial optimism of the students gave way to more sober reflection and a decision on their part that a book on social change was needed more desperately than ever before.

We determined from the beginning that the students in each team would tell it like they saw, heard and felt it. We are convinced that the student readers will understand and appreciate the honesty and ingenuity of their Berkeley compatriots. As concerned, opinionated people they sought to inform and to promote genuine social change, and to be taken seriously. They owe no allegiance to any government body, foundation, profession or tradition. Indicative of their concern, they and I agreed before we started work, to donate sixty per cent of the royalties from the book to the Fund for the College of Malcolm X, an organization backing an ethnic studies college at the University of California, Santa Cruz [Buckhout et al., 1971].

In critiquing this experimental course, the professor and students were pleased with the outcome, and all expressed the feeling that they had learned a great deal. The level of involvement was so high that little time was left for formal evaluation or soliciting of student ratings. The instructor was often told by the students that the experience was one of the most meaningful that

they ever had. In turn the instructor felt that he could not objectively evaluate how a peak experience changed a student. Obviously, some students contributed and profited more than others; but the collective experience would not have been possible without the many minor contributions of the less active students.

In the summer of 1970, a mini-version of the same procedure was attempted at California State College, Hayward, in a course on social psychological research. With only 18 students, the class focussed on the population explosion as a social issue which integrated the class efforts to learn how to do relevant psychological research. This time the goal of a published article was set, with all students sharing in the conception and execution of the research -and its authorship. A stratified sample survey of attitudes toward family planning, sterilization, and abortion was conducted on unmarried young people. In this case, undergraduates had to learn interviewing techniques, computer analysis, statistics, and the population literature from other students and faculty. The point was that in order to say something useful about the social problem-population-it was necessary to acquire rapidly the usual skills of social scientists. In addition, the students had to learn to communicate their topical findings in a way which would maximize their social utility—an elusive and somewhat unique skill for social scientists.

In a graduate course at the California School of Professional Psychology, Kutner is currently focussing on the theme of the Psychology of Women. The course is designed to create social change in various ways. First, the goal of the year-long course is to edit a book which communicates information about women's liberation. The chapters deal with the content of the women's liberation movement, such as employment, child care centers, abortion, and the stereotype of inferiority. Each problem is treated with a threefold approach: protest, research, and action. For instance, protest concerning job discrimination on the basis of sex raises the question of sex differences in achievement motivation. The data will be applied to programs for generating a need to succeed. Thus, it is shown how a problem is expressed and how the re-

search is conducted and applied to solving the problem.

The second benefit of the book depends upon its sale. A portion of royalties received will be given to a social activity that furthers social change for women. The choice is to be made by the class. Third, the authorship for the book will not be determined

¹Copies of the product, "Family Planning by Those Who Should Know Better," are available from R. Buckhout, Department of Psychology, California State College, Hayward, California 94542.

entirely by social status: students and faculty will be listed as authors. In this way we hope to change the all too common practice of exploiting students without recognizing their efforts. Fourth, it is expected that student attitudes will change in the process of working together in this context. The fifth avenue of change is that through professional training the way is paved for future change.

The procedure in the course will consist mostly of reading, discussion in class, and writing in small groups. Participants in the women's liberation movement will be invited to class. In addition, the students will be encouraged to attend women's rights meetings to gain a more personal understanding of the subject.

Social Issues Curriculum

The course just described suggests a much broader change in education. A whole curriculum could be based on various social issues.

Each course could be centered around a social problem, such as poverty or violence. Probably the best level at which to start is with lower division undergraduate courses where students have not yet suffered a hardening of their professional arteries. When they take upper division courses, and at the masters degree level, they can explore psychology more systematically; for instance, this would be an appropriate time for courses in learning theory, developmental psychology, experimental design, and so forth. At the doctoral level the courses again might be organized around social problems. Toward the end of his formal education the student may be able to make valuable contributions while integrating his previous experiences. This pattern in the curriculum would be similar to the sequence of events in a given course on social issues: protest, research, and action.

Conclusions

We stress the radical nature of these ideas in the sense that they will inevitably produce an impact on the institutions in which they flourish.² In effect, the institutions of higher learning would become centers for the promotion of social change, devoted to the development of theories of change and the training of change agents—in addition to their present role as trainers of social sci-

²The political repercussions are not to be taken lightly. In the wake of the reconstitution efforts at Berkeley, the State Colleges and the University of California have issued "guidelines" limiting the advocacy role of the professor and contributing to the already tight repression which characterizes higher education in California.

ence professionals. Imagine a department of psychology which is itself responsible for substantive action in the area of population, drugs, violence, etc. Imagine further than its students had a reputation for having influenced legislation, having created a community clinic, having published books with impact, or having created a new journal, a magazine, or television documentary before they enter the field. The graduate of such a program would have gained valuable relevant experience and possibly have made real contributions toward the promotion of human welfare, while learning his trade. The teachers, as participants in attempts to solve social problems about which there are few theories, few guidelines, vague goals, and little history, would probably be learning along with their students.

Together, student and teacher-student can help each other in

answering the question, What can we do?

Comment from the Corner

Drs. Kutner and Buckhout have produced some models that in my opinion ought to be widely imitated. The idea of having a class actually produce something through their joint efforts seems to me an educational idea that can hardly fail. What works for a class might work for a whole department or school. I should like to see a college—not too large a one to be sure—set itself the task of getting out a policy statement on some major issue each year, with different departments taking the responsibility for different kinds of relevant research and all hands having a share in the final recommendations. This would help integrate the intellectual life of that institution and generate at the same time some sense of community. Other readers will have other ideas. Let us hear them.

Nevitt Sanford

REFERENCE

Buckhout, R., Sutton, C. et al. (Eds.) Toward social change: A handbook for those who will. New York: Harper and Row, 1971, in press.

Comments and Rejoinders

Comment on: "Attitudes versus Actions" by Allan W. Wicker, JSI, Autumn, 1969.

Lewis W. Brandt University of Saskatchewan, Regina Campus

The Behaviorist's Leap: An Inquiry into What Attitude Researchers Measure.

In his interesting review of the relationship between actions and "attitudes" Wicker recognizes that "it is essential that researchers specify their conceptions of attitudes [1969, p. 75]." In line with his behavioristic approach as expressed by his title, Wicker equates "attitude" with "verbal behavior" and the latter implicitly with "people's feelings." He expresses the belief that the problem he encountered can be solved by better "operationalization"—in spite of what Bridgman (1945, 1959) said and wrote twenty years after he first introduced that concept. The central factor Wicker misses is related to the question of defining the meaning of check-marks on attitude (and other) questionnaires.

As Holzkamp (1964) points out, an experimenter must decide whether he defines check-marks on his questionnaire as ver-

bal behavior, judgments, opinions, or facts.

If the check-mark is defined as verbal behavior, it must be treated as merely a physical event from which statistical predictions may be derived, but no conclusions can be drawn concerning the meaning the check-mark has for the individual who made it. In other words, it must not be taken to represent a private phenomenon such as an internal attitude, or some hidden reality such as a "latent process." Nothing but a statistical relationship between check-marks and actions can be sought for. As Wicker reports, such relationships are not very high. As judgments, the check-marks are defined as "the spontaneous expression of a human being [Holzkamp, 1964, p. 229]," i.e., what the person wants to express in the given situation and under the specific circumstances in which he places the check-marks on the questionnaire. These judgments may or may not correspond to the respondent's opinions. Such judgments may be co-determined by attitudes towards the experimenter and/or other aspects of the total experimental situation. The assumption that check-marks on questionnaires represent judgments in this sense seems to me the most justified one. In that case, however, the check-marks cannot be considered to represent attitudes except towards any or all aspects of the total experimental situation (cf., Brandt, 1970a, 1970b).

By opinion, Holzkamp means the "experimentally provoked expression of a verbalized position assumed originally for oneself' [Holzkamp, 1964, p. 229]." This would refer to one's conviction of the attitudes one truly believes one holds and more specifically to the way in which one believes one will act in a given situation. I shall

return to this point further on.

Finally, it is possible to define the check-mark as representing a fact. Concerning a question like "Would you marry a Negro?", the researcher must then decide which of two possible facts he wants the check-mark under "yes" to stand for:

(1) It may stand for the respondent's actual marriage to a Negro. This is what Wicker calls an "overt behavioral response." However, as the research reviewed by Wicker indicates, check-marks on attitude scales do not represent facts in this sense.

(2) The fact corresponding to the check-mark under "yes" may be defined as representing a willingness to marry a Negro, i.e., a private phenomenon related to what Wicker calls "people's feelings." This definition of the checkmark raises the question as to what is the fact of "willingness to marry a Negro." Must that willingness be conscious or can it be unconscious? If it can be unconscious, how can the respondent indicate this fact by a checkmark?

Thus, before investigating any possible relationship between "attitudes" and actions any researcher must decide whether he will consider verbal expressions as mere verbal behavior, judgments, opinions, or representations of facts—and in the last instance he must define what he means by facts. Under no circumstances is he permitted to leap from one definition to another.

When Wicker equates "attitudes" at one point with "verbal behavior" and at another with "people's feelings," he makes what I call The Behaviorist's Leap, i.e., he jumps back and forth between

public and private phenomena without distinguishing between them. When he refers to attitudes as verbal behavior, he seems to imply what Holzkamp calls opinions and not mere physical muscle contractions producing check-marks on a piece of paper. Since he compares "attitudes" and "actions," Wicker must mean by the former the way the person thinks he has acted towards certain people or things in the past and/or will act towards them in the future.

One need not even go to non-English psychology—though it might help (Brandt, 1963)—to learn that "behaviorism . . . has outlived whatever usefulness its role might once have had [Koch, 1964, p. 6]." Even some American experimental psychologists begin to acknowledge that, as Deese recently stated, "We can study ourselves directly [1969, p. 517]." When we do so, we realize that we frequently act quite differently from the way we expected outselves to act in given circumstances. We know that we cannot predict our own actions 100 percent. We thus know that our attitudes, if we define them as opinions in Holzkamp's sense, do not always fully determine our actions. We thus recognize that there are other determinants of our actions, some of which we may consider unconscious—which implies that we cannot state them on attitude questionnaires even if we would like to.

On the other hand, though Wicker concludes from his review of the literature that "the assumption that feelings are directly translated into actions has not been demonstrated [1969, p. 75]," we unfortunately also know that too many people too frequently translate their feelings directly into actions. In psychoanalysis this is termed "acting out." In plain English it is called acting impulsively. Research which cannot demonstrate this dem-

onstrates that the research is unrelated to everyday life.

One central issue in all research including attitude research is that of definition. If by attitude one means some private phenomenon, it can be defined neither by judges' ratings (Brandt, 1968) nor by operations, but only by phenomenal analysis (Holzkamp, 1964; Kaminski, 1959), i.e., by a detailed description of the sensations, feelings, thoughts, fantasies related to the phenomenon under investigation. This requires no more introspection than placing a check-mark after the question "Would you marry a Negro?"

No experimental research, but only reflection, is required to establish that attitudes as defined by phenomenal analysis, i.e., a person's opinions concerning his future actions, do not co-vary predictably with his future actions. If attitudes are defined in terms of a person's actions themselves, the relationship discussed by Wicker ceases to exist. The behavioristic problem with which Wicker is concerned results from a lack of clear definitions and from The Behaviorist's Leap.

REFERENCES

Brandt, L. W. Linguistic isolation? American Psychologist, 1963, 18, 70.

Brandt, L. W. A note on the use of judges. Journal of Psychology, 1968, 68, 261-66. BRANDT, L. W. Control or reduction of variables? An experimenter inclusive model. Psychological Reports, 1970, 27, 80-82. (a)

Brandt, L. W. Phenomenology, psychoanalysis, and behaviorism. In A. P. Giorgi (Chm.), Phenomenology in psychology. Symposium presented at the

American Psychological Association, Miami, September 1970. (b)

Bridgman, P. W. Rejoinder and thoughts, II. In E. G. Boring (Ed.), Symposium

on operationism. Psychological Review, 1945, 52, 281-84. BRIDGMAN, P. W. The way things are. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

Press, 1959.

Deese, J. Behavior and fact. American Psychologist, 1969, 24, 515-22. HOLZKAMP, K. Theorie und Experiment in der Psychologie. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1964. (Quotations translated by L. W. Brandt.)

KAMINSKI, G. Das Bild vom anderen. Berlin: Dr. Georg Lüttke, 1959.

KOCH, S. Psychology and emerging conceptions of knowledge as unitary. In T. W. Wann (Ed.), Behaviorism and phenomenology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

WICKER, A. W. Attitudes versus actions: The relationship of verbal and overt behavioral responses to attitude objects. Journal of Social Issues, 1969, 25(4), 41-78.

INDEX

JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES, VOLUME 26 (1970)

Aldrich, Howard. The Effect of Civil Disorders on Small Business	
in the Inner City	1:187
Aller Verson I Toward Inderstanding Kiots:	
Some Perspectives	1:1
Some Perspectives	2:149
Amonte Dominic The Enidemiological Distribution of Civis	
Description	4:105
D M The SR Model as a Predictor of INCERO	
Responsiveness to Reinforcement	2:61
Billingsley Andrew Black Families and White Social Science	3:127
Di-1. Morion Implicit Assumptions Underlying Fieschool	
I transmitted Programs	2:15
D I I IN Comment on "Attitudes versus Actions by	
Allan W. Wicker	4:163
D II I Debent Education for the Projessional Dould	
Activist	4:155
Caplan, Nathan. The New Ghetto Man: A Review of Recent	
	1:59
a	
1954–1970: A Review of the Literature Novelected Source of Social	4:25
Cazden, Courtney B. The Situation: A Neglected Source of Social Class Differences in Language Use	2:35
Class Differences in Language Cost and the Poor: Past, Present,	
Class Differences in Language Use . Cohen, Wilbur J. Government Policy and the Poor: Past, Present, and Future . And Future	3:1
and Future Crooks, Roland C. The Effects of an Interracial Preschool Register Regist	
Crooks, Roland C. The Effects of all Interfaces of Racial Program upon Racial Preference, Knowledge of Racial	ME A HOLL
Program upon Kacial Preference, Knowledge	4:137
Program upon Racial Preference, Knowledge of Racial Differences, and Racial Identification	
Cummins, Marvin. Intervention Research and the	4:49
Survey Process	4:1
Deutsch, Morton. The Kurt Lewin Mellional Treschtation.	

Fogelson, Robert M. Violence and Grievances: Reflections on the	1.141
Fogelson, Robert M. Violence and Grievances: Reflections on the 1960s Riots Forward, John R. Internal-External Control and Black	1:141
1900s Riots	1:75
Forward, John R. Internal-External Control and Militancy Militancy Freedman, Marcia. Poor People and the Distribution of Job	
	3:35
Freedman, Marcia. Poor People and the Distribution of Jos Opportunities. Gittell, Marilyn. Urban School Politics: Professionalism vs.	
Gittell, Marilyn, Urban School Politics: Professionansin	3:69
Reioriii	
Goering, John M. Intervention Research and the Sarving	4:49
Process	2:83
Gurin Gerald, Expectancy	2.03
Gurin, Patricia. Expectancy Theory	2:1
Gurin, Patricia. Expectancy Theory in the Study of Tovers, Guttentag, Marcia. Introduction . Guttentag, Marcia. Group Cohesiveness, Ethnic Organization,	2:105
Guttentag, Marcia. Group Conesiveness, Edition of and Poverty.	3:11
and Poverty Guttentag, Marcia. The Insolence of Office	
Guttentag, Marcia. The Insolence of Office Hartman, Donna M. The Epidemiological Distribution of CNS	4:105
Dysfunction	3:47
Hazard, Geoffrey C., Jr. Legal Problems Peculiar to the 1001	3:109
Hazard, Geoffrey C., Jr. Legal Problems Technical Research Herzog, Elizabeth. Social Stereotypes and Social Research	
Different Races for Actors in Interracial	. 4:87
Productions	. 1:165
Kutner, S. Jerome. Education for the Professional Social	
Activist	. 4:155
Activist Levine, Adeline. The More Things Change: A Case History of	3:19
Child Guidance Clinics	. 3.17
Levine, Murray. The More Things Change: A Case History of	3:19
Child Guidance Clinics Levine, Murray. The More Things Change: A Case History of Child Guidance Clinics Child Guidance Clinics Child Guidance Clinics Child Guidance Clinics	
Dysfunction	1:19
Marx, Gary T. Civil Disorder and the Agents of Social Control	and the same
McConshay John B Racial Socialization, Comparison 20	1:121
and the Watts Riot	2:169
14 'Las Doniel P Comment on Jensen and the Ivixuii	
Cabinet	2:191
Paige Leffery M. Changing Patterns of Anti-White Attitudes	4:69
Poinwater Lee The Problem of Lower Class Culture	2.155
Peiss Albert Ir. The Effect of Civil Disorders on Sman	4 107
Business in the Inner City	4:3
Sanford, Nevitt. Whatever Happened to Action Research? Sanford, Nevitt. The Activists' Corner 1:233; 2:183; 3:1	53: 4:15
Sanford, Nevitt. The Activists' Corner 1:255; 2:165, 5:	133,
Sears, David O. Racial Socialization, Comparison Levels, and the Watts Riot	1:12
Shellow, Robert. Social Scientists and Social Action from	THE RESERVE OF THE PERSON OF T
within the Establishment	1:20
Within the Establishment	

a war a part of the state of	
Siegel, Gary. Three Studies of the Preferences of Students of	
Different Races for Actors in Interracial Theatre	
	4:87
Productions Productions of CNS	
Storey, Delores B. The Epidemiological Distribution of CNS	4 105
Dysfunction	. 4:105
Tombinson I M Ideological Follindations for Negro Action.	
A Comparative Analysis of Militant and Non-militant Views	
A Comparative Analysis of William and Ton Ministra	1:93
of the Los Angeles Riot	1.75
The Enidemiological Distribution of CNS	
	4:105
Dysiunction Fugliation Research	4:57
Weige Carol H The Politicization of Evaluation research.	3 12X 142+ 2
Weiss Ionathan The Law and the Fool	. 3.37
Williams, Jay R. Internal-External Control and Black	
Williams, Jay R. Internal-External Control and	1:75
Militancy	Programme (
Zamelan I quie A Ir The Poverty Board: Some Consequences	A STATE OF THE STA
of "Maximum Feasible Participation."	. 3:85
OI WAXIIIUIII I Casible I at the pattern	

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP

Publisher: File two copies of this form with your postmaster. Postmaster: Complete verification on page 2

Form Approved, Budget Bureau No. 46-R029

MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION

(Act of October 23, 1962; Section 4369, Title 39, United States Code)

3. FREQUENCY OF ISSUE

2. TITLE OF PUBLICATION DATE OF FILING October 1, 1970

Journal of Social Issues

4 issues, published quarterly
4 location of known office of Publication (Street, city, county, state, ZIP code)

University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024
5. LOCATION OF THE HEADQUARTERS OR GENERAL BUSINESS OFFICES OF THE PUBLISHERS (Not printers)

P.O. Box 1248, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

6. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF PUBLISHER, EDITOR, AND MANAGING EDITOR

Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, P.O.Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Mich. EDITOR (Name and address)

Bertram H. Raven, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024

MANAGING EDITOR (Name and address) Jacqueline Goodchilds, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024

7. OWNER (If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual must be given.)

NAME	ADDRESS
Society for the Psychological	P. O. Box 1248, University of Michigan
Study of Social Issues	Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
B. KNOWN BONDHOLDERS, MORTGAGEES, AND OTHE OF BONDS, MORTGAGES OR OTHER SECURITIES (If there	R SECURITY HOLDERS OWNING OR HOLDING 1 PERCENT OR MORE OF TOTAL AMOUNT
OF BONDS, MORIGAGES OR OTHER SECONTIES (1)	
NAME	ADDRESS
	ADDRESS

9. FOR COMPLETION BY NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AUTHORIZED TO MAIL AT SPECIAL RATES (Section 132.122, Postal Manual)

The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this or-ganization and the exempt status for Federal income tax purposes

Have not changed during preceding 12 preceding 12 months months

(If changed, publisher must submit explanation of change with this statement.)

10. EXTENT AND NATURE OF CIRCULATION	AVERAGE NO. COPIES EACH ISSUE DURING PRECEDING 12 MONTHS	ACTUAL NUMBER OF COPIES OF SINGLE ISSUE PUBLISHED NEAREST TO FILING DA
A. TOTAL NO. COPIES PRINTED (Net Press Run)	8,500	8,000
PAID CIRCULATION SALES THROUGH DEALERS AND CARRIERS, STREET VENDORS AND COUNTER SALES	-0-	-0-
2. MAIL SUBSCRIPTIONS	6,700	6,701
C. TOTAL PAID CIRCULATION	6,700	6,701
D. FREE DISTRIBUTION (including samples) BY MAIL, CARRIER OR OTHER MEANS	600	615
E. TOTAL DISTRIBUTION (Sum of C and D)	7,300	7,316
F. OFFICE USE, LEFT-OVER, UNACCOUNTED, SPOILED AFTER PRINTING	1,200	684
G. TOTAL (Sum of E & F-should equal net press run shown in A)	8,500	8,000

I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete.

(Signature of editor, publisher, business manager, or owner) H Caroline Election

The Journal of



A quarterly for research related to war and peace

SEPTEMBER 1970 ISSUE (XIV, 3	SEPTEN	MBER 1	970 ISSUE	(XIV, 3):
------------------------------	--------	--------	-----------	---------	----

Individual Differences in	"Definition of the Situation"								Ole R. Holsti
---------------------------	-------------------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	---------------

Attitudes Toward Westbound Refugees in the East Ernst F. Mueller German Press . .

County Seat Wars: A Preliminary Analysis James A. Schellenberg

Other articles; gaming section; books received

\$8.00 per year for individuals, \$15.00 for institutions; single issues \$3.00

Published by The Center for Research on Conflict Resolution The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104

REVISTA MEXICANA DE PSICOLOGIA

Director: LIC. JUAN ABASCAL

PUBLICACION DEL INSTITUTO TECNOLOGICO Y DE ESTUDIOS SUPERIORES OCCIDENTE

Suscripción Anual: \$30.00 M. N.

LA REVISTA MEXICANA DE PSICOLOGIA SE PUBLICA TRES VECES AL AÑO 300 PAGINAS AL AÑO—SUSCRIPCION FUERA DEL PAIS \$3 DOLARES NUMERO SUELTO \$12.50 PESOS.

DIRECCION, REDACCION Y ADMINISTRACION

I.T.E.S.O. Langloix No. 44 Guadalajara, Jal. México.

The British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology Volume 9 Part 3 September 1970

DAVID KIPNIS and BARRY GOODSTADT Character structure and friendship relations

M. G. KING Sex differences in the perception of friendly and unfriendly interactions

A. H. MEHRYAR A cross-cultural investigation of Eysenck's hypothesis regarding the relationship between personality and attitudes

MICHAEL ARGYLE, VERONICA SALTER, HILARY NICHOLSON, MARYLIN WILLIAMS, and PHILIP BURGESS The communication of inferior and superior attitudes by verbal and non-verbal signals

N. B. JOHNSON, MARGARET R. MIDDLETON, and HENRI TAJFEL The relationship between children's preferences for and knowledge about other nations

J. P. N. PHILLIPS A new type of personal questionnaire technique

A. H. MEHRYAR Some data on the Persian translation of the EPI

F. MAKHLOUF NORRIS, H. GWYNNE JONES, and HUGH NORRIS Articulation of the conceptual structure in obsessional neurosis

NEVILLET YEOMANS, ALFRED W. CLARK, MARGARET COCKETT, and KERRY M. GEE Measurement of conflicting communications in social networks

45s. net (\$7.50 USA). Annual subscription £6 10s. net (\$22.00 USA)

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Bentley House, 200 Euston Road, London N.W. 1 American Branch: 32 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES

Revista del Instituto de **Estudios Internacionales** de la Universidad de Chile Director: Daniel Moore

Año IV

julio-septiembre 1970

No. 14

SUMARIO

ALAIN JOXE Y CECILIA

CADENA

Armamentismo dependiente: caso latinoamericano

CORNELIUS F. MURPHY, JR.

Coacción económica y Tratados

desiguales

JOHN GITTINGS

La nueva guerra en Indochina

CLAES CRONER

Estudies sobre el subdesarrollo colombiano, Comentario critíco

JULIO LUNA

El desarrollo pesquere y la in-

tegración regional

ALFREDO LUNA TOVAR

La Declaración de Santiago, antecedentes y proyecciones

Reseña de libros

Libros recibidos

Suscripsión anual: en América Latina

US \$10.00

fuera de América Latina US \$13.00

Dirigirse a:

ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES

Departamento de suscripciones

Casilla 10220, Santiago de Chile

RACE

A Journal of Race and Group Relations The Institute of Race Relations, 36 Jermyn Street, London, S.W.1.

The journal provides contributions to the study of race relations from a wide range of academic and applied disciplines. The reader will thus find material within his own field and also authoritative and intelligible statements from other fields that supplement his work. As well as articles, each number includes 'Quarterly Forum' which carries shorter items and reports on conferences and institutes, and there are also reviews of the current and relevant literature.

VOLUME XII

JULY 1970

NUMBER 1

The Rt. Hon. Quintin Hogg · Race Relations and Parliament

Claire Palley · Law and the Unequal Society: Discriminatory Legislation in Rhodesia under the Rhodesian Front from 1963-1969

Anthony Richmond . Housing and Racial Attitudes in Bristol

Robert Bell · Marriage and Family Differences among Lower-class Negro and East Indian Women in Trinidad

A. S. Barnett, R. H. Ward, C. J. Pickvance · Some Factors
Underlining Racial Discrimination in Housing: A Preliminary
Report on Manchester

Quarterly Forum • Reviews

quarterly 70s or \$9.50 a year

20s or \$3 single copies

Oxford University Press
Press Road, Neasden Lane, London, N.W.10.

TERZO MONDO

rivista trimestrale di studi, ricerche e documentazione sui paesi afro-asiatici e latino-americani

anno III n. 9

diretta da UMBERTO MELOTTI

settembre 1970

Sommario

Commenti

Corrado Corghi Umberto Melotti

Umberto Melotti

Saggio

Umberto Melotti

Ricerche

Giampaolo Calchi-Novati

Giorgio Max

I nostri temi Piero Gheddo e U. Melotti

Esperienze

M. Cremona e R. Terranova

Interventi Bruno Rizzi

Archivio per il razzismo

Notizie

Attività

Solidarietà con la Libia

Cuba, il momento della verità

Demitizziamo Lenin

Marx e il Terzo Mondo (I): modo di produzione asiatico e dispotismo orientale

Il socialismo arabo come dottrina di

sviluppo

Socialdemocrazia e neocolonialismo Madagascar: un'analisi delle forze e delle

prospettive politiche

Imperialismo e sottosviluppo

Incontro culturale e ricerca psicologica

nel Ciad

Quale socialismo?

REDAZIONE e AMMINISTRAZIONE: via G. B. Morgagni 39-20129 Milano, Italy. Questo numero: L. 1.200-Abbonamenti 1970: L. 3.500-Offerta speciale ai lettori di questa rivista: tutti gli arretrati completi 1968 e 1969 + abbonamento 1970 lire 9.800—Versamenti sul ccp 3/56111 intestato a "Terzo Mondo."

SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE

An International and Interdisciplinary Journal of Social Philosophy

Editor: K. T. Fann; Associate Editors: D. David Gruender, Donald C. Hodges; Advisory Editors: Christian Bay, Noam Chomsky, Marlene Dixon, D. W. Gotshalk, Irving L. Horowitz, Oliver M. Lee, Ralph Miliband, Gunnar Myrdal, James O'Connor, Enzo Paci, Sidney M. Peck, John Sommerville, Francis Sparshott, Donald A. Wells, Robert Paul Wolff.

Volume I. Number 2. (Fall, 1970)

- "The Social Function of Knowledge" by William Leiss
- "Violence" by John Lawrence
- "The Canadian New Left as an American Daimonion" by Howard Adelman
- "The Influence of Bruno Bauer on Marx' Concept of Alienation" by Z. H. Rosen
- "Image of Man in Marx" by P. Walton, A. Gamble, and J. Coulter
- "Revolution of the Roofless in Latin America" by Karl Lenkersdorf
- "Stereotypes in U.S.-Latin American Relations" by Miles D. Wolpin
- "On Baroness Wootton's Larceny" by Lorenne M. G. Smith
- "Can Civil Disobedience be Justified?" by Joseph Betz

All communications, manuscripts, subscriptions, and books for review should be sent to the Editor at the Department of Philosophy, The Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida, 32306, U.S.A. Subscriptions are \$1.50 per issue for individuals and \$3.00 per issue for institutions.

PHYLON

THE ATLANTA UNIVERSITY

Review of

RACE AND CULTURE



Oldest Publication of Its Kind in the United States

Readable, Informative, Provocative

Reporting and Assessing Contemporary Developments in Race and Culture Throughout the World

Invaluable reference on Black Studies and the Black Experience

Featuring Research Articles, Essays,

Book Reviews, Short Stories,

Poems

Appealing to the General Reader and to the Scholar

Published Continuously Since 1939

SUBSCRIPTIONS

\$4.50 a year

\$1.50 a single copy

\$8.00 two years

FOREIGN SUBSCRIPTIONS

\$5.50 a year

\$1.75 a single copy

Published Quarterly in March, June, September, and December.

ATLANTA UNIVERSITY
Atlanta, Georgia, 30314

International Organization

ANNOUNCES A SPECIAL ISSUE FOR AUTUMN 1970

REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Theory and Research

Leading scholars explore the theoretical and empirical aspects of the study of regional integration in the most comprehensive and up-to-date work in the field.

Leon N. Lindberg Stuart A. Scheingold Editors

Hayward R. Alker Fred M. Hayward Andrzej Korbonski Joseph S. Nye Stuart A. Scheingold Ernest B. Haas
Ronald Inglehart
Leon N. Lindberg
Donald J. Puchala
Philippe C. Schmitter

Contributors

Volume 24

Number 3

Individual copies of this issue will be available in paperback or cloth edition from Harvard University Press or as part of a subscription to International Organization.

Subscription Rate:

\$7.50 a year

\$19.00 three years

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION

40 Mount Vernon Street

Boston, Massachusetts 02108

SOCIAL POLICY The Magazine of the Human Services and the Movements for Radical Social Change

EDITORIAL BOARD Roy Bennett Noam Chomsky Peter Edelman Amitai Etzioni Marilyn Gittell Alvin Gouldner Charles Hamilton Nat Hentoff Roy Innis Paul Jacobs Kenneth Keniston Rhody McCoy Eleanor H. Norton Ricardo Ontiveros Luther Seabrook

Frank Riessman

PUBLISHER

Myron E. Sharpe

FROM THE CURRENT ISSUE

Betty Friedan criticizes sexual politics

Friendly Fascism: A Model for America ■ Bertram Gross

Educational Agenda for the 1970s and Beyond: Public Schools of Choice

Mario Fantini

Strategies for Radical Social Change: A Symposium ■ Stanley Aronowitz, Roy Bennett, Bennett Berger and Edgar Friedenberg

The Blacks and the "New Class"

Frank Riessman

Adequate Income vs. Nixon's "Welfare Reform" ■ George Wiley, Jonathan Kaufman

Does the U.S. Economy Require Imperialism? ■ Roy Bennett and S. M. Miller with comments by Noam Chomsky, Robert Heilbroner



social policy

901 North Broadway White Plains, N.Y. 10603

Please enter my subscription for SOCIAL POLICY for

1 year at \$8 2 years at \$14 3 years at \$19

Check enclosed Bill me Published six times a year. Outside Continental U.S. add \$1.

Name		A PONT OF THE PARTY OF THE PART	1	
Address	ALC: NO.	A STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE PAR	Aller Street	

City_____Zip____

BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE

VOLUME 15 · NUMBER 5 · SEPTEMBER 1970

Dimensions of Affective Expression in Four Expressive Modes
by Donald R. Sweeney, David C. Tinling, and
Arthur H. Schmale, Jr.

A Study of Self-Explicated Utility Models
by Robert T. Hoepfl and George P. Huber

The Problem of Salience in the Theory of Collective Decision-Making
by Michael Taylor

A Computer-Automated Procedure for Testing Some Experiences of Family Membership by David Reiss and W. H. Sheriff, Jr.

COMPUTERS IN BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE

An Experiment in Learning Behavior Using Computer-Assisted
Instruction

by Nancy C. Lucas, William G. Harless, and Roger E. Thies

Demonstration of Computer-Augmented Group Problem Solving

by Robert C. Joyner and Christopher J. Green

A bimonthly journal appearing in January, March, May, July, September and November. Cosponsored by the Fund for the Behavioral Sciences and The Institute of Management Sciences. Editor: James G. Miller, M.D., Ph.D.

Subscriptions are on volume basis only. U.S., Possessions and Canada: Individuals \$15, Institutions \$30. All other countries: \$18. Address all communications to Behavioral Science, Mental Health Research Institute, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104. Make checks payable in U.S. dollars to Behavioral Science.

SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW MONOGRAPH NO. 15

Monograph Editor: Paul Halmos

"THE CHOICE OF WORK AREA OF TEACHERS"

by

Dr. E. P. Duggan

Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Education, University of Keele.

and

Professor W. A. C. Stewart

Vice-Chancellor, University of Keele.

PUBLICATION DATE: February, 1970 Price: 30/- + 1/- post; \$4.60 + 20¢ post

Copies will be obtainable from:

The Secretary to the Monograph Editor, University KEELE, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG, England.

SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Announcing Another Topical Issue
URBAN PROBLEMS AND POLICIES

We are especially interested in manuscripts dealing with either urban problems or urban policies and preferably both. Our preference is for articles no longer than 30 typewritten pages (including footnotes and tables) and research notes of 10 pages or less. Receipt of three copies of a manuscript usually facilitates an editorial decision within six weeks. For style and format see recent issues of SSQ or write for our style sheet. Your cooperation in bringing this intended issue to the attention of your colleagues will be greatly appreciated. We will continue to consider manuscripts for the topical issue until June 15, 1971. Manuscripts should be addressed to the Editor, Social Science Quarterly, The University of Texas, Austin, 78712.

THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, London, S.W.1

THE WORLD TODAY

STUDENTS OF CURRENT AFFAIRS, to be well informed, need the facts. In THE WORLD TODAY, the monthly journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, experts bring to the general reader up-to-date and reliable information on world affairs.

Authoritative and objective, THE WORLD TODAY not only deals with international problems but also includes articles on internal political and economic conditions in individual countries, written by authors with first-hand knowledge. Short comment in 'Notes of the Month' puts current developments in perspective and provides a background to events of international significance.

MONTHLY

Price 4s. per copy; 45 s. per year (In USA and Canada \$6.50) Students' rate 40s.

Published under the auspices of the

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LONDON

by the Oxford University Press Press Road, Neasden, London, N.W.10.

An IASP Translation Journal

SOVIET PSYCHOLOGY

Editor Dan, I. Slobin

Selections from Vol. VI, No. 3-4 and Vol. VII, No. 1
Special Issues Covering
Fifty Years of Soviet Psychology
Josef Brozek, Guest Editor

On the Fiftieth Anniversary of Soviet Psychology

A. A. SMIRNOV

The Fiftieth Anniversary of Soviet Psychophysiology

YE. I. BOYKO

Problems of Vision in the Works of Soviet Psychologists and Physiologists

A. I. BOGOSLOVSKIY

Neuropsychology: A New Branch of Psychological Science

YE. E. KHOMSKAYA

The Problem of Child Development in Soviet Psychology

A. N. LEONT'YEV


Fifty Years of Soviet Psychology of Upbringing

L. I. BOZHOVICH AND L. S. SLAVINA

From the History of Soviet Labor Psychology

YU. V. KOTELOVA

From Aviation Psychology to Space Psychology F. D. GORBOV AND F. P. KOSMOLINSKIY





INTERNATIONAL ARTS AND SCIENCES PRESS, INC. 901 North Broadway, White Plains, New York 10603

SOCIAL FORCES

VOLUME 49

SEPTEMBER 1970

NUMBER 1

JOHN T. DOBY—Man the Species and the Individual: A Sociological Perspective

PHILIP K. HASTINGS, DEAN R. HOGE—Religious Change Among College Students Over Two Decades

ANDREW J. WEIGERT, DARWIN L. THOMAS—Secularization:
A Cross-National Study of Catholic Male Adolescents
J. ALAN WINTER—On the Mixing of Morality and Politics:

A Test of Weberian Hypothesis

RAYMOND C. RYMPH, JEFFREY K. HADDEN—The Persistence of Regionalism as a Factor in Racial Attitudes
Among Methodist Clergy

BERNARD LAZERWITZ—Contrasting the Effects of Generation, Class, Sex, and Age on Group Identification in Jewish and Protestant Communities

HOWARD M. BAHR—Aging and Religious Disaffiliation
BENNIE GRAVES—Particularism, Exchange and Organizational
Efficiency: A Cast Study of a Construction Industry
ELLIOTT H. GROSOF, LLEWELLYN Z. GROSS,

CONSTANTINE A. YERACARIS, WALTER C. HOBBS—
Anchorage in Organization: A Dialectical Theory

JON P. MILLER—Social-Psychological Implications of Weber's Model of Bureaucracy: Relations Among Expertise, Control, Authority and Legitimacy

GEORGE W. WALLIS—Chronopolitics: The Impact of Time Perspectives on the Dynamics of Change

ERDMAN PALMORE, FRANK J. WHITTINGTON—Differential Trends Toward Equality Between Whites and Nonwhites
J. M. BRUCE—Intragenerational Occupational Mobility and

Visiting With Kin and Friend

LARRY D. BARNETT—Achievement Values and Anomie Among Women in a Low-Income Housing Project

TED GOERTZEL—A Note on Status Crystallization and Urbanization

JERRY LANSDOWNE—The Mailed Questionnaire in Panel Research: Some Empirical Observations

BOOK REVIEWS

NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

Volume XIII: 1957

No. 1 Therapeutic Camping for Disturbed Youth. Elton B. McNeil, Issue Editor.
No. 2 Witnesses and Testimony at Trials and Hearings. Joshua A. Fishman, and Rudolph E.

No. 4 Race Relations in Private Housing, Albert J. Mayer, Issue Editors.

Ime XIV: 1908

No. 1 Interpersonal Dynamics in a Desegregation Process. Marian Radke Yarrow, Issue Editor.

No. 2 Adjustment in Retirement. Gordon F. Streib and Wayne E. Thompson, Issue Editors.

No. 3 New Light on Delinquency. William McCord, Issue Editor.

No. 4 Culture Change and the Small Community. Robert J. Smith, Issue Editor. Volume XIV: 1958

Volume XV: 1959

No. 1 Mental Health in the Classroom. John C. Glidewell, Issue Editor.
No. 2 Consulting With Groups and Organizations. Jack R. Gibb and Ronald Lippitt, Issue Editors.
No. 3 Cross-Cultural Studies in the Arab Mid-East and United States: Studies of Young Adults.
Bradford B. Hudson, Issue Editor.

Desegregation Research in the North and South. Thomas F. Pettigrew, Issue Editor.

Volume XVI: 1960

No. 1 Training for Political Participation. Gordon L. Lippitt, Issue Editor.
No. 2 New Pathways from the Mental Hospital, Henry Wechsler and David Landy, Issue Editors.
No. 3 America, Mass Society and Mass Media. Warren G. Bennis, Issue Editor.
No. 4 Leadership and Participation in a Changing Rural Community. John Harding, Edward C.
Devereux, Jr. and Urie Bronfenbrenner, Issue Editors.

Volume XVII: 1961

No. 1 Social Change and Psychological Patterns, Joseph Adelson, Issue Editor.
No. 2 Social Psychological Implications of Man in Space. Herbert E. Krugman and Donald N. Michael, Issue Editors.

No. 3 Psychology and Policy in a Nuclear Age. Roger W. Russell, Issue Editor.
No. 4 Trigger for Community Conflict: The Case of Fluoridation. Benjamin D. Paul, William A. Gamson, and S. Stephen Kegeles, Issue Editors.

Volume XVIII: 1962

No. 1 Impacts of Studying Abroad. George V. Coelho, Issue Editor. No. 2 The Uses of Television. Lotte Bailyn, Issue Editor, Lewin Award, Other Papers. No. 3 Work, Health and Satisfaction. John R. P. French, Robert L. Kahn, and Floyd C. Mann,

No. 4 Man, and Satan, Isidor Chein and Henry A. Murray. Robert Chin, Issue Editor.

Volume XIX: 1963

No. 1 Psycho-Cultural Factors in Asian Economic Growth. Manning Nash and Robert Chin, No. 2 American Political Extremism in the 1960's. Harold M. Proshansky and Richard I. Evans,

No. 3 Human Factors in Cross-Cultural Adjustment. Sven Lundstedt, Issue Editor.
No. 4 Kurt Lewin Memorial Addresses 1962-63. Robert Chin and Leonard Solomon. Issue Editors.

Volume XX: 1964

No. 1 Aesthetic Probings of Contemporary Man. Warren G. Bennis, Issue Editor.
No. 2 Negro American Personality. Thomas F. Pettigrew and Daniel C. Thompson, Issue Editors.
No. 3 Kurt Lewin Memorial Address 1964, Alfred J. Marrow. Education as Social Invention,

Youth and Social Action. Jacob R. Fishman and Frederic Solomon, Issue Editors.

Volume XXI: 1965

No. 1 Poverty Dynamics and Interventions. Berton H. Kaplan, Issue Editor.

No. 2 The Social Responsibilities of the Behavioral Scientist. Kenneth D. Benne, Issue Editor.

No. 3 Addresses and Essays. Kenneth B. Clark, Herbert C. Kelman, Donald N. Michael, et al.

No. 4 Old Age as a Social Issue. Robert Kastenbaum, Issue Editor.

Volume XXII: 1966

No. 1 Libergriften and Social Charge in the South Lorded Balance and Thomas

No. 1 Urbanization and Social Change in the South. Leonard Reissman and Thomas Ktsanes,

No. 2 The Sexual Renaissance in America. Ira L. Reiss, Issue Editor.
No. 3 Misperception and the Vietnam War. Ralph K. White, Author.
No. 4 Mar's Response to the Physical Environment. R. W.
Editors. Presidential Address 1966, Jerome D. Frank. W. Kates and J. F. Wohlwill, Issue

No. 1 Conflict and Community in the International System. Elise Building, Issue Editor. Kurt Lewin Volume XXIII: 1967

No. 2 Problems of Bilingualism. John MacNamara, Issue Editor.

No. 3 Student Activism. Edward Sampson, Issue Editor.

No. 4 Family Planning in Cross-National Perspective. Lee Rainwater, Issue Editor.

Volume XXIV: 1968

No. 1 Values, Attitudes and Behaviors In Social Science and Society. Abraham J. Tannenbaum, Issue Editor.
Presidential Address, Milton Rokeach. Kurt Lewin Memorial Address, Muzafer Sherif.
Presidential Address, Milton Rokeach. Kurt Lewin Memorial Address, Muzafer Sherif.
No. 2 Social Psychological Research in Developing Countries. John DeLamater, Robert Hefner, Rémi Clignet, Inc. Philosephiloge.

No. 3 Personality and Politics: Theoretical and Methodological Issues. Fred I. Greenstein, Issue Editor. No. 4 Tradition and Modernity: Conflict or Congruence. Joseph Gusfield, Issue Editor.

No. 1 Values in Crisis: Racism, War and the Conception of Evil. J. Diedrick Snoek, Issue Editor. Presidential Address, Thomas F. Pettigrew. Kurt Lewin Memorial Address, Morton Deutsch. Volume XXV: 1969

No. 2 Alienated Youth. Abraham J. Tannenbaum, Issue Editor.
No. 3 Motivation and Academic Achievement of Negro Americans. Edgar G. Epps, Issue Editor.
No. 3 Motivation and Academic Achievement of Negro Americans. Edgar G. Epps, Issue Editor. No. 4 Selected Papers: 1969. J. Diedrick Snoek, Issue Editor. Presidential Address, Martin Deutsch. Kurt Lewin Memorial Address, Ralph K. White.

Volume 26: 1970

No. 1 Ghetto Riots. Vernon L. Allen, Issue Editor.
No. 2 The Poor: Impact on Research and Theory. Marcia Guttentag, Issue Editor.

No. 3 Professionals and the Poor. Marcia Guttentag, Issue Editor.